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PARLIAMENT. [433.]

June 22. 1779.

Mr David Hartley. I have waited with much anxiety and impatience through the courfe of the prefent feffion, in expectation, that fome propofitions for peace, between this country and America, would have been offered to the confideration of parliament. A very general report has prevailed for fome months paft, that fome negotiation towards peace has been fet on foot, under the mediation of the court of Spain. I confefs to you, Sir, that when I heard that the court of Spain was to be the mediator, I did not form to myself any favourable omen of fuccefs from fuch a mediation; neither does it afford any favourable opinion of the conduct of adminiftration, that they have fuffered themselves to be amufed with the pretences of that court upon fuch a fubject. It amounts to conviction of infincerity in themselves towards peace, if they have employed their time no better; for I will venture to fay, that they might have found a better employment for their time and attention, if they had been fo difpofed. I am bold to fay this, because I speak what I know. Minifters were not ignorant where they might have negotiated an bonourable and fincere peace; but they have rejected and refufed that oppor tunity, which perhaps may never occur again.

Sir, it is upon the fubject of this falla. cious negotiation with Spain, which the minifters of this country have fo meanly fubmitted to; and likewife upon their refufal of other terms honourable to this country, and equitable in themfelves, which were offered to them, but refused on their part, (and which I shall this day lay before you), that I rife now to trouble you. I must beg your favour. able attention, not only as upon a matter of great public importance, but likewife your indulgence particularly to my felf, as having been the perfon through whofe hand that negotiation paffed, which might have procured peace, but which minifters have thought proper to reject. I think myself called upon by every tie of duty to my country, and by every confideration of prudence to my felf, to lay this tranfaction before you. My reafon for fo doing is evident; it is to discharge myself to my country of any concealment in a matter of fuch deep

importance, in which perhaps the fate of many countries, and the lives of many thousands, may be involved. In civil commotions, and in great national wars, thofe men take great refponfibilities upon themfelves who refufe proffers of accommodation. They charge themselves with all the confequences which may afterwards affect their country by fuch refufal. However other men may think upon this subject, it never fhall be faid of me, that knowing of practicable terms of peace, I had fecreted that knowledge from my country. I therefore feel myfelt compelled to lay before this Houfe and my country, the ftate of those terms which his Majefty's ministers have taken upon themfelves to refufe, although they knew at the fame time that they would have laid a fure foundation for a folid and permanent peace. I wifh the public, at the fame time, to be informed of the ftate of the pretended negotiation for peace, under the auspices of a branch of the Houfe of Bourbon, that they may confront that negotiation with the terms of the other, which, as having been con cerned therein, I know to have been honourable, equitable, and practicable, and to have been conducted on one part, at leaft, in fincerity and good faith, though rejected by a British ministry.

Sir, it happened, fome months ago, to fall to my lot to have the negotiation for the exchange of British and American prifoners [394.] pafs through my hands. Having nothing fo anxioufly at heart as the defire of abating all the miseries of war, it may be eafily imagined, that I did not confine my thoughts merely to the object of the exchange of prisoners, but that I was tempted, at the fame time, to make ufe of frequent opportunities of communication which came in my way, to feel the pulfes of the refpective parties from time to time, towards a general accommodation. It requires not the rank of a crowned head to become a mediator. The moft private individual acting in plain and fimple fincerity, is ten thousand times more adequate to obtain fuccefs in fuch an undertaking, than the moft auguft court in Europe, acting from pride, paffion, and felf-interest. With refpect to the court of Spain, this may be brought to a clear teft. If minifters will give their confent to lay before this Houfe, all the papers and documents relating to the Spanish negotiation, (which I fhall move for before I fit

down),

down), you will fee whether it be an unjuft or harsh judgement upon the imputed motives of that court, to fuppofe that they have not been influenced by the view of restoring general peace and tranquillity to mankind, but that the paffions of pride and felf-intereft have guided their conduct. I am fure, as far as we can judge by the fample of their principles, as contained in the late Spanifh ambaffador's refcript of the 16th of June, now lying upon your table [316.], the very first act of their interference under the pretence of a mediator for peace, ought to have been treated by a British ministry as an open declaration of war. For what does that refcript say of mediation? Does it even make a pretence of mediating for peace? No. It does indeed tell you, that a British miniftry were mean enough to apply for the mediation of the court of Spain; but, at the fame time, it declares moft explicit ly, on the part of that court, that their intention and plan was to lie in wait till G. Britain should have exhausted herself by war, and just at the moment (when ever it fhould arrive) that the fhould be upon the point of fettling her differences with the other powers with whom the was involved, Spain had referved to her felf the right of interpofing her hundred grievances before any general plan of pacification fhould be fuffered to take place. So much for the Spanish mediation for peace, as far as it appears upon the face of the refcript of the 16th June, delivered by the Marquis of Almodovar. If the Houfe fhould be of opinion to address his Majefty, to lay before them all the papers and documents referred to in that refcript, we shall then fee the whole of that negotiation in its true colours. It is fit that minifters fhould give fome account to the public why they have difgraced their country, by meanly courting the infidious mediation of a haughty and hoftile power, the known and declared ally to France, by the family-compact; and why they have, at the fame time, refufed honourable terms of accommodation, which were offered to them through a channel which could not be fufpected of infincerity or deceit.

Sir, I am not confcious that I affume to myself any unbecoming claim of importance when I tell you, that I was myfelf the inftrument of that mediation for preliminary terms of negotiation

which might have led to peace. Sincerity, and good-will towards this country and towards America, being the only qualities requifite in fuch a mediator, I hope that in thofe qualities, at leaft, I fhall never be thought defective. In my private and circumfcribed situation, every thought and labour of mine has been de voted, both in parliament and out of it, to point out those dangers to which the minifters of this country are continually expofing it, by their headstrong and in. flexible obftinacy in profecuting a cruel and deftructive American war; and at the fame time I have endeavoured to trace the road to peace and reconciliation with America, as the fundamental remedy for all thofe evils which we have already brought upon ourselves, and all thofe ftill greater evils which, I fear, are lying in wait for us, if we should perfit in following any other road than that which leads to peace.

The two great and cardinal points which I have kept in view, and which have often fuggefted to the Houfe in the courfe of the prefent feffion, have been, the armaments of Spain on the one hand, and the obvious practicability of peace with America on the other, as deduced from the nature of the cafe, and the te ftimony of recent events in the courfe of the last year.

The American alliance with France was the effect of reluctant neceffity; t was decifive; it was eventual, and would never have taken any effect at all, if the British ministry had not, infidiously un der the fimulation of peace, ftill perfift ed in exercifing all the horrors of war. The miniftry of this country pretended to offer peace, but the fword was under ; their cloak. And after all, what wa that pretended offer? It was an offer to talk about peace, but without any fpecific and bounden conditions. They required previously of America, that they fhould renounce that protection from foreign power which they had been dis ven to feek in their own defence, and the face of mankind to break their frit engagement of public faith with a power from whom they had received affistance«. Let that engagement have been ever fa reluctantly incurred on their part, frum cruel neceflity impofed upon them by British miniftry, it was ftill binding up on them; and that the motives which induced France to interfere, were not motives of magnanimity or affection, was

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obvious to all the world. It was the convention of Saratoga which procured to America the active friendship of France. While the event of the American conteft at that critical period was dubious, the friendship of France was prudential, unavowed, and undecided. The true teft of magnanimity and cordial friendship would have been more feelingly proved in the time of their greatest difficulties and ftruggles, in rebus incertis. Such conduct on the part of France might have laid the foundation of permanent obligation. But still, in every case, engagements of honour are binding, with out regard to motives. This ground, however, which I have now ftated, is the only foundation of the prefent connection between France and America; and it is this very ground itfelf which I take for my own argument and propofitions for peace and reconciliation between Great Britain and America: America will doubtless perform all her contracted engagements; but whenever the British miniftry can be prevailed up on, or compelled by their country, to abate their hoftilities towards America, the common interefts, mutual inclina tions, habits of affection, and all the ancient ties of friendship and confanguinity between us, will again emerge into operation, and lead the two countries to peace and reunion with each other.

Being convinced of the neceffary and infallible operation of these principles; being likewife fully convinced, that both the nations of Great Britain and America ardently with to fheath the fword, and to fpare the further effufion of blood, and that the hearts of none but the miniftry alone are set upon vindictive pur. pofes; I have, from time to time, felt the pulfes of each party for fome terms of accommodation; and if I could have obtained the concurrence of British minifters, I fhould have been in the fairest profpect of fucceeding to my wifh, for they alone were unconfenting. I will now lay before you thofe terms which minifters have thus refufed, and which refufal has now actually brought on a Spanish war, fuperadded to the American and French war. If those terms had been accepted, America, at leaft, would have been inlifted on our fide, in the cause of restoring general peace. But ministers are obftinately and inflexibly determined to plunge their country into Every degree of confufion and ruin, which

the gratification of their pride, madness, and revenge, can drive us to, rather than to lay the foundation of national fafety, in an equitable and fincere negotiation of peace and good-will with America. On the other hand, you will fee, in the course of that transaction, that the difpofition of America is fincere for peace. The terms which I am now going to state to you are honourable for this country; they involve us in no act or propofition of unbecoming humilia. tion: if they had, I fhould never have been the proposer of them. The concurrence with those propofitions of peace by the perfons to whom America has intrufted the conduct of the negotiations, does honour to their country. In this act of theirs, on the part of their country, I ftill recognife the heart of America unaltered to this country, (I do not mean towards its ministers), but America towards Great Britain. Remember, Sir, the words of their last petition, which was, indeed, trampled under foot by ministry, and judge if their hearts are not ftill the fame. At that time" their breafts retained too tender a regard for the kingdom from which they derived their origin, to requeft fuch a reconciliation as might, in any manner, be inconfiftent with her dignity or welfare [37. 432.]." They do fo ftill, when brought to the fair and free teft. The proof of this is fixed by the free concurrence, on their part, with the following terms, which are fully confiftent with every principle of equity and honour, at the fame time that they are calculated to preferve the dignity and welfare of this country, and to reftore peace and reunion with America. The terms are as follows.

I. That commiffioners be appointed to treat, confult, and agree, upon the final fettlement and pacification of the prefent troubles in America, upon safe, honourable, and permanent terms, fubject to ratification by parliament.

2. That any one of the aforesaid commiffioners may be empowered to agree, as a preliminary, to a fufpenfion of all hoftilities by fea and land, for the certain term of ten years.

The withdrawing of the British forces is not propofed as a preliminary, but is referved as the firft article of the negotiation. The condition against which this fhould be fet in balance, on the o ther fide, must be a ftipulation for the

fecurity

fecurity of the friends of the British go- ance, I would concede every thing to vernment in America. [40, 462.]

3. That any one of the aforefaid commiffioners may be empowered to agree, as a fecond preliminary, to fufpend the operation of any and all acts of parlia ment, respecting America, during the terms of the truce.

4. That a truce of the aforefaid term of years be agreed to, and declared be tween Great Britain and France.

5. That the general treaty fhall be fet on foot for negotiation, as foon as may be after figning the aforefaid preliminaries.

6. That any articles of the negotiation may take effect as foon as agreed to by the parties, in the course of the negotiation, without waiting for the final conclufion of the treaty.

Sir, the Houfe having now heard the terms themselves, I fhall trouble them only with a short comment upon them, for I think they do fufficiently speak for themfelves. The firft article is, "That commiffioners be appointed to treat, confult, and agree, upon the final fettlement and pacification of the present troubles in America, upon safe, honourable, and permanent terms, fubject to ratification by parliament." Upon this article I have but little to fay, by way of comment or comparison with the Spanish treaty, until we shall be more informed, as to the plan and mode propofed for negotiation under the Spanish aufpices. It is generally reported, that that negotiation was to have been conducted at Madrid, at the nod of that court. If there be any fenfe of national honour left in this country, fuch a propofition fhould have been confidered as a declaration of war on the part of Spain. I know the answer that an Earl of Chatham would have given upon fuch an occafion. The answer which that great man, who carried the name of this country to the highest pin. nacle of human glory, gave to a Spanish minifter upon a propofition fimilar to this, in the year 1761, was this: "It will be time enough to make fuch propofitions when you are in poffeffion of the Tower of London." As to my own part, Sir, I should have thought it a difgrace to have entertained the moft diftant idea of meanly fubmitting the arbitration of British and American concerns to the court of Madrid, proftrating ourfelves at their feet, the defpifed fupplicants of their mediation and forbear

reconciliation with America, I would give my heart to them; but I would not be dictated to by the house of Bourbon, The propofed treaty therefore, under the propofitions which I have juft now ftated, was to have been free and open between the original parties concerned, and uncontrouled by any influence what foever, except the univerfal laws of ju. ftice and fincerity, and the returns of mutual affection between the parties.

The fecond article is, a fufpenfion of all hoftilities by fea and land for the term of ten years, with a condition annexed: for the withdrawing of the British forces upon a ftipulation on the other fide for the fecurity of the friends of the British government in America. Sir, you mu certainly have made the obfervation al ready, that throughout all the above-re cited terms there is not the leaft mention of independence. I have induftriou passed it by, with a view of avoiding very occafion of giving offence. But may be urged in argument, That a ten year's truce would amount fubftantially and eventually to independence. To which I reply, That, if it be so, I do no more than follow a very pleadable example, namely, that of your parliamentary commiffioners last year; who, in canval fing with the Congrefs the point of inde pendence, make use of thefe words "We are not inclined to difpute with you about the meaning of words, but fa far as (by independence) you mean the entire privilege of the people of North America, to dispose of their property, and to govern themselves without a reference to Great Britain beyond what is neceffary to preferve that union force in which our mutual fafety and advantage confift, we think that fo far in dependency is fully acknowledged in the terms of our letter of the 10th of Jurt and we are willing to enter upon a fair dif cuffion with you of all the circumftances which may be necessary to enfure, or even to enlarge that independency [40.532.] Now, Sir, I only beg of you to beftow one moment's attention to compare this declaration with the second article of th propofitions now under our confiden tion, and let any man tell me, whether there is any thing in that fecond artice which precludes that union of force in which our mutual fafety and advantage comm fift; or, as I fhould exprefs the fame thing, though in other words, is there

any obftacle thrown in the way by that propofition to preclude the negotiation of a federal alliance between Great Britain and America? The men who after fo full a declaration as that through their commiffioners laft year on the fubject of independence, profeffing their readinefs to enfure, and even to enlarge it; thofe men, I fay, who now would cavil at a ten-year's truce, as conveying an eventual independence which cannot be broader than that which they themselves laft year were even solicitous to enlarge; thofe men, I fay, do now give the most public proof, and the most explicit and fhameefs avowal of their duplicity and infin⚫ cerity, in thofe fallacious offers which they tranfmitted through their commifioners laft year to America. Who will give confidence to fuch minifters, that hey would have ever ratified their own roposals of the last year, when it is conidered, that thofe very minifters have low rejected the propofitions which are it present under our discussion, upon no other ground of objection but the inadmiffibility of a ten-year's truce, as conveying fome poffible degree of independence in the event, but which certainly does not convey any degree of independence broader than that which they of fered spontaneously themselves laft year to enfure, and even to enlarge? So much then for the good faith and confiftence of minifters.

is, by a fufpenfion of arms for ten years, to difarm the tyrannical few who now controul and compel the multitude againft the bias of their inclination and intereft, thereby giving full and free fcope to thofe fuppofed difpofitions to prevail without controul, if they do exift; is fuch a propofition, I fay, upon the foregoing premises, to be confidered as eftablifhing independence? No, Sir; men who can pretend to be convinced, notwithstanding fuch inconfiftencies in their own arguments, have other fecret motives and meanings in their conduct, which no reason will ever conquer: they can mean but one thing; which is, to fruftrate every poffible offer of reconciliation with America: and they have not the common decent regard for their own character or confiftence, to be fcrupulous upon the pretext, how fhallow foever it may be, if it will but serve their turn for the day.

But, Sir, there is another ingenious turn given to this argument of the tenyear's truce as being tantamount to independence. The argument ad hominem is turned upon myself. It is faid, You at least do not believe all the ftories that are related about four fifths of America being attached to the dependence upon this country, therefore, at least, according to your view of things, this propofed conceffion of a ten-years truce must be confidered as equivalent to independ But, Sir, with your permiffion, I can- ence. I have an answer likewife for this not agree this point of a ten-year's truce cavil; and it is taken from the very perbeing tantamount to independence upon fons themselves who make the objection. another ground: We have had much evi- I may call every member in this Houfe to dence brought to our bar lately to prove be my witnefs, that whenever ministers to us, that four fifths of America are zea have spoken upon this point of independlously attached to their ancient dependence, they have always declared it to be ence upon this country, and languishing to return to that dependence [461.]. This is the language univerfally held and proclaimed by the dependents of minifters, and by minifters themselves. Then mark the confiftence of this language with the argument now infifted upon by the fame perfons, viz. That a ten-years truce is equivalent to independence. What! are four men out of five throughout America languishing to return to their dependence upon the minifters of this country, and are thefe four fifths defeated of their ardent wishes by the combination of the fifth men, who having arms in their hands, are at prefent masters over a great majority of their countrymen; and is a propofition, the very first object and operation of which VOL. XLI.

abfurd in the highest degree to attempt the government of any country contrary to the general fenfe and inclination of the people. I agree with them perfectly in that opinion; but I cannot conceive by what inference of logic they can urge that as an objection to me, which they maintain as a principle themselves.

I think, Sir, that I have now anfwered all the objections which I have heard thrown out against the propofal of a tenyears truce upon the fcore of independence, or I fhould rather fay that the objections have anfwered themselves. As to the propofition of a ten-years truce taken upon its own ground, it seems to bid the faireft of all poffible arrangements for producing peace and reconcilement. Time given for cooling on both fide, 3 P

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