are revived, without any mention of, or allusion to, other powers, except merely, that the Batavian Republic is included in the pacific stipulations. The important provisions, the adjustment of matter of dispute, were reserved for the secret convention, the substance of which convention we are now informed of through the mutual complaints of the parties relative to the nonfulfilment thereof. Napoleon, we are told, by the Russian notes, stipulated, 1. To evaacuate the kingdom of Naples, and having deavoured to sngage to respect the neutrabe a sufficie-mgdom, during the war then existing, and during all future wars; the latter of which stipulations he has certainly violated, and had violated at the time when the complaint was made by Russia, in the month of July, 1804. 2. He stipulated to establish, in concert with Russia, some principle whereon to come to a final settlement of the affairs of Italy; instead of which, complains Russia, he did, almost immediately after the secret convention was concluded, cause himself to be chosen, and actually became, without any concert at all with Russia, President of the Italian Republic, and, at the same time, disposed of the other parts of Italy according to his sole pleasure. 3. He engaged to indemnify, without delay, the King of Sardinia, whom, however, he has not indemnified, but, on the contrary the chief part of whose territories he has annexed to France, and this, too, without consulting Russia. These charges are unquestionably well founded; but, Napoleon answers, * that Russia has not fulfilled her part, not only of the secret con vention, but of the 3d article of the treaty of peace, which was concluded three days previous to the conclusion of the convention †. He charges Russia with having violated that article in giving protection to French emigrants; in accrediting them to the neighbouring powers of France, where they might indulge their hostile dispositions against their country; in authorizing the conduct of Count Marckoff, who, during his residence at Paris, encouraged intrigues to disturb the internal tranquillity of France, and who even went so far as to place under the protection of the law of nations, French emigrants and other agents in the pay of England; in ordering a court mourning for the Duke D'Enghien. He then demands, as a preli minary to any step in the way of fulfilment

* See Talleyrand's note of the 29th of July last, present Vol. p. 758 and concluded in p. 890.

See this treaty, Register, Vol. I. p. 165.

on his part, that Russia shall evacuate the Republic of the Seven Islands, agreeably to the 9th article of the secret convention, which stipulates that there shall be no foreign troops in those islands, an article, says he, evidently violated by Russia, who has continued to send troops thither, which she has openly re-inforced, and has changed the government of that country without the consent of France. He concludes, with declaring, that Russia has, besides, violated the 20 article of the secret convention, by manifesting a partiality for England, instead of co-operating with France, agreeably to the precise expressions of that article, " in order to con. "solidate a general peace, to re-establish a "just balance in the four parts of the world, "and to procure the liberty of the seas." D'Oubril, in his answer to this note of Talleyrand, treats the charges relative to the emigrants as vague and unfounded; he passes in silence over that relative to the mourning for the Duke D'Enghien; the ta king possession of the Seven Islands he asserts was with the consent of France; but, as to the stipulated co-operation for "pro"cuting the liberty of the seas," he says not a word. It was necessary, Sir, to take this short review of the grounds of the dispute between Russia and France, in order to be able to judge, not only of the present pro bable intentions of Russia, but also of the line of conduct which Austria and Prussia, more especially the former, is likely to pursue. Austria, already deeply stung by the triumphant rivalship of Russia, by the direct interference of the latter in the affairs of the Germanic Body, and by the losses in territory and in power experienced through the means of that interference, must have been fired with indignation and rage at learning the contents of the secret convention of the 11th of October, 1801. This feeling, on the part of Austria, Napoleon looked forward to as an inevitable consequence of a disciosure of the terms of the secret convention; and, therefore, he always laughed at the complaints and remonstrances of Russia; for, by breaking with her, on account of non-fulfil ment of his secret stipulations, he was sure to have Austria on his side. That he never intended to fulfil any one of the articles of the secret convention is, I think, evident; nor would it, perhaps, be very easy to deter mine, which would have been most detri mental to Europe, the fulfilment, or the non-fulfilment of them: the domination of Italy by Napoleon, or the introduction of Russia into the affairs of the South, which

See his answer, present Volume, p. 750.

latter, to the extent contemplated by the secret convention, could not have failed to be speedily followed by the total overthrow of the Turkish Empire, and by the reduction of Austria to perfect insignificance; to say nothing about the "procuring of the liberty of "the seas." The final adjustment of the affairs of Italy, if Russia had participated therein, must have led to some changes in the Mediterranean and on the side of Tur key. Russia would have had something more solid than a piece of parchment for the due execution of the terms of such adjustment. In short, the result most probably would have been, that from four great military powers, the number of those powers, upen the continent, would have soon been reduced to two: an Emperor of the East, and an Emperor of the West. Napoleon wanted no equal; be therefore chose to preserve Prussia and Austria and to break with Russia; thus making France the one and only first rate power, having three second rate powers whom he might play off against one another, according as his views might require, and as their interests and passions might favour those views.- -His views, at present, as far as relates to the Continent, assuredly are, not to be at war with either of the great military powers; to prevent Russia from encroaching upon the Turkish dominions; to keep matters of territory, dominion, and military force, as they now stand, and, at all events, if Russia should, in any direction, pursue an hostile course, to arm Austria or Prussia, or both, against her. That he will not succeed in these views the state of things affords us little reason to hope. Russia may, in order thereby to obtain a greater degree of influence in the Mediter ranean, join us in the war, to a certain extent. Her object is to gain influence to the South; and, having failed to accomplish that object by the means of a pacific cooperation with France, she may endeavour to accomplish it by the means of warlike cooperation with Eugland; and, with this view, she may join us in the war. But, it is not very probable, that we should gain much by her co-operaton. On the contrary, if it be of importance with us to have great influence in the Mediterranean and the Levant, the introducing of the Russian navy and influence into those parts appears to be the certain way of finally injuring our own interests; because, when we have once given her a firm footing, Napoleon will not fail to tempt her with a peace, in which our power, in that part of the world, should be sacrificed. Whether the temptation would succeed, or not, is a question the decision.

of which must be left to those, who have observed the conduct of nations, under similar circumstances. It seems, however, to be more probable, that Russia will not take any very active part in the war; because, without the co-operation of either Austria.or Prussia, or both of them, she can make no impression upon Napoleon; and, for those powers to join Russia against him, in the present state of the Continent, would be to forge their own chains; seeing that the patural consequence would be, a peace, in which they would be sacrificed to Russia.. Then would return the case to have been apprehended from the due execution of the secret convention of 1801; that is to say, the abasement of Austria and Prussia, particularly the former, and the division of Europe between two great powers, France and. Russia. That this is the light, in which the subject is viewed at Vienna and Berlinwe certainly have no positive preof; but, if it be the light wherein reason views it, we have no foundation to hope that they will view it in any other.Before the recent acts of violence, committed by France, we talked about continental coalitions against Napoleon; and, since the commission of those acts, we have spoken with still greater confidence. But, we ought always to expect, that the powers of the Continent will act agreeably to their interests; that is, according to their own views of safety, or of ambition; and, when we come to look into the causes, which have created the quarrel between Russia and France, we find that the quarrel is for power, on the part of Russia, and that, such is the nature of that power, that the desiring to acquire it is, of all pos sible causes, the one most likely to create an irreconcilable enmity between that court and the other courts, with whom the wishedfor coalition must take place, if it take place at all. As to the acts of violence, which Napoleon has ordered to be committed, particularly that committed upon our minister at Hainburgh, they would, doubtless, in other times, have rouzed the powers of the Continent against the aggressor; but, nowa-days, such offences can only be expected to be brought forward in the list of provocations, when a power is already disposed and able to make war; and, when we express such sanguine hopes from this source, we seem to forget the treatment which Mr. Drake, Mr. Smith, and other of our ministers, have received from the courts of the Continent. The Elector of Bavaria ordered our minister away on account of the charge preferred against him by Napoleon; Lord Hawkesbury delivers to the foreign

corps diplomatic a note wherein he justifies | conduct like that of which Mr. Drake was charged; whereupon Napoleon publishes an interdiction against all our ministers at neutral courts in the neighbourhood of France. As we are not permitted to doubt of the "prudence" of a doctrine promulgated by Lord Hawkesbury, we must content our. selves with the privilege of mourning its consequences. Perhaps, however, we may yet be allowed to express our surprize, that the government who openly justified conduct such as that of Mr. Drake, should never have openly obtained, or even demanded, any satisfaction for the deep disgrace inflicted in the driving of that gentleman from Munich. Do we say, that the court of Munich was beneath the notice of a nation like England? the answer is, that it was not thought beneath the dignity of his Majesty to send a representative to that court. The Elector of Bavaria, through his minister, unequivocally expresses his abhorrence of the conduct of Mr. Drake, pronounces it to be inconsistent with the law of nations, and orders him, accordingly, not to appear again at his court. As far as we have heard, neither Prussia nor Austria have expressed any dissent from this decision of Bavaria indeed, they seemed to assent to it, in the notes of their ministers, delivered upon the occasion, at Paris. What reason is there to suppose, then, that they will make any important movement in consequence of the seizure of Sir George Rumbold, which appears to have been grounded upon our having publicly proclaimed a doctrine the contrary of that upon which they then acted? To seize a public minister is, indeed, widely dif ferent from a request made to a neutral court to send him away; and, it is also widely

* See the note of the Baron de Montgelas to Mr. Drake, Register, Vol. V. p. 676. -It is not unnecessary here to remark on the ridiculous perverseness of the ministerial newspapers, who are continually representing Mr. Drake's letters to Mehée de la Touche as "a fabrication" of the French; when, by just looking at the note of Montgelas, which note they themselves have published, it will be perceived, that the Elector causes Mr. Drake to be informed, that he. bas Mr. Drake's letters to Mehée then before his eyes, in Mr. Drake's own band. • writing! How can any one place reliance upon prints that persevere in such barefaced falsehoods? How is it possible that the coun stry can be served by them? Truth itself, coming through such vehicles, loses its character and its effect.

different from the siezing of the Duke d'Er ghien; but, it is, nevertheless, not very likely, that those who remained entirely unmoved by the latter should be rouzed to war by the former, Our present inquiry is, not whether these courts act as become them; it is not what Austria and Prussia ought to do, but what they are likely to do; not what they think and how they feel as to our cause, but what part they are disposed to act during the war. And, I think, that man must be very sanguine, who expects them to arm for the purpose of avenging the siezure of our ministers at foreign courts.

As, in this disgrace of our corps diplomatic, the cause seems to have, in a great degree at least, originated with our selves; so, it would be by no means dif ficult to show, that the state of things which has so completely divided Austria and Prussia from Russia, as to feeling towards France, originated, in great part, from the same source. Our general conduct during the last war, and more especially our abandonment of our allies at the peace, have alienat ed the Continental powers from British con nexion. Nay, that very secret convention, which has now proved so deadly an instru ment in the hands of Napoleon, would never have existed, or would have been superceded, if we had acted a disinterested part in concluding the peace of Amiens; if we had not preferred the possession of colonies to the possession of influence upon the continent of Europe; if we had not preferred what we regarded as profit, to our honour. In the declaration of the present war, complaint is made, in His Majesty's name, that the French "have annexed to their dominions Piedmont,

Parma, Placentia, and the Island of Eiba, "without allotting any provision to the King "of Sardinia, whom they have despoiled of "the most valuable part of his terrritory, "though they were bound by a solemn "engagement to the Emperor of Russia, "to attend to his interests, and to pro

vide for his establishment."*. To this the French have answered, "that, at the

66

peace, they offered to England, pro"vided she would leave Ceylon to the "Dutch, to make such an arrrangement in "behalf of the King of Sardinia as she "might propose." This fact has been published all over the world, and not a word has ever appeared in contradiction to it. Whether true or false the world believes it; and upon that belief will judge of us and act towards us. And,

* Register, Vol. III. p. 744. ↑ Ibid,

p. 1924

what a light are we placed in by this fact, when it is compared with our complaints made in behalf of the King of Sardinia at the breaking out of a new war between us and France? We complain, too, that, upon this subject, France has broken her promise to Russia. What, then, we knew of this secret convention, it seems, so long ago as the spring of 1803! But why did we leave the matter to Russia? Why did we leave in the hands of Napoleon this means of wheedling Russia into his power, the means of inflaming Austria against Ru-sia, when we ourselves had wherewith to purcbase for the King of Sardinia an establishment more ample than it was at all likely for Russia ever to obtain for him? Here, Sir, you must pardon me, if I recur, for a moment, to the debates upon the peace. "A great military monarch, when he was

at the lowest ebb of his fortunes," said Mr. Windham," and had sustained a de"feat, that seemed to extinguish all his "remaining hopes, the terms of his let"ter written from the field of battle

were" We have lost every thing, but ““our honour." Would to God, that the

same consolation, in circumstances liable "to become in time not less disastrous, re"mained to Great Britain! I should feel a "far less painful load of depression upon "my mind, than weighs upon it at this

moment. But, I fear that we have contrived to combine in this proceeding, all "that is at once ruinous and disgraceful; "all that is calculated to undo us, in re"putation as well as in fortune, to deprive

of Sardinia by the giving up of Ceylon! By the surrendering of a colony which has already cost us more, perhaps, in national strength than it is possible that it ever should restore to us! You, Sir, upon the occa sion now reverted to, asserted, that we had acted towards our allies "with dignified "liberality." You were ready to grant, indeed, that we ought to have claimed "Piedmont for its sovereign," but, said you, "could we have obtained it? Could we "have procured its restoration unless we "could have disposed of the King of Etruria, "unless we could have destroyed the Li

gurian and Cisalpine Republics, and dr

ven the French from the mountains of "Switzerland ? Unless we could have "done all this, it would have been in vain "( to restore the King of Sardinia to his "capital, surrounded as he would have "been by the French and by their depen"dent and affiliated Republics." When we recollect that you were consulted in every stage of the negotiation, and when we also recollect the proposal made by the French respecting Ceylon and the King of Sardinia, we shall need no comment to enable us to form a just opinion of the motive by which this argument must have been dictated. But, Sir, if we could not obtain Piedmont for its sovereign, we now know that we could have obtained something for him by the yielding of Ceylon; and, the world well knows that we obtained him nothing. Mark, besides, mark well, for the world has marked, our frankness and sincerity. We could think of nothing less than Pied mont, and that too, quite independent; quite clear of all annoyance from any ot Napoleon's republics; but, provided Russia will obtain an establishment for the King of Sardinia, we do not seem to care much what it is, or where or how it lies. It was

however, without an attempt to relieve "her, without even a helping hand stretch"ed out to support or to cheer her, under "that ruin which she has brought upon "herself, with no fault on her part, while "adhering faithfully to her treaty with us. "Naples, too, and Portugal and Tur"key will attest, to the end of time, the "good faith of Great-Britain; and shew to

the world, that she is not a power, who "seeks her own safety by abandoning those "with whom she has embarked in a com

mon cause" * What would he have said, then, if he had known, that we might have obtained an establishment for the King

* Register, Vol. II. p. 1180.

even to re-place the King of Sardinia iu "his capital," and, of course, in his dominions; but, if Russia will get him" an "establishment," we will thank her; nay, we will quarrel with Napoleon, we will even make it one of our grounds of war against him, if he refuses to grant this "establishment" through the means or Russia! How truly, then, was it observed by Mr. Wilberforce, that the very in"tegrity and good faith of the ministers

and people of this country rendered us

unfit for continental connexion." ! ——— It may, perhaps, he said, however, that by utility in replacing the King of Sardinia

* Register Vol. II. p. 114. Y

in his capital, you confined your meaning to utility to ourselves. But we now see, that such an act would not have been useless even to us. So true it is, that in acting justly by others, we, in the end, are sure to promote our own good. In the first place, we should have derived from such a proceeding the negative advantage of preventing the enemy from blasting our fame by the disclosure of the fact, that we refused to give up Ceylon for the purpose of obtaining a settlement for our unfortunate and faithful ally. We should have derived likewise the advantage always attendant on gets of national disinterestedness. Europe would have acknowledged that we had not been shedding her blood for our own sakes; and that though we were unable to leave our allies as we found them, we did all we could for that end. We should have preserved our character for generosity and frankness; we should not have lost all but our honour; we should. in that respect, have retained our honour and lost nothing; and, in the career of a new war, we should have started with, at least, the hearty good wishes of the Continent of Europe. But, besides this general effect of the proceeding, we should have prevented, or lessened, some of the particular evils, which we now experience. Any arrangement that we could have made for the King of Sardinia might have failed in preventing Piedmont from being finally annexed to France; yet, we are not sure that it would have failed. And, who shall be certain, that the abandonment of that prince by us was not the principal cause of that annexation? If the King of Sardinia had been re-established in Piedmont, however surrounded by French arms and French influence, the ejecting him would not have been a slight matter. It might have again brought Austria and Russia into the field. It might, and it would, have retarded the execution of Napoleon's projects. At any rate, it would have entirely prevented the secret convention hetween Russia and France, that convention the terms of which seem to have been drawn up for the express purpose of exciting the envy and hatred of Austria against Russia, after having kept Russia in the interests of France as long as her remaining so could be of any use to the latter. And thus, Sir, ave we now smarting for that policy, which, looking at nothing but the custom-house books, preferred a spice-colony to the honour of the nation.But, after all, some one will ask, is it possible that the powers of kurope, that Austria and Prussia will not rouze themselves? Rouce themselves for what?

Against Napoleon? Why, he is the benefactor of the latter; and the former is a great power out of his reach, and in no danger from him, unless Russia be first let into the South. Swift tells a story somewhere about the curates and the bishops, the former crying out that the church was in danger, and the latter exhorting them to peace, observing, we are very well as we are." So say Austria and Prussia: and, if the heads of those nations were to read the London newspapers, they must be u terly astonished at our uneasiness on their account; at our friendly desire to promote their interests ;- at our philanthropic attention to their prosperity, safety, and independence; and, parti cularly at the tender anxiety we are constantly expressing for the preservation of their dignity and their honour. Sometimes this anxiety shows itself in our displeasure at their tame and pusillanimous conduct; and, there have been instances, where it has bro ken forth in reproaches, not to say downright abuse. Nay, we have not spared even menaces against them; and have, in a recent case, proceeded to put those menaces into execution, by siezing their treasure; as if we had said, if you will not make use of it for the maintenance of your honour, we will.'-Yet, is it possible, that the powers of the continent, that Austria and Prussia, would stand by and see Great Britain subdued and added to the dominions of Napoleon, rather than embark in the present war against him? Such a choice certainly is not impossible. But, this is not the true question. The true question is: will Austria and Prussia, rather than engage in the present war, see Great Britain continue the war single handed, though exposed to the inroads of Napoleon, and even to the danger of being annexed to his empire? And this question, I am much afraid, that, upon a review of all the above-stated circumstances, we must determine in the affirmative.-Time to recruit is very much wanted by Austria; and both Austria and Prussia must wish to see the ambitious strides of Napoleon directed in any course rather than to the North and the East. That it will force its way in some direction or other they must well know; directed to the Westward, it is not very easy to discover how it could endanger of annoy them; and, therefore, it is by no means unreasonable to suppose, that they would even wish to see it exhaust its force upon these islands. Ia answer to such a supposition, it will be asked, whether Austria or Prussia could be safe, if the British dominions were once subdued by Napoleon? But, Sir, Austria and Prussia will easily see, that this sub