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cartouch-boxes, That it was with the participation, confent, and approbation, of Gen. Gates, that the foldiers put them on; and that the troops paffed by his Excellency on their march, with all their accoutrements on their backs nor is there any mention of the cartouchboxes in the correfpondence between Gens Heath and Burgoyne.

As to the defcriptive lifts, he fays, he never meant to deny, that the prifoners names were taken down in Canada: he always knew they were; and the reafon was, they had bound themselves to return to Canada upon a demand, and it was therefore neceffary to know their a bodes: he ftill perfevered, however, in his affertions, that in the inftances where he was prefent, descriptive lifts were not made, nor any lifts or fignatures propofed upon fufpicion of public faith [142.]: and it is remarkable, that the committee of congrefs, though they charge Gen. Burgoyne with being totally mistaken in what he said of the prifoners in Canada, fay only that thofe lifts contained the provinces, counties, and towns, to which the prifoners belonged; whereas they admit, that the lifts demanded of Gen. Burgoyne were to contain, not only the name and former place of abode, but alfo the occupation, fize, age, and defcription, of every non-commiffioned officer and private foldier [40. 183.]. · But Gen. Burgoyne adds, that he is perfuaded Gen. Heath, and thofe of his of. ficers with whom he converfed on the fubject, plainly faw he meant to comply upon the precedent as ftated in Gen. Heath's letter of Jan. 21. [142, 3.]: and fhould any doubt still fubfift, that an idea of being releafed from the engagements of the convention has been adopted by any part of the troops, he offers, that every officer fhould join their fignatures to his, for a further pledge of faith, provided the fufpenfion be immediately taken off. [145.]

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The Congrefs, on a committee to whom this letter of Gen. Burgoyne's, with the papers inclofed, was referred, reporting, "That they have carefully perufed and duly confidered the letter and papers, and are of opinion, that nothing therein contained is fufficient to induce Congress to recede from their refolution of the 8th of January laft, refpecting the convention of Saratoga," refolved, March 2. 1778, "That Congrefs agree to faid report."

have denied the facts afferted in Gen. Burgoyne's letter, as they founded their refolutions of Jan. 8. 1778, on a denial of other facts; so that they must be held to admit, that Gen. Gates approved of the men keeping their cartouch-boxes, and that Gen. Burgoyne would have g ven the defcriptive lifts demanded, provided the fufpenfion of the imbarkation were taken off. Their only reason, therefore, for fufpending the imbarka tion of Gen. Burgoyne's army, mut have been, that they were charged by him with a breach of public faith, because his officers were not properly accommo dated in quarters.

Let us confider, whether Congress, by their conduct, have refuted or con firmed the charge of a breach of faith.The only thing Gen. Burgoyne could mean by the charge muft have been, to get the grievance complained of, quarters, redreffed; and this would have happened of courfe, on the imbarka tion's taking place.-Congrefs, on the other hand, alledge, that the cartoutboxes were with-held, and defcriptive lifts refused. Sure, if they meant to keep faith, and to vindicate their cha racter, their conduct would have been, to fufpend the imbarkation only till the cartouch-boxes and defcriptive lifts should be given; for thefe two articles were the only infractions with which they charged Gen. Burgoyne. Instead of this, they fufpend the imbarkation till a rati fication of the convention be obtained from the court of G. Britain; thereby adding a new condition to the conve tion, and delaying the execution of it; though with the fame breath they a prefsly fay they have no power to do e ther [40. 183.]; and this without e gaging to agree to the imbarkation wh the ratification should be obtained.

I

Our court condefcended (meanly think) to offer a formal ratifica tion; and the various fhifts devifed by Congress to evade performance, by which Mr Fox (who is as great an enemy t our miniftry as they are) fays [19.)

they have departed from every pri ciple that ought to bind men," were related in my former letter. [40.606.]

Honour fhould be held as facred in d vil life as credit is in the mercantile. Now if a merchant should, on fuch pretences, refufe payment of his bills, it would max require the fpirit of prophecy to foret. that his credit would not long be go** If Congrefs could, they certainly would am, &c. I

PAR

PARLIAMENT, seff. 1778-9. [644.] On the 8th of June Lord George Germain, in the committee on the conduct of the American war, opened the evidence in favour of administration. His object (he faid) was not to accufe any gentleman, but to defend minifters and himself. The evidence of Gen. Gray, if not overturned, would bear hard against adminiftration; but he trufted, that when gentlemen would confider, that the General had been only one year and ive months in America, and had feen 10 more of the country than what lies between the head of the Elk and Philadelphia, and between that city and New York, they would be of opinion, that owever high Gen. Gray stood in his miitary profeffion, and no officer ftood igher, he had certainly formed a hafty udgement of the people. He fhould rove, that a very confiderable part, if ot a majority of Americans, were riends to G. Britain; that there were ctually regimented in our service more Americans than were at prefent under the ebel commander; that we can raife men America for five or fix dollars a-piece, hile the congress could not get recruits nder 266. The evidence not having een lately in America, could not prove he latter fum to be the fum given in heir time, it was then fomewhat fhort fit; but the last dispatches made the ounty given by the congrefs to recruits mount to 75 1. Sterling. The difaffecon of the people to their new governent he could prove prefumptively from is circumftance, that though congrefs ad once expected to take the field with ,000 men, and had voted that number, ey had never been able to muster more an 20,000 in one army.

With regard to the adequacy of the rce fent out, his Lordthip had no oubt about it: the force had been adeate, not to the reduction of America sited against us, for fuch a reduction ould be impoffible, but to the reducon of rebellion. — The obje& of the thern expedition by the Capes of Virnia his Lordship did not understand. the General's favourite route to Phila Iphia had been by the head of the Elk, would, by landing at Newcaftle on e Delaware, have had a fine and a fhort ad. The General's reafon for not nding there, viz. That the enemy was force at Wilmington, he would prove VOL. XLI.

to be chimerical; for that there was not an enemy in force within fourscore miles of Newcastle. Another thing he had to obferve, was Sir William's not having made a diverfion in the Maffachufet's: he certainly could have fpared 3000 men for that purpofe; for he required only 11,000 rank-and-file for the expedition, and he had full 14,000 at the battle of Brandywine, while Washington had no more than 10,000. Sir William indeed had faid, and faid truly, that the rebelarmy confifted of 15,000 men; but in thefe were included the drivers, futtlers, &c.: he could prove to a man the number of effective fighting men in Washington's army in that battle, and that they amounted to no more than 10,000. Had a diversion been made in the Maffachu-fet's, Gen. Gates never could have muftered the army with which he had forced Gen. Burgoyne to furrender.

With regard to the northern expedition, he thought it highly justifiable, from the nature of the fervice, which had made the French undertake quite a fimilar one in the laft war. And as to its practicability, the General himself in whofe hands it failed, never entertained a doubt about it till the unfortunate affair at Bennington. Every fort where oppofition could be expected had been ta ken. Nay, the General himself, when he detached Col. Baum, gave him directions to meet him at Albany: fo fure he was of the practicability of the march. Unfortunately he changed his opinion, and ordered Col. Baum to Bennington, a march of 150 miles, (the distance a proof that little danger was apprehended); the detachment was cut off. enemy, by our delays in bringing up immenfe trains of artillery, and a great fuite of provifion waggons, was fuffered to grow stronger: for when Gates took upon him the command of the rebel-army, it confifted of no more than 2500; but by our delays it was fuffered to increafe to 18,000.

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town, defiring to pay the damage; which the foldiers were acquainted with, and they never plundered more: That (being afked, he faid) he gave out the following order: "Newtown, Long island, Aug. 31. 1776. Brigade orders. Maj.-Gen Robertfon, refponsible for the actions of those he commands, takes upon him felf the expence of fatisfying the people of the village for the depredations com mitted upon them by part of the first brgade laft evening. Without first doing this piece of justice, he could not have prefumed to intercede for pardon to thofe a court-martial has condemned. He hopes for the future the troops wil abstain from a crime which difgraces e ven victory, and defeats the King's i tentions to protect and reclaim his Ame rican fubjects:" That to encourage ge tlemen in the country to take commi fions, and exert themselves to raise provincial corps, they got British pay: That he thinks the bounty-money to a recrut for inlifting into thefe corps was about five dollars; and that he heard the rete paid a high bounty for recruits, and th when a militiaman was drafted, he heard that fometimes Ico l. currency was paid for a fubftitute: That he heard that the congrefs voted, for the campaign 17 eighty-five or eighty-fix battalions, sc men in each; but he often heard they never got half: That in the campaign 1777 we had 52,815 men; of whan, 40,874 were under the command of Sir W. Howe: That he thinks we had at that time a force that could beat any the rebels could produce against it, and be was always of that opinion: That he s well acquainted with the Hudson's river, and the country on each side of it: The (being asked, if he thought the opening à communication between Canada and New York, by taking poffeffion of Hudfon's river, would have been the me proper plan for putting an end to the bellion) Gen. Gage, and the officers & confulted with, acquainted Lord Dart mouth, that they thought that the be of all plans; and that this made him think the better of his own opinion that cafe: and that he was clear the force of our whole army was equal to have poffeffed the North river: That with respect to the propriety of the expedition to Philadelphia by Chefapes bay, the commander in chief might have had a thoufand reafons whic the witnefs did not know, and therr fore he could form no judgement ef

army, feeing flags of truce going between the two armies, expreffed fuch joy in the expectation of a treaty, as was thought might be attended with ill confequences; to prevent which Mr Washington gave out an order on the 20th of Auguft, affuring the troops that there was no treaty, although he had sent the proposals which he received from Lord and Gen. Howe to the congrefs on the 17th of Auguft [38.586.]: That though every exertion had been made by the congrefs and their adherents to bring a numerous army into the field for the campaign 1776, he never heard from good authority of any army they had collected of more than 16,000 men; and that at the end of the campaign, when Gen. Howe arrived in the Delaware, the numbers had dwindled greatly, fo that the army that went through the Jerseys were not above 8000: That order and discipline are not fo ufeful in any place as in woods; and a corps raifed in America, difciplined by an acquaintance of the witnefs, has fhewn it felf more fuperior to the rebels in the woods, than our beft battalions are to theirs in the open field: That, in order to conciliate the minds of the people, a proclamation was iffued, defiring the inhabitants to take a declaration: certificates were given to thofe who took it, and they had the King's pardon from the commiffioners: That numbers figned addreffes, commending our government, and abufing that of the rebels; thefe were printed, with people's names at large; and the army having foon left that country, the rebels took up the figners, banished them, or fent them to the mines: That there was a great deal of plundering of the inhabitants by our troops as they paffed through the country, by which we loft friends and made enemies: That the commander in chief gave orders against it repeatedly; but a number of officers who had come lately, and entertained a notion that the Americans were enemies, did not perhaps take care enough to prevent plundering, fo that it was very frequent: That the witnefs prevented plundering in the brigade which he commanded; that he always confidered the great object of the war to be the regaining of the people, and to do this by letting them fee we were their friends; that fome parties fent for water, having plundered Newtown in Long-iland, the witnefs had them tried and fentenced; application was made in their favour; and he fent to the

pp. 1779. Parliament: Commons on Gen. Howe's conduct.

but many officers with whom conversed, feared that Gen. Buryne's army would be loft if not fupted; and the witness wrote to a mem- of the Houfe, that if Gen. Burgoyne Ericated himself from the difficulties he s furrounded with, future ages would we little occafion to talk of Hannibal's ape: That Gen. Howe's voyage fouthrd was certainly a diverfion in favour the northern army; but a movement Albany would have been a more werful diverfion: That (being asked, when Gen. Howe imbarked at Staten and for Philadelphia, a corps had been at by fea to alarm the coafts of New gland, what effect would fuch a meae have had in favour of Gen. Buryne's operations) a threatened invafion urally keeps people at home, efpecialmilitia, who may march or not as they afe: That (being afked what number men would have been fufficient to ve given fuch an alarm) he had often cafion to confider that subject; that he nfelf went out from that country at at time with 1700 men, had crofs nds, and was driven to different parts the ocean; that he often wished to e officers on board to have been card to the coaft of New England; as he en thought, fuch an appearance, and e burning a few barns, would have ought back the New-England army to e defence of their own country: That eing asked, if he recollected any inince where fuch an appearance had ch an effect) a pretty large body of rels were marching through Jerfey to pport the lines of Fort Washington; very large fleet of Dutch tranfports iled out of the Hook; the rebels were raid for Philadelphia; the troops were >untermanded; and Col. Cadwallader, ho commanded in the rebel-lines, gave e witnefs this as the reason why they ere fo eafily quitted.

To queftions put by other members n this and following days, Gen. Roertfon answered, That (being asked, in what he had faid relating to New England, he meant to burn barns only, r all houfes as they came in his way) e meant to alarm the coaft rather than o diftrefs it; to burn the houfe that would make the greateft blaze, and do he least mischief; and he did not inend to penetrate far into the country: That (being asked, if he thought himelf authorised to undertake fuch an expedition without order) he never burnt

695

a house, he often prevented it; but he
wished he could have burnt the barns,
and given the alarm he intended, because
he was ftill convinced it would have an-
fwered a great end; and that he would,
as often as he had it in his power, an-
noy the enemy, and take the reft up-
on himfelf: That from the returns, and
other information, he believed the num
ber of our army in the Jerfeys in 1777
was 17,015 men, and that of the rebels,
according to different accounts, 8, 9, or

10,000.

The witnefs was crofs-examined by Gen. Howe; but we muft refer those who would see the whole, to the Parliamentary Register: we have extracted what we thought contained moft information. His examination was ended June 14.; and that of Mr Galloway was begun on the 16th; - which we began fome months ago [457.], and fhall now conclude.

Mr J. Galloway's Examination. [650.]

Q. Do you remember the march of Sir W. Howe from the Elk to Philadel was you with him? phia?

A. I was.

Q. Is it not almoft the whole length of the province in that direction? A. By no means *.

Q. Is the province more extensive in that direction than from the Elk to the Delaware?

A. Not in that ftraight direction from the Elk to Philadelphia.

Q. Had Sir W. Howe a strong army with him?

A. I fhould think a very strong army confidering the force in oppofition to him .-The foree in oppofition to him

at

• Sir William Howe's march was not in a ftraight direction from the Elk to Philadel phia, but in a circuit.-He marched first nearly north about fixty miles to the Schuyl kill; then changed his route, and pafled to Philadelphia, about twenty miles in a course fouthward of east. — In the first direc tion he might have paffed an hundred miles farther than he did.

†The force of an army does not confist in numbers, fo much as in military appointments and difcipline. The British army had the beft appointments, and was compo fed of veterans, high-fpirited and perfectlydifciplined troops.-The rebel-army was not only very badly appointed, but confifted of new-raifed undifciplined troops, commanded, for the most part, by officers unskite led in military knowledge. Hence we find, 4 T 2

shas

at the battle of Brandywine did not confift of more than 15,000 men, the army and its attendants, including officers and all, fave about 1000 militia, for whom they could not procure arms.

Q. How many of the King's loyal fubjects joined the army of Sir W. Howe on that march?

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A. There were many came into the camp, and returned again to their habitations. I do not know of any that joined in arms, not one; - nor was there any invitation for that purpose. By Sir W. Howe's declaration, which is before this committee, he only requefted the people to stay at home.

Q. If the people were fo defirous of repreffing the tyranny of the Congrefs, how came they not to take that oppor. tunity of rifing to protect themfelves, and to deliver up the ufurping magiftrates?

Q. So that the loyal people are not able to protect themselves after the withdrawing of the army?

A. I don't make that conclufion.If an army goes into the country with defign to reduce it, and fhould find it neceffary to make use of the force of that country for its defence, after the army may leave it to go on other operation; common policy, and the practice I be lieve of all Generals, has been, for the army to remain in that country until the proper measures are taken, by proper rules and regulations, to embody the force, by which it may be protected when the army fhall leave it.

Q. How long did Sir W. Howe fay at Philadelphia?

It is truly abfurd and ridiculous, to e pect that the people of a country, howew well affected to us, who are destitute of am, or any of the means of war, will rife in our favour, without fome encouragement offered, or the leaft commiffion or invitation to do ; more especially when that country contain militia armed, and an army capable of kep

A. The people in the province of Weft New Jersey had been deferted: - many of them who had taken an active part, and been affifting to the General, were obliged, to fave their lives, to fleeing the field, ready to fupprefs them. to New York for protection, and defert their wives, their families, and proper ty; and more, it is not natural to think that people of property will join an ar my paffing as that did, from the head of Elk to Philadelphia, leave their wives and families, and their property, liable to be deftroyed every moment after the departure of the army, without fome affurance, or without fome protection left with them, or affurances that the army would continue with them, or be ready to protect them.

Q. Is that fo in all the provinces ?
A. I think it will be fo all the world

over *

that the British troops have met with no difficulty in defeating them, however advantageously posted, and whenever they have been attacked. But in the five feveral compiete defeats at Long island, the White Plains, Quibble-town, Brandywine, and Germantown, there was no purfuit after victory. This important part of military policy, fo effential to final fuccefs, was in every inftance omitted; and the rebel-general, with the affiftance of the rebel-ftates, fuffered to col lect and recruit his diminished army, to renew the appointments loft in battle, and to appear again in force in the field. Under a conduct to erroneous, what avail fuperior numbers, difcipline, or appointments? Force, however great, is ufelefs unless exert ed, and victory is vain unless pursued.

fides, the people of Pennfylvania had feen the British army in the poffeffion of all New Jerky, and its troops cantoned from New York Trenton, to cover it, and no measures purfued to embody the loyal în arms, or to make use ef the well-affected force within it for its de fence. They had feen that army, by one fourth part of its numbers of new-raifed undifciplined troops, driven out of Weft Jerity, and feveral thousands of his Majesty's faith ful fubjects who had taken a decifive part in our favour, abandoned to the exafperated refentment of their enemies. They had feen large bodies of loyalifts rifing in favour of the crown, in the feveral colonies of May. land, the Delaware counties, North Cas lina, and New Jersey, unfupported by the British army, and fuppreffed and feverely punished by the rebels. After thefe examples, it would certainly have been extreme folly in the people of Pennsylvania, circus flanced as they were, to rife in our favour without the least affurance of aid, or invit tion to do fo. It is certainly confiftent with all experience and found policy, when General enters a country, and withes for the aid of a party in it, to folicit it, and to gi them the neceffary fupport, and means of doing it. The invitation, in all reafon, fhould come from the General, not the of fer from the people. His intereft and day demand it; the danger of their fafety for bids it. If the people, labouring under fach difficulties, are to blame for not offering their aid, how much more fo is the General for not asking it?

A. The

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