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interest was to cease. Subsequently Plaintiff signed his name thereto and delivered it to the endorsees. Before S. k Co. notified Defendants of the transfer to them, Plaintiff gave them notice that he revoked and countermanded it, but Defendants, notwithstanding, paid it over to S. k Co. on receiving an indemnity from them. Plaintiff subsequently made a formal demand upon Defendants for the money, which was not complied with.

Quiere: In an action by Plaintiff against Defendants how far they were authorized to set up in answer, as a payment good in equity, that the deposit receipt had been transferred by Plaintiff to S. k Co., and that they had paid the amount to S. k Co. accordingly. C. P., vol. xxi, p. 492.

Munro vs. Cox.—Declaration on a note payable to G, or order. Plea non fecit. The note when produced was payable to G or order, "for the use of M."

Held: No variance, for it was declared on according to its legal effect.

There was also an equitable plea, setting out facts which, if true, shewed that M, was not entitled to the money, and alleging that the Plaintiff, the endorsee of G, took it with notice.

Held: That the fact of the note being expressed to be for the use of M, was no evidence of such notice, for this shewed only M's right as against G, whereas the plea was in denial of his right. U. C. Q. Pt. vol. xxx, p. 363.

Macklem $ al. vs. Thome .j- at.—Upon a sale of hides by weight, of specified qualities, according to inspection, *'. e. " cared and inspected No. 1 hides ' &c.

Held: That the weight was ascertained and marked by the Inspector, under 27-28 Vic., ch. 21, and 29-30, Vic. ch. 2-1, were binding upon the parties, in the absence of anything in the agreement to the contrary.

Held, also: That the seller must pay the Inspector's fees, the agreement not providing otherwise.

Held, also: That upon the evidence, set out in the case. the Defendants were acting as principals, not as agents for the Plaintiffs, the purchasers, and therefore could not charge commission. Q. B., vol. xxx, 464.

McInnes vs. Milton.—Where the Defendant signed, as maker, a printed form of a promissory note, and handed it to A, by whom it was filled up for $853, and the Plaintiffs afterwards became endorsers of it for value without notice.

Held: That the Defendant was liable, though it might have been fraudulently or improperly tilled up or endorsed. Q. B., vol. xxx, P489.

The Royal Cunadiim Bank rs. Kerr.—A banking firm in Toronto, having become embarassed by gold operations in New York, applied to the Plaintiffs to whom they owed $50,000, to advance them $15,000 more; and in order to obtain the advance, they offered to secure both debts by a mortgage on the real estate of one of the partners, worth S30,000. The Plaintiffs agreed, made the advance and obtained the mortgage. In less than three months afterwards the debtors became insolvent under the Act. They were indebted beyond their means of paying at the time of executing the mortgage, but they did not consider themselves so, nor were the mortgagees aware of it. The mortgage was not given from a desire to prefer the mortgagees over other creditors, but solely as a means of obtaining the advance which they thought would enable them to go on with their business and pay all their creditors.

Held: That as respects the antecedent debt, the mortgage was valid as against the assignee in insolvency. C. C, vol. xvii, p. 47.

The Queen vs. Puttee. A sciri facias to set aside a patent at the instance of a private relator without the fiat of either the AttorneyGeneral of the Dominion or of Ontario having been first obtained. Held: 1. That a fiat was necessary. 2. That the Attorney-General of Ontario was the proper authority to grant the fiat in such a case. Canada Law Journal, vol. 7, p. 71.

Clemens qui tam is. Berner. Returns of convictions and fines for criminal offences being governed by the Dominion Statute, 32-33 Vic., cap. 31, sec. 76, and not by the Law Reform Act of 1868, are only requested to be made semi-annually to the General Sessions of the Peace. Semble, that the right to legislate upon this subject belongs to the Dominion Parliament, and is not conferred upon the Provincial Legislatures by the B. N. A. Act, 1867. (7 C. L. J. 73).


Bill Of Lading.—B bought cotton for A, at his request, and B transmitted a bill of lading and invoice thereof to C, his correspondent. The invoice, a duplicate of which was sent to A, described the cotton as shipped " on account and risk of A." C sent A the bill of lading, with a bill of exchange unaccepted, but retained the bill of lading. C stopped the delivery of the cotton to A.

Held: That accepting the bill of exchange was a condition precedent to the right to hold the bill of lading, and that in this case the cotton remained the property of B.

Shepherd <y Harrison. 5 L. R. H. L. 116; s. c. 4, L. R. Q. B. 196, 493.

Contempt.—By the Constitution Act for the Colony of Victoria, (The Imperial Statute 18 & 19 Vic. c. 55, s. 35, and the Colonial Act "20th Vict. No. 1) power is given to the Legislative Assembly of Victoria to commit by a general warrant for contempt and breach of privilege of that Assembly.*

G. was declared, by the House of Assembly of Victoria, to have committed a contempt and breach of privilege, and, under the Speaker's Warrant, which was in general terms, without specifying any specific offence; G. was committed to gaol. G. was afterwards brought up by Habeas Corpus and discharged out of custody by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in the Colony, on the ground that the above Constitution Statute and Colonial Act did not confer upon the Legislative Assembly the same powers, privileges and immunities as are possessed by the House of Commons. On appeal held by the Judicial Committee:

First: That the Statute and Act gave to the Legislative Assembly the same powers and privileges as the House of Commons had at the time of the passing of the 18 & 19 Vic. c. 55, of committing for contempt.

Secondly: That, incident to those powers and privileges, there was vested in the Legislative Assembly the right of judging for itself what constituted a contempt, and of ordering the commitment to prison of persons adjudged by the House to have been guilty of a contempt and breach of privilege by a general warrant without setting forth the specific grounds of such commitment; and

Thirdly: That as G. had been guilty of a contempt and breach of the privileges of the Legislative Assembly, and bad been duly committed; therefore, the Supreme Court bad no power to discharge him out of custody.

Special leave to appeal granted, on the ground that the question raised was one of public interest, involving the Constitutional rights of a Colonial Legislative Assembly. On reversing the order of the Court below, no costs were given, as the appeal was only allowed to decide the abstract question.

The Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of Victoria, Ajipelt., § Hugh Glass, Result. 3 L. R., P. C. 560.

Contract.—A pianist engaged to play on it certain day, but was prevented by illness.

Held: That there was an implied condition in the contract that illness should excuse her.

Robinson vs. Davidson. 0 L. R. Ex. 269.

Criminal Law.—A woman living apart from her husband, and having custody of their infant child, left it at her husband's door,

* See for like power given to Senate and House of Commons of Canada, The British North America Act 1867 & 31 Vic. c. 23, 8.1 (Canada).

telling him she had done so. The husband allowed it to remain from 7 P.m. to 1 A.M.

Held: That the husband was guilty of wilfully abandoning and exposing the child.

Reg. vs. White. 1 L. R. C. 0. 311.

The Defendant killed a number of rabbits, left them in bags in a ditch, in the grounds where killed, as a place of deposit, and subsequently returned and took them away.

Held: That the killing and taking away were one continuous act, and the Defendant was not guilty of larceny but felony.

Reg. vs. Tovmley. 1 L. R. C. C. 315.

A reduction to writing of an oral statement previously given under oath, is a deposition, though not itself sworn to. Reg. vs. Fletcher. 1 L. R. 0. C. 320.

Domicile.—A British subject domiciled in France, had two illegitimate children by a French woman, whom he afterward married, when the children were legitimated according to the law of France.

Held: That the status of the children in Englan was to be determined by the law of France.

Skottowe vs. Young. 11 L. R. Eq. 474.

Railway.—Plaintiff took a ticket from Defendant, railway company, from A to C, at B, between A and C, said company's line joined the line of another company, over which the Defendants had, by Act of Parliament, running powers to C, on payment of tolls, the traffic arrangements being with the second company by said Act. Defendants train ran into a train of the other company, through negligence of the latter, and the Plaintiff was injured.

Held: That the Defendants were liable for such negligence. It seems the contract is that reasonable care shall be exercised by all by whom such care is necessary, for reasonably safe conveyance to the end of the journey.

Thomas vs. Rhymney Railway Co. 6 L. R. Q. B. 266, s. c. 5 L. R. Q. B., 226.

Will.—Testator owning real estate in England and Scotland devised " all the rest, residue and remainder of my real estate situate in any part of the United Kingdom, or elsewhere," in trust for his two sons. The will was incompetent to pass the Scotch estate, which descended to the eldest son as heir.

Held: That the heir must elect, between the Scotch estate and the benefits under the will.

Orrell vs. Orrell. 6 L. R. Ch. 302.


Merchant^ Bank v>. Slate Bank.—The Merchants Bank of Boston bought certain gold, in certificates and coin, under a contract with M, by which SI had a right to purchase of the bank the same amount on certain terms. After this, M. & S., cashier of the State Bank, came together to the Merchants' Bank, and said they had come for gold, S. saying that he would pay for it by certifying Ms. checques. The gold was delivered to S. who wrote on two cheques drawn by M. on the State Bank, " Good,"' signed by himself as cashier, and gave them to the cashier of the Merchants' Bank, the next day. The president of the latter presented them for payment at the State Bank, when S. told him that the certificates had been there, but were not there now and that he would get the money and pay the checques. It was not shown what became of the gold. M. had no deposit in the State Bank, and it refused to pay the checques, denying its cashiers authority to certify them. Both banks were organized under the National Banking Act, and had the powers given by it; among others the power of buying gold. The by-laws of the State Bank made the cashier "responsible for the moneys, funds and other valuables of the bank," and required that all contracts, cheques, drafts, receipts. &c, ana all indorsements necessary to be made by the bank, -; should be signed by him or the president. The directors had not defined his duties more specifically, but it appeared that S. was intrusted by the directors with large powers, without a special delegation of authority ; that an account was kept between him and the bank, which represented his transactions; that he gave cheques in lieu of bills. when discounts were made: gave cheques for the purchase of exchange, and for money borrowed of other banks, and had done so to a very large amount. A large number of cashiers from other banks in Boston testified that they exercised the same powers, and were authorised to borrow and lend the money of their banks, and to each other, and to pledge the credit of their banks; and that these transactions were uniformly conducted on the faith of the cashier's implied powers. There was no proof that either S. or any of them had ever certified cheques or purchased gold: the Supreme Court of Massachusetts having decided that a teller could not certify cheques.

Held: 1. That it" the certificates and the gold actually went into the State Bank, the bank was liable for money had and received, whatever detect there may have been in the cashier's authority to buy them. 2. If they did not, it was a question for the jury upon the evidence as to the powers exercised by him and the usage of the other banks, whether his power to bind the bank by his contract might not fairly be inferred, applying the rule that where an innocent party deals with a corporation, unaware of any defect in its agent's authority, and there being nothing to excite suspicion, if the contract can in fact be valid under any circumstances, the party has a right

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