in the mean time, whilft we guard what we have already got, we hold ourselves in readiness to catch at further favourable incidents, as they may occur."

After this letter there follows a procla. mation, in the name of Auguftine Prevoft, Efq; Brigadier-General and Commander in Chief of his Majefty's troops in the Southern diftrict; Hyde Parker, jun. Efq; commanding his Majefty's fhips in the river Savannah; and Archibald Campbell, Efq; commanding the northern detachment,-dated, Savannah, March 4. 1779; — declaring, "That all the laws of the province of Georgia which were in force at the end of the year 1775 [37.548.], are, and fhall continue, in full force, until fuch time as a period of lefs difquiet fhall enable a future general affembly to alter or amend them; "--and eftablishing a civil government, and naming perfons to fill the feveral offices.

Lt-Col. Campbell adds, That at Augufta and round it, the inhabitants, to the number of 1400 men, fubmitted, fwore allegiance to the King, took the benefit of his Majefty's gracious protection, and were formed into twenty companies, in the ftyle of militia, for the defence of their property against the incurfions of the rebels from Carolina: That after his return down the country, intelligence was received, that a body of the loyalifts of North and South Carolina, confifting of about 600 men, after being repulfed by the rebels, were in fearch of the royal army by the back or upper road; that the advanced part of the army was immediately moved towards them; and that 300 of them joined the King's troops, and are formed under their own leaders with every poffible at tention and encouragement: and, That fince the laft action many deferters from the Continental troops in Carolina had come in, and were forming into companies; and that a lieutenant-colonel and thirty men had arrived in one night immediately before his departure. Lond, gaz. "London, April 16. By a proclamation published at New York, all deferters from the provincials are offered a refuge in that city, and are allowed to enter on board the privateers if they chufe; a promife is alfo given them, that they fhall not be impreffed into the King's fervice. In confequence of which many hundred feamen have come in to go on board the private ships of war, which has much affected the provincials, the want of feamen being very great in all their ports."

AFTER forty years spent in the service of my country, little did I think of being brought to a court-martial to answer to charges of misconduct, negligence in the performance of duty, and tarnishing the honour of the British navy. These charges, Sir, have been advanced by my accufer. Whether he has fucceeded in proving them or not, the court will determine. Before he brought me to a trial, it would have been candid in him to have given vent to his thoughts, and not, by a deceptions fhew of kindness, to lead me into the miftake of fuppofing a friend in the man who was my enemy in his heart, and was fhortly to be my accufer. Yet, Sir after all my mifconduct; after fo much negligence in the performance of duty; and after tarnishing fo deeply the honour of the British navy; my accufer made no fcruple to fail a fecond time with the man. who had been the betrayer of his coun try! Nay, during the time that we were on fhore, he correfponded with me os terms of friendship; and even in his let ters he approved of what had been done, of the part which he now condemns, and of the very negligent mifconduct which has fince been fo offenfive in his eyes!

Such behaviour, Sir, on the part of my accufer, gave me little reafon to ap prehend an accufation from him. Nor had I any reason to suppose, that the ftate would criminate me. When I returned, his Majefty received me with the greatest applaufe. Even the First Lord of the Admiralty gave his flattering teftimony to the rectitude of my conduct, and feemed with vaft fincerity to applaud my zeal for the fervice. Yet, in the mo ment of approbation, it seems as if a fcheme was concerting against my life: for, without any previous notice, five articles of å charge were exhibited against me by Sir Hugh Pallifer; who, mott unfortunately for his caufe, lay himself under an imputation for disobedience of orders at the very time when he accufed me of negligence. This, to be fure, was a very ingenious mode of getting the start of me. An accufation exhibited against a commander in chief, might draw of the public attention from neglect of du

ty

ty in an inferior officer. I could almoft with, in pity to my accufer, that appear ances were not fo ftrong against him. Before the trial commenced, I actually thought that my accufer might have fome tolerable reasons for his conduct: but from the evidence, even as adduced to account for the behaviour of the Hon. Gentleman in the afternoon of the 27th of July; from that evidence, I fay, Sir, I find that I was mistaken. The trial has kft my accuser without excuse; and he now cuts that fort of figure which, I truft in God! all accufers of innocence will ever exhibit.

I have obferved, Sir, that the opinions of officers of different ranks have been taken: I trust that the court will indulge me with the fame liberty, in the evidence for my defence. Some have refufed to gretheir opinions. I thought it strange; as plain fpeaking, and a full declarata, are the best of evidences in a good caufe.

I would wifh, Sir, the court to confidr, that in all great naval, as well as military operations, unless the design be fully known, the several manœuvres may have a ftrange appearance. Matters have been called to give their opinions on the Ligher departments of command. High-. authorities fhould have been taken. Such authorities are not scarce; for I am happy to fay, there never was a country ferved by naval officers of more braver. kill, and gallantry, than England ca boaft at prefent. As to this court, I intreat you, Gentlemen, who compofe , to recollect, that you here fit as a court of honour as well as a court of justice; and I now ftand before you, not merely to fave my life, but for a purpose of infinitely greater moment,- to clear my fame.

My accufer, Sir, has been not a little miftaken in his notions of the duty of a commander in chief, or he would never have accufed me in the manner he has done. During action fubordinate officers either are (or they ought to be) too attentive to their own duty to obferve the manoeuvres of others. In general en gagements it is fcarcely poffible for the fame objects to appear in the fame point of view to the commanders of two different fhips. The point of fight may be diferent. Clouds of smoke may obftruct the view. Hence will arife the difference in the opinions of officers as to this or that manoeuvre, without any intentional VOL. XLI.

partiality. Whether I have conceived objects in exact correspondence with the truth; whether I have viewed them unskilfully, (or, as my accufer has been pleased to term it, un-officer like), thefe are matters which remain to be determined. I can only fay, that what Sir Hugh Pallifer has imputed to me as negligence, was the effect of deliberation and choice. I will add, that I was not confined in my powers when I failed; I had ample difcretion to act as I thought proper for the defence of the kingdom. I manœuvred; I fought; I returned; I did my beft. If my abilities were not equal to the task, I have the confolation to think, that I did not folicit, nor did I bargain for the command. More than two years ago, in the month of November 1776, I received a letter from the First Lord of the Marine department, wherein he obfer ved, "That, owing to motions of foreign courts, it might be necessary to prepare a fleet of obfervation." My reply to this letter was, "That I was ready to receive any command from his Majefty, and I beg ged to have the honour of an audience." This request was complied with. I was clofeted; and I told the King, that "I was willing to ferve him as long my health would permit." I heard no more until the month of March 1778, at which time 1 had two or three audiences, and I told his Majefty, that "I had no acquaintance with his minifters, but I trufted to his protection and zeal for the public good." Here was no finifter views, no paltry gratifications; I had nothing, I felt nothing, but an earneft defire to ferve my country. I even accepted the command in chief with reluctance. I was apprehenfive of not being fupported at home. I forefaw, that the higher the command, the more liable was I to be ruined in my reputation. Even my miffortunes, if I had any, might be conftrued into crimes. During forty years fervice, I have not received any particu lar mark of favour from the crown. I have only been honoured with the confidence of my fovereign in times of public danger. Neither my deficiencies nor my misconduct were ever before brought forward to the public. And it is now fomewhat ftrange, that, fo well acquainta ed as my accufer muft have been with my deficient abilities, it is ftrange, I fay, Sir, that he fhould be the very perfon who brought me the meffage to take the command upon me! Nay, further, Sir, Bb

he

he brought me that meffage with great feeming pleasure! There was, or there was not reafon at that time to doubt my ability. If there was reafon, how could my accufer with me to accept a command for which I was difqualified? If there was not any reafon to doubt my profeffional abilities fixteen months ago, I have given no reason why they should be fince called in queftion. When I returned from the expedition, I did not complain of any thing. I endeavoured to ftop all murmurings. I even trufted the First Lord of the Admiralty in the fame manner as I would have done my moft intimate friend. This might be im prudent. It might be dangerous. But, Sir, I am by nature open and unguarded; and little did I expect, that traps would artfully be laid to endeavour to catch me on the authority of my own words.

It was in the month of March 1778, that I was told a fleet lay ready for me to command. When I reached Portfmouth, I faw but fix fhips ready; and on viewing even thofe with a feaman's eye, I was not by any means pleafed with their condition. Before I quitted Portfmouth, four or five more were ready; and I will do the perfons in office the juftice to fay, that from that time they ufed the utmoft diligence in geiting the fleet ready for fervice. On the 30th of June I failed with twenty fhips of the fine; and very fortunately I fell in with the Belle Poule and other French frigates; and the letters and papers found on board them were of material fervice to the ftate. Capt. Marthall diftinguifhed himfelf with the greatest honour. I confefs, that when I fell in with thofe frigates I was at a lofs how to act. On the one hand, I conceived the incident to be favourable to my country; and, on the other, I was fearful that a war with France and all its confequences might be laid to my charge. For any thing I can tell, this may yet be the cafe. It may be treasured up to furnifh another matter for future accufation. To this hour I have neither received official approbation or cenfure for my conduct. With twenty fhips of the line I failed. Thirty-two ships of the line lay in Breft water, befides an incredible number of frigates. Was I to feck an engagement with a fuperior force? I never did, nor fhall I ever, fear to engage a force fuperior to the one I then commanded, or that I may hereafter command: but I

well know what men and ships can do; and if the fleet I commanded had been deftroyed, we muft have left the French mafters of the fea. To refit a fleet requires time. From the fituation of affairs naval ftores are not very foon fupplied. Never did I experience fo deep a melancholy as when I found myself for ced to turn my back on France! I quitted my station, and my courage was ne ver put to fo fevere a trial. [40.324,8.]

I was permitted to fail a fecond time without receiving official praife or blame for the part I had acted. These were difcouraging circumftances. But they did not difturb my temper. My principal object was, to get ready for fea with all possible hafte. I was furprised on my return to be threatened with the fate of Adm. Byng [19.202.], and I was ftill more furprised to be charged with cowardice.

With thirty fhips of the line I failed early in July. The French Admiral failed from Breft with thirty-two fhips. I believe, that when the fleets came in fight of each other, the French were not a little furprifed to fee me fo ftrong. I de fire not to throw the flighteft imputa tion on the courage of the French Admiral. I believe him to be a brave man and one who had fome particular reafons for the line of conduct he pursued. I. was determined if poffible to bring the French to battle, as I had every reafon to think, that their having avoided an engagement when it was for four days in their power to attack me, was owing to their expecting fome capital reinforce ments. I therefore thought that the fooner I could engage them the better: efpecially as I knew, that the principal fleets of our trade were daily expected in the channel; and if the French fleets had been permitted to difperfe without an action, our East and Weft India fleets might have been intercepted, the convoys might have been cut off, and the ftake of England might have been loft. I beg leave to mention, that in the reign of K. William the gallant Adm. Ruffe! was two months in fight of a French fleet, and he could not poffibly bring them to action: my being in fight of the French fleet four days before the engagement, will not therefore appear quite fo extraor dinary as it has been reprefented. Had it not been for the favourable change of wind on the morning of the 27th of July, I could not have brought the French to action when I did.

I

I am exceedingly forry, Sir, that the Admiralty have refufed me the liberty of producing my inftructions. In all for mer courts-martial, the inftructions and orders have been fent with the charge to the members of the court. As it has been denied in this inftance, I muft, and do fubmit.

Although on the 27th of July I fought and beat my enemy, and compelled him to take fhelter by returning into port; yet the effort did by no means aufwer my wishes. I rushed on to re-attack the enemy. Why I did not accomplish my defign, will be seen in the evidence I hall produce. I might, it is true, have chafed the three fhips which were vifible on the morning of the 28th of July; but with very little profpect of fuccefs I therefore chose to return to Plymouth with my fhattered fleet, to get ready for fea again; not however forgetting to leave two fhips of the line to cruife for the protection of our trading fleets; which, thank God! all arrived fafe.

On my return, Sir, I moft cautiously avoided to utter a fyllable of complaint, because it might have fufpended our naval operations, which at that time would have been highly dangerous. I could not think of attending to a court-martial when greater objects were in view.

With refpect to the fecond edition of the Formidable's log-book, it appears to have been fabricated rather for the purpofe of exculpating the profecutor, than to criminate me. I shall therefore pass it over, and permit the gentleman to make the most of fuch an exculpation. I cannot, however, be fo civil to the alterations and additions in the log-book of the Robufte. Capt. Hood's conduct muft have ftruck the court, as I believe it did every perfon, except the profecutor, with aftonishment.

A great ftrefs, Sir, has been laid on my letter to the Admiralty. There is a paffage in it where I feemed to approve the conduct of every officer in the fleet [40. 387.]. The court will obferve, that I was not in my letter to inform all Europe, that a Vice-Admiral under my command had been guilty of neglect, whilft there remained a poffibility of excufe for his conduct. As to courts-martial, one very bad confequence will I am fure refult from this trial: it will terrify a commander in chief from accepting a commiffion, if he should be liable to be brought to a trial by every fubordinate officer.

As I have touched on my letters, I will juft obferve, Sir, that the m ft difagreeable task I ever experienced, was that of writing my letter of the 30th of July. However, if I writ ill, I am confident that I fought well, and the defertion of the trade of France was evident from the numbers of rich captures which are made a number far exceeding any thing ever known in fo short a period ! His Majesty noticed this in a speech from the throne. [40.621.]

Mr Prefident, I now defire that the judge advocate may be directed to read the charges, and I will answer the several accufations.

The Replies of Adm. Keppel.

The first of the charges contained in the first article is, "That on the morning of the 27th of July 1778, having a fleet of thirty fhips of the line under my command, and being then in the prefence of a French fleet of the like number of ships of the line, I did not make the neceffary preparations for fight."

To this I anfwer, That I have never understood preparations for fight to have any other meaning, in the language and understanding of feamen, than that each particular ship, under the direction and difcipline of her own officers, when in purfuit of an enemy, be in every respect cleared, and in readiness for action; the contrary of which no admiral of a fleet, without a reasonable caufe, will prefume: And as from the morning of the 24th, when the French fleet had got to the windward, to the time of the action, the British fleet was in unremitting purfuit of them, it is fill more difficult to conceive, that any thing more is meant by this charge than what is immediately after conveyed by the charge that fol lows it, viz. "That on the fame morning of the 27th I did not put my fleet into line of battle, or into any order proper either for receiving or attacking an enemy of fuch force."

By the second part of the charge I feel myself attacked in the exercise of that great and broad line of difcretion which every officer, commanding either fleets or armies, is often obliged, both in duty and confcience, to exercife to the best of his judgement; and which, depending on circumftances and fituations infinitely various, cannot be reduced to any pofitive rule of difcipline or practice : 'A difcretion which, I fubmit to the court, I B b &

was

was peculiarly called upon, by the ftrongeft and beft motives, to exercife; which I therefore did exercife; and which, in my public letter to the board of admiralty, I openly avowed to have exercised. I admit, that on the morning of the 27th of July, I did not put my fleet into a line of battle; because I had it not in my choice to do fo, confiftently with the certainty, or even the probability, of either giving or being given battle; and because, if I had fcrupulously adhered to that order, in which, if the election had been mine, I should have chosen to have received or attacked a willing enemy, I should have had no enemy either to receive or attack.

I fhall, therefore, in answer to this charge, fubmit to the court my reafons for determining to bring the enemy to battle at all events; and fhall fhew, that any other order than that in which my fleet was conducted from my first feeing them, to the moment of the action, was incompatible with fuch determination.

In order to this, I muft call the attention of the court to a retrospective view of the motions of the two fleets, from their first coming in fight of each other.

On my firft difcovering the French fleet at one o'clock in the afternoon of the 23d of July, I made the neceffary fignals for forming my feet in the order of battle; which I effected towards the evening, and brought to by fignal, and lay till the morning; when, perceiving that the French fleet had gained the wind during the night, and carried a preffed fail to preferve it, I difcontinued the fignal for the line, and made the general fignal to chafe to windward, in hopes that they would join battle with me, rather than fuffer two of their capital fhips to be entirely feparated from them, and give me a chance of cutting off a third, which had carried away a topmaft in the night, and which, but for a fhift of wind, I must have taken. In this, however, I was disappointed; for they fuffered two of them to go off altogether, and continued to make every ufe of the advantage of the wind.

This affiduous endeavour of the French Admiral to avoid coming to action, which, from his having the wind, was always in his option, led me to believe that he expected a reinforcement. This reflection would alone have been fufficient to determine me to urge my purfuit, in as collected a body as the nature

of fuch a purfuit would admit of, without the delay of the line, and to feize the firft opportunity of bringing on an engagement.

But I had other reafons no lefs urgent: If, by obftinately adhering to the line of battle, I had fuffered, as I inevitably muft, the French fleet to have fe parated from me; and if, by fuch separation, the English convoys from the Eaft and Weft Indies, then expected home, had been cut off, or the coaft of England had been infulted, what would have been my fituation? Sheltered un der the forms of difcipline, I might, perhaps, have efcaped punishment; but I could not have escaped cenfure. I fhould neither have efcaped the contempt of my fellow-citizens, nor the reproaches of my own confcience.

Moved by thefe important confidera tions; fupported by the examples of Adm. Ruffel, and other great com manders, who, in fimilar fituations, had ever made ftrict orders give way to rea fonable enterprise; and particularly en couraged by the remembrance of having myfelf ferved under that truly great of ficer Lord Hawke, when, rejecting all rules and forms, he grasped at victory by an irregular attack : I determiued not to lofe fight of the French fleet, by being outfailed, from preferving the line of battle, but to keep my fleet as well colleted as I could, and near enough to af fift and act with each other, in cafe a change of wind, or other favourable cir cumftances, fhould enable me to force the French fleet to action.

Such were my feelings and reflections, when the day broke, on the morning of the 27th of July; at which time the fleet under my command was in the following pofition: Vice-Adm. Sir Robert Harland was about four miles diftant, on the Victory's weather-quarter, with moft of the fhips of his own divifion, and fome of thofe belonging to the centre; Vice Adm. Sir Hugh Pallifer at about three miles diftance, a point before the lee-beam of the Victory, with his mainfail up; which obliged the fhips of his divifion to continue under an eafy fail.

The French fleet was as much to windward, and at as great a distance, as it had been the preceding morning, ftanding with a fresh wind at S. W. clofe hauled on the larboard tack, to all appearance avoiding me with the fame induftry it ever had done.