was not in a regular line of battle, appeared by the French Admiral being out of his ftation, far from the centre of his line, and next, or very near, to a fhip carrying a Vice-Admiral's flag, and from fome of their fhips being abreast of each other, and in one, as they passed the British fleet, with other apparent marks of irregularity. Indeed every motion of the French feet, from about nine, when it went upon the starboard tack, till the moment of the action, and even during the action itself, I apprehend to be decifive against the alledged indication of defigning battle: for if the French Admiral had really defigned to come to action, I apprehend he never would have got his fleet on the contrary tack to that on which the British fleet was coming up to him, but would have shortened fail, and waited for it, formed in the line on the fame tack; and even when he did tack towards the British fleet, the alledged indication is again directly refuted, by the van of the French fleet hauling their wind again, inftead of bearing down into action, and by their hoifting no colours when they began to engage.

Notwithstanding thefe incontrovertible truths, my accufer imputes it to me, that a general engagement was not brought on but it is evident from the teftimony of every witness he has called, that a general engagement was never in my choice; and that so far from its being prevented by my not having formed the line of battle, no engagement, either general or partial, could have been brought on if I had formed it. Indeed it is a contradiction in terms to speak of a general engagement, where the fleet that has the wind, tacks to pafs the fleet to leeward on the contrary tack.

Such was the manner in which, after four days purfuit, I was at laft enabled, by a favourable fhift of wind, to clofe with the fleet of France: and if I am juftifiable on principle in the exercise of that difcretion which I have been fubmitting to your judgement, of bringing, at all events, an unwilling enemy to battle, I am certainly not called upon to defcend to all the minutiae of confequences refulting from fuch enterprise, even if fuch had enfued as my accufer has af ferted, but which his own witneffes have not only failed to establish, but absolutely refuted. It would be an infult on the understanding of the court, were I to offer any arguments to fhew, that ships which

engage without a line of battle, cannot closely, uniformly, and mutually fuppo each other, as when circumftances a mit of a line being formed; because it felf-evident, and is the bafis of all t difcipline and practice of lines of batt But, in the present case, notwithstan ing I had no choice in making any pofition for an attack, nor any poffi lity of getting to battle otherwife than did, which would be alone fufficient repel any charge of consequent irregul rity, or even confufion; yet it is n necessary for me to claim the protecti of the circumstances under which I a ed, because no irregularity or confufi either exifted or has been proved; all t chafing hips, and the whole fleet, e cept a fhip or two, got into battle, a into as close battle as the French fie which had the option by being to wit ward, chose to give them. The Vi Admiral of the Blue himself, though the rear, was out of action in a th time after the Victory; and fo far fr being left to engage fingly and unfi ported, was paffed during the action three fhips of his own divifion, and v obliged to back his mizen topfail, keep out of the fire of one of the larg fhips in the fleet, which must have co tinued near him all the reft of the tit he was paffing the French line, as fhall prove he was within three cab lengths of the Formidable when the ring ceased.

Anfwer to the Second Article. [97.]

The moment the Victory had paf the enemy's rear, my first object was, look round to the pofition of the fe which the fmoke had till then obfcu from obfervation, in order to determi how a general engagement might best brought on after the fleets fhould ha paffed each other.

I found that the Vice-Admiral of t Red, with part of his division, had tac ed, and was standing towards the ener with top-gallant fails fet, the very thi I am charged with not having direc him to do; but all the rest of the fhi that had paffed ahead of me were fill the ftarboard tack, fome of them dra ping to leeward, and feemingly emple ed in repairing their damages. T Victory herself was in no condition tack; and I could not immediately wei and ftand back on the fhips coming aftern of me out of the action,

in action. The Vice-Admiral of the Blue was on the ftarboard tack, ftanding away from his ftation, totally regardless of the fignal that was flying to form the line; and most of the other fhips, except the Red divifion, whofe pofition I have already ftated, were far aftern; and five difabled fhips at a great diftance on the lee-quarter. Mott of these facts are already established by the accufer's own evidence; and I fhall prove and confirm them all by the teftimony of that part of the fleet whofe fituations will enable them to speak to them with certainty.

I trust they will convince the court, that I had it not in my power to collect the fleet together to renew the fight at that time, and that from their not being able to follow me, I confequently could not advance with them; that I did not haul down the fignal for battle, till it ceafed to be capable of producing any good effect; that during the whole time I ftood towards the enemy, I endeavoured, by the most forcible of all fig. nals, the fignal for the line of battle, to call the fhips together, in order to renew the attack; that I did avail myself of the ships that were with the ViceAdmiral of the Red, as far as circumftances admitted; and that I therefore did do the utmost in my power to take, fink, burn, and deftroy the French fleet which had attacked the British fleet.

Aufwer to the Fourth Article. [97.] The French fleet having wore, and be. gan to form their line on the ftarboard tack, by the wind, which if they kept would have brought them close up with the centre divifion, foon afterwards ed. ged away, pointing towards four or five difabled ships, which were at a diftance to leeward, and with evident intention to have separated them from the reft of the fleet; to prevent which I made the fignal to wear, and flood athwart their van in a diagonal courfe, to give protection to thofe crippled fhips, keeping the fignal for the line flying to form and collect the fleet on the ftarboard tack. As I had thus been obliged to alter my difpofition, before Capt. Sutton left the Victory, with my former meilage, I dif. patched him with orders to the Vice-Admiral of the Red to form with his divifion at a distance aftern of the Victory, to cover the rear, and to keep the enemy in check, till the Vice-Admiral of the

Blue fhould come into his ftation, with his divifion, in obedience to the fignal. Thefe orders the Vice-Admiral of the Red inftantly obeyed, and was formed in my wake before four o'clock; when, finding, that while by the course I fteer. ed to protect the crippled fhips, I was nearer the enemy, the Vice-Admiral of the Blue ftill continued to lie to windward, and by fo doing kept his divifion from joining me, I made the fignal for fhips to bear down into my wake, and that it might be the better diftinguished (both being fignals at the mizen-peak I hauled down the fignal for the line for about ten minutes, and then hoifte it again. This fignal he repeated, the he had not repeated that for the line battle; but by not bearing down himfel he led the fhips of his divifion to inter pret his repeating it as requiring them come into his wake instead of mine.

Having now accomplished the protec tion of the difabled fhips, and the Frend fleet continuing to form their line, ran ging up to leeward, parallel to the cen tre-divifion, my only object was to for mine, in order to bear down upon thes to renew the battle; and therefore, at quarter before five o'clock, after havin repeated the fignal for fhips to wing ward to bear down into my wake, wi no better effect than before, I fent th Milford with orders to the Vice Adm ral of the Red to stretch ahead, and tal his ftation in the line; which he inftant ly obeyed: and the Vice-Admiral of th Blue being ftill to the windward, wit his fore-topfail unbent, and making vifible effort to obey the fignal, whic had been flying the whole afternoon, fent out the Fox, at five o'clock, wit orders to him to bear down into m wake, and to tell him, that I only wait ed for him, and his divifion, to renes the battle. While I was difpatching thefe frigates, having before hauled down the fignal to come into my wake, 1 p abroad the fignal for all thips to com into their ftations, always keeping th fignal for the line flying. All this pro ducing no effect on the Vice- Admiral the Blue, and wearied out with fruitleg expectation, at feven o'clock I made ti fignal for each particular fhip of th Vice Admiral of the Blue's divifion come into their station: but before the had accomplished it, night put an end to all further operations.

It may be obferved, that amongst the Бува

If the Vice-Admiral chufes to confider this as a culpable neglect, I can only fay, that it occurred to me to treat him with a delicacy due to his rank, which had fome time before induced me to fend him the meffage by Capt. Windfor, the particulars of which he has already faithfully related to the court.

I truft I have little reafon to appreBend, that the court will be inclined to confider my conduct as I have ftated it, anfwer to this fourth article of the charge, as difgraceful to the British flag. After I had put upon the fame tack with he enemy, to protect the disabled part f my fleet, and to collect the reft toge. her, there would have been little to do a renew the battle, but bearing right lown upon the enemy, if my accufer had led his divifion in obedience to the repeated fignals and orders which I have fated. The Victory never went more han two knots, was under her double. erfed topfails and forefail, much thatred, which kept the fhips that were ear her under their topfails, and fufferthe French fleet, which might always ave brought me to action if they had clined to do it, to range up paralwith the centre, under very little fail. I was to protect the five difabled fhips bove mentioned, and to give the reft me to form into fome order, that I adged it more expedient to ftand as I ad under that easy fail, than to bring to ith my head to the fouthward. The part will judge whether it was poffile for any officer in the fervice really believe that thefe operations could ive the appearance of a flight, or furnish rational pretence to the French Admito claim the victory, or publish to the orld that the British fleet had run aay.

Anfwer to the Fifth Article. [97]

On the morning of the 28th of July, the rench fleet (except three fail which were en upon the lee quarter) was only vifilefrom the maft-heads of fome of the fhips f the British fleet, and at a distance from e, which afforded not the smallest proe of coming up with them; more epecially as their hips, though certainly Bach damaged in their hulls, had not pparently fuffered much in their mafts nd fails: whereas the fleet under my ommand was generally and greatly flatred in their mafts, yards, and rigging, VOL. XLI.

As to the three French fhips, I made the fignal at five o'clock in the morning for the Duke, Bienfaifant, Prince George, and Elifabeth, to give them chace, judging them to be the propereft fhips for that purpofe; but the two laft were not able to carry fufficient fail to give even countenance to the purfuit; and, looking round to the general condition of my fleet, I faw it was in vain to attempt either a general or partial chace. Indeed my accufer does not venture to alledge that there was any probability, or even poffibility, of doing it with effect; which deftroys the whole imputation of his charge.

Under thefe circumstances, I could not miflake my duty; and I was refolved not to facrifice it to an empty fhew and appearance, which is beneath the dignity of an officer unconscious of any failure or neglect. To have urged a fruitless purfuit with a fleet fo greatly crippled in its mafts and fails, after a diftant and fly. ing enemy, within reach of their own ports, and with a fresh wind blowing fair for their port, with a large fwell, would have been not only wantonly ex. pofing the British fleet under my command, without end or object, but misleading and defeating its operations, by delaying the refitment neceffary for carrying on the future fervice with vigour and effect.

My accufer afferts, by a general conclufion to the five articles exhibited a-. gainft me, that from what he ftates as inftances of misconduct and neglect in me, 66 a glorious opportunity was loft of doing a moft effential service to the state, and that the honour of the British navy was tarnished."

The truth of the affertion, That an opportunity was loft, I am not called upon either to combat or deny. It is fufficient for me, if I fhall be fuccefs. ful in proving, that that opportunity was feized by me, and followed up to. the full extent of my power. If the court fhall be of that opinion, I am fatiffied; and it will then reft with the ViceAdmiral of the Blue to explain to what caufe it is to be referred, that the glorious opportunity he speaks of was loft, and to whom it is to be imputed, (if the fact be true), that the honour of the Bri tish navy has been tarnished.

[To be continued.]