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are revived, without any mention of, or al on his part, That Russia shall evacuate the lusion to, other powers, except merely, that Republic of the Seven Islands, agreeably to the Batavian Republic is included in the
pa the 9th article of the secret convention, cific stipulations. The important provi which stipulates that there shall be no fosions, the adjustment of matter of dispute, reign troops in those islaode, an artiele, says were reserved for the secret convention, he, evidently violated by Russia, who has the substance of which convention we are continued to send troops thither, which she now informed of through the mutual com has openly re-inforced, and has changed the plaints of the parties relative to the non government of that country without the confulfilment thereof. Napoleon, we are told, sent of France. He concludes, with declaring, by the Russian notes, stipulated, 1. To eva that Russia has, besides, violaled the 2d arti
cuale the kingd. m of Naples, and having cle of ihe secret convention, by manifesting deavoured to sngage to respect the deuira - a partiality for England, instead of co-operabe a subliniat mgdom, during the war then ting with France, agreeably to the precise mexisting, and during all future wars; the expressions of that article, " in order to con
latter of which stipulations he has certainly “ solidate a general peace, to re-establish a violated, and had violated at the time when “ just balance in the four parts of the world, the complaint was made by Russia, in the " aod to procure the liberty of the seas." month of July, 1804. 2. He stipulated to D'Oubril, in his answer to this note of Talestablish, in concert with Russia, some leyrand, treats the charges relative to the principle whereon to come to a final settle emigrants as vague and unfounded; be ment of the affairs of Italy; instead of passes in silence over that relative to the which, complais Russia, he did, almost im- mourning for the Duke D'Enghien; the tamediately after the secret convention was king possession of the Seven Islands he asconcluded, cause himself to be chosen, and seris was with the consent of France; but, actually became, withoul any concert at all as to the stipolated co-operation for “ prowith Russia, President of the Italian Re " curing the liberty of the scas," he says not a public, and, at the sanje time, disposed of word. I -It was necessary, Sir, to take the other parts of Italy according to his sole this short review of the grounds of the disa pleasure. ' 3. He engaged to indemnify, pute between Russia and France, in order to without delay, the King of Sardinia, whom, be able to judge, not only of the present prohowever, he has not indemnified, but, on bable intentions of Russia, but also of the the contrary the chief part of whose terri line of conduct which Austria and Prussia, tories he has annexed to France, and this, more especially the former, is likely to portoo, without consulting Russia. These sue. Austria, already deeply stung by the charges are unquestionably well founded; triumphant rivalship of Russia, by the direct but, Napoleon answers, * that Russia has not interference of the latter in the affairs of the fulfilled her part, not only of the secret con. Germanic Body, and by the losses in terrivention, but of the 3d article of the treaty of tory and in power experienced through the peace, which was concluded three days pre means of that interference, must have been vious to the conclusion of the convention to fired with indignation and rage at learning He charges Rossia with having violated that the contents of the secret convention of the article in giving protection to French emi. 11th of October, 1801. This feeling, on grants; in accrediting them to the neighbour- the part of Austria, Napoleon looked forward ing powers of France, where they might in to as an inevitable consequence of a disciodulge their hostile dispositions against their sure of the terms of ihe secret convention ; country; in authorizing the conduct of and, therefore, he always laughed at the com, Count Marckoff, who, during his residence plaints and remonstrances of Russia; for, by at Paris, encouraged intrigues to disturb the breaking with her, on account of non-fulbilinternal tranquility of France, and who even ment of his secret stipulations, he was sure went so far as to place under the protection to have Austria on bis side. Tbat he never of the law of nations, French emigrants and intended to fulfil any one of the articles of other agents in the pay of England; in or the secret convention is, I think, évidents dering a court mourning for the Duke nor would it, perhaps, be very easy to deterD'Engbien. He then demands, as a preli inine, which would have been nost detriminary to any step in the way of fulfilment mental 10 Europe, the fulfilment, or the
non-fulfilment of them: the domination of * See Taliej rand's note of the 29th of Italy by Napoleon, or the introduction of July last, present Vol. p. 758 and concluded Russia into the aifairs of the South, which in p. 890. # Eee this treaty, Register, Vol. I. p. 165.
. See his answer, present Volume, p. 754.
latter, to the extent contemplated by the se of which must be left to those, who have cret convention, could not have failed to be observed the conduct of nations, under simia, speedily followed by the total overthrow of lar circumstances. It seems, however, to the Turkish Empire, and by the reduction of be more probable, that Russia' will not take Austria to perfect insignificance; to say no any very active part in the war; because, thing about the procuring of the liberiy of without the co-operation of either Austria.or 6 che seas." The final adjustment of the Prussia, or both of them, she can make no affairs of Italy, if Russia had participated impression upon Napoleon ; and, for those thereiu, must have led to some changes in powers to join Russia against him, in the the Mediterranean and on the side of Turi present state of the Continent, would be to key. Russia would have had something more forge their own chains; seeing that the pasoud than a piece of parchinent for the due Tural consequence would be, a peace, in execution of ihe terms of such adjustment. which they would be sacrificed to Russia.. In short, the result most probably would have Then would return the case to have been been, that froin four great military powers, apprehended from the due execution of the the number of those powers, upen the con secret convention of 1801 ; that is to say, tiorni, would have soon been reduced to the abasement of Austria and Prussia, par. two: an Emperor of the East, and an En ticulaily ve former, ard the division of Euperor of the West. Napoleon wanted no rope between two greal powers, France and. equal; he sherefore chose to preserve Prus Russia. That this is the light, in which sia and Austria and to treak wiih Russia ; the subjece is viewed at Vienna and Berlin: thus making France the one and only first we certainly have no positive prcof; but, if raie power, having three second rate powers it be the ligbi wherein reason views it, we whom he might play off against one another, have vo foundation to hope that they will according as his views might require, and view it in any other.-- Before the recent as their interests and passions might fa.. acts of violence, committed by France, we vour those views.--His views, at present, talked about continental coalitions against as far as relates to the Continent, assuredly Napoleon; and, since the commission of are, not to be at war with either of the those acts, we have spoken with still greater great military powers; to prevent Russia confidence. But, we ought always to exfrom encroaching upon the Turkish comi pect, that ihe powers of the Coniinent will nions ;
to keep matters of territory, domi. act agrecably to their interests ; that is, acnion, and military force, as they now stand, cording to their own views of safety, or of and, at all events, if Russia should, in any ambition; and, when we come to look into direction, pursue an hostile course, to arm the çauses, which have created the quarrel Austria or Prussia, or both, against her. between Russia and France, we find that the That he will not succeed in these views the quarrel is for power, on the part of Russia, state of things atfords us little reason to hope. and that, such is the nature of that power, Russia mpay, in order thereby to obtain a that the desiring to acquire it is, of all posgreater degree of influence in the Mediter. sible causes, the one most likely to create an ranean, join us in the war, to a certain ex. irreconcilable coming between that court tent. Her object is to gain influence to and the other courts, with whom the wishedthe South; and, having failed to accomplish for coalition must take place, if it take place that object by the mans of a pacitic co ar all. As to the acts of lvlenca, u hich operation with France, she may endeavour Napoleon bas ordered to be ccmitted, parto accomplish it by the means of warlike co ticularly that conimitied upon our annister operation with England; and, with this at Hainburgh, they wonld, doubtless, in viow, she may join us in the war. But, it other times, have rouzed ihe powers of the is not very probable, that we should gain Continent against the aggressor; but, nowmuch her co-operaton. On the contrary, a days, such offences can only be expected if it be of iniporiance with us to have great to be brought forward in the list of provoinfluence in the Mediterranean and the Le cations, when a power is already disposed vant, the introducing of the Russian navy and able to make war; and, when we and influence into those parts appears !o be express such sanguine hopes from this the certain way of finally injuring our own source, we seen to forget the treatment interests; because, when we have once which Mr. Drake, Mr. Smith, and other of given ber a firm footing, Napoleon will not our minisiers, have received from t?r courts fail to tempt her with a peace, in which our of the Continent. The Ilictor or Bavaria power, in that part of the world, should be ordered our minister away on account of the sacrificed. Whether the temptation would charge preferred against him by Napoleon ; succeed, or not, is a question the decision Lord Hawkesbury delivers to be foreiga
corps diplomatic a note wherein he justifies | different from the siezing of the Duke d'Er conduct like that of which Mr. Drake was ghien ; but, it is, nevertheless, not very charged; whereupon Napoleon publishes an likely, that those who reinained entirely oninterdiction against all our ministers at neu. moved by the latter should be rouzed to war tral courts in the neighbourhood of France, by the former, Our present inquiry is, not As we are not permitted to doubt of the whether these courts act as become them; “prudence" of a doctrine promolgated by it is not what Austria and Prussia ought to Lord Hawkesiury, we must content our do, but what they are likely to do; not Selves with the privilege of mourniog its what they ibink and how they feel as to consequences. Perhaps, however, we may our cause, but what part they are disposed yet be allowed to express our surprize, that 10 act during the war. And, I think, ibat the
government who openly justified conduct man must be very sanguine, who expects such as that of Mr. Drake, should never them to arm for the purpose of avenging bave openly obtaioed, or even demanded, ibe siezure of our ministers at foreign courts.
any satisfaction for the deep disgrace ipflict -As, in this disgrace of our corps di- ed in the driving of that gentleman from plomatic, the cause seems to have, io a
Munich.* Do we say, that the court of great degree at least, originated with our. Munich was beneath the noiice of a nation selves; so, it would be by no means dif. like England ? the answer is, that it was ficult to show, that the state of things which pot thought beneath the dignity of his Ma has so completely divided Austria and Prussia jesty to send a representative to that court. from Russia, as to feeling towards France, The Elector of Bavaria, through his mi. originated, in great part, from the same nister, voequivocally expresses his abhor source.
Our general conduct during the rence of the conduct of Mr. Drake, pro last war, and more especially our abandon. nounces it to be inconsistent with the law ment of our allies at the peace, have alicnatof nations, and orders him, accordingly, not ed the Continental powers from British con. to appear again at his court. As far as we nexion. Nay, that very secret convention, have beard, neither Prussia nor Austria have wbich has now proved so deadly ap instraexpressed any dissent from ibis decision of ment in the hands of Napoleon, would never Bavaria : jodeed, they seemed to assent to have existed, or would have been superceded, it, in the notes of their ministers, delivered if we had acted a disinterested part in con. upon the occasion, at Paris. What reason is cluding the peace of Amiens; if we had not there to suppose, then, that they will make any preferred the possession of colonies to the important movement in consequence of the possession of influence upon the continept of seizure of Sir George Rumbold, which ap Europe; if we bad pot preferred what we pears to have been grounded upon our having regarded as profit, to our honour. In the depublicly proclaimed a doctrine the contrary claration of the present war, complaint is of that upon which they then acted ? To
made, in His Majesty's pame, that the French seize a public minister is, indeed, widely dis « have annexed to their dominions Piedmoni, ferent from a request made to a neutral court Parma, Placentia, and the Island of Eiba, to send him away; and, it is also widely “ without allotting any provision to the King
“ of Sardinia, whom they have despoiled of * See the note of the Baron de Montge " the most valuable part of his territory, las to Mr. Drake, Register, Vol. V. p. 670. “ though they were bound by a solema
- It is not unnecessary here to remark on " engagement to the Emperor of Russia, the ridiculous perverseness of the ministerial " to allend to his interests, and to pronewspapers, who are continually represente u vide for his establishment," * To this ing Mr. Drake's letters to Mehée de la the French haye answered, “ that, at the Touche as “ a fabrication" of the French ; “ peace, they offered to England, prowhen, by just looking at the note of Mont vided she would leave Ceylon to the gelas, which note they themselves bave pub « Dutcb, to make such an arrrangement in lished, it will be perceived, that the Elector “ behalf of the King of Sardinia as she causes Mr. Drake to be informed, that he.
“ might propose." † This fact has been bas Mr. Drake's letters to Mehée then published all over the world, and not a before his eyes, in Mr. Drake's own band. word has ever appeared in contradiction writing ! How can any one place reliance to it. Whether true or false the world upon prints that persevere in such bare faced believes it ; and upon that belief, will false boods: How is it possible that the coun judge of us and act lowards us. And, try can be seved by them? Truth itself, coming - through such vehicles, loses its * Register, Vol. III. p. 744. Ibid, cbaracter and its effect.
what a light are we placed in by this fact, of Sardinia by the giving up of Ceylon ! when it is compared with our complaints By the surrendering of a colony which has made in behalf of the King of Sardinia at already cost us more, perhaps, in national the breaking out of a new war between us strength ihan it is possible that it ever should and France ? We complain, too, that, restore to us! You, Sir, upon the occa. upon this subject, France has broken her sion now reverted to, asserted, that we had promise to Russia. What, then, we knew of acted towards our allies “ with dignified This secret convention, it seems, so long ago “ liberality." You were ready to grant, inas the spring of 1803 ! But why did we deed, " that we ought to have claimed
leave the matter to Russia ? Why did we • Piedmont för its sovereign," but, said you, · leave in the hands of Napoleon this means " could we have obtained it? Could we of wheedling Russia into his power, the “ have procured its restoration unless we means of intlaming Austria against Ru-sia, " could have disposed of the King of Etruria, when we ourselves had wherewith 10 pur “ unless we could have destroyed the lio cbase for the King of Sardinia an establish "garian and Cisalpine Republics, and dr:inent more ample than it was at all likely “ ven the French from the mountains of for Russia ever to obtain for him? Here, “ Switzerland ? Unless we could have. Sir, you must pardon me, if I recur, for a " done all this, it would have been in vain moment, to the debates upon the peace. " to restore the King of Sardinia to his "A great military monarch, when he was " capital, surrounded as he would have se at the lowest ebb of his fortunes," said “ been by the French and by their depenMr. Wiodham, " and had sustained a de. « dent and affiliated Republics.” When “ feat, that seemed to extinguish all bis we recollect that you were consulted in every: " remaining hopes, the terms of his let stage of the negotiation, and when we also " ter written from the field of battle recollect the proposal made by the French 64 were “ We have lost every thing, but respecting Ceylon and the King of Sardinia, " " oor honour. Would to God, that the we shall need no comment to enable us 10
same consolation, in circumstances liable form a just opinion of the motive by which “ to become in time not less disastrous, re this argument must have been dictated, “ mained to Great Britain ! I should feel a But, Sir, if we could not obtain Piedmont " far less painful load of depression upon for its sovereign,' we now know that we 'my 'mind, than 'weighs upon it at ihis could bave obtained something for him by
moment. But, I lear that we have con. the yielding of Ceylon ; and, the world “ trired to combine in this proceeding, all well knows that we obtained him nothing. " that is at once ruinous and disgraceful ; Mark, besides, mark well, for the world " all that is calculated to lindo .us, in re has marked, our frankness and sincerity, “ polation as well as in fortune, to deprive We could think of nothing less than Pied. "11s of all those resources, which bigh mont, and that too, quite independent; " fame and unsullied character may create quite clear of all annoyance from any or "'even “ under the ribs of death.” Ha Napoleon's republics ; but, provided Russia ving next stated the case of Sardinia, and will obtain an establishment for the King shown that it was our duty to make some of Sardinia, we do not seem to cart much sort of prói ision for her unfortunate mo. what it is, or where or how it lies. It was narch, he says: • We have left Sardinia, " in vain," perfectly." in vain," for us «s. however, without an attempt to relieve even to re-place the King of Sardinia in “ her, wiihout even a helping hand stretch “ his capital," and, of course, in his do" ed out to support or to cheer her, under minions.; but, if Rassia will get him “ « that ruin which she has brought upon “ establishment," we will thank her ; nay, “ herself, with no fault on ber parr, while we will quarrel with Napoleon, we will " adhering faithfully to her treaty with us. even make it one of our grounds of war "--Naples, too, and Portugal and Tur- against bim, if he refuses to grant this " key will attest, to ihe end of time, the “ establishment" through the means. :01
good faith of Great-Britain ; and shew to Russia ! "How truly, then, was it'observed " the world, that sbe is not a power, who by Mr. Wilberforce, that "the very in. “ seeks her own safety by abandoning those tegrity and good faith of the ministers
with whom she has embarked in a com " and people of this country rendered us
mon cause " * What would he have de unfit for continental connexion." ! said, then, if he had known, that we might It may, perhaps, be said, however, that have obtained an establishinent for the King by utility in replacing the King of Sardinia * Register, Vol. II. p. 1180.
* Register Vol. Il. p. 1141. win
in his capital, you confined your meaning | Against Napoleon Why, he is the beneto utility 10 ourselves.
But we now see,
factor of the latter; and the former is a great that such an act would not have been useless power out of his reacb, and in po danger even to us. So true it is, that in acting from bim, unless Russia be first ler into ibe justly by others, we,' in the end, are sure Souih. Swifi tel!s a story somewhere about to promote our own good. in the first the curates and the bishops, the former cryplace, we should have derived from such a ing out that the church was in danger, aod proceeding the negative advantage of pre the latter exhorting them to peace, obseryventing the enemy from blasting our fame ing, “ we are very well as we are." So say by the disclosure of the fact, that we re Austria and Prussia : and, if the heads of fúsed to give up Ceylon for the purpose of Those nations were to read the London newsobtaining a settlement for our unfortunate papers, they niust be u terly astonished at and faithful ally. We should have derįved our uneasiness on their acc unt; at our likewise the advantage always attendant on friendly desire to promote their interests ;- at sets of national disinterestedness. Europe our philanthropic attention to their prospewould have acknowledged that we had not rity, safety, and independence; and, parti. been shedding her blood for our own sakes ; cularly ai the tender anxiety we are conand that though we were unable to leave our stantly expressing for the preservation of their allies as we found ihem, we did all we could dignity and their honour. Sometimes this for that end. We should have preserved anxiety shows itself in our displeasure at nur character for generosily and frankness ; - their tame and pushilaninicus conduct; and, we should not have lost all but our honour; there have been instances, where it has bro. we should in that respect, have retained ken forth in reproaches, not 10 say dow). our honour and lost nothing; and, in the right abuse. Nay, we have not spared eren career of a new war, we should have sarted menaces against them; and have, in a rewith, at least, ihe hearty good wishes of the cent case, proceeded to put those menaces Continent of Europe. But, besides this into execution, by siezing their treasure ; 25 general effect of the proceeding, we should if we had said, if you will not make use of lave prevented, or lessened, some of the • it for the maintenance of your honour, we particular evils, which we now experi willi'-Yet, is it possible, that the powers ence. Any arrangement that we could of the continent, that Austria and Prussia, have made for the King of Sardinia would stand by and see Great Britain submiglit have failed in preventivg Pied dued and added to the dominions of Napo. mront from being finally annexed to France ; leon, rather than enibark in the present war yet, we are not sure that it would have against him? Such a choice certainly is not failed. And, who shall be certain, that impossible. But, this is not the true ques. the abandopment of that prince by us was lion. The true question is: will Austrie mt the principal cause of that annexation ? and Prussia, rather than engage in the preIf the King of Sardinia had been re-esta sent war, see Great Britain continue the war blished in Piedmont, however surrounded by single handed, though exposed to the inFrench arais and Fiench influence, tharjici reds of Napoleon, and even to the dauger of ing him would not have been a slight mita being annexed to bis eni pire ? And this ques.
er. It might bwe aglio brought An-tria tion, I am much afraid, ihat, upon a review and Russia into the field. It might, and is of all the above-stated circumstances, we wouli, have recarded the execution of Napo must determine in ibe affirnative-Time leon's projects.
A: any race, it would have 10 recruit is very much wanted by Austria ; entirely prevented the secret convention he and both Austria and i'russia must wish 10 twren Rusia and France, that couvention see the ambitious strides of Napoieon dithe terms of which seem to have been drain rected in any conse rather than to the Norih up for the express purpose of excitirg the and the Last.' That it will toice its war ja envy and liatred of Austria against Russia, some direction or other they must well know; attcr having kept Russia in the interests of directed 10 the West word, it is not very easy France as long as her remair ng cu could be to discover how it could endanger of annoy of any use to the latter. And thos, Sir, gre them; and, therefore, it is by no means unwe now smarting for bat posisy, which, reasonable to suppose, that they would even looking at nothing but the custom house wish to see it exhaust its force upon these books, preferred a spice-colony w the honour islands. la an,wer to such a sopposition, it of the nation. But, after all, sone one will be asked, whether Austria or Prussia will a-k, is it possible that the powers of Eu could be safe, if the British dominions were rope, bat Austria and Prussia will col rouze once subdued by Napoleon ? But, Sır, Aus. nemselves? Roace themselves tor wha:? iria and Prussia will easily see, that this sub.