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udge continue to behave well; the limitation | vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inwas therefore applied to the office, and not the ferior courts as Congress may from time to time good behavior, because if the office should be ordain and establish." Here, then, instead of discontinued, which is clearly implied in this cautioning the Legislature that a law for the expression, it was not the intention of the con- organization of courts, when passed, can never stitution that the compensation should be re- be repealed, it contains an invitation to a reviceived, no service in that event being to be sion from time to time. It contains an intimarendered. From this interpretation of the con- tion, that the subject is new and difficult, and stitution, all of the departments are preserved an injunction to ordain and establish your courts in the due exercise of their respective functions from time to time, according to the results, for the general good, without any of the mis- which an experience of the system alone could chievous and absurd consequences resulting suggest. The gentleman from Pennsylvania from the opposite construction. It is admitted (Mr. HEMPHILL) observed that the character of that the first part of this section expressly vests irrepealability was not exclusively attached to Congress with the general power to ordain and this law, and attempted to furnish instances of establish courts; and, if there had been no other other laws of the same character. He instanced restriction, the consequent power to unordain, a law for the admission of a new State into the or abolish. The restriction relied upon is not Union. a restriction in express words: there are no words in the constitution prohibiting Congress from repealing a law for organizing courts; the restraint contended for, therefore, is by implication, and that implication, to say the least, not expressly connected with any Legislative attribute. Is it right, is it a correct interpretation, that when a power is given in express words for the most important purposes, that it should be restrained or prohibited by implication? Can so much inattention and folly be attributed to the framers of the constitution, as would result from the supposition that if it was their intention that a law growing out of one of the specified powers, in contradistinction to all others, should be irrepealable when once passed, that so extraordinary a principle would be left to mere implication? Such a supposition would be the highest injustice to the superior intelligence and patriotism of those gentlemen, manifested in every other part of the instrument. No, sir, they would have made notes of admiration: they would have used every mark, adopted every caution, to have arrested and fixed the attention of the Legislature to so extraordinary a principle.

The

The gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. DAVIS) had given a proper reply to that remark; the strongest instance the gentleman gave, was of a law executed. After the new State is admitted into the Union, in virtue of a law for that purpose, the object of the law is answered. State admitted has no stipulated duties to perform on its part, no services to render; in the case before the committee the law is in a state of execution, and the judges have services to render on their part which the competent tribunals may determine to be neither useful nor necessary. A law for the appropriation of money to a given object, may be adduced as an instance; the money is applied; its object is answered; the law may be said to be irrepealable, or, in other words, the repeal would produce no effect. That is not the case of the law in question. Mr. G. said he had no doubt but that the framers of the constitution had particular reference to the British act of Parliament of William III. for the establishment of the independence of the judges in that country, in framing the section for the establishment of the Judicial Department in the United States; and it is not a little remarkable, that whilst gentlemen in They would have said, Legislators! be cir- one breath speak of the independence of the cumspect! Be cautious! Be calm! Be deli- English judges, as the boast and glory of that berate! Be wise! Be wise not only for the nation, in the next breath they tell us that by the present, but be wise for posterity! You are repeal of the present act, the independence of the now about to tread upon holy ground. The judges here would be immolated. Let this sublaw you are now about to pass, is irrepealable!ject be examined. In the third chapter of the Irrevokable! We are so enamored with the salutary and practical independence of the English Judiciary system, that in infusing its principle into our constitution, we have stamped it with the proverbial folly of the Medes and Persians! If this principle had been introduced into the constitution in express words, it would have formed an unfortunate contrast to all other parts of the instrument; yet gentlemen make no difficulty in introducing that principle by construction, which would have appeared so stupid and absurd if written in express words in the body of the instrument. But there is no such language in the constitution. Let us see what is the language of that instrument. "The Judicial power of the United States shall be

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first book of Blackstone's Commentaries, the independence of the English Judiciary is fully explained. He begged to read the exposition of that commentator on that subject.

"And, in order to maintain both the dignity and independence of the judges of the superior courts, it is enacted by the statute, 13 W. III. c. 2, that their bene placito, but) quam diu bene se gesserint, and their commissions shall be made (not, as formerly, durante salaries ascertained and established; but that it may be lawful to remove them on the address of both Houses of Parliament. And now, by the noble improvements of that law in the statute of Geo. III. c. 23, enacted at the earnest recommendation of the King himself, from the Throne, the judges are continued in their offices during their good behavior,

notwithstanding any demise of the Crown, (which was formerly held immediately to vacate their seats,) and their full salaries are absolutely secured to them during the continuance of their commissions. His Majesty having been pleased to declare, that "he looked upon the independence and uprightness of the judges, as essential to the impartial administration of justice; as one of the best securities of the rights and liberties of his subjects; and as the most conducive

to the honor of the Crown."

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them into mere courts of piepoudre, assign them the most paltry duties to perform, keep them continually in session, in inco¤?<L> ent places; whilst new courts could be erecte. to perform all the essential business of the s tion. This would be taking down the be pretensions assigned to the judges by the tleman from North Carolina, (Mr. HENDERSOS of being formed into a permanent corps for the purpose of protecting the people against the worst enemies, themselves; and degrading the into pitiful courts of piepoudre, rendering link service and receiving large compensations. An this would be the case, if party purposes way the object, and not the general good. Accore ing to his construction, these absurd resis could not take place, unless by a virtual breast of the constitution. Because, he contends that service and compensation were correlative terms; and that there ought always to be a die apportionment of service to compensation. This he considered as the plain and sound interprets tion of the constitution, and the moment its departed from, infinite absurdities ensue. He intended to have taken another view of the subject, as it respects the relative influence á the law of the last session, and the propos

Now, sir, under the doctrine contended for by the repeal of this law, let us see whether the judges of the United States are not more independent than the judges of England. In the first place, Congress have the power of originating, abolishing, modifying, &c., the courts here. The Parliament in England have the same power there. Congress cannot remove a judicial officer from his office so long as the office itself is deemed useful, except by impeachment, two-thirds of the Senate being necessary to a conviction. In England, judges can be removed from their offices, although the offices may be deemed useful, by an address of the majority of the two Houses of Parliament. Here then is one essential advantage in favor of the independence of the judges of the United States. Congress cannot diminish the com-repeal upon this question; but the gentlemt: pensation of the judges here during their con- from Massachusetts (Mr. BACON) has put tes tinuance in office. In England, the Parliament subject in so much stronger point of view the may diminish the compensation of the judges, he could do, that he would refer to his remarks at their discretion, during their continuance in thereupon, observing only that he had no dost office. Here, then, is another obvious advantage but that the law of last session, now proposed in favor of the independence of the judges of to be repealed, was, in every respect, as muc the United States; whence is it, then, that we opposed to the doctrine of gentlemen, as the hear of the independence of the English judici- contemplated repeal could be. The sections f ary, as being the boast and glory of that country, the law particularly alluded to, are the twentyand with justice, too, and at the same time hear fourth, in these words, "and be it further ense the cry of the immolation of the independence ed, that the district courts of the United States. of the judges of the United States, when, under in and for the districts of Tennessee and Kenthe interpretation of the constitution by the tucky, shall be and are hereby abolished," and favorers of the repeal, the judges here are more the twenty-seventh, in these words, "and be it independent than the English judges? It can further enacted, that the circuit courts of the have no other object than to excite a popular United States, heretofore established, shall cease clamor, which, if excited at all, can have only and be abolished." a momentary effect, and will be dissipated as soon as the subject shall be thoroughly examined and understood. But it appeared to him, that if gentlemen really do value the independence of the judges, they have taken an unfortunate ground in the interpretation of the constitution. Under their construction, the judges may be placed not only in a dependent, but a ludicrous point of view.

Gentlemen admit that Congress may constitutionally increase or diminish the duties of judges; give or take away jurisdiction; fix the times of holding courts, &c., saving therefrom the salaries of the judges. Under this admission, Congress may postpone the sessions of the courts for eight or ten years, and establish others, to whom they could transfer all the powers of the existing courts. In this case, the judges would be held up to the people as pensioners, receiving their money and rendering no service in return; or Congress might convert

Mr. G. concluded by observing that, upon the whole view of the subject, feeling the firmest conviction that there is no constitutional impediment in the way of repealing the act in question, upon the most fair and candid interpretation of the constitution:-believing that principles advanced in opposition, go directly to the destruction of the fundamental principle of the constitution, the responsibility of all public agents to the people-that they go to the establishment of a permanent corporation of individuals invested with ultimate censorial and controlling power over all the departments of the Government, over legislation, execution, and decision, and irresponsible to the people; believing that these principles are in direct hostility to the great principle of Representative Government; believing that the courts formerly established, were fully competent to the business they had to perform, and that the present courts are useless, unnecessary, and expensive;

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believing that the Supreme Court has heretofore | awaken the sensibility of party. This was my discharged all the duties assigned to it in less temper and design when I took my seat yester Der than one month in the year, and that its duties day. It is a course at present we are no longer could be performed in half that time; consider- at liberty to pursue. The gentleman has wanbeing the compensations of the judges to be among dered far, very far, from the points of the debate, the highest given to any of the highest officers and has extended his animadversions to all the Car of the United States for the services of the prominent measures of the former administrawhole year; considering the compensations of tions. In following him through his prelimiall the judges greatly exceeding the services nary observations, I necessarily lose sight of the sere assigned them, as well as considering all the cir- bill upon your table. pcumstances attending the substitution of the new system for the old one, by increasing the number of judges, and compensations, and lessening their duties by the distribution of the business into a great number of hands, &c., while acting under these impressions, he should vote against the motion now made for striking out the first section of the repealing bill.

FRIDAY, February 19.

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exists in this country an anti-republican party. He will not venture to assert such an opinion on the floor of this House. That there may be a few individuals having a preference for monarchy is not improbable; but will the gentleman from Virginia, or any other gentleman, affirm, in his place, that there is a party in the country who wish to establish a monarchy? Insinuations of this sort belong not to the Legislature of the Union. Their place is an election ground

The gentleman commenced his strictures with the philosophic observation, that it was the fate of mankind to hold different opinions as to the form of government which was preferable. That some were attached to the monarchal, while others thought the republican more eligible. This, as an abstract remark, is certainly true, and could have furnished no ground of offence, if it had not evidently appeared that an allusion was designed to be made to the parties in this country. Does the gentleman suppose that we The House again resolved itself into a Com- have a less lively recollection than himself of mittee of the whole House on the bill sent from the oath which we have taken to support the the Senate, entitled "An act to repeal certain constitution; that we are less sensible of the acts respecting the organization of the Courts spirit of our Government, or less devoted to of the United States, and for other purposes." the wishes of our constituents? Whatever imMr. BAYARD.-Mr. Chairman, I must be al-pression it might be the intention of the genlowed to express my surprise at the course pur-tleman to make, he does not believe that there sued by the honorable gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. GILES,) in the remarks which he has made on the subject before us. I had expected that he would have adopted a different line of conduct. I had expected it as well from that sentiment of magnanimity which ought to have been inspired by a sense of the high ground he holds on the floor of this House, as from the professions of a desire to conciliate, which he has so repeatedly made during the session. We have been invited to bury the hatchet, and or an alehouse. Within these walls they are brighten the chain of peace. We were disposed lost; abroad, they have an effect, and I fear are to meet on middle ground. We had assurances still capable of abusing the popular credulity. from the gentleman that he would abstain from reflections on the past, and his only wish was that we might unite in future in promoting the welfare of our common country. We confided in the gentleman's sincerity, and cherished the hope that, if the divisions of party were not banished from the House, its spirit would be less intemperate. Such were our impressions, when the mask was suddenly thrown aside, and I know that this is the distinction of party we saw the torch of discord lighted and blazing which some gentlemen have been anxious to before our eyes. Every effort has been made establish; but this is not the ground on which to revive the animosities of the House, and in- we divide. I am satisfied with the constituflame the passions of the nation. I am at no tional powers of the Executive, and never loss to perceive why this course has been pur-wished nor attempted to increase them; and I sued. The gentleman has been unwilling to do not believe that gentlemen on the other side rely upon the strength of his subject, and has of the House ever had a serious apprehension therefore determined to make the measure a party question. He has probably secured success, but would it not have been more honorable and more commendable to have left the decision of a great constitutional question to the understanding, and not to the prejudices of the House? It was my ardent wish to discuss the subject with calmness and deliberation, and I did intend to avoid every topic which could

We were next told of the parties which have existed, divided by the opposite views of promoting the Executive power and guarding the rights of the people. The gentleman did not tell us in plain language, but he wished it to be understood, that he and his friends were the guardians of the people's rights, and that we were the advocates of Executive power.

of danger from an increase of Executive authority. No, sir, our views as to the powers which do and ought to belong to the General and State Governments, are the true sources of our divisions. I co-operate with the party to which I am attached, because I believe their true object and end, is an honest and efficient support of the General Government, in the exercise of the legitimate powers of the constitution.

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I pray to God I may be mistaken in the opin- | price of our liberty and independence o ion I entertain as to the designs of gentlemen not to have been paid? Is he bold enou to whom I am opposed. Those designs I believe hostile to the powers of this Government. State pride extinguishes a national sentiment. Whatever is taken from this Government is given to the States.

each, and feel the public pulse. As the fever increases he will proceed, and the moment of delirium will be seized to finish the great work of destruction.

to denounce this measure as one of the Feder victims marked for destruction? Is it the de sign to tell us that its day has not yet come, t is approaching; and that the funding syster to add to the pile of Federal ruins? Do I ber The ruins of this Government aggrandize the the gentleman say we will reduce the army States. There are States which are too proud a shadow; we will give the navy to the words: to be controlled; whose sense of greatness and the mint, which presented the people with te resource renders them indifferent to our protec-emblems of their liberty, and of their soverei tion, and induces a belief, that if no General Gov-ty, we will abolish; the revenue shall depe ernment existed, their influence would be more upon the winds and waves; the judges shall be extensive, and their importance more conspicu- made our creatures, and the great work shall ous. There are gentlemen who make no secret be crowned and consecrated by relieving the of an extreme point of depression, to which the country from an odious and oppressive publ Government is to be sunk. To that point we debt? These steps, I presume, are to be take are rapidly progressing. But I would begin progression. The gentleman will pause £ gentlemen to remember, that human affairs are not to be arrested in their course, at artificial points. The impulse now given may be accelerated by causes at present out of view. And when those who now design well, wish to stop, The assumption of the State debts has bea they may find their powers unable to resist the made an article of distinct crimination. It ha torrent. It is not true that we ever wished to been ascribed to the worst motives-to a desz give a dangerous strength to Executive power. of increasing a dependent moneyed interest. I While the Government was in our hands, it was it not well known that those debts were part of our duty to maintain its constitutional balance, the price of our Revolution? That they ro by preserving the energies of each branch. in the exigency of our affairs, from the effor There never was an attempt to vary the rela- of the particular States, at times when the Fetion of its powers. The struggle was to main-deral arm could not be extended to their relief! tain the constitutional powers of the Executive. Each State was entitled to the protection of the The wild principles of French liberty were | Union, the defence was a common burden, and scattered through the country. We had our every State had a right to expect that the exJacobins and disorganizers. They saw no dif- penses attending its individual exertions in the ference between a King and a President, and as general cause, would be reimbursed from the the people of France had put down their King, public purse. I shall be permitted farther to they thought the people of America ought to add, that the United States, having absorbed put down their President. They who consid- the sources of State revenue, except direct taxered the constitution as securing all the princi- ation, which was required for the support of ples of rational and practical liberty, who were the State governments, the assumption of thes unwilling to embark upon the tempestuous sea debts was necessary to save some of the States of revolution, in pursuit of visionary schemes, from bankruptcy. were denounced as monarchists. A line was drawn between the Government and the people, and the friends of the Government were marked as the enemies of the people. I hope, however, that the Government and the people are now the same; and I pray to God that what has been frequently remarked may not in this case be discovered to be true, that they who have the name of people the most often in their mouths, have their true interests the most seldom at their hearts.

The honorable gentleman from Virginia wandered to the very confines of the Federal Administration, in search of materials the most inflammable and most capable of kindling the passions of his party.

He represents the Government as seizing the first moment which presented itself to create a dependent moneyed interest, ever devoted to its views. What are we to understand by this remark of the gentleman? Does he mean to say that Congress did wrong in funding the public debt? Does he mean to say that the

The internal taxes are made one of the crimes of the Federal Administration. They were i posed, says the gentleman, to create a host of dependents on Executive favor. This supposes the past administrations to have been not only very wicked, but very weak. They laid taxes in order to strengthen their influence. Who is so ignorant as not to know, that the imposition of a tax would create a hundred enemies for one friend? The name of excise was odious; the details of collection were unavoidably expensive, and it was to operate upon a part of the community least disposed to support public burdens, and most ready to complain of their weight. A little experience will give the gentleman a new idea of the patronage of this Government. He will find it not that dangerous weapon in the hands of the administration which he has heretofore supposed it; he will probably discover that the poison is accompa nied by its antidote, and that an appointment of the Government, while it gives to the administration one lazy friend, will raise up against it

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en active enemies. No! The motive ascribed | ing itself of the depredations of the Algerines, For the imposition of the internal taxes is as un- created a navy. Did the gentleman mean to founded as it is uncharitable. The Federal Ad- insinuate, that this war was invited by the ninistration, in creating burdens to support the United States? Has he any documents or proof credit of the nation, and to supply the means of to render the suspicion colorable? No, sir, he its protection, knew that they risked the favor has none. He well knows that the Algerine of those upon whom their power depended. aggressions were extremely embarrassing to the They were willing to be the victims when the Government. When they commenced, we had public good required. no marine force to oppose to them. We had no harbors or places of shelter in the Mediterranean. A war with these pirates could be attended with neither honor nor profit. It might cost a great deal of blood, and in the end it might be feared that a contest so far from home, subject to numberless hazards and difficulties, could not be maintained. What would gentlemen have had the Government to do? I know there are those who are ready to answer: abandon the Mediterranean trade. But would this have done? The corsairs threatened to pass the Straits, and were expected in the Atlantic. Nay, sir, it was thought that our very coasts would not have been secure.

The duties on imports and tonnage furnished a precarious revenue-a revenue at all times exposed to deficiency, from causes beyond our reach. The internal taxes offered a fund less liable to be impaired by accident-a fund which did not rob the mouth of labor, but was derived from the gratification of luxury. These taxes are an equitable distribution of the public burdens. Through this medium the Western country is enabled to contribute something to the expenses of a Government which has expended and daily expends such large sums for its defence. When these taxes were laid they were indispensable. With the aid of them it has been difficult to prevent an increase of the public debt. And notwithstanding the fairy prospects which now dazzle our eyes, I under-merce. take to say, if you abolish them this session, you will be obliged to restore them or supply their place by a direct tax before the end of two years. Will the gentleman say, that the direct tax was laid in order to enlarge the bounds of patronage? Will he deny that this was a measure to which we had been urged for years by our adversaries, because they foresaw in it the ruin of Federal power? My word for it, no administration will ever be strengthened by a patronage united with taxes which the people are sensible of paying.

We were next told, that to get an army an Indian war was necessary. The remark was extremely bald, as the honorable gentleman did not allege a single reason for the position. He did not undertake to state that it was a wanton war, or provoked by the Government. He did not even venture to deny, that it was a war of defence, and entered into in order to protect our brethren on the frontiers from the bloody scalping-knife and murderous tomahawk of the savage. What ought the government to have done? Ought they to have estimated the value of the blood which probably would be shed, and the amount of the devastation likely to be committed before they determined on resistance? They raised an army, and after great expense and various fortune, they have secured the peace and safety of the frontiers. But why was the army mentioned on this occasion, unless to forewarn us of the fate which awaits them, and to tell us that their days are numbered? I cannot suppose that the gentleman mentioned this little army, distributed on a line of three thousand miles, for the purpose of giving alarm to three hundred thousand free and brave yeomanry, ever ready to defend the liberties of the country. The honorable gentleman proceeded to inform the committee, that the Government, avail

Will gentlemen go further, and say that the United States ought to relinquish their comIt has been said that we ought to be cultivators of the earth, and make the nations of Europe our carriers. This is not an occasion to examine the solidity of this opinion; but I will only ask, admitting the administration were disposed to turn the pursuits of the people of this country from the ocean to the land, whether there is a power in the Government, or whether there would be if we were as strong as the Government of Turkey, or even of France, to accomplish the object? With a sea-coast of seventeen hundred miles, with innumerable harbors and inlets, with a people enterprising beyond example, is it possible to say, you will have no ships or sailors, nor merchants? The people of this country will never consent to give up their navigation, and every administration will find themselves constrained to provide means to protect their commerce.

In respect to the Algerines, the late adminis tration were singularly unfortunate. They were obliged to fight or pay them. The true policy was to hold a purse in one hand and a sword in the other. This was the policy of the Government. Every commercial nation in Europe was tributary to those petty barbarians. It was not esteemed disgraceful. It was an affair of calculation, and the administration made the best bargain in their power. They have heretofore been scandalized for paying tribute to a pirate, and now they are criminated for preparing a few frigates to protect our citizens from slavery and chains! Sir, I believe on' this and many other occasions, if the finger of Heaven had pointed out a course, and the Government had pursued it, yet that they would not have escaped the censure and reproaches of their enemies.

We were told that the disturbances in Europe were made a pretext for augmenting the army and navy. I will not, Mr. Chairman, at present