was approved by President Monroe, without a dissenting voice from any member of his cabinet (35).

It is clear from this action by two presidents and three congresses that no opinion was entertained that the benign provisions of the national constitution had any force or efficacy in the territories (36).

§ 158. Effect of change of government on political and private law and civil rights. It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon by the United States, throughout all periods, that whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory, or the allegiance of its inhabitants, are transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, that the society itself is not disbanded or disorganized, nor are the municipal laws of the community-that is, laws which are intended for the protection of private rights as between individualsabrogated by the change of sovereignty (37). By the

35 It was a strongly southern cabinet. Benton says: "General Jackson, the governor, took care that power should be no ‘barren sceptre' in his hands." Ex Dred Scott Dec., p. 72.

30 The liberty of our subjects must from now on rest on the inherent limitation mentioned in the Insular Tariff cases.

37 Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244. This is the ground upon which Justice Chase holds that the state of Texas was not dissolved by the act of secession and the creation of an unlawful government. "It is not difficult to see that in all these senses the primary conception (of the state) is that the people, in whatever territory dwelling, either temporarily or permanently, and whether organized under a regular government or united by looser and less definite relations, constitute the state.

"This is undoubtedly the fundamental idea upon which the republican institutions of our country are established. It was stated very clearly by an eminent judge (Mr. Justice Patterson, in Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 Dall. 93) in one of the earliest cases adjudicated by this court, and we are not aware of anything in any subsequent decision of a different tenor." "Our conclusion, therefore, is, that Texas continued to be a state of the Union, notwithstanding the transactions to

change, public property passes from one government to the other, but private property remains as before, and with it those municipal laws which are designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment (38).

All laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions and constitution of the new government are abrogated unless expressly continued in force.

Upon the cession of foreign territory to the United States the laws of the country in support of an established religion, or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect; and the laws of the country on other subjects would necessarily be superseded by existing laws of the new government upon the same matters. But with respect to laws affecting private rights, the possession, use and transfer of property, and designed to secure good order and peace in the community, and promote its health and prosperity, which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule is general, that a change of government leaves them in force until, by direct action of the new government, they are altered and repealed (39).

which we have referred-the abdication of the government and the treason of the citizens." Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 726. These acts being void were of no effect, and so long as the United States was endeavoring to guarantee a republican form of government, it could not admit that the state was dissolved.

38 U. S. v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 87.

39 Chicago & Pac. Ry. Co. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 546, 547. See also American Ins. Co. v. Canter. 1 Pet. 542; Halleck, Int. Law, ch. 34, sec.

§ 159. Civil rights secure. Political rights there are none. The people of the United States, as sovereign owners of the national territories, have supreme power over them and their inhabitants. In the exercise of this dominion the People are represented by the government of the United States, to the several departments of which all the powers of government over that subject are necessarily entrusted, subject, of course, to such restrictions as are expressed in the constitution, or are necessarily implied in its terms, or in the purposes and objects of the power itself; for it must be admitted in respect to this, as in every power of society over its members, that it is not absolute and unlimited. In ordaining governments for territories, all the discretion which belongs to legislative power is vested in congress; and that extends, beyond all controversy, to determining by law, from time to time, the form of the government over a particular territory, and the qualifications of those who shall administer it (40).

The personal and civil rights of the inhabitants of the territories are secured to them, as to other citizens, by the principles of constitutional liberty, which restrain all the agencies of government, state and national. This doctrine was fully and forcibly declared by the chief justice delivering the opinion of the court in National Bank v. County of Yankton (41).

40 Id. Insular Tariff cases.

41 101 U. S. 129; Murphy v. Ramsay, 114 U. S. 44. See also American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511; United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526; Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164; Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393.

§ 160. Colonial dependency may be continued. No territorial government need be erected. The government exercises sovereign power over the territorial possessions except as restricted by treaty provisions and limitations universal in their application, of which there are several.

It is not incumbent upon the United States to establish a territorial form of government, but congress may provide for the government of the territory in such manner as it deems best subject to such limitations as those spoken of.

The United States has been in possession of and has exercised such sovereignty over a large extent of country, either unoccupied or occupied only by native tribes, with whom were mingled a few white settlers (43).

§ 161. Effect of admission of a state on private titles to land in the territory. "In a debate in the senate in June, 1850, on the act for the admission of California, a motion to amend the act by requiring California, before her admission, to pass in convention an ordinance providing, among other things, 'that she relinquishes all title or claim to tax, dispose of, or in any way to interfere with the primary disposal by the United States of the public domain within her limits,' was opposed by Mr. Douglas and Mr. Webster as unnecessary, and was defeated by a vote of thirty-six to nineteen. In the course of the debate, Mr. Douglas referred to the provision of the constitution authorizing congress 'to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations concerning the ter

48 First Nat. Bank v. Yankton Co., 101 U. S. 129; In re Lane, 135 U. S.443. Langford v. Monteith, 102 U. S. 145. See also Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 1; Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75.

ritory or other property of the United States,' and said: "This provision authorizes the United States to be and become a land-owner, and prescribes the mode in which the lands may be disposed of and the title conveyed to the purchaser. Congress is to make the needful rules and regulations upon this subject. The title of the United States can be divested by no other power, by no other means, in no other mode, than that which congress shall sanction and prescribe. It cannot be done by the action of the people or legislature of a territory or state.' He supported this conclusion by a review of all the acts of congress under which states had theretofore been admitted. Mr. Webster said that these precedents demonstrated that 'the general idea has been, in the creation of a state, that its admission as a state has no effect at all on the property of the United States lying within its limits,' and that it was settled by the judgment of this court in Pollard v. Hagan (44) 'that the authority of the United States does so far extend as by force of itself, proprio vigore, to exempt the public lands from taxation, when new states are created in the territory in which the lands lie'" (45).

§ 162. The partition of jurisdiction by admission. Upon the admission of a state into the Union, the state

44 3 How. 212, 224.

45 Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 164, 165. See also Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st sess., vol. 21, p. 1314; vol. 22, p. 848, and secs. 960, 989, 1004; 5 Webster's Works, 395, 396, 405. In Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92, 99, Mr. Justice Field, delivering the judgment of this court, said: "With respect to the public domain, the constitution vests in congress the power of disposition and of making all needful rules and regulations. That power is subject to no limitations." Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343.