« PreviousContinue »
tion, les co-associés peuvent être traités comme si la société existait encore et peuvent être poursuivis comme tels, sans qu'il soit nécessaire de les désigner comme ayant été en société. Per Mackay et Beaudry; Mondelet, dissident.
Montréal, 30 Novembre 1870. Carton vs. Bishop.—Jugé : Qu'un père, non tuteur de son fils mineur, ne peut ponrsuivre pour les gages de co dernier. Défense en droit maintenue. Mackay, J.
Patenaude vs. Charron.—Jugé; Qu'une clôture de ligne ou de division, existant entre deux héritages depuis plus de trente ans, doit servir de base a un bornage, sans égard aux titres. Torrance, J.
La Corp. de Montréal <j" Wilson, Tiers-Opposant.—Jugé: Qu'après que l'évaluation d'un terrain, soumis à expropriation dans la Cité de Montréal, aura été mise de coté par la Cour, le propriétaire de ce terrain ne peut former une tierce opposition à ce jugement, bien qu'il n'ait pas été partie dans la première instance. Mackay, J.
Le Blanc vs. Beaudoin <y Bédard, intervenant.—Jugé : qu'une partie coupable de félonie ne peut elle même demander la nullité d'un acte de vente d'immeubles faite en compromis de cette félonie. Mackay, J.
Coates v. The Glen Brick Co., et Welsh, Intervenant. Jugé que les compagnies incorporées sous l'acte de la Législature de Québec, 31 Vict. ch. 25, n'ont pas le pouvoir d'émettre des billets promissoires, à moins que ce pouvoir ne soit formellement donné par les règlements de la compagnie; 2o. que dans l'espèce, les règlements étant que "the Directors shall have the management of the affairs of the Com11 pany" (sect. IX) ct que "the President and Secretary shall have power to draw cheques, to sign deeds, stock certificates, all contracts authorized by the Board of Directors and all matters and documents of special import," et n'étant pas prouvé que les billets en question avaient été autorisés de manière à être placés dans la catégorie de contracts authorized by the Board of Directors, ils ne pouvaient lier la Compagnie. Beaudry, J.
The Glen Brick Co. v. Shackwell. Shackwell v. The Glen Brick Co. Wetsh v. The Glen Brick Co.—Jugé que des souscriptions à un fonds social ou stock, obtenues par surprise, fraude et par de faux états des affaires de la compagnie faits par ses officiers et ses directeurs, sont nulles et ne produisent aucune obligation. Les actionnaires ainsi trompés peuvent même recouvrer ce qu'ils ont payé en à compte de leurs parts.
Montréal, Avril 1870.
Malhiot vs. Tessier $ Lemonde.—Jugé: Que deux cultivateurs qui ont signé un billet promissoire ne 6ont pas obligés solidairement, et que
la solidarity n'existe que dans le cas oil les faiseurs d'un billet sont cbmmercants. Mackay, J.
30 decembre 1870. Boucher vs. Brault.—Juge : Qu'un locataire, apres avoir fait protester son locateur que la maison louee est inhabitable peut laisser cette maison, sans avoir fait resilier le bail et qu'une saisie-gagerie par droit de suite pratiquee par ce locateur est mal fondee, si le locataire prouve qu'en realito la maison etait inhabitable. S. C. Montreal, per Hon. delet, J.
La redaction de la Revue doit &■ l'obligence de Mr. Colston le somniaire dcs decisions suivantes, prononcees a, Quebec en decembre dernier.
No. 22. Leduc $ Oullet. Held: That the delay of 25 days mentioned in C. P. C. art. 1149, within which the petition in appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court must be filed with return &c, is final and limitatif. Q. B. in appeal.
No. 14. Villeneuve $ Bedard. Held: That pending an appeal from a judgment dismissing an action en separation de corps et de Mens, the Court will not grant a provisional alimentary allowance to the wife, Plaintiff in Court below. (Ibid.)
No. 881. Ulric Arcand v. Charles Blanchet § Francois Croteau.—In January, 1848, Croteau executed a deed of obligation for £50 and interest, in favour of Arcand's auteur, and mortgaged thereby a certain piece of land, which in June, 1855, he sold to Blanchet, who by the deed of sale bound and obliged himself to pay the said debt, and who the same day executed another deed of obligation, without novation for £75 and interest, being the principal and interest accrued on the original debt in favour of the Plaintiff's auteur. Action against Blanchet and Croteau for joint and several condemnation for amount due under the said deeds. Action dismissed on demurrer. No action for a joint and several condemnation lies. S. C. Quebec, Taschereau, J.
No. 901. Louis Lemicux vs. Mark Forcade, curatorto Gabriel Lemieux, her husband interdicted for drunkenness.
Held: That the defendant could be sued alone; that her husband need not be put en cause, and that she need not be authorized specially for that purpose. Same Court, Taschereau, J.
Fark Gate Iron Company, Limited, and Coates.—The provisions of 13 and 14 Vict, c., CI, s. 14, requiring the party appealing from the decision of a County Court judge to give a notice of appeal and security for costs within ten days, are not conditions precedent to the jurisdiction of the court to hear appeal, and they may therefore be waived by the respondent. 5 L. B. C. P., 634.
Daviea v. Snead.—The Defendant mentioned to the rector of her parish a rumour that she had heard publicly uttered, impugning his conduct and the conduct of his solicitor, the plaintiff, in the administration of a certain trust. The plaintiff having brought an action of slander against the defendant, the jury found that the words complained of were spoken bond fide nnd without malice, under the belief that it was important for the defendant's rector to know the rumour in order that he migh clear his character:
Held: that, upon this finding, the communication was privileged, and that the privilege extended to the alleged slander of the plaintiff, as the communication could not be made without mentioning him. 5 L. E., Q. B. 608.
Maillard v. Page.—The defendant accepted the plaintiffs draft at six months, and the plaintiff agreed in writing to renew the hill, if circumstances should prevent the defendant from meeting it at maturity. The defendant made no application for renewal during the currency of the bill; but on the plaintiffs presenting it for payment shortly after it became due, he claimed to have it renewed according to the agreement, circumstances having, in fact, prevented him from meeting it. In an action on the bill:
Held (Cleasby, B., dissenting ) C. Ex.: that the defendant was not bound to apply for a renewal during the currency of the bill; but that it was sufficient if he did so within a reasonable time after it became due. L. R., C. Ex., 312.
Frost v. Knight.—The defendant promised to marry the plaintiff so soon as his (the defendant's) father should die. During the father's lifetime, the defendant refused absolutely to marry the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued for breach of promise, the defendant's father being still alive:
Held (Martin, B., dissenting): that the principle of Hochster v. De la Tour, was not applicable to the case of a promise to marry, and that no breach had been committed, 5 L. R., Ex., 322.
Bell v. Fothergill and others.—On the death of the deceased a will was found, the signature to which had been cut out, but gummed on to its former place. The will had been in the custody of the testator up to the time of his death. Declarations of the deceased made subsequent to the date of the will were proved of an intention to benefit his wife by will. No other will was forthcoming.
Held: that the presumption that the deceased cut out the signature animo reoocandi was not rebutted, and that the gumming on the signature in its original place did not revive the will. 2 L. R., P. & D., 148.
Hawkins v. Allen.—A lady gave a cheque for £5,000 to the surgeon who attended her, to be laid out in the erection, establishment, and support of an hospital. The money was invested by the surgeon in consols, in the names of himself and another as trustees, and both immediately afterwards executed a deed of trust declaring the objects of the gift. The declaration of trust was not made known to the donor, who died a few days after its execution.
Held: that the object of the gift did not exelude the acquisition of land; and that the donor having died within twelve months after the execution of the deed, the gift was invalid under the statute (9 Geo. 2, c. 36). L. R., Eq., 246.
AMERICAN DECISIONS. (From the American Law Review, October, 1870 and January 1871.)
Pierce v. Milwaukee Jf St. Paul R. R. Co.—By the custom of a railroad company, persons whose grain was carried by the road, were entitled to have their empty bags carried free:
Held: that this carrying was not gratuitous, and that the company was liable as a common carrier in case such bags were lost. 23 Wise. 387.
The City v. Lamson.—Suit on coupons detached from a bond brought more than six years after the instalment of interest for which such was given had accrued.
Held: That the suit was not barred by the Statute of Limitations until suit was barred on the bond itself. 9 Wallace, 477.
Belknap vs. Bank of North America.—A merchant sent his clerk to the Post Office with a sealed letter to mail, containing a bank check payable to A.B., or order:
Held : that he was not guilty of negligence which would render him liable on the check to a holder in good faith for value, to whom the clerk, after abstracting it from the letter, passed it, altered by making it payable to bearer. 100 Mass. 376.
Shaw v. Spencer.—A firm gave to the defendant, as collateral security for a debt due from the firm to him, two certificates of stock standing in the name of a member of the firm, namely "A. B. trustee" and by him transferred in blank, each certificate being on its face expressly "transferable only on the books of the company by the holder hereof, in person, or by a conveyance in writing recorded in said books, and surrender of this certificate." The certificate belonged to the plaintiff:
Held: that the certificates of stock were not negotiable instruments, that the word "trustee" sufficiently notified the defendant as to the character of the firm's title, and that plaintiff was entitled to the stock. 100 Mass. 382.
Le Secretaire De La Redaction.
CONFLICT OF PRESCRIPTIONS.
/* extinctive prescription or limitation of personal actions governed by the laic of the country where the suit is brought, the lex fori, or by the lex loci contractus f
An important question of private international law, which for many years has been, and still continues to be. discussed by legal writers and in courts of justice. is, whether the limitation of personal actions is governed by the lex, fori or by the lex loci contractus. It is true that in England and the United States the point may be considered as settled in favour of the lex fori, although even in those countries we see jurists of such high standing as Westlake and Bateman, strongly defending the claim of the lex loci contractus. In a late case of Harris v. Quiue. the learned Lord Chief Justice Cockburn inclined towards the latter view, although he admitted the lex fori to be the rule. And if to these considerations be added the fact that the question remains as yet undecided on the continent of Europe and in this Province. a review of the law on the question may not be found without interest and practical utility.
True it is that the legal profession in every country is familiar with the reasonings pro and con. At the same time it must be admitted that there exists no complete review of the different systems advocated throughout the commercial world. The English and American writers do not fail to produce every English and American authority, but they rarely pay to the French and contincutal jurists the attention and consideration which their learning Vol. I. i. No. 'J.