Opinion of the Court. tory," and that these "articles shall be considered as articles of compact between the original states and the people and states in the said territory, and forever remain unalterable, unless by common consent." In Hogg v. Manufacturing Co., 5 Ohio Rep., 410, at page 416, Hitchcock, J., speaking of a clause in Article IV, of the ordinance, said, “This portion of the Ordinance of 1787, is as much obligatory upon the state of Ohio as our own constitution. In truth it is more so; for the constitution may be altered by the people of the state, while this cannot be altered without the assent both of the people of this state and of the United States through their representatives. It is an article of compact, and, until we assume the principle that the sovereign power of the state is not bound by contract, this clause must be considered obligatory." And in Hutchinson v. Thompson, 9 Ohio R., 52, at page 62, Grimke, J., remarked: "But when application for admission into the Union. was made by the people inhabiting the eastern part of the territory, modifications in several parts of the ordinance were asked for, and they were granted by the United States as one party, to the state as the other. This seems to show that the people of Ohio have, so far, treated the articles of compact as of perpetual obligation. The alterations proposed were with a view to the immediate formation of a state constitution, and were of no importance if the states should have a right to annul the ordinance the moment it assumed that condition." Similar language is found in the opinion in Cochran's Heirs v. Loring, 17 Ohio R., 409, 424 Opinion of the Court. 425, and the foregoing quotations remain as the unmodified expressions of this court upon this subject. We are not unaware of various dicta which have appeared from time to time in opinions by learned justices of the supreme court of the United States, beginning with Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How., 212, and Permoli v. First Municipality, 3 How., 589, 616; Strader v. Graham, 10 How., 82. But it requires no acute analysis to differentiate those cases and to show that they do not go very thoroughly into the question whether the Ordinance of 1787 can be superseded otherwise than by the "common consent" of the parties to the compact as required by the terms of the ordinance, or whether such "common consent" ever has been given; and, giving the fullest effect that can be claimed from those remarks by the distinguished judges, it is obvious that they ignore the distinction between a mere act of congress which may be repealed or superseded by subsequent acts, and a solemn and formal "compact," in the nature of a treaty as it were, between the proprietary states. and the people and states of the territory which was subsequently to be erected into several states of this Union. They ignore, moreover, the fact that the compact, on the good faith of which the original proprietors ceded this territory to the United States, expressly declared that the principles declared therein shall be the basis of "all laws, constitutions and governments which forever hereafter shall be formed in the said territory;" and at best these declarations rest on no stronger foundation than the provision of the compact itself, namely, that a state with constitutional limitations as pro Opinion of the Court. vided, "shall be admitted, by its delegates, into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original states, in all respects whatever." See cases above cited and Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S., 678, 688-689; Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S., 151, 159; Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Co., 123 U. S., 288, 295-296; Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S., 1, 9-10. Whatever that clause may mean, it certainly does not mean that all state constitutions shall be, or are, alike, nor that a new state erected in the Northwest Territory, shall be understood to surrender all the guaranties of the compact as a condition of admission as a state. We have thus briefly indicated the reasons for our belief, that the Great Charter of the Northwest Territory is still under, and above, and before, all laws or constitutions which have yet been made in the states which are parts of that territory; and that under its guaranties the state has not the right to draft a citizen into particular service without substantial compensation. At least, it is clear to us that the provisions of this statute which require a professional man to search out non-professional information and certify it to state authorities, is unnecessary, unreasonable and arbitrary, and is not, therefore, a valid exercise of police power. The demurrer to the indictment should have been sustained and therefore the judgment of the circuit court reversing the judgment of the court of common pleas is Affirmed and defendant discharged. SPEAR, C. J., SHAUCK, PRICE, JOHNSON and DONAHUE, JJ., concur. Statement of the Case. FISHER V. THE STATE OF OHIO. Contributing to delinquency of minor female-Affidavit not bad for duplicity, when-Section 1654, General Code-Motion to quash indictment-Should not be sustained, when-Overruling of motion not final, when. 1. An affidavit charging that F. on or about the 1st day of March, 1909, and at divers other days and times between that date and the first day of April, 1910, did unlawfully aid, abet, induce, cause, encourage and contribute to the delinquency of L. S., a female minor child, and further stating the acts, means and methods by which he contributed to such delinquency, states an offense under the provisions of Section 1654, General Code, and is not bad for duplicity. 2. A motion to quash an indictment should not be sustained unless the defect or imperfection complained of is of such nature as to tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits of the case. 3. The overruling of a motion to quash an indictment will not be regarded as a final decision of the question presented thereby, when the point is one that, if well taken, would be available on demurrer or upon motion in arrest of judgment. (Ex Parte Bushnell, 8 Ohio St., 599, approved and followed.) (No. 12830-Decided June 30, 1911.) ERROR to the Circuit Court of Clark county. On the second day of April, 1910, Harry Boswell filed with the probate judge of Clark county, Ohio, an affidavit charging the plaintiff in error with contributing to the delinquency of S-, a female minor child, a portion of which affidavit omitting names, reads as follows: "That one F-, late of said county, on or about the first day of March, 1909, and at divers other days and times between said day and the first day of April, 1910, at the city of Springfield, Statement of the Case. county of Clark and state of Ohio, did unlawfully aid, abet, induce, cause, encourage and contribute to the delinquency of S-, a female minor child as aforesaid, in this, to-wit, that the said F— did then and there unlawfully and knowingly aid, abet, procure, cause and encourage the said S-to associate with vicious and immoral persons, one of said vicious and immoral persons then and there being said F, and the said F- did then and there have unlawful sexual intercourse with the said S-; that the said F- did then and there unlawfully aid, abet, procure, cause, contribute and encourage the said Sto have certain indecent, immoral and lascivious relations with the said F F—, and that the said F- did then and there unlawfully aid, abet, procure, cause, contribute and encourage the said S- to be then and there and thereby guilty of immoral conduct, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the state of Ohio." To this affidavit the plaintiff in error filed a motion to quash, which motion was overruled and a plea of not guilty entered. A jury was waived and the cause tried to the court resulting in a finding of guilty and the plaintiff in error was sentenced to pay a fine of one thousand dollars. and to be imprisoned in the Xenia workhouse for one year and to further stand committed until said fine and costs are paid. Error was prosecuted to the circuit court of Clark county, which court affirmed the judgment of the probate court, and this proceeding in error is now prosecuted in this |