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120. Jugé que la maxime: "Contrà non valentem agere non currit præseriptio ne s'applique pas à la prescription d'un an stipulée dans une police d'as

surance.

Browning et The Provincial Assurance Company, C.S. Per Beaudry, J. Jugement confirmé en appel purement et simple

ment.

Per Duval, Caron, Badgley et Monk; 10 mars 1871.

VI.-Décret.

130. Cette cour avant la mise en force du Code de Procédure Civile décida que l'adjudicataire d'un immeuble désigné comme contenant 400 arpens, lorsqu'en réalité il n'en contenait que 188 a droit de recouvrer l'excédant du prix qu'il a payé. Desjardins et La Banque du Peuple, 8 L. C. J., p. 106.

Per Sir LaFontaine, Mondelet et Badgley; Aylwin et Duval, diss.

Doutre & Elvidge, 10 décembre 1870.

Per Duval, Monk et Loranger; contrà, Caron et Badgley.

Aucun des articles du Code n'est indiqué comme de droit nouveau. De plus le Code n'a pas prévu le cas où la contenance est donnée dans la saisie de l'immeuble; il ne parle que des saisies de corps certains par numéros ou par tenants et aboutissants s'il n'y a pas de cadastre dans la localité.

130. Depuis le Code de Procédure Civile, la vente du Shérif est sans garantie de mesure, quand même cette mesure serait indiquée dans les annonces et dans le titre du shérif; et l'adjudicataire d'un emplacement de ville designé comme contenant 10,725 pieds lorsqu'en realité il n'en contient que 7738, soit une différence en moins de 2987 pieds, n'a droit à aucune diminution du prix.

Per Duval, Caron et Badg ley; contrà, Drummond et Monk.

Melançon et Hamilton, 10 mars 1871.

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140. L'article 1585 du Code Civil dit: "Dans les ventes judiciaires sur exécution, l'acheteur, au cas d'éviction, peut recouvrer le prix qu'il a payé avec les intérêts et les frais du titre; il peut aussi recouvrer ce prix avec intérêt des créanciers qui l'ont touché, sauf leur exception aux fins de discuter les biens du débiteur."

140. Jugé que cet article ne s'applique qu'au cas d'éviction totale et non à celui d'éviction partielle.

Même cause.

VII.-Preuve du don manuel.

L'article 776 du Code Civil dit: "La donation des choses mobilières, accompagnée de délivrance, peut être faite et acceptée par acte sous seing privé ou par convention verbale."

150. La preuve testimoniale des dons manuels accompagnés de livraison, est admissible. Mahoney et McCready, 15

L. C. Rep. 275.

Per Duval, Meredith, Drum

mond, Mondelet et Badgley. Colville et Flanagan, 8 L.

C. Jur. 225.

Per Duval, Meredith, Mondelet et Badgley.

150. La preuve testimoniale du don manuel accompagné de livraison n'est pas admissible.

Duval, Caron, Drummond, Badgley et Loranger.

Voyer et Richer, 7 septembre 1870.

Tableau.

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"THE AMERICAN LAW REVIEW" ON THE FISHERY QUESTION.

In the April number of The American Law Review, appeared an article on "The North Eastern Fisheries." In the January number of La Revue Critique, the same subject was discussed, and it would not so soon have been reverted to had the article in the Law Review dealt solely with acknowledged principles of law, but some of its propositions are so very new, extraordinary, and startling, that they demand instant examination.

At page 416 of the Law Review appear these words: "We "shall now inquire whether the Convention of 1818 is an existing compact; and if not, what are the rights of American fisher"men under the treaty of peace of 1783." The result of the inquiry is announced at page 419: "Applying these well estab"lished principles to the facts under discussion, and the conclu"sion is inevitable. The Convention of 1818 contained a renun"ciation of, a limitation and restriction upon, the otherwise full "enjoyment of rights created in 1783. The renunciation, limi"tation, and restriction were wholly removed, and in place thereof "affirmative provisions were substituted. These latter were "finally annulled, and there is now left no compact between the "two governments interfering with Article III. of the Treaty of "1783. The result is the same as though the United States and "Great Britain had simply and directly abrogated the clause of "renunciation contained in Article I. of the Convention of 1818."

The portion of the article in question referring to the effect produced on Article III. of the Treaty of 1783, by Article I. of the Convention of 1818, hardly requires discussion, as the elaborate argument on pages 418 and 419, if well founded, shows conclusively that the Convention of 1818 novated Article III. of the Treaty of 1783. But, moreover, the Convention of 1818 was in the nature of the transactio of the Roman law, and fixed the rights of the parties.*

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Are the words "And the United States hereby renounces for ever any liberty heretofore enjoyed or claimed by the inhabitants thereof, to take, dry, or cure fish on or within three marine

* Mackeldey, Man. de Droit Romain, § 470.

"miles of any of the coasts, &c.," of no avail against the words of the treaty of 1783? Did they not in plain terms annihilate any right or liberty which might at any time have been in existence, either enjoyed or claimed by the inhabitants of the United States, to fish, &c., within the limits specified in the renunciatory clause?

In that portion of the article which treats of the effect produced by the Treaty of 1854 on the Convention of 1818, the propositions advanced are startling in their novelty. "It is the "case," says the learned writer, "which often arises in the muni"cipal law of substituting one contract for another, by which the "prior one is swallowed up, and ended, and the latter alone is "left binding upon the parties."

The Convention of 1818 fixed the rights of American citizens in the Canadian fisheries, the reciprocity treaty, in consideration of certain commercial advantages extended to Canadians, gave to American citizens the liberty, in common with British subjects, to take fish in Canadian waters for the term of ten years after it went into operation, and further until twelve months after either party should give notice of intention to terminate it. The reciprocity treaty, then, was in its nature merely temporary, in contradistinction to the Convention of 1818, which was perpetual. Either party had the power, after the expiration of ten years from its coming into force, to terminate it by giving a year's notice, consequently it was a contract with a resolutive condition (condition resolutoire). With all due deference to the writer in the Law Review, it is impossible to admit his sweeping assertion that treaties" are interstate contracts, and the doctrines of Inter"national Law relating to them are borrowed entire and un"changed from the corresponding departments of municipal "jurisprudence." Where in the mazes of American jurisprudence are we to seek for the corresponding department in this case? Is Massachusetts the blessed State where jurisprudence pure and undefiled is to be found? or does New York with its famed judiciary, furnish municipal jurisprudence of undoubted worth? or are we to seek for it before the United States Courts? The only jurisprudence which is of authority in such case is that of the Civil Law, and from the source of all municipal laws on the subjects of contracts, must be drawn the principles governing the question now raised.*

* Heffter, § 90; Bluntschli, § 450.

The 1183 article of the Code Napoleon thus declares the provisions of the Civil Law affecting contracts containing a resolu tive condition "La condition resolutoire est celle qui, lorsqu'elle s'accomplit, opère la revocation de l'obligation, et qui remet les choses au même état que si l'obligation n'avait pas existé, &c."

Article 1088 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada is in the following words declaratory of the Civil Law "a resolutive condition, when accomplished, effects of right the dissolution of the contract. It obliges each party to restore what he has received, and replace things in the same state as if the contract had not existed; subject nevertheless to the rules established in the last preceding article with respect to things which have perished or been deteriorated."*

In this 'case then it is clear that on the termination of the treaty of 1854, Great Britain and the United States stood to each other, as regards the Canadian Fisheries, precisely in the position they occupied previous to that treaty coming into force, that is to say bound by the provisions of Article I of the Convention of 1818.

Want of space prevents the further enumeration of the proposition relating to the novation (erroneously styled payment in the article referred to) of the Convention of 1818. But no doubt can be entertained that it is as erroneous as the proposition therein advanced of the non-novation of the fishery article of the Treaty of 1783 by article I of the Convention of 1818.

WILLIAM H. KERR.

* See Pothier Obligns. Nos. 224, 672; 4 Marcadé § 564; 3 Massé Dr. Com. Nos. 1795, 1797; Story on Con. § 977; 2 Fiore, p. 58.

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