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In answer to observations upon the decline of the nation, we are always reminded of the fate of former gloomy predictions upon the same subject; and, that patient gentleman, Sir John Sinclair, has taken the pains to collect together passages from twenty or thirty authors, who have, at various times, predicted the ruin" of England from the effects of the national debt. I shall, in the course of these letters, take an opportunity of showing, that the far greater part of what the most of these authors regarded as the ruin of their country, did, pretty nearly in the time and manner predicted, take place; and that, in many instances, the consequences apprehended were mitigated or prevented altogether, by the measures which their predictions produced. But, unless it be pretended, that, because some past predictions have not been fulfilled, no future ones, relative to the fall of a nation, can be fulfilled, this mode of answering cannot be very satisfactory, at least, until it be shown, that the circumstances, under which former gloomy predictions were made, were similar to, or of a nature still more dangerous, than the circumstances of the present times. It is not my intention here to enter into the subject of the papermoney system; that system will be treated of as a cause, and not as a mark of national decline; but, I cannot forbear just to notice how weak that argument in favour of the funding system must be, which is built upon the failure of the predictions of those who thought they foresaw a national bankruptcy in times when a measure like that of" bank-restriction" had never entered into the mind of man. What resemblance was there, in this respect, between those times and the present? Never till within these eight years was there a scarcity of coin known in England. Till then paper was merely an auxiliary currency. Till then there were no notes under five pounds, now there are in the kingdom notes down to a value so low as that of a depreciated sixpence. Yet, it is with these facts before his eyes, and without a single instance in the history of the world of an extensive degraded paper currency having recovered from its degradation, that Sir John Sinclair has thought proper to produce predictions of a century ago, and from their failure (without proving it) to argue that the present predictions, relating to the same subject, are false!It is, however, precisely in the same way that we are answered, when we insist upon the political dangers and decline of the country. We are told that such apprehensions have been before ex

pressed over and over again; but, no mention is made of those apprehensions, which, at different times, have proved well founded, nor any acknowledgment of the fulfilment of certain predictions, in part if not in whole. The decline of the country has been insisted on, and its subjugation (always conditionally) has been predicted; and, because it has not yet actually been subjuga ted, we are hence bid to conclude, that it has not declined, and that it will not fall. But, unless the persons who have male this conclusion insist that the fall of this kingdom is an abs lute impossibility, it behoves them, before they press their conclusion upon me, to show, as in the case of the paper-money system, that the nation has ever before been placed in circumstances equally dangeroas to those of the present. When they have shown me this; when they have referred me to a time that saw England without an ally upon the continent, and France in complete possession of all the coast of Europe from the Baltic to the Gulph of Ve. nice, particularly that of Flanders and Holland, countries without whose perfect independence as to France it was a fixed maxim with English statesmen that England could never be safe; when they have shown me the time that the threats of France held the whole people of England in a state of bodily requisition for the mere defence of their native soil, totally uncertain of the moment when they should be called on to inundate their fields, to burn their houses, and to destroy their cattle, lest they should afford succour to an invading French army: when they can point to the time, that, in a war with France, the utmost hope expressed by Englishmen was to be able to defend their wives and their fire-sides, and, that, so great was their terror, they publicly implored the Almighty to save them from being swallowed up quick" when, in short, they can show me a time, since the battle of Hastings, since the day when an army of Frenchmen invaded England, de. feated an army of Englishmen, conquered the country, enslaved the people, and dishonoured their language and their name; if, since that day any other can be shown me when England stood in such awe of France as she does at this moment, then will I acknowledge that my anxiety for the safety and honour of my country may have augmented its dangers and disgrace; but, if no such instance can be shown me, I shall remain sincerely convinced, that we are in a fearful state of national decline, and, under that conviction, together with the hope of contributing in some small degree to

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TRISH PAPER MONEY.

SIR,-Two circumstances have lately occurred in regard to the paper currency of Ireland, which are particularly deserving of

animadversion. The first is the refusal of the bank directors to adopt the plan proposed by Mr. Foster to lower the rates of exchange; the second the advance in these rates to 15 per cent. on London.-It is to be hoped that the discussions of so dry a subject, though it has lost much of its novelty, will not be considered as undeserving of attention, for though better understood, the state of the currency in this country is still of such a nature, as to require even more frequent discussion, and some immediate measures to arrest the evils which attend it. So far as exertions have hitherto been made, they have produced no other effect, than the proof of the cause of the malady. No specific step has been taken, nor any tacit reformation teen adopted, not even in consequence of the decisive judgment of parliament, and its authority in support of the charge, which has been made against the conduct of the bank directors. The attention therefore of every one, who is interested in the result of the restriction Jaw, whether as to its operations in Ireland or in Great Britain, should not be with-held from the events which occur in the former country, because they are events, which carry with them positive loss to individuals, and afford practical proof of the tendencies of this law to produce similar loss and similar hazard in Great Britain. The approaching meeting of parliament renders the present claim on the consideration of the public still more particularly in season, because it is but reasonable to expect, that, after the unqualified opinion which the committee of Irish exchange have passed upon the causes of the high rates of it, parliament should pursue the subject, and adopt measures calculated to put an end to the depreciation of bank paper.In respect to the circum stances which have of late taken place, it is undoubtedly of consequence, that the pub. lie should be acquainted with the cause of the failure of the remedy of depreciation, which had been recomo.erded by the committer. The conduct of the bank directors is the sole cause of it. It is are known to every one, that Mr. Foster proposed to them

the plan for lowering the exchange mentioned in the report of the committee, similar to that, which, under the same circumstances, was adopted, and was successful in Scotland, namely, the plan of forming a fund in London, on which the bank might draw, by the means of its extensive capital, in competition with the usual dealers in exchange, but with this very favourable circumstance with regard to the state of things in Ireland, that the loan afforded this fund was without expense; whereas the forming of a fund in London was attended both by expense and risk where the directors of the Scotch chartered bank undertook to bring exchange to par. But this plan the Irish directors would not even entertain so far as to permit it to become a subject of their deliberation; and why? because three-fourths of them are themselves dealers in exchange. Three-fourths of those, who can command the greatest commercial capital in Ireland, are interested in the fluctuation and high rates of exchange between Dublin and London. Hence, Mr. Cobbett, we arrive at the bottom of the whole secret. In this manner it comes to light, why those worthy mercantile statesmen, men of universal endowments, and many of whom were exa. mined before the committee, have so ardently, and with so consistent and uniform integrity hoodwinked, as it were, the question of depreciation. The wise men of the banks have in no instance so strenuously supported the rule of thumb, as in the controversy respecting the causes of the high rates of exchange -The governor and deputy governor of the bank of Ireland did certainly abet the doctrine of the balance of trade with so much earnestness, that it was not easy to be accounted for; though what might hen appear surprising, is now easy of explanation. But occurrences of great abuse, Mr. Cobbett, which take place in Ireland, are so frequently thought light of because they are Irish, and because abuses are common in Ireland, that it is necessary to illustrate the abuse in question by sup posing it possible that a similar occurrence had happened in London. For instance, if, by any great paradox in politics, the emperor of Germany had paid two millions of his debt; and if, during the period of remit tance, the exchange between London and Hanburgh had been very unfavourable, and liable to great fluctuation in the rates of it ; and if, after a solemn inquiry into the causes of it by parliament, it should be required. by Mr. Pitt of the bank directors to assi-t him in a plan, which he had matured for lowering the rates of exchange by altering

the mode of remitting this loan; if, aftertaining high fluctuating rates of exchange. such preliminary events, the bank directors should refuse to act in dealings in exchange, when the interest of the public was concerned, and it should become notorious that the reason for so refusing to act, was because it would interfere with the private exchange dealings in which they had been, and expected to be engaged, and their jobbing on the past remittances of the loan; would not the voice of every one be raised against them? Such has been the precise mode of conduct of the bank directors of Ireland in respect to the remittances of the loans in London, the fluctuations in the rates of exchange, and the remedy proposed by the Irish chancellor of the exchequer. Such conduct, Mr. Cobbett, is reprehensible to a degree not admitting of terms adequate of expressing it. Let any one consider who the directors of the bank of Ireland are, and what their functions. Let him duly estimate the operations of an immense accumulation of capital in a country, where capitals are generally small. Let him look back to the object and uses of the institution of the bank, and he will be convinced, that the present directors have forfeited the confidence of their constituents, the bank proprietors, and betrayed their trust as guardians of the public interest. The object of the institution was to maintain commercial credit. The object of the proprietors in appointing directors, is to select such men as are best qualified to maintain and fairly improve the value of their stock. How much benefit has been virtually afforded to commercial credit by those excessive issues of paper which have produced so great a depreciation, and which have led to the annihilation of silver currency, and nearly to the destruction of the retail trade of Dublin, it is easy to calculate and how far the value of bank stock is promoted by another consequence of depreciation, namely, the high rates of exchange, is still to be experienced, when the directors of the bank will be called upon to pay their notes in guineas, on the re-triction being taken off in England. But the public have the greatest reason of complaint, because the bank was established by the public through parliament, to protect its interests, so far as they were concerned in all matters relating to the circulation of the country. The public gave the bank the authority under which the accumulation of a prodigious capital is made to operate with all the efficacy of active and secret administration, and yet it is this capital which is brought to the public market in Dublin to injure the public by its operations in main

-The whole object of the institution is perverted, and this in a most eminent de gree, for the directors even refuse to co-ope rate with the officers of government. In respect, therefore, to the existence of the co operation of the bank of Ireland we may with reason infer from what has been already advanced, that it has produced much injury to the public through its great command of capital, and that it is deficient as an institution calculated to aid the financial measures of the country. That, in fact, it is of no further service than any commercial partner, ship would be, that by its dealings can wake large dividends and bonuses on its stock; and, that in short, it is a striking proof of the injurious nature of all bodies corporate, and of monopoly, in whatever shape it appears, under the protection of the law. But to return to the immediate object of this letter, the refusal of the bank to become a party in promoting an exchange at par between this country and Great Britain: let us, in the first place, examine by what other means this desideratum can be effected. It appears to me, 'Mr. Cobbett, that no other remedy is left for our choice than the interference of parliament, to compel the bank to pay their notes, with those of the bank of England. This every one must admit would be a certain remedy; but the bank directors of Ireland will assert, that such a measure would be their certain ruin; Mr. Puget, their agent in London, has declared this opinion, before the committee, (Min, of Evidence, p. 4). But surely the committee did not examine those who were interested in dealings in exchange, to acquire opinions for the purpose of adopting them as their, own, but to procure such information by their examinations as might enable them to form a correct opinion on the subject.The committee have, in their report, refuted every other opinion which was advanced by those gentlemen, who formed a part of the body corporate of the Irish bank, and had they felt it necessary to report on the specific measure of making them pay in bank of England notes, there can be little doubt, that the same fate would have attended Mr. Puget's doctrine in this instance, as awaited it in so many others. But, under every circumstance, this doctrine is very suspicious, and, if considered in detail, will prove radically fallacious. Mr. Puget says (in answer to the question, "what do you conceive to "be the objections to sneh a measure being adopted?) If the balance of debt should continue against Ireland, ultimately the ruin of the bank, by its paying the whole

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Ireland, and the exports of the rents of ab-
sentees, the quantity of bills on the Ex-
change in Dublin will be greater than
the quantity on the Exchange in Lon-
don, or in other words, there will be
a sufficiency of bills at all times in Dub-
lin to answer the demands of the re-
mitters, without rendering it necessary for
them to have recourse to the Bank for Bank
of England notes. But, if even the remit-
ters did apply to the Bank in preference to
the holders of bills, the Bank would have the
power of being the purchasers of these bills
at par, and thus be able to procure Bank of
England notes at par. The immediate re-
duction of the price of Bills on London to
par, being an inevitable consequence of the
Bank paying in English notes, and the con-
stant supply of these bills being also an in-
evitable consequence of the export trade,
the balance being in favour of Ireland, this
remedy if adopted, could not produce the
loss of £5 to the Bank. There could not be
any failure of the plan, unless the holders of
bills on Loudon were able to keep them out
of the market, and to throw all the demand
of the remitters on the Bank; but as such
an attempt must be made by the common
consent of all those who have them, as the
Bank may obtain possession of large quanti-
tities of them, and as it would require a ca-
pital as great or greater than the capital of
the Bank, to render the measure of with-
holding them of sufficient effect to produce
any loss to the Bank; there is no good rea-
son to suppose that any attempt of the kind
would ever be made.--Thus, it is very
evident, that nothing is wanting to secure an
exchange at par, except the payment by the
Bank of the notes they issue with Bank of
England notes; and further, that it is im-
possible that any loss can attend that mea-
sure so long as the balance of payment is in
favour of Ireland. As the committee, there-
fore, have been able to prove that this ba-
lance is, and always has been favourable,
and have clearly explained the ground on
which it is manifest that it will continue to
be so, there should be no time lost, in my
opinion, Mr. Cobbett, to impose upon the
Bank of Ireland the obligation of doing

"loss of the exchange of the country." And as Mr. Puget and Mr. D'Olier and Mr. Colville, and many other dealers in exchange, have asserted, that the balance of debt is against Ireland, ergo, the bank of Ireland must be ruined by such a measure being adopted. But the assertions of these gentlemen have been exposed as altogether unfounded, by the able and deliberate decision of the Exchange Committee. This committee, composed of some of the most intelligent members of the House, after a close and daily application for upwards of three months; after having had a full opportunity of consulting every thing that had been said or written on the subject, have declared, that the balance on all accounts, is in favour of Ireland to a very considerable amount. The reasoning, therefore, of the Exchange dealers in respect to the measure of paying in Bank of England notes is exposed as fallacious, and bears very much the appearance of being the result of private considerations, and it may safely be contended, that, if the Bank of Ireland were obliged to pay their notes in those of the Bank of England, there would be no ruin to be apprehended, and through the operations of a favourable balance, no possibility even of any loss accruing upon the transaction. But, in order to express the mode of argument here made use of in a more practical manner, let us suppose that a law had passed directing the Bank of Ireland to pay in Bank of England notes, as they formerly did in guineas, on the 1st day of next month; and even let us suppose, that the rates of Exchange of Dublin on London were as they actually are, 15 per cent. what would be the effect on the funds of the Bank? It would be said by the Exchange dealers, that all persons wanting to remit to London would apply to the Bank for bills, and produce a drain of English notes, which would end only with their entire ruin. That this would not be the result it is by no means difficult to explain. The exports of Ireland maintain, at all times, a certain supply of merchants' bills on London, which are daily sold on the Exchange. These bills must be disposed of, and converted into Irish paper for the purpose of enabling the exporting merchant to go on with his busi-justice to their creditors, so far as adopting

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ness. The remitters therefore, to London, would still have the market of the Exchange to supply them with bills; and these bills must be disposed of at par, when the buyer has his option to refuse to take them, or go to the Bank and procure Bank of England notes. So long, therefore, as the exports of Ireland together with the imports of loans, amount to a greater sum than the imports of

Bank of England paper in the place of gui-
neas as payment of their notes, is capable
of affording that justice.This letter,
Sir, has been unavoidably extended to so
great a length, that it will be necessary for
me to postpone the further consideration of
the subject of it to another opportunity. I
have the honour, &c.
I, T.

Dublin, Oct. 18, 1804

66

CATHOLICS OF IRELAND.

SIR,-In your last number, page 507, you observe justly, that "forty thousand 66 men, ready to embark from England at a "day's notice, would have prevented Napo"leon from becoming emperor." You also observe, page 495, that "invasion cannot "be repelled without a powerful army," and you then inquire very naturally, "how you ought to proceed in order to obtain "such an army?"I answer that highly important question thus: EMANCIPATE THE CATHOLICS OF IRELAND, and you can form a disposeable army of 100,000 excellent troops within six months.--Allow me, Sir, to recall your attention to the affairs of Ireland. The British possessions in the East and West Indies may enrich the mother-country and feed her commerce, but they are a continual drain of her physical strength; they employ many thousands of her best soldiers and sailors, and yet some of her most valued colonies are said to be on the eve of revolt or of insolvency.-IRELAND is the sole remaining resource of this empire. A timely attention to it will avert the downfal of England, consolidate her credit, double her strength, and re-establish her authority abroad. On the other hand, nothing can be more ruinous to England than the present treatment of that country. It is wholly owing to the ignorance of our statesmen, and to the inattention of the British public. England is now obliged to maintain nearly 50 000 troops in Ireland for the sole purpose of preventing rebellion. Here is an excellent army locked up and actually mouldering away. England has been further obliged, for some years past, to lend about three millions annually for the service of Ireland, and must continue to do so, if she adheres to her present system, because the yearly revenue, as Mr. Foster has lately shewn, is absorbed by the interest of the Irish debt, even as it now stands. Not a shilling of this money can ever be repaid to England. Not a soldier can ever be spared for the defence of England. Ireland also requires, and actually employs, I know not how many ships of war for the sole protection of her coast.--Now, Sir, let us examine what might be effected, by wisdom, for the relief of England from so enormous an incumbrance, and for her support against the common enemy; and for that purpose, I beg leave to premise a few facts, little known or noticed, but, in my mind, of immense importance. These facts are communicated to you by a person who knows England and Ireland well, who loves both Countries equally, and hopes to see them

long and cordially united together in strength and affection.--Ireland contains five millions of inhabitants. Four millions of

these, at the least, are catholics; of these the males are two millions, who can muster 400,000, capable of bearing arms. These are men, generally of robust frames, daring souls, hardy education, and, altogether, of that structure of body and temper, which, by the agility of the one and the impetuosity of the other, is peculiarly fitted for warfare against France. Let experienced officers testify, whether there are any more desirable soldiers and sailors for a foreign expedition than the Irish, who have served under them in Egypt, Holland, and both the Indies. The alertness and military strictness of Irish serjeants are proverbial in the regiments of the line. Now, Sir, of these four hundred thousand fighting men about one hundred thousand are actually serving in our navy, army, militia and yeomanry. They are almost all non-commissioned officers or privates. The remaining three hundred thousand are dispersed throughout Ireland, not engaged in the general defence, or properly invited so to do. They are principally husbandmen, artists, peasants and day-labourers.From infancy the catholics of Ireland are obliged, by their political situation, to turn their thoughts to politics, to compare their condition with that of their fellow-subjects, to inquire after the usages and affairs of foreign nations, and to study the works of various political writers. He. ce are formed habits of research and discussion. Hence a mutual commnisseration, an antipathy to servitude, and a longing for relief. Persecution endears their religion to their hearts, and every new insult offered to their clergy, every unjust accusation_preferred against their principles, only tends to compress this formidable body of men into a firm and compact phalanx. Yet they are far from being a priest-ridden people. On the contrary, they are wholly indifferent about the aggrandizement of their clergy, and by no means liberal in donations for their support. Their nobility and gentry are men of ancient families, tolerably well educated, of high and old fashioned honour, scrupulous integrity, and, if they are unversed in the routine of public life, they are likewise untainted by habits of venality or servile intrigue.--Their bishops and priests are about 2,200 in number. The merits of this class are as various as their habits of life, the rank of their respective families, and

* See Mr. Newenham's Essay on the Population of Ireland.

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