the chances of their education. They have, almost all, been educated at one or other of the universities of France, Spain, Germany, and Flanders. Amongst them are very many as pious, learned, and polished men, as have at any time adorned Christianity. Many, too, are rough and uncouth, from necessarily associating with the lower classes; but they are pious, moral, and inoffen. sive. Indeed, I can testify, that at no one of a great number of assizes, that I have attended, have I ever observed a catholic priest charged with any offence, or even a party in a civil action.--From this cursory view of the catholic laity and clergy of Ireland, I proceed to show, what has been done by our ministers towards gaining the active co-operation of this inmense force. In truth, Sir, they have literally done those things which they ought not to have done, "and they have left un lone those things "which they ought to have done." They have tried every experiment upon the catholics, save that which alone would succeed. They have resorted to the balloting system: but this has only forced the balloted men either to abscond for a time, or to produce deformed boys or decrepid old men as substitutes. They next offered bounties for enlisting; but these have been sullenly refused. Military ardour was wanting, where the common people (unjustly I trust) suspected, that a successful war would only rivet their chains. Ministers still evading the direct proceeding, have given commissions for raising regiments, within these last three months, to some gentlemen (protestants still, observe) who were supposed to be the most popular amongst the peasantry; but here also they have drawn blanks. These embryo colonels have failed in the respective districts of their supposed popularity, and have been obliged, in fine, to betake themselves to the hacknied system of crimping. The consequence is, that their levies are ludicrously thin, and composed of squalid and wretched, objects. In short, it is plain, that ministers must, sooner or later, adopt the only wise expedient, that of "abolishing "the oppressive and unchristian code of "intolerance, which at this moment ac"tively afflicts the catholics of Ireland, to "the disgrace of protestant principles."You can scarcely imagine the grievous extent to which this code is pushed in its letter, spirit, and consequences, against catholic industry, comforts, learning, property, and liberty. In a future letter I shall, with your permission, detail the specific grievances to which I advert, and then let it not be ignorantly asked, what do the Irish catholics want, or, what do they complain of? I shall demonstrate to you, that these grievances may be relieved (very beneficially for the protestants, and without the least risk to our constitution in church or in state) by two pages of an act of parliament. The consequences will be these, and let Englishmen well weigh them. 1. You will easily raise one hundred thousand catholic soldiers in Ireland for the. disposeable force of the empire. 2. The remaining 200,000 catholics, capable of bearing arms, may, when thus reconciled, be safely armed and regimented for domestic defence. 3. You need no longer maintain 50,000 regulars in Ireland, nor send out the annual loan (or rather gift) of three millions of money to that country. 4. You may safely enlist, for general service, as many of the 21,000 Irish militiamen, now embodied, as you think proper. 5. Of the 480.000 men who compose the! British volunteers, two-thirds may return"to their homes and their industry; and: thus the cultivation of the arts and of mafactures will not be interrupted in Britain. 6. The union with Ireland will be firmly cemented, and the pledge of British faith, solemnly given to the catholics at the uni-on, will be honourably redeemed. 7. Great Britain and Ireland may safely bid defiance to invasion, and every man may "then indeed lay down his head to rest.' No invasion will be attempted. No future insults will be offered by France, and, consequently, it is probable that wars' may become less frequent for a century to come. 8. You will be respected abroad. You may act offensively against France, and, probably may dictate the terms of a peace, or, at least, no enemy will presume to dictate the terms of peace to you, if ministers do their duty. Compare these glorious prospects with the present declining, convulsed, and inglorious state of the empire-and can. Englishmen for a moment hesitate to agree with-AN IRISH FREEHOLDER.-Dublin, October 4, 1804. SIR ROBERT WILSON'S PAMPHLET. [The following letter has been taken from the Morning Chronicle. It is so very interesting, both as to the manner and the matter, that I cannot refrain from inserting it at full length.] "Sermonum satis ipsa præbet urbs: Loquacitatem suam contineat: nos castrensibus consiliis contentos futuros esse sciat."-LIVY. 1, 44. S. 22. SIR,-I have observed lately a disposition in ministers and their advocates, to discourage any proposals on the part of our most intelligent officers to improve the present plan of national defence. We have all witnessed the neglect with which Colonel Craufurd's advice was received by the late ministry, when he recommended to them to ensure the safety of the country, by a large increase of the regular forces; and in one of the ministerial papers, there has lately appeared, in the form of a letter signed "HANNIBAL," a direct and personal attack on Sir Robert Wilson, for his manly and patriotic caution against imitating Carthaginian policy in our volunteer establishment.-1 cannot help observing, Sir, that this gentleman, who expresses such an aversion to comparisons, has been rather unfortunate in the choice of the name which he has adopted: it is to be lamented, that the gentleman's learning did not suggest to him a more appropriate signature; had he recollected the name of that accomplished pedant, who lectured Hannibal on the art of commanding an army, he would no doubt have felt the propriety of adopting it for his own. But this ominous mistake, Sir, we must attribute to inadvertency, and not to a fondness for any fancied similarity between himself and his great prototype, since in his own style, which is certainly unparalleled, he has given us a convincing proof of his aversion to resemblances.-The first part of that letter, Sir, I profess I do not understand, but the latter part, which is rather more intelligible, moderates my grief for what I have lost. In this Hannibal seems to accuse Sir Robert Wilson of perverting a passage in Livy, in order to render more striking the comparison of this country to Carthage, and thus increasing the confidence and exultation of the enemy.-In defending Sir Robert against the insinuations contained in this charge, I shall perhaps do for him what be would disdain to do for himself; but as I mean to notice them only as they tend to discourage any reformation in our present plan of defence, I shall not, like Hannibal, be guilty of the indecorum of descending into conjecture, with regard to the motives of a military man, in communicating to his country, in the hour of danger, his opinion on a military question: I shall rather, as one of the public, content myself with Sir Robert Wilson's declaration of his object, expressed in his own words: It is idle, it "is criminal, then, to suffer the views of "the selfish, or the antiquated notions of an originally false reasoning, to predomi"nate against the positive security of the country."To Hannibal, perhaps, the object professed in these words, " To render the country secure, by the exposure of errors in its plan of defence," may not appear to be in the language of the schools Causa per se: He may not believe it possible, that any man could be urged by the mere Amor Patrie, to take up either his sword or his pen in its defence. Did not Hannibal's style and ignorance of history free him from the suspicion of being an hireling, we might be lieve, that his own letter contained a scurrility of censure beyond what mere patriotism could bestow.-I shall now, Sir, proceed to inquire, whether there be any resemblance in the relative situations of this country and Carthage, and how far this resemblance, if it exist, may affect our safety.-During the present contest between France and this country, the cry of Delenda est Carthago has been frequently heard from our enemies, who maintain that there is a sufficient resemblance between this country and ancient Carthage to justify the invidious comparison, while their enmity, assisted by their national vanity, creates in them the hope, that they shall render it still more exact by our destruction, and thus establish their own claim to be regarded as the Romans of the modern world.-Although, Sir, a very slight acquaintance with ancient history will enable us to see that the French do not resemble the Romans in the better part of their character, yet it would be unsafe to deny, that there is a great and a dangerous resemblance in those points which must ren der them formidable as enemies, though not respectable as men.-They are, like the Romans, a nation wholly military; like them, they do not scruple to wage a war of extermination; and, as if the whole world were their inheritance, they affect to treat those who submit to their arms as slaves, and those who resist as rebel-From this, Sir, we may see, that the comparison on the side of our enemies is sufficiently accurate for all the purposes of hostility; they are perhaps equally powerful with the Romans, certainly stimulated by equal hatred, and will probably be directed by equal talent. -These resemblances, Sir, I urge, not to increase French confidence but English security: to gratify their hope of invading this last retreat of European freedom, I would not leave them even the solitary chance of our imprudence.-It behoves us now, Sir, seriously to consider, whether we do not, in some points of our political economy, resemble the Carthaginians too much for our safety-Whether we do not, from commercial considerations, weaken, in a dangerous degree, our regular army, and in this great struggle prevent too many of our youth from becoming efficient soldiers, that we may retain them, as citizens and manufacturers, under the denomination of volun teers. I am ready, Sir, to believe, that, if daring courage could ensure victory, the volunteers of this country would, in the hour of battle, manifest their right to the ancient characteristic of the British soldier, *των άλλων απανίων πλεων αυθαδεια και θυμῷ Vixouevos. But Sir Robert Wilson has, I think, ably demonstrated,that courage in a volunteer will not avail against the discipline of soldiers by profession; and, if his arguments needed any additional support, it might be found in the histories of the civil wars of most countries, wherein the regular troops have almost invariably declined the scale of victory. In that war particularly which put a period to Roman liberty, it may be observed, that the volunteers of Italy, though incorporated with old troops and conducted by Pompey, could not withstand the veterans of Cæsar on the plains of Pharsalia.If to fight pro aris et focis could render volunteers equal to regulars, the Romans would not have comprised in their empire nearly the whole of the ancient world: each of the people, whom they invaded and subdued, had to fight for their wives and their children, their altars and their firesides; they were inspired with every sentiment that might urge men to battle, but they trusted too much to newly raised troops, and the pious wish "Irruat & causa quem vincit vincat armis," and were conquered. But if we inquire, Sir, more particularly into the causes why the Romans were always victorious in war, we shall find that they possessed an advantage over other states, and more especially the commercial ones, which we should be careful not to allow our enemies to possess over us in this critical period of our history. This advantage consisted in their military institutions, which rendered arms the profession of the great body of the people, and did not leave to any but the Emeriti, who had seen 20 years service, the choice of becoming volunteers. Whereas, in the mercantile republics, commerce, operating like Indian policy, to divide men into casts, left but a very small proportion of the citizens to form a regular army.-But it should seem, Sir, according to the author of the letter to which I have before alluded, that Carthage had no volunteers in her army at the battle of Zama; that is the greatest commercial state in the world, did not employ any of its members in trade, and transform them into soldiers in the hour of danger, when the enemy was near its gates.If we are to read Livy's description of this battle with no other eyes than those of school boys, we must construe the words Carthaginienses and Afros, by the simple terms Carthaginians and Africans; but if we are to take into our consideration the few veterans of his own countrymen, which Hannibal brought with him from Italy, the mercantile pursuits of the people, and the great number of artificers and tradesmen, the natural offspring of commerce; and at the same time remember, that Carthage was a great city, not an extensive country; we must suppose, that a very great proportion of the native Carthaginian force on that fatal day, was composed of that description of people who are only to be called from their employments by revolution of in. vasion, too late indeed to become soldiers, and hardly in time to be volunteers. Besides, Sir, in no other way can the contradictory concessions of Livy, when speaking of the same body of men, be reconciled than by being understood of a mixed multitude of veterans and volunteers, in which the latter were predominant.In one place, he says, "Auxiliares cedentes secunda acies, "Afri et Carthaginienses, adeo non sustine"bant, ut contra etiam, ne resistentes, per"tinaciter primas cædendo ad se perveniret "hostes pedem referrent." In another part of the same narration, he says, "Tum ubi "omnis spes esset Milites Carthaginienses "Afrosque;" and informs us that when he Romans engaged this body, "Novum de integro pretium ortum est, quippe ad veros "hostes perventum erat, et armorum genere 68 et usu Militia, et fama serum gestarum et "magnitudine vel spei vel periculi pares."→ In addition to this, we may observe, that the very terms of the exhortation which Hannibal used, when addressing this body, are peculiarly adapted to a volunteer force, and such as Mr. Pitt himself would use when exhorting his own: "Carthaginiensibus manía patriæ, Dii jenates sepulchra majorum, li"beri cum parentibus, conjugesque pavi "dæ, aut excidium servitiumque aut impe"rium orbis terrarum; nihil aut in metum, "aut in spem medium ostentatur." These fine substitutes for discipline and experience, these talismanic words, which are to convert raw troops into good soldiers, have never yet availed, though assisted by superiority of numbers. If prudence is wanting, all the other deities are absent. Numbers, and the that they should decry in their doctrine what they disregard in their conduct, and that those men should be averse to a parallel of ancient and modern states, who must blush when compared with their fathers.—It is the practice, Sir, of a wise statesman, to draw useful lessons from the instructive examples of ancient history, and to discern when the remote causes of the subversion of great and ancient empires, have begun to be remote causes in that which he governs; he will then see how two states may resemble each other in their mistakes, and by this provident detection of his errors, he will be ena bled to correct them before it be too late, and prevent the parallel from becoming perfect, by the destruction of his country; whereas those who by a blind and obstinate adherence to a pernicious system, refuse to discover any resemblance in their faults, will feel it too late in their punishments.—— I could readily, Sir, suffer ministers to acquire wisdom in this way, since they are so unwil ling to obtain it by any other mode, were not the fate of my country committed to their care. If, like Phaeton, they risked nobody's necks but their own, we might indulge an ambition that would be fatal only to themselves; but in this case it is necessary that the passengers interfere, that they may save their own lives. goodness of our cause, are a poor depen-lels, is in them perfectly natural; it is fit dence in battle, and it is a still poorer consolation in defeat, to exclaim with Cato, "victrix causa Diis placuit victa Catoni.”But in trusting to numbers rather than to discipline, Mr. Pitt makes a very natural mistake; he is accustomed to triumph by majorities, and if a battle were like a problem of arithmetic, or to be decided, as many of his questions are, by figures, he would, no doubt, prove a very able general.- -But to leave conjecture for proof, we have in Polybius, from whom Livy derived his account of the battle, a direct and positive confirmation of Sir Robert Wilson's assertion. Had Hannibal the ability to read that historian in the original, or the modesty to consult him. in a translation, he might materially improve the comments with which he has promised to favour us on Livy's description of the battle of Zama.Yet Hannibal affects either to deny that there is more than a vague resemblance between this country and Carthage, or deprecates the comparison as encreasing the hopes of the enemy; at the same time he is ready to admit, that "France "is a military power, ambitious of general "dominion, and that England is the Queen "of Commerce." Is this then the safest and most appropriate character for England to assume, when she is to contend for her existence with that military power? Is she to take the field with a title which formerly distinguished Carthage, and contributed to its fall?If the industrious enmity of the Romans had not extended itself to every thing that was Carthaginian, we should, no doubt, have found in the annals of that unfortunate people, the protests of the Windhams and Craufurds of their day, against the folly of remaining merchants and volunteers, when they had to contend with soldiers.--Every country, Sir, has, previous to its fall, its political Cassandra, whose predictions are verified only by being neglected.--Happy would it have been for Carthage, if she could have read her history, as we read it; happy is that country whose rulers are wise enough to profit by it.--Very different, Sir, is the conduct of our ministers and their hirelings, they either deny that there is any truth in the comparison, or reprobate its admission as ominous and discouraging. What should be the cause of more vigorous preparations and safer policy, is despised as dastardly, or condemned as imprudent; and in a contest which demands the wisest and most vigorous exertion of our force, they compro mise the safety of our country by feeble and inefficient measures.--But an aversion to profit by history, and an antipathy to paral SCARCITY OF COIN. SCIPIO. SIR, Having lately spent a few days in London after an absence of some months, I was surprised to find much more gold in circulation than when I was last there. I was surprised at this, because as I conceived the gold had disappeared on account of causes which continued to exist, I had expected that the effect would have also continued. Those causes I look upon it to be, first, the depreciation of the paper currency, which occasions the exportation of guineas; and, secondly, the disposition to hoard. Now, I conceive that from what you have so repeatedly urged upon this subject, it is pretty evident that the first of these causes, instead of having ceased, must continue to increase progressively; and, consequently, the disposition and temptation to export must increase along with it. I should imagine likewise that the second cause, viz. the disposition to hoard, would have likewise increased. That disposition arose either from the apprehension of the total loss of value by the paper, in case of an attack from France, or of any sudden alarm; or from the conviction that as the paper was silently but certainly hastening to the utmost point of depreciation, it was prudent and wise, in this case as in the other, for each one to have by him a little bag of guineas, whereby he might supply his necessities during the confusion that would arise in the period, betwixt the annihilation of the paper and the re-appearance of gold in sufficient abundance for general use The ap prehension of the speedy arrival of the French seems, indeed, to be daily wearing off, and, consequently those, who may have been induced by that dread alone to amass a hoard, may with perfect consitsency, if not with perfect prudence, now dissipate it. The other call, however, on every prudent man, to collect a few guineas and keep them by him, instead of decreasing, certainly becomes more loud and strong every day —Accordingly, I can account for the re-appearance of gold only upon two grounds; either first, on the principle that the French not now being likely to come over (a question which I am not now willing to discuss), the necessity of a hoard is less pressing; and this ground relates only to those who provided merely under that apprehension; or, secondly, on the supposition, which will bear alike upon all hoarders that they cannot afford to allow part of their capital thus to lie idle and dormant. To those who act upon the first of these grounds I shall only say, that as every precaution must be taken against a contingency and not against a certainty; each man must judge for himself whether the advantage resulting from the precaution, if the contingency happens, is sufficient to counterbalance the expense and trouble of it, in case it does not-To those who dissipate their hoards from being unwilling to incur the expense of keeping them sac.ed; I could suggest the propriety, I had almost said the necessity, of submitting to it.-In this case as in the last, each man must judge for himself, and on the same principle; but it should never be forgotten that while one cause of the disappear: nce of gold, the hoarding, ceases to operate; the other cause, the exportation continues not only in full vigour, but to act with increased energy-Our paper is now so depreciated, that it is quite vain to expect that ga neas will remain in circulation along with it. Those which are not hoarded, will most undoubtedly be exported; and will continue to be so; till not one is left in the country People then should recollect, what will be the universal distress in case of a total loss of value by the paper, if no guineas are forthcoming from private hoards to supply its place. Some people may expect that there is a large accumulation of cash in the Bank; which will be drawn out to relieve the ne< cessities of the moment: but supposing that to be the case, it will undoubtedly be the business of those in power not to allow this resource to be dissipated in relieving and assisting individuals, but to be retained for the use of government. And in the suppo sition that this is not the case; (to which opision I certainly very strongly incline) they will not have the prospect even of that tardy relief which might then be expected. In short, I must corsider the dissipation of these private hoards as a most unfortunate circumstance, and I have, therefore, tronbled you, Mr. Cobbett, with this short letter, in hopes that they may induce people to be more provident of them.—In paper money, not convertible into gold, no vast confidence can be placed. The first mo ment of alarm, it will cease to have any exchangeable value altogether; and as there is every reason to suppose that the providence of government has not been sufficient to amass a supply of guineas for the dreaded emergency, the private hoards seem our best and only resource.-Before I conclude this letter, I must express my perfect agree. ment with your correspondent, Agricola, as to the remedy of depreciated notes. The remedy he proposes would undoubtedly be effectual; but, at the same time, it would be very difficult to carry it into ef fect. I believe nothing but an association of large landed proprietors, with that avowed object, could have any effect. Such an association I should be happy to see.-I am yours, &c.-ANNIBAL. October 22, 1804 THE CATAMARAN, AN EXCELLENT NEW BALLAD, In imitation and to the tune of " Malbrook s'en "va-t'en guerre." DUNDAS is gone to Boulogne He has a pawky plan To burn the French flotilla, 'Tis call'd Catamaran. Like ladies in romances DUNDAS is come off Boulogne; DUNDAS our tars haranguing |