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evitably produce the destruction of the monarchy, if not the subjugation of the country. And, I am not talking of distant consequences. We have any time those two years been told that we are in “the crisis of “ our fate.” When things are conne to a crisis, it requires but a short time, and no very great event, to effect a total change. Three or four years would be quite sufficient; and the quartern leaf at half a-crown; a sudden and great degradation of the paper-money, or some such circumstance, would be more than enough to put an end at once to all our hopes and our feats.-[This subject shall be resumed in my next.]
The MAN of No PARTY. In a poem, published a few years ago, from under the pen of Mr. Canning and others, the French atheist Lt Peau was emphatically styled, “ the man without a God." As Lepeau was in religion, nearly such is, as to political matters, “a man without a party.” On this subject I have selected, from Swift, some excellent sentiments, as a motto to the present sheet. The selection has been made from the 45th ExAM Ner. The whole pas. sage is so good, and at this time so well worthy of the attention of every man in the country, from the peasant even to the prince, that I cannot refrain from inserting it en
tire. “Whoever calls himself a man of no “ party, you may depend upon it is of a to
party; but, it is such a party as he is ashamed to own. For even while he says he is of no party, you may observe, from the whole drift of his discourse, that he is plainly prejudiced in favour of one party, and that too always the worst. And the true reason of his not declaring is, that he thinks the party not yet strong enough to protect him. The Justice of the cause, or the goodness of the intention, seems to be out of this gentleman's scheme. The only distinction he goes by is, to be professedly of no party, that he may occasionally be of either. Others there are, who are really of a party, and don’t know it; they carry on designs which are kept a secret from them; and these indeed are such insignificant tools of a party, that they may properly enough be said to be of no party: they are machines purely passive : and, without any will of their own, obey the impulse of the wheel that moves them. But you shall never hear a man of true principles say
serting that cause which they are bood in honour and conscie c to d-ferti " —— Your man of no party is genero! ; or, 1shed very liberally with impudence as well as hypocrisy; and, as to his political chal ic: ter, he is by turns, a brutal demogogo - and a smooth-tongued sycopha t. None oe' ter than he knows how to wheedle the sovereign people, or to flatter the ear o his pri, re. He changes of ener than the weather, and no change, however sud en or great, ever rises a blush upon his creek; an i, the only justification he ever thinks it worth his while to put forward, is that he has altered bis opinion, without ever being able to give any one reason from which such alteration has arisen. The fundamental maxim of his creed, is, that the end sanctifies the means; the end of which he never, for one moment, loses sight, is, his own private interest; and, in pursuing this, he boggles at nothing. He is generally a second rate than 10 oint of talents, and of the very lowest rate of all in point of birth and family connexion. Such and s , situated as to make him look downwards with insolent pride, and upwards with envy and hatred. I wished very much to make some observations upon the prices of provisions, particularly by way of nswer to a correspondent in a former part of this sheet.——The further Prorogation of Parliament would, too, afford matter for comment. My readers may be assured, that it is to be ascribed - to any thing rather than a full treasury, three quar: ters of the civil-list being already behind hand again ——No ; it is in order to try once more the chapter of accidents The intention of the former Prorogation, was, to endeavour to strengthen the ministry before the Parliament opened.
Pinted by Cox and Baylis, No 75, Great Queen Street, and published by R. Bagshaw, Bow Street, Covent Garden, where former Nunbeis may be lau; scid also by J. Budd, Civwl, and Mitre Pall-Mall.
south a MERICA. SIR,-Previous to the Treaty of Amiens, that treaty which its authors told us was
“a peace of experiment," but which, might
with more propriety have been called “ the “superfluity of experiment," many persons seemed to believe in the possibility of living at peace with new modelled France. The * experiment," however, soon, conviuced them of the fallacy of this opinion ; and men of all parties now agree in considering the actual situation of France—that is to say, her enormous aggrandizement, which places so many million of men at her disposal, together with all the ports of Europe from Cuxhaven to Venice ; the nature of her government, which acknowledges no law but convenience and caprice, and no means but violence ; the present tempet of her people, who seem to desire no other recounpence for the disgraceful slavery in which they are held by a Corsican usurpor, than the plunder and subjugation of other nations ; and, above all, the occupancy of every part of the Ocean from Ferrol to the mouth of the Elbe–as the immediate cause of imminent, perpe ual, and ever increasing danger to Great Britain. And thus, though all are desirous of peace, no one dares to hope for it, because every one feels it to be impossible in the actual situation of things. The first condition of a treaty with Buonaparté should be, the destruction of the flotillas destined for the invasion of this coun try; and who is weak enough to imagine him disposed to listen to such a demand?-There is, too, another point on which there appears to be but one opinion ; namely, the impossibility on the part of Great Britain, of making, single-handed, any considerable impression on France. It is acknowledged that she is sufficiently powerful to conquer, single-handed, the colonies of her enemy, to assist the maritime countries in casting off the yoke of their task-master, to harass his trade by confining it to what he may carry on by land or in neutral bottoms, in a word, to perplex him in every possible shape ; but, it is a-nied, that she can ever succeed in
tearing from him, by force of arms, those countries from which he immediately threatens the destruction of Great-Britain. Thus far, men of all descriptions are entirely agreed; but, the moment they enter upon the nature of the warfare to be carried on against an enemy so powerful and so inveterate, they fly off into two distinct parties. - The former tell us: 1. that since Great-Britain cannot deliver Europe from the yoke of France, nor confine that restless and ambitious nation within its ancient limits, we ought therefore to abandon the Continent to its own sate, that is to say, to those divisions and to that spirit of weakness and irresolution which ännounce its approaching destruction, unless those powers who are still respectable do not speedily rally round that standard, which the sovereign of the most extensive empire in the universe has so nobly raised in support of a cause, in which neither his rivals nor his enemies can possibly impute to him the slightest motive of personal, ambition: 2. that we ought to confine ourselves to placing the country in such a state of defence as shall take from the enrmy the desire of attempting an invasion : 3 that in abandoning to him the empire of the Continent, we ought to reserve to ourselves the empire of the seas, and seek in our industry and in the extension which will thereby be given to our commerce, the means of supporting that state of defence, which, though necessary, is acknowledged op all hands to be extremely burthensome to the nation . In short, the advocates of this system confine the policy of Great-Britain to this—“ that she ought “ always to be at war and never conquered." They have taken for their emblem a porcupine with its quills bristled, and occasionally darting them at the tyger seeking to devour it : their motto is “ Noli me tangere."-The advocates of the defensive system are not without arguments in support of their doctrine. They tell us: 1. that though this state of habitual defence may be expensive to Great-Britain, the state of habitual menace which France has adopted is not less sq. to that country : 2, that though sums to an . enormous annount may be expended to ob." tain this object, the whole of the money so expended remains in the country : while, on the contrary, the sums which would otherwise be laid out in subsidies, or for the payment of troops employed on the Contiment, would be entirely lost to this coun
: 3. that war secures to Great-Britain at exclusive commerce, and, consequently, a vast increase of revenue to its government: 4. that if, by the tyranny of the Despot of
Europe, commerce is thrown for a time out .
of its natural channel, fresh ones will be opened by coptraband traffic : and lastly, the advocates of this system never fail to prop up their arguments for totally separaling the interests of Great-Britain from those of the Continent, by invectives against the pusillanimity, the bad faith, and the selfishness of the powers of the Continent, by common place observations on the inefficacy of war like coalitions, and by methodistical cant on the unchristian like conduct of paying for the effusion of human blood.— The other party, leaning upon the example of all ages, and more particularly upon the principles of policy constantly pursued by the British nation, maintain, that since the danger which at present threatens GreatBritain arises solely from the overgrown power of France, it is not by a system purely defensive, a system as precarious as it is humiliating and expensive, that she ought to be secured from it, but by striking at the very root of the evil, that is to say, by setting bounds to this monstrous and overgrown power: that if England cannot, singlehanded, accomplish this desirable object, she ought cordially and actively to unite with the powers of the Continent actuated by the same motive, not by making a trifling diversion beneficial only to herself, for the purpose of seizing a few colonies, which would only withdraw a portion of the defenders of the mother country for the moment, but by directing a powerful and efficacious attack against the weak side of the common enemy : that to keep England in a constant state of alarm, Buonaparté has only to spread the major part of his troops between Brest and the Texel, where they are not more expensive to him, than they would be in any other part of his frontiers : that ille money employed on the Continent in subsidies or otherwise, is not, as some affect to te us, lost to Great-Britain, inasmuch as this same money must, in the long run, and even in thorse of 4 few years, return o bdustrious, in
du try supplies the Continent: that though, by means of a contraband traffic, commerce may succeed in opening the channels which violence would close, the systern of contraband acts always as a fresh duty on the value of the merchandize, and that Buonaparté being the supreme director of all the contraband trade carried on in the countries subject to his dominion, and the only receiver of duties arising therefrom,
this duty on the goods exported thither from
Great Britain operates almost entirely to his advantage, and may be continued at his discretion: that in proportion as Buonaparté strengthens and extends his dominion, this alternate system of prohibition and pillage will also be extended and strengthened : that it is not new colonies nor raw materials, that Great Britain stands in need of, but fresh markets for them: that though, on the one hand, the rigorous exclusion of British goods for one, two, or three years, would be severely felt by the countries subject to the will of Buonaparté, it would, on the other, be ruincus to Great-Britain and completely destructive to her manufactures: that a system purely defensive would make Great Britain a world separate and distinct from the rest of the habitable globe, “penitas “ toto divisos orbe Britannos :” that by thus separating themselves from their fellowcreatures, Englishmen would subscribe to that system of banishment which their implacable enemy has pronounced against them, and which he is now striving by every means, both of cunning and of violence, to put into execution : that though in a recent publication, a partisan of the defensive system has enumerated several enterprises, which failed of success because they were either badly planned, badly executed, or undertaken merely by way of experiment (for now a days politics and war, like chemistry and physics, are become experimental sciences) it would, nevertheless, be no difficult task to point out others of a nature far more important, and which, by a happy co-operation of the navy of England with the land forces of her continental allies, would assuredly be attended with the desired success ; and that, consequently, the great object of British policy should be, to rouze the powers of the Continent, both by her example and her co-operation, to a re-union of their forces against the disturber of their repose : lastly, that should all these efforts prove unsuccessful, should these powers, insensible to the noble example presented by Russia-and Sweden, still persist in their fatal inactivity, it will then be the duty of England to explore in distant countrics fresh sources of riches and of power, beyond the reach of the envy of her rivals and the fury of her enemies. On this point, too, men of all descriptions entertain but one opinion; they differ, however, as to the mode of execution. The plan which appears to be most in favour, is that of revolutionizing America' —Against a doctrine so monstrous, and which, to the disgrace of the age we live in, is broached in all conversations and openly avowed in recent publications, it is high time to enter a protest. Good God, Sir, to revolutionize to And have we, then, forgotten, that this word, invented to describe the most terrible scourge that can possibly afflict the human race; that this word, unfortunately so comprehensive, expresses the union of every evil—universal plunder and proscription, assassination in all its shapes, a systematic confiscation of property, the overthrow of all laws divine and human, of all institutions religious and political; and as a definite result, according to the po. litical circumstances of the society to which it attaches, either complete anarchy and a degradation of civilized life to that of the brute creation, or an execrable tyranny submitted to as a remedy for the evils which gave it birth 2 But, moral considerations apart, let us inquire into the political consequences of such a plan to Great Britain, supposing her government so far destitute of principle, as to have recourse to it.—Seeing that France has succeeded in arrogating to herself either a complete dominion or a preponderating influence over the rest of Europe, which it is not in the power of Eng. land to snatch from her, it becomes the duty of the British government, say the advocates of the revolutionary system, to endeavour to obtain, by means of her naval superiority, a similar dominion over those parts of the globe, which, from their too great distance, are placed beyond the reach of French arms; but more especially over South America, which country is truly considered as an inexhaustible source of riches; and the means proposed for the attainment of this object is to revolutionize it. Not to enter into useless considerations, let us lay aside generalities, and particularize the subject of this discussion.——The United States form no part of our inquiry. The portion of America inhabited by tribes of savages is sheltered from all revolutions, except those slow but salutary changes which the progressive civilization of the adjoining countries may, in the course of time, spread over the face of those extensive territories. The project, therefore, extends only to Spanish and Portuguese America.—It cannot be credited for a moment, that such a line of conduct could,
without exciting the deepest indignation, be proposed toward, a monarchy, which, in circumstances the most critical, maintained an unshaken fidelity to its engagements at the peril of its existence, and at a moment too when Great Britain, distracted by other cares, could not lend it the assistance necessary to its preservation, and which in all probability, did not, without the consent of the British government, treat with an enemy, who has not yet pardoned its attachment to this country. But, say these revolutionary advocates, what the uninterrupted good understanding between Portugal and England would not permit with regard to the Brazils, the secret enmity of Spain for Great Britain, and her open partiality to France, would fully justify with respect to Spanish America. Viewing the subject in this light, will the British government attempt the conquest of those immense territories, or, wisely distrusting their ability to effect so vast an enter
prize, will they prefer the odious alternative 1. y
of revolutionizing them, in the hope of turning their commerce exclusively into our hands 2—On the project of conquering Spanish America, I shall say but two or three words. At a moment when the threats of invasion employ the whole military strength of "the United Kingdom, when the difficulty of protecting distant acquisitions would be still greater than that of conquering them, when Malta, and Gibraltar, which are, as it were, but two points, require such considerable garrisons, where would the British government find troops to send out to conquer Mexico and Peru ? Where would she find the garrisons necessary to occupy the principal ports and posts of this boundless territory, of which Great Britain, in point of extent, would form but a small province How would this handful of men be able to support themselves against the influence of a destructive climate, and the hatred and incessant attacks of a numerous population, entertaining the strongest antipathy to strangers, and totally differing from their conquerors in their laws, their manners, their customs, and, above all, in their language and religion Where would the British government find recruits to supply the loss occasioned by a constant warfare against the climate and the inhabitants What envy would not such a conquest excite in every court of Europe, incessantly told as they are by our enemy, that England arrogates to herself the despotism of the seas, and a monopoly of the commerco of the world 2 Above all, what alarin would it not excite in the breasts of our commercial rvals, I mean the United States of America! And, in case of a rupture with that country, what means of annoyance would not the contiguity of Old and New Mexico with Louisiana constantly afford them 1 If I am asked, whether I think it possible to revolutionize those countries, I answer, yes! Throughout there reigns the greatest discontent against a government situated at a distance, too weak to protect its subjects, but sufficiently powerful to impose the severest restlictions, not only on their trade, but upon the very produce of their soil. But, supposing this event to take place, let us examine what the consequence would be to Great Britain. To do this with some degree of precision, it will be necessary to consider a little the nature of the population of Spanish America. The inhabitants may be divided into five distinct classes: 1. A handful of native Spaniards, who repair thither to pass a few years, and who occupy every lucrative post under the government: 2. An incomparably more numerous class of Spanish descent, who, though excluded from public situations, possess nearly all the lands and riches of the country. 3. A very considerable number of native families, who, like the peasantry of Poland and Russia, are attached by law to the spot on which they were born. 4. A pretty numerous class of negroes and mulattoes, partly slaves and partly freed men. 5. Although the above classes appear to comprise the whole population, there nevertheless springs out of then a fifth class, or rather body, totally distinct from the other four, I mean the clergy. It is extremely powerful, not only from the number of those who compose it, but from its immense riches, the hierarchy of its members, and, above all, its influence over the other classes, and more especially the inferior ones The first four of these classes are divided from each other by the strongest antipathy: among the two former, who are united by one conn. mon origin, by education, and by the rank they hold in society, I meat, the Spaniards born in Europe and the Creoles, is this hatred carried to the greatest excess. From this classification of the inhabitants, this distribution of employs and possessions, this weakness of the government, it necessarily follows, that the introduction of republican principles would be the signal for the total subversion of the existing government; that in the struggles that would arise in forming a new one, all classes would join in expelling the native Spaniards; and that, this done, the two last classes, to which may be added all the poor among the class of Creoles, formit'g a population infinitely more numerous than the proprietors, would unite in exterutinatios, vi at least Postis those pro
rietors, of whose weakness and indoence no European can form an idea; that this accomplished, those vast ter; ritories, peopled solely by unfettered
slaves or indolent savages, would sink
into a state of prosound barbarism, and so much the more rapidly, as the mildness of the climate and the extent and richness of the soil would furnish a spontaneous subsistance to men, knowing no wants, and to whom repose is the summum bonum, whatever may be the riches concealed in the bowels of the earth, or ready to burst forth with the slightest cultivation. In such a state, what advantages, I ask, would Spanish America present to the commerce and industry of Great Britain The revolutionary system would have made it one vast desert covered over with dead bodies and watered with human gore, and inhabited only by a few tribes of savages disputing their wretched existence with the wild beasts.--— I shall not amuse either myself or your readers with another plan, which is said to have been in circulation a few wetks ago. I mean the project of seizing the mines of Peru and Mexico, for the purpose of paying off our national debt! I did imagine, Sir, that ever since the fruities attempt of Sir Walter Raleigh, we had relinquished the idea of conquering the country of Eldorado, where, we were told, the very fleece of the sheep and the flints of the roads are of solid gold. If, however, any ot our monied men should wish to estimate the value of this new hypothesis, they have only to calculate the quantity of metal, half the amount in gold, and half in silver, (at sixty pound sterling per pound for the gold, and four for the silver), necessary to liqui. date 600 millions of capital, and they will find it would require a mass of 5 millions of pounds weight of gold, and 75 of silve, making in all a total of 80 millions of pounds weight ! And, supposing the Spaniards to keep their gold and silver at the entrance of their mines, ready to be sent away in wago gons, it would require, at the rate of one thousand pounds weight to each horse, no fewer than eighty thousand horses to carry off the treasure | I must also beg leave to remind these money loviug gentry, that the
roads of these countries, more especially in
the Cordilleres, are by no meads so smooth
and so even as the turnpike roads round our
metropolis. Such mad projects may poo
sibly an use the greedy credulity of stock.
jobbers and loan-mongers, but it is a gross
insult to the British nation, and discovers •
total ignorance of her powers and her no
to grity, to advise her to trust cliefly for