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sion that Art. 176 of our Code must be interpreted in the same manner as Art. 378 of the French Code, and that recusation cannot be proposed for any other ground except those ennumerated.
The petitions now under consideration are not founded on any of the causes of recusation enumerated in the law, but on grounds quite different—grounds which tend to dishonour not only the judges recused, but all the Eoman Catholic judges in the whole vast extent of British territory—grounds unheard of up to this day in the annals of jurisprudence; for it is in truth the first time that a party has been bold enough to recuse a judge on account of his religious belief. These petitions must therefore be declared inadmissible and be rejected, simply "because the fact alleged is not included in the cases of recusation provided for by the law," according to the very simple formula adopted in France in like cases.
But here arises the question of greatest importance for us: "Has the judge recused the right to pronounce on the admissibility of the petition by which he is recused? To this question I do not hesitate to answer in the negative. His Honor cited Art. 184 of our Code, as follows: "When the recusation is made before the judge has made his declaration, communication of it must be given to him, and he must declare in writing whether the grounds are true or not; another judge then proceeds to determine whether the recusation is founded or not, without the recused judge having a right to be present."
This Article conforms to Art. 24 of title 24, of the Ordonnance of 1667, and is the same in the French Code. It is therefore evident that the law forbids the judge recused to pronounce on the admissibility of the petition in recusation, however frivolous, vexatious and unfounded may be the grounds of it; it seems to me equally evident that the judge recused is bound to declare in writing if the facts alleged in the petition are true, and that even before a competent tribunal has pronounced on the legality of such facts. It is to be regretted that our codifiers did not prefer to incorporate in our code the procedure established by Art. 385 of the French Code, as to the time when the declaration of the judge should be made, rather than have continued the old practice.
Under the disposition of the French Code, a judge recused is never bound to declare whether the facts alleged are true or not, until a competent tribunal has declared that these facts are of a nature to justify the recusation. Here it is different. The Judge recused must make his declaration forthwith, however insufficient in law may be the facts enunciated in the petition.
I am, therefore, of opinion, 1st, That these four petitions in recusation must be rejected tut ou tard, as inadmissible. 2nd, That, nevertheless, we, the Judges recused, are incompetent to pronounce on the question of admissibility, and on any other question touching these petitions. 3rd, That on the fyling of these petitions, we are bound to declare, in writing, the truth of the only fact on which rest all these petitions, namely, whether it is true that we are each and all Roman Catholics, rejecting, however, every attempt to extort from us our opinions on the questions of law and religion raised in the recusation.
I must add that these were put into writing some days ago, when, being absent from Court, I was under the impression that these petitions had been duly fyled. But having been since apprised that the Judges, present at the time of the presentation of these petitions in open Court by the counsel for the appellant, had forbidden the clerk to fyle the petitions, I find myself free from any recusation of which I am bound to take cognizance.
Caron, J., concurred in declaring the petitions inadmissible. The Code contained the causes for which recusations might be proposed. The causes alleged in the present petitions were imaginary and absurd. It was for the Court to see whether the causes of recusation were legal before the petitions were permitted to be fyled. In the present instance, the petitions were wholly inadmissible and insulting to the Judges, and the Court was right in refusing to receive them, and the Judges were not bound to make any declaration.
Ddval, C. J., thought the petitions should not be treated seriously. If it were possible to suppose that they, were intended seriously, there could hardly be any greater insult offered to the Judges. It would be to accuse them of treason, and of being false to the oaths which they had taken. Judges had a right to protect themselves from such charges. But, for his part, he did not treat this petition seriously. There was only one opinion entertained by the Bench on the merits of it. If there were any foundation for such a petition, no Roman Catholics should be appointed Judges. It would be doing too much honor to the petition to treat it serious. It was enough to say that it shall not be received nor entered on the fyles of the Court. The principal question that arose was, had the Judges recused the right to declare the petition inadmissible? His Honor believed they had. The Judges were bound by the law to sit, and could not withdraw in this case more than in any other. The Judges in the Court below had not recused themselves or been recused, though two of them were Catholics. As to fyling the petitions without the permission of Court, His Honor believed that could not be done.
Mr. Doutre, Q.C., then moved for leave to appeal to Her Majesty's Privy Council. This motion stands over to March term.
Constitutionality of Acts of the Local Legislature in matters of
importance, inasmuch as it involved the question of the validity of an Act passed during the previous session of the Parliament of Quebec. It was- in the case of Delide vs. L' Union St. Jacquet de Montrial.
The action was brought to recover $-43 from the Defendants, a benefit or benevolent society, of which the Plaintiff's husband had been a member in his lifetime. The Plaintiff now claimed to be entitled to a weekly allowance of $1.50 under the rules of the society, so long as she remained a widow. The Defendants pleaded an Act of the Legislature of the Province of Quebec, of date 1st February, 1870. cap. 58, by which the Defendants were empowered to convert the claims of the Plaintiff iuto a sum of §200 to be at once paid over in satisfaction of all demands. The Plaintiff answered to this that the Legislature of the Province of Quebec had no authority to pass such an Act, and that the Act was unconstitutional, null and of no effect, inasmuch as the Legislature of Quebec had no power to legislate in matters of insolvency and bankruptcy, and the act in question violated vested rights.
Per curiam. The effect of this Act, according to the Plaintiff, would be to force her to compound for her debt. It is necessary to examine the powers of the Local Legislature in order to decide the point which was raised in the case.
By the Union Act, 30 Vict., cap. 3, sec. 91, it was declared that notwithstanding anything in the Act, the exclusive legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all matters coming within the classes of subjects enumerated, and, inter alia, No. 21 specifies bankruptcy and insolvency as one of the classes of subjects. Then No. 29 declared that any matter coming within any of the classes of subjects enumerated in this section shall not be deemed to come within the class of matters of a local or private nature comprised in the enumeration of the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces.
Then section 92 defines the subjects of exclusive Provincial legislation. "In each Province, the Legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to matters coming within the classes of subjects next hereinafter enumerated, that is to say: No. 7. The establishment, maintenance and management of hospitals, asylums, charities, and eleemosynary institutions in and for the Province, other than marine hospitals." Then No. 11. "The incorporation of companies with Provincial objects." No. IS. "Generally in all matters of a merely local or private nature in the Province."
His Honor then referred to the preamble to the Act *of the Province of Quebec passed last session, in which it was set up that the expenses of the Union St. Jacques were more than the receipts, and that the Society was unable to continue to pay the pensions to certain widows, of whom the plaintiff was one, and the receipts could not be made to balance the expenditure, &c. Was there insolvency here? The Custom of Paris says, "le cas de déconfiture est quand les biens des débiteurs tant meubles qu''immeubles ne suffisent pas aux créanciers." Bell's Dictionary says, "When a person's debts exceeded his estate he was said to bo insolvent." Such being the condition of the Society, the Act provided that the Union St. Jacques was authorised to convert the pensions into §200 to be onre paid to each of the widows. In the event of refusal to accept the $200, the money was to be kept in trust for them. The Court now came to the important question whether this Act was beyond the power of the Local Legislature. The Dominion Legislature has exclusive jurisdiction in matters of insolvency. From this and the other clauses cited above, the Court came to the conclusion that the Provincial Legislature had no power to make such a law as that passed last session with reference to the Union St. Jacques. The plea of the Defendants was therefore overruled, and the Defendants condemned to pay $13.64, the amount sued for.
SOMMAIRE DES DÉCISIONS RÉCENTES.
Montréal, 10 décembre 1870.
La Corporation de St. Martin et la Compagnie des Chemins de Péage de Tile Jésus.—La corporation de St. Martin prit une action devant la Cour de Circuit pour enlèvement d'une obstruction sur la voie publique. Par une disposition statutaire, la Cour de Circuit a seule jurisdiction pour connaître de ces actions. La Denanderesse joignit à son action une demande en dommages-intérêts au montant de $400.00, mais cette demande fut discontinuée pendant l'instance.
Jugé :—Que la demande en dommages-intérêts étant purementaccessoire et ayant été discontinuée, la Cour de Circuit conservait sa jurisdiction sur l'action principale.—Per Duval, J. C, Drumond, Badgley, J.J. Contra, Caron et Monk, J.J.
Quid? Si la demande en dommages-intérêts n'avait pas été discontinuée.
Macfarlane et Dewey.—Jugé qu'un billet de $400 donné par Mme. Dewey, sous la pression et les menaces d'une poursuite criminelle contre son fils pour vol de $25, était nul, faute de considération et comme ayant été consenti en compromis d'une félonie. Per Drumruond, Badgley et Monk.—Contra Duval et Caron, qui étaient d'opinion que l'action de Marfalane devait être maintenue pour $25.
The Chaudière Gold Mining Company et Desbarats.—Jugé: lo. que sous l'Edit de 1743, une corporation étrangère ne peut acquérir des biens immobiliers dans la Province de Québec, sans la permission de la Couronne ou l'autorité de la Législature; 2o. que partant dans le cas d'une vente de tels biens et d'éviction, la dite corporation n'avait pas d'action en dommages contre son vendeur.—Per Caron, Badgley et Monk.—Contrà Duval et Lorangtr.
Ranger et Seymour.—Jugé: qu'après discontinuation d'une saisie sur fieri facias par le Demandeur, du consentement du Défendeur, un venditioni exponas ne peut être émané, la première saisie étant alors considérée caduque.—Per Duval, Caron. Drummond, Badgley et
l'ollard et Irving.—Avant le code de Procédure, le capias ad respondendum n'existait pas pour des dommages non liquidés. Mêmes juges.
Doutre vs. Elvidge.—Jugé: que l'adjudicataire, à une vente par le shérif d'un terrain de 49 acres, qui n'a pas la quantité déterminée, a droit a une réduction pro rata du prix d'adjudication. Semble: qu'il en serait autrement de la vente d'un corps certain. Per Duval, Monk et Lorangcr.—Contra Caron et Badgley.
COUR DE RÉVISION.
Montréal, 30 Novembre 1870.
Fordyce vs. Kcarns.—Le défendeur, dans le but de faire de la terre neuve mit le feu à des souches sur sa propriété: un vent violent s'éleva tout à coup et propagea le feu sur la propriété de son voisin, le demandeur.
Jugé: Que le défendeur était responsable des dommages causés à la propriété du demandeur, bien que le feu y eût été communiqué par force majeure. Berthelot, Mackay et Beaudry, J.J.
Davis vs. Shaw ■j- Shaw, Oppt.—Jugé: Que la vente d'effets mobiliers, entre parents, non Buivie de déplacement et de tradition réelle, est présumée frauduleuse vis-à-vis des tiers créanciers et doit être annulée. Per Mackay et Beaudry; Mondelet, dissident.
Ste. Marie vs. Ostell.—Jugé: Que l'adjudicataire des créances d'un failli, à une vente faite par un syndic, doit alléguer dans son action contre un débiteur de ce failli et prouver que toutes les formalités requises par la loi pour procéder à cette vente ont été observées i et qu'à défaut de telle allégation, l'action de cet adjudicataire sera déboutée sur défense en droit. Per Berthelot, Torrance et Beaudry. Ce jugement est confirmatif de celui rendu en cour inférieure par l'hon. Juge
30 décembre 1870.
The City of Glasgow Bank, vs. Arbuckle .jf al. et Kerry $ al.—Jugé' Que quant a la liquidation des affaires d'une société après sa dissolu