Heffter: "Les traités publics réels qui concernent les sujets "et les rapports individuels, ont la même autorité que les lois de "l'État, s'ils ont été contractés et publiés régulièrement."

Dupin: "Les traités sont obligatoires comme conventions "entre les puissances contractantes; mais ils ont force de lois à "l'égard des sujets considérés comme tels."

Enfin, la Conférence de Londres ne vient-elle pas d'affirmer le même principe de la manière la plus solennelle, en déclarant à l'unanimité: "That it is an essential part of the law of nations "that no power can shake off the engagements of a treaty or "modify its stipulations except with the assent of the contracting "parties." +

La Constitution Américaine n'a pas voulu laisser cette matière importante dans le doute de la science. L'article 6, par. 2, déclare: "This constitution and the laws of the United States "which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land." Il est able que les commentateurs comme les tribunaux ne citent presque jamais cet article pour appliquer le principe qu'il consacre; ils considèrent sans doute qu'il existe par suite de l'ordre naturel des choses, de droit commun public pour ainsi dire.

remarqu

Abdy sur Kent §: "All treaties made by that power become of "absolute efficacy, because they are the supreme law of the land." Story || "In regard to treaties, there is equal reason why they "should be held, when made, to be the supreme law of the land. It "is to be considered, that treaties constitute solemn compacts of "binding obligation among nations; and unless they are scrupu"lously obeyed and enforced, no foreign nation would consent to "negociate with us; or if it did, any want of strict fidelity on our "part of the discharge of the treaty stipulations would be visited "by reprisals or war. It is, therefore, indispensable that they "should have the obligation and force of a law, that they may "be executed by the judicial power, and be obeyed like other "laws. This will not prevent them from being cancelled or 'abrogated by the nation upon grave and suitable occasions; for

• Droit International, p. 186.

† Principes du Droit de la Nature et des Gens, vol. 5, p. 198. Séance de 17 Janvier, 1871.

International Law, p. 410.

| Com. on Const. of U. S., § 966; voir aussi Wheaton, éd. Dana § 266.

"it will not be disputed, that they are subjected to the legislative power, and may be repealed, like other laws at its pleasure, or "they may be varied by new treaties; still, while they do sub"sist, they ought to have a positive binding efficacy, as laws, 66 upon all the states and all the citizens of the states. The peace "of the nation, and its good faith, and moral dignity, indispen"sably require that all state laws be subjected to their supremacy. "The difference between considering them as laws, and and con"sidering them as executory, or executed contracts, is exceed"ingly important in the actual administration of public justice. "If they are supreme laws, courts of justice will enforce them "directly in all cases, to which they can be judicially applied, "in opposition to all state laws, as we all know was done in the case of the British debts secured by the treaty of 1783, after "the Constitution was adopted. If they are deemed but solemn compacts, promissory in their nature and obligation, courts of "justice may be embarrassed in enforcing them, and may be compelled to leave the redress to be administered through other "departments of the government. It is notorious that treaty "stipulations (especially those of the treaty of peace of 1783) "were grossly disregarded by the states under the Confederation. "They were deemed by the states, not as laws, but like requisi"tions, of mere moral obligation, and depended upon the good "will of the states for their execution. Congress, indeed, re"monstrated against this construction, as unfounded in principle "and justice."

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La jurisprudence Américaine ne laisse aucun doute sur le point que les traités font partie de la loi suprême de l'Union, et qu'ils sont supérieurs aux lois particulières des Etats; mais elle ne va pas jusqu'à indiquer la règle à suivre en cas de conflit entre le Congrès et les traités. Il semblerait que, vu qu'aux Etats-Unis les traités n'obtiennent force de loi que par la sanction du Congrès, le dernier acte de ce corps doit prévaloir sur le premier. D'un autre côté l'action du Congrès dans un tel cas n'est pas seulement législative, elle est surtout internationale; et ne peut-on pas soutenir que tant que les nations étrangères n'ont pas renoncé à la convention, les tribunaux Américains doivent respecter le traité nonobstant l'ordre contraire du Congrès? Quoi qu'il en soit, il n'en est pas ainsi des traités de la Grande Bretagne; ils peuvent généralement être consentis sans le concours des Chambres; et même à propos des traités qui doivent être ratifiés par le Parlement, ne peut-on pas dire que, dès lors qu'il

est admis que la législature coloniale doit se courber devant les conventions internationales de l'Empire, parcequ'elles forment partie des lois Impériales tant qu'elles n'ont pas été éteintes ou modifiées par les pouvoirs contractants, il faut également admettre que le Parlement Britannique lui-même n'est pas plus puissant à cet égard que le Parlement du Canada, et que tous deux sont soumis à l'autorité des traités.

Qu'il nous soit permis, en terminant, d'observer qu'il est temps que la règle (si elle existe), que les lois de l'Etat priment ses contrats, disparaisse de son code national. Elle a son origine dans un état social qui n'existe plus: celui où chaque nation, pour cause d'éloignement et de plusieurs autres circonstances, regardait avec jalousie et méfiance l'action de ses voisins. Les relations commerciales du monde moderne ont effacé les distances et les préjugés nationaux; elles ont fait de l'univers, pour ainsi dire le séjour d'une seule et même société; et evidemment elles rendent les traités aussi nécessaires que les lois particulières de l'Etat. Il est donc hautement à désirer que la justice fasse place à l'égoisme des temps passés, et que les conventions internationales soient vues et appliquées avec ce respect qui entoure les lois spéciales de chaque peuple. L'intérêt public comme l'honneur national et le bonheur de l'humanité en général exigent que tel soit le dernier mot du droit international.

Enfin l'argument que, si les tribunaux peuvent maintenir les traités même à l'encontre des lois de l'Empire, le pouvoir judiciaire serait tout puissant et même au dessus de l'Empire, n'a plus sa raison d'être. Il n'y a pas plus de danger, ni d'anomalie, à investir la magistrature du droit de faire respecter les traités que de maintenir la constitution. Dans ce dernier cas comme dans le premier, le tribunal est juge souverain et en dernier ressort. Les deux matières nous semblent reposer sur un même piédestal, la parole nationale, l'une donnée par le Souverain, l'autre par le Parlement, avec cette remarquable différence que les traités appartiennent à un ordre de choses plus élevé que celui d'aucune législation particulière, et que partant ils commandent plus d'autorité et d'obéissance. Le salut public demanda impérieusement qu'il en soit ainsi, et le salut du peuple est la loi suprême. Salus populi suprema lex.

Comme nous l'avons annoncé, nous n'avons pas la prétention de trancher cette question delicate, mais seulement de la soumettre à l'examen des esprits philosophes de la profession.

THE FREE NAVIGATION OF THE RIVER ST. LAWRENCE BY THE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES.

The consolidation of the Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, into the Dominion of Canada, has opened a wide field for the exercise of statesmanship to the leaders of the Canadian people. Dependent but in name, Canadians are now free to shape the destinies of their country.

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With increased powers have arisen new responsibilities. The Dominion must now bear a full share of the burthens of the realm in lieu of the trifling weights laid on the infant Provinces by the Mother Country. Conflicting rights require adjustment, na tional and religious prejudices claim treatment, and international difficulties demand settlement. To restore friendly commercial relations with our neighbours, but lately sources of prosperity; to subdue the jealousy of race, the bane of the Province of Canada; to extinguish the embers of religious feud, now threatening to burst into flame; to arrange the Fishery, the St. Lawrence, and the Fenian difficulties, all pregnant with war, if not settled at once and for ever,—are some of the tasks of the Ministry of the day. Verily, the bark of State requires skilful handling by its pilots to avoid the reefs and shoals lying in its course.

With a population of but four millions, Canada is bounded to the south by the United States, inhabited by nearly forty millions of people. The absorption of Mexico and the Dominion into the Union is favoured by many American statesmen; the Continent of North America, with the adjacent islands, forming one vast Republic, is the dream of United States politicians. The instability of parties, the corruption pervading the body politic, and the power of the mob, all combine to make the policy of the United States uncertain and dangerous to their neighbours. No expedient to divert the minds of their people from the strife of party, would be so popular as a foreign war, undertaken for the acquisition of territory on this continent; each individual would think that in the national losses he would secure a fortune, and would smother his patriotism in his selfishness.

For many years past the United States Government has nursed

grievances against their neighbours-it is of more importance that the Alabama claims should never be settled than that by a money payment far exceeding the actual losses, the grievance should be abated. The Fishery, the St. Lawrence, and the Fenian questions, are all open sores, irritating to Canada and Great Britain, which, when the opportunity is favourable, may furnish pretexts for a declaration of war.

It is the object of this paper to investigate the claim so persistently brought forward by the United States to the right of free navigation of the River St. Lawrence, to determine its validity, and to suggest, if possible, a mode in which it can be quieted for

ever.

President Lincoln, in his Message to Congress, delivered on the 5th Nov. 1870, thus drew the attention of his countrymen to the subject:

THE NAVIGATION OF THE ST. LAWRENCE.

A like unfriendly disposition has been manifested on the part of Canada in the maintenance of a claim of right to exclude the citizens of the United States from the navigation of the St. Lawrence. This river constitutes a natural outlet to the ocean for eight States with an aggregate population of about 17,600,000 inhabitants, and with an aggregate tonnage of 661,367 tons upon the waters which discharge into it. The foreign commerce of our ports on these waters is open to British competition, and the major part of it is done in British bottoms. If the American steamer be excluded from this natural avenue to the ocean, the monopoly of the direct commerce of the Lake ports with the Atlantic would be in foreign hands, their vessels on transatlantic voyages having an access to our lake ports which would be denied to American vessels on similar voyages. To state such a proposition is to refute its justice. During the administration of Mr. John Quincy Adams, Mr. Clay unquestionably demonstrated the natural right of the citizens of the United States to the navigation of this river, claiming that the act of the Congress of Vienna in opening the Rhine and other rivers to all nations showed the judgment of European jurists and statesmen that the inhabitants of a country through which a navigable river passed have a natural right to enjoy the navigation thereof as far as the sea, even though passing through the territory of another power. This right does not exclude the co-equal right of the sovereign possessing the territory through which the river debouches into the sea to make such regulations relative to the policy of the navigation as may be reasonably necessary, but these regulations should be framed in a liberal spirit of comity, and should not impose needless burdens upon the commerce which has the right of transit. It has been found in practice more advanVOL. I.

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No. 2.