be in pencil,1 or any other material capable of making a legible writing. "Writing" must moreover be held to include printing, at least as regards the body of the instrument, for which it is not unusual to employ a printed form. Printing in its turn of course includes lithography, engraving and every means by which letters are impressed in ink or color n the surface of paper or other like material.

§ 61. Material.-Bills, notes and other instruments of exchange, although often spoken of as commercial paper, and usually written or printed on paper, are not necessarily so.3 Unusual form and material are clearly to be avoided as sub

'Byles 79; Chitty 147; 1 Daniel 83; 1 Edwards 169; 1 Parsons 21; Story on Prom. Notes 11. This was first held as to notes in 1825 in Geary v. Physic, 5 B. & C. 234; S. C., 7 Dow. & Ry. 653; all the judges concurring. It has been followed in Closson v. Stearns, 4 Vt. 11; Brown v. Butcher's and Drover's Bank, 6 Hill 443; Reed v. Roark, 14 Tex. 329. See, too, Thöl W. R. 141, for recognition of the same principle in Germany. Mr. Parsons, however, speaks of the decision in Geary v. Physic as rendered “incautiously" (1 Parsons 22), and Mr. Justice Story regrets the establishment of the doctrine (Story on Prom. Notes 11).

Writing in pencil has been held sufficient in case of a deed of settlement, McDowel v. Chambers, 1 Strobh. Eq. 347; a contract, Merritt v. Clason, 12 Johns. 102; S. C., 14 Ib. 484; Jeffery v. Walton, 1 Stark. 267; Draper v. Pattani, 2 Speers 292 (under the statute of frauds); a will, Green v. Skipworth, 1 Phillim. 53; Dickenson v. Dickenson, 2 Phillim. 173; or a codicil to a will, Rymes v. Clarkson, 1 Phillim. 22.

21 Daniel 84; 8o Story on Prom. Notes & 11, and Thöl W. R. 141 (as to the body of the instrument, but contra as to the signature). And a memorandum printed on the margin of a note is part of it, Zimmerman v. Rote, 75 Penna. St. 188 (1874); or even on the back, Farmers' Bank v. Ewing, 78 Ky. 264 (1880). In Pennington v. Baehr, 48 Cal. 565 (1874), a printed fac-simile of an autograph was held to be a sufficient signature to a coupon. So, to a due bill, Weston v. Myers, 33 Ill. 424 (1864). In Commonwealth v. Ray, 3 Gray 447, an indictment for forgery of a printed railroad ticket was sustained on the ground that "printing" was included in the term "writing.' And in Indiana writing is declared by statute to include "printing, lithographing, or other mode of representing words or letters," 2 R. S., Davis' Ed., p. 316 ch. 29. In Massachusetts by statute of 1804 (c. 58 % 1) all bills, notes, checks, drafts or obligations whatsoever under the amount of five dollars were required to be wholly in writing, and if made or issued after April 1st, 1805, bearing the impression of types, plates or printing, they were to be utterly void. This act was held to apply to notes issued after April 1st, 1805, but fraudulently ante-dated to evade the statute, even in the hands of bona fide holders, Bayley v. Taber, 5 Mass. 286 (1809).

Byles 78, 167; 1 Daniel 86; 1 Edwards ? 169; 1 Parsons 23; Story on Prom. Notes ? 11.

Metallic tokens have never been recognized at common law as more than simple evidence of debt, Byles 260. In England tokens made partly of gold or silver formerly made the issuer liable to the holder by 53 Geo. III. c. 114, repealed now by 24 and 25 Vict. c. 101; but if wholly or in part of copper, the issuer is liable only to the original taker by 57 Geo. III. c. 46.

jecting the instrument to suspicion and endangering the good faith of the holder's title. No question, however, has been raised in English or American courts as to notes on other material than paper or parchment, and the doubt, if there is one, can hardly be deemed of any practical importance.

§ 62. Signature-Necessary.-Signature is the writing of a person's name in order thereby to give effect to the contract signed. The signature of maker or drawer, therefore, as the case may be, is essential to the completeness and efficacy of a note, bill or other negotiable instrument.' And even where several have signed as sureties for a principal, the note has been held incomplete until signed by the principal also.2 In like manner a note signed by A. and delivered to the payee's agent under an agreement that he was not to be holden unless another person "signed ahead of him," is not binding on A., in the hands of the payee at least, without the other person's signature. And without the signature of the drawer a bill payable "to my order," though accepted, was formerly held to be of no force either as a bill of exchange or as a promissory note. It has, however, been held in a recent case in the United States, that a promissory note signed by an in

1Byles 89; Chitty 187; 1 Edwards 143; Story on Prom. Notes 34; 1 Daniel 83; Thöl's W. R. 148; Vyse v. Clarke, 5 Čarr. & P. 403 (1832); Tevis v. Young, 1 Metc. 199 (Ky. 1858); May v. Miller, 27 Ala. 515 (1855). So, Bills of Exchange Act 1882, 45 and 46 Vict. c. 61 § 23. And the forgery of acceptance on an instrument in the form of a bill of exchange, with no drawer named and no drawer's signature, is not the forgery of a bill of exchange, Regina v. Harper, C. C. Reserved, 15 Am. L. Rev. 553 (1881).

"Knight v. Hurlbut, 74 Ill. 133 (1874). And he may set up such defense against one who held it until maturity for the payee and then had it indorsed for the purpose of bringing suit, Stricklin v. Cunningham, 58 Ill. 293 (1871).

3 Miller v. Gambie, 4 Barb. 148 (1848). But such defense is in general unavailable against a bona fide holder for value, Smith v. Moberly, 10 B. Mon. 266 (1850). See, also, the question of conditional delivery, discussed infra.

4 Byles 89; Stoessiger v. S. E. Ry. Co., 3 El. & Bl. 553 (1854); Goldsmid v. Hampton, 5 C. B. N. S. 108 (1858). See, also, McCall v. Taylor. 34 L. J. C. P. 365; S. C., 19 C. B. N. S. 301 (1865). The contrary is provided by statute in the Argentine Republic (Com. Code 1862 Art. 7766); and in Uruguay (Com. Code 1865 Art. 789). And in Harvey v. Cane, 24 W. R. 400, 34 L. T. N. S. 64 (1876), the acceptor's signature of a bill leaving the drawer's name blank, was held to amount to an authority to a bona fide purchaser for value to write his own name as drawer.

dorser, and delivered with a blank for the maker's signature, authorized the holder to fill such blank like any other.1

The statutes of some of the United States require that negotiable instruments shall be signed by the person to be holden thereby. The statute of 3 and 4 Anne c. 9 applies only to "notes in writing signed by the party who makes the same." And in general the statutes of foreign States require the signature of the maker or drawer both. to notes and bills. of exchange.3

§ 63. Signature-What Name.—In general, however, unless otherwise provided by statute, the full name of the signer is not essential to a good signature. Thus, a signature by initials has been held sufficient. So, too, even an indorse

Whitmore v. Nickerson, 125 Mass. 496 (1878). And this may, of course, be done by the payee as the maker's agent by express authority, Haven v. Hobbs, 1 Vt. 238 (1828).

This is the case as to all negotiable instruments in Indiana (1 R. S. 1876, Davis' Ed., c. 1771); and as to negotiable notes in Iowa (1880 R. C 2082); Nevada (1861 P. L. p. 4; 1 Comp. L. 1873 c. 5 2 9); New Jersey (1795 Pat. Rev. p. 3424); New York (1801, 1 R. L. 151; 2 R. S., Ed. 1875, p. 1160 ? 1); and as to orders for the payment of money in Tennessee (1762 P. L. c. 94; 1871 C. S. 1959). As to bank notes special provision is made by statute in many States for their signature by the president and cashier.

This is the case in the Argentine Republic (Code of Commerce 1862 Art. 7766): Austria (Austr. Exch. Law of 1850 Art. 4); Bolivia (Mercantile Code 1834 Art. 362 8, as to bills of exchange; and Art. 463 % 7, as to drafts); Chili (Code of Commerce 15 Art. 633, as to bills of exchange; and Art. 7717, as to drafts and notes); Colombia (Code of Commerce 1853 Arts. 384, 517); Ecuador (same as Spain by act of 1829); Germany (Gen. Germ. Exch. Law of 1848 Art. 4); Guatemala (as to notes, Ordinances of Bilbao of 1774 c. 1481); Holland (Commercial Code of 1838 Arts. 100, 208, 210); Honduras (same as Guatemala); Hungary (Lw of 1860 ch. 1 8 14); Lower Canada (Civil Code 1867 3 2280, 2346); Mexico (Code of Commerce of 1854 Art. 223, as to bills of exchange: Art. 447, as to drafts and notes); Nicaragua (Code of Commerce of 1869 Art. 241, as to bills of exchange; Art. 312, as to drafts and notes); Paraguay (same as Guatemala); Peru (Code of Commerce 1853 Arts. 381, 522); Portugal (Commercial Code 1833 Arts. 321, 424); Russia (Exch. Law of 1832 Art. 541); Salvador (Code of Commerce 1855 Arts. 381, 510); Spain (Code of Commerce 1829 Arts. 426, 563); Sweden and Norway (Exch. Law of 1851 ch. 11); Switzerland (Zurich 1805 2 1, 2; Basle 1863 3; Berne 18593); Uruguay (Code of Commerce 1865 Art. 789); Venezuela (Code of Commerce 1862 Art. 1). The Code Napoleon of 1807, which in this respect governs France, Belgium, Greece, Hayti, San Domingo, the Canton of Geneva and Turkey is silent as to the question of signature (Code Art. 110). It is maintained, however, by M. Bedarride that this is necessarily implied from the proof, which can only be made by proof of the signature (Droit Commercial, Bk. 1 Tit. 8 Art. 42).

1 Daniel 84; 1 Edwards ? 170; 1 Parsons 23; Thomson on Bills 40; Merchants' Bank v. Spicer, 6 Wend. 443 (1831); Palmer v. Stephens, 1 Den. 479 (1845); Weston v. Myers, 33 Ill. 424 (1864). But see Chalmer's Dig. Art. 49 n.

ment in figures "1, 2, 8," the intention of the indorser to bind himself as such being clearly shown. So, too, a maker or indorser may be bound by the signature of an assumed or fictitious name; by a corporate, official, or partnership name; or even by the name of a factory or of a steamboat, the owners being held as makers. The reader is referred for the consideration of such signatures to a later chapter on maker's and drawer's names. It is, however, advisable in all possible cases that the signature should contain the entire surname and at least the initials of the Christian names. This, or more, is required by many foreign statutes."

§ 64. Seal-Mark-Stamp-Printing.-And it seems that in the civil law a seal is no equivalent for a signature, whatever the signer's intention may be. Nor is a seal alone sufficient at common law, except perhaps in the case of a corporation note or bill. But where the person signing cannot write, his mark will be a sufficient signature. And this

where the former of these cases is cited with the comment that "in America the rule is lax." See, too, Caton v. Caton, L. R. 2 H. L. 143 (1867).

'Brown v. Butchers' and Drovers' Bank, 6 Hill 443. But see Chalmer's Dig. Art. 49 n., as to extending this rule to England.

"The maker's own name or the name of his house or of the person who signs for him under a sufficient power of attorney is requisite to a good signature in the Argentine Republic (Com. Code 1862 Arts. 776, 916).

The maker's name is required in Austria (Law of 1850 Arts. 4, 96); Brazil (Com. Code 1850 Arts. 354, 426); Chili (Com. Code 1865 Art. 771, as to notes and drafts); Germany (Gen. Exch. Law 1848 Arts. 4, 96); Hungary (Law of 1860 ch. 1 ? 14, the last name in full and initials at least of first name); Mexico (Code Com. 1854 Arts. 323, 447); Guatemala, Honduras and Paraguay (Orde. Bilbao 1774 ch. 14 % 1, as to notes); Lower Canada (Civ. Code 1867 2280, 2344, "signature or name"); Russia (Law of 1832 Art. 541, "full name"); Spain (Code Com. 1829 Art. 426-so, too, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador). So, also, the indorser's name is required in Brazil (Com. Code 1850 Art. 362); Colombia (Com. Code 1853 Art. 424); Costa Rica (Code Com. 1853 Art. 414); Ecuador (see Spain); Germany (Gen. Exch. Law 1848 Art. 12); Mexico (Code Com. 1854 Art. 360); Guatemala, Honduras and Paraguay (Orde. Bilbao 1774 ch. 13 3); Salvador (Code Com. 1855 Art. 421); Spain (Code Com. 1829 Art. 467).

Heineccius de Camb. c. 4 ? 18; Story on Prom. Notes ? 35. 'Chalmer's Dig. Art. 49.

Chalmer's Dig. Art. 278; Crouch v. Credit Foncier, L. R. 8 Q. B. 382 (1873). 6 Byles 79; 1 Daniel 84; 1 Edwards 2 146, 170; 1 Parsons 23; Story on Prom. Notes 34; Chalmer's Dig. Art. 49; George v. Surrey, 1 Mood. & M. 516 (1830); Willoughby v. Moulton, 47 N. H. 205 (1866); Hilborn_v. Alford, 22 Cal. 482 (1866); Shank v Butsch, 28 Ind. 19 (1867); Shiver v. Johnson, 2 Brev. 397 (1810); Handyside v. Cameron, 21 Ill. 588 (1859). But under the

is expressly provided by statute in some States;1 and also by some foreign statutes.2

Printing a signature with a hand stamp is probably sufficient, although such act necessarily impairs the means of proof. And such signature for the Bank of England by a clerk has been specially legalized by statute. It is, however, more doubtful whether a signature printed in the ordinary manner, without any manual act of the maker, is sufficient."

4

Revised Code of Alabama the mark must be accompanied by the signer's name written near it and attested by a witness, Flowers v. Bitting, 45 Ala. 448 (1871).

'In California, "signature or subscription includes mark, when the person cannot write, his name being written near it and witnessed by a person who writes his own name as a witness" (1872 Polit. Code ? 17; Civ. Code & 5014; Code Civ. Proc. § 10017; Penal Code ? 13007).

In Indiana, "in all cases where the written signature of a person is requisite, either the proper handwriting of such person or his mark shall be intended" (2 R. S. 1876, Davis' Ed., p. 316 c. 29).

In Tennessee orders by any one for the payment of money must be "signed by his proper hand" (1871 C. S. & 1959; 1762 P. L. c. 984).

own name

A signature by mark is invalid unless attested by a court or notary, in Germany (Gen. Exch. Law 1848 Art. 94); Austria (Law of 1850 Art. 94); Hungary (Law of 1860 ch. 1 14; but since 1863 no person unable to write can make a bill of exchange, Ib.) The signature of the maker "with his " is required in the Argentine Republic (Com. Code 1862 Art. 776 6); Uruguay (Com. Code 1865 Art. 789). So, as to both drafts and notes in Chili (Com. Code 1865 Art. 771 % 7). In Honduras, Guatemala and Paraguay (Orde. Bilbao 1774 c. 13 2) both name and residence of drawer are requisite to a bill of exchange, and full signature of the maker to a promissory note (Ib. c. 14 % 1). In Lower Canada bills and notes must contain "the signature or name" of the drawer (Civ. Code 1867 2 2280, 2344). The signature of the maker or drawer is required to be written by his own hand in Colombia (Com. Code 1853 Art. 384, as to bills); Costa Rica (Cod. Com. 1853 Art. 373); Ecuador (same as Spain since 1829); Mexico (Cod. Com. 1854 Art. 223; and as to drafts and notes, subscription of maker's or drawer's name is requisite, Ib. Art. 447); Peru (Cod. Com. 1853 Art. 381 % 7); Spain (Cod. Com. 1829 Art. 426). In Switzerland (Zurich 1805 & 2; Berne 18593; Basle 1863 3, the signature must be by the maker's or drawer's own hand or by attorney). Indorsement must be in the indorser's own hand in Brazil (Com. Code 18.50 Art. 362); and must contain his name and entire signature in Honduras, Guatemala and Paraguay (Orde. Bilbao 1774 c. 13 § 3).

A person stamping his own name has been held to have sufficiently complied with a statute requiring a paper to be "signed," Bennett v. Brumfitt, L. R. 3 C. P. 28 (1867). The statute of Indiana seems to exclude signature by stamp, printing, &c., as it provides that "writing" shall include printing, &c., "but in all cases where the written signature of a person is requisite either the proper handwriting of such person or his mark shall be intended" (2 R. S. 1876, Davis' Ed. p. 3169).

'Act 1 Geo. IV. c. 92 § 3.

Signature of this sort has been held sufficient in England for a bill of parcels, Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 Bos. & P. 239 (1800); Schneider v. Norris, 2 M. & S. 286 (1814), Lord Ellenborough, C. J., saying of this case, “here there is a signing by the party to be charged by words recognizing the printed

E