the Eneid to an Epigram of Martial. But Ch. II. the longest Extenfion, with which Grammar has to do, is the Extension here confider'd, that is to fay a SENTENCE. The greater Extenfions (fuch as Syllogifms, Paragraphs, Sections, and complete Works) belong not to Grammar, but to Arts of higher order; not to mention that all of them are but Sentences repeated. Now a SENTENCE (c) may be sketch'd in the following defcription-a compound C 2 Quantity tem, aut Interrogantem vocant; vel rem: fique rem, vel cum ipfum confequi cupit, quicum loquitur, ut in optante oratione, vel aliquam ejus actionem: atque in bâc, vel ut a præftantiore, ut in Deprecatione; vel ut ab inferiore, ut in eo, qui proprie Jussus nominatur. Sola autem Enuncians a cognofcendi facultate proficifcitur : bacque nunciat rerum cognitionem, quæ in nobis eft, aut veram, aut fimulatam. Itaque Hæc fola verum falfumque capit: præterea vero nulla. Ammon, in Lib. de Interpretatione. (c) Λόγω δὲ φωχή συνθετὴ σημαντική, ἧς ἔνια μέρη καθ ̓ αὐτὰ σημαίνει τι. Arift. Poet. c. 20. See alfo de Inter pret. c. 4. Ch. II. Quantity of Sound fignificant, of which certain Parts are themselves alfo fignificant. THUS when I fay [the Sun fbineth] not only the whole quantity of found has a meaning, but certain Parts also, such as [Sun] and [bineth.] BUT what shall we fay? Have these Parts again other Parts, which are in like manner fignificant, and fo may the progrefs be pursued to infinite? Can we fuppose all Meaning, like Body, to be divifible, and to include within itself other Meanings. without end? If this be abfurd then must we neceffarily admit, that there is fuch a thing as a a Sound fignificant, of which no Part is of itself fignificant. And this is what we call the proper character of a (d) WORD. For thus, though the Words (α) Φωνή σημαντική, ής μέρος ἐδεν ἰσι καθ' αυτὸ onμarrior. De Poetic. c. 20. De Interpret. C. 2. 3. Prifcian's Definition of a Word (Lib. 2.) is as follows Words [Sun] and [Shineth] have each a Ch. II. Meaning, yet is there certainly no Meaning in any of their Parts, neither in the Syllables of the one, nor in the Letters of the other. IF therefore ALL SPEECH whether in profe or verfe, every Whole, every Section, every Paragraph, every Sentence, imply a certain Meaning, divifible into other Meanings, but WORDS imply a Meaning, which is not fo divifible: it follows that WORDS will be the Smalleft parts of Speech, in as much as nothing less has ing at all. any Mean follows-Dictio eft pars minima orationis conftructæ, id eft, in ordine compofitæ. Pars autem, quantum ad totum intelligendum, id eft, ad totius fenfus intellectum. Hoc autem ideo dictum eft, nequis conetur vires in duas partes dividere, hoc eft, in vi& res; non enim ad totum intelligendum hæc fit divifio. To Prifcian we may add Theodore Gaza.-Λέξις δέ, μέρα ἐλάχισον κατὰ σύνταξιν λόγο. Introd. Gram. 1. 4. Plato fhewed them this characteristic of a Word-See Cratylus, p. 385. Edit. Serr, Ch. II. To know therefore the Species of Words must needs contribute to the knowledge of Speech, as it implies a knowledge of its minuteft Parts. THIS therefore muft become our next Inquiry. СНАР. CHA P. III. Concerning the Species of Words, the fmalleft L ET us first search for the Species of Ch. III. commonly received by Grammarians. For The man, that hath no mufic in himself, Is fit for treafons Here the Word [The] is an ARTICLE;- |