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which creates the offices they fill, the irresistible consequence is, that whatever law is passed the judges must carry into execution, or they will be turned out of office. It is of little importance to the people of this country whether Congress sit in judgment upon their laws themselves, or whether they sit in judgment upon those who are appointed for that purpose. It amounts to the same despotism; they in fact judge the extent and obligations of their own statutes by having those in their power who are placed on the sacred seat of justice. Whatever the Legislature declares to be law must be obeyed. The constitutional check which the judges were to be on the Legislature is completely done away. They may pass ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, suspend the writ of habeas corpus in time of peace, and the judge who dares to question their authority is to be hurled from his seat. All the ramparts which the constitution has erected around the liberties of the people, are prostrated at one blow by the passage of this law. The monstrous and unheard of doctrine which has been lately advanced, that the judges have not the right of declaring unconstitutional laws void, will be put into practice by the adoption of this measure. New offences may be created by law. Associations and combinations may be declared treason, and the affrighted and appalled citizen may in vain seek refuge in the independence of your courts. In vain may he hold out the constitution and deny the authority of Congress to pass a law of such undefined signification, and call upon the judges to protect him; he will be told that the opinion of Congress now is, that we have no right to judge of their authority; this will be the consequence of concentrating Judicial and Legislative power in the same hands. It is the very definition of tyranny, and wherever you find it, the people are slaves, whether they call their Government a Monarchy, Republic, or Democracy.

Mr. Chairman, I see, or think I see, in this attempt, that spirit of innovation which has prostrated before it a great part of the old world— every institution which the wisdom and experience of ages had reared up for the benefit of man. A spirit which has rode in the whirlwind and directed the storm, to the destruction of the fairest portion of Europe; which has swept before it every vestige of law, religion, morality, and rational government; which has brought twenty millions of people at the foot of one, aud compelled them to seek refuge from their complicated miseries in the calm of despotism. It is against the influence of this tremendous spirit that I wish to raise my voice, and exert my powers, weak and feeble as they are. I fear, sir, on the seventh of December, it made its appearance within these walls, clothed in a gigantic body, impatient for action. I fear it has already begun to exert its all-devouring energy. Have you a judiciary system extending over this immense country, matured by the wisdom of your ablest and best men? It must

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be destroyed. Have you taxes which have been laid since the commencement of the Government? And is the irritation consequent upon the laying of taxes worn off? Are they paid exclusively by the wealthy and the luxurious part of the community? And are they pledged for the payment of the public debt? They must be abolished. Have you a Mint establishment, which is not only essentially necessary to protect the country against the influx of base foreign metals, but is a splendid attribute of sovereignty? It must be abolished. Have you laws which require foreigners coming to your country to go through a probationary state, by which their habits, their morals, and propensities may be known, before they are admitted to all the rights of native Americans? They must be repealed, and our shores crowded with the outcasts of society, lest oppressed humanity then should find no asylum on this globe I

Thursday, February 18. A message was received from the President Of The United States, transmittinga letter from the Secretary of War on the subject of certain lands in the neighborhood of our military posts, on which it might be expedient for the Legislature to make some provisions. A letter was also received from the Governor of Indiana, on the same subject. The said Message and letter were read, and ordered to lie on the table.

The Judiciary Bill.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act to repeal certain acts respecting the organization of the Courts of the United States and for other purposes."

Mr. Stanley.—Mr. Chairman, every measure which is brought under the consideration of a Legislature must first bo tested by its expediency. Unhappily, in the present instance, another question arises—its constitutionality. I will endeavor, concisely, to examine the subject on both those points. And, first, as to the expediency of the measure. In order to form a correct estimate between the present Judiciary system of the courts of the United States and that for which it was substituted, it is proper to take a comparative view of both.

Under the former system, there were six judges of the Supremo Court of the United States, who held two sessions of the Supreme Court in each year, at the seat of Government, Those judges also held in each State a circuit court, two terms in each year, in which the judge of the district was associated with the circuit judge. The organization of the district courts having jurisdiction, principally, of matters affecting the revenue and admiralty causes, not being connected with the present question, need not be examined. From the errors of this system resulted, first, a delay of justice. The judges bound to hold courts in succession at remote parts of the continent, were continually H. or R.]

Judiciary Syttem.

Judiciary System. [Fmnrm, 1S& Judiciary System.

travelling; from the variety of accidents to which travellers are subjected in this country, from the condition of roads and overflowing of rivers, it frequently happened that the judges failed in their attempts to get to the courts, or arrived so late that little business was done. Suitors, jurors, and witnesses, were subjected to the trouble and expense of attending courts without the accomplishment of their business; hence resulted a delay of justice. In the State to which I belong, during the few years existence of the former system, this was the case frequently.

Another great evil resulting from that system was, its tendency to lessen the character and respectability of the Federal bench. Those best acquainted with the profession of the law will most readily admit, that even a life of patient study is unequal to the complete attainment of principles and rules; and that much labor and industry are necessary to preserve that which is gained. Consequently, that extent of legal knowledge, correctness of judgment, and respectability of character, which should designate the persons qualified for this important trust were seldom to be found, but in men far advanced in years. Men possessing these qualifications, not inured to labor, are seldom equal to the fatigue of cheir duty; or, if at the time of appointment, fast approaching to the infirmities of age, were not to be expected to relinquish the enjoyments of private life for an office, which, however honorable, subjected them to the fatigue of a day laborer. The office, with its incumbrances, was, as it were, offered to the lowest bidder. And men best qualified to honor the bench, were driven from it. True it is, men have been found eminently uniting virtue and talents, who have accepted the office under all its distressing circumstances, but we owe this rather to their patriotism than to the advantages of the situation. Let it also be remembered that, in some instances, gentlemen who would have adorned the seat of justice of any country, were compelled to relinquish their seats; and in others, refused to accept the appointment.

Another error of that system was, that the judges of the Supreme Court, the court in th i last resort, before whom the errors of the inferior circuit courts were to bo corrected, were the same men who presided in those circuit courts. With great deference for the opinions of gentlemen who prefer that system, I pronounce my opinion, that its errors were radical; that those who justly estimated the importance to our interest and national character, of a speedy and correct administration of justice, ought to have desired a change. The present system has happily obviated these errors. The States are divided into six circuits; in each State is appointed one judge, called a circuit judge; the judges of the States, composing one circuit, ride together into the States of their circuit, and together hold the court. The much smaller distance which those judges have to travel than

the circuit judges, under the former svstea. secure their due attendance; a portion of tbar time is left them to study and reflection, and tfes same persona presiding at successive terms. » uniformity of decision is preserved. The -4i former judges hold the Supreme Court, with Cbtenal constitutional jurisdiction in matters of x'm utmost national importance, and appellate jurisdiction, in certain cases, where the sum a dispute is two thousand dollars; they are &1& the court in which the errors of the cirsst court are examined and corrected.

It is objected against the act proposed to he repealed, that a dangerous patronage is crested by it for the President. I shall pass over wis! I consider an inconsistency in this objection aming from gentlemen who profess that impfici confidence is due to the man chosen by the people, who, in his appointments, speaks not lest the voice of the people than the voice of Goi. and examine the weight of the objection. L' this apprehended patronage means the power <d appointing the Judiciary, that power is giva. by the constitution, and is the same, whether the powerof the Judiciary be vested in six or a sixteen judges. If it fear an undue control orer the people in favor of the Executive, through tlx Judiciary, make the judges as independent * we contend they are and ought to be, and thej are placed beyond t he necessity of descending ta the practice of improper means to preserve Executive favor.

We have been told, sir, that it is iiecesarr the judges should ride into the States to gab * knowledge of the laws by which, in many casea, they are to decide. Until this occasion I have never heard thut the laws of a country eooii only be acquired in the atmosphere of ths country where they are in force. Nine-tenths of the decisions in our State courts and Federal courts turn on questions of common law; yet, has it ever been suggested that an American judge was incompetent to decide on common la* questions, because he had not studied in England? No, sir, the knowledge in both cases may be acquired in the closet. To these observations permit me to add, that the remonstrances from the bar of Philadelphia, composed of gentlemen no less celebrated for the respectability of their private than of their professional character, who, on this occasion, so interesting to the welfare of their country, have sacrificed their political prejudices, strongly expressing their decided preference of the present system to the former, is, to my mind, conclusive, that it ought to be preferred. I am, therefore, of opinion, that it is inexpedient to pass the present repealing bill; and so long as my opinion is supported by the respectable authority I have just alluded to, and opposed only by the objections which I have noticed, I shall feel satisfied that opinion is correct.

In approaching the second question which I proposed to examine—the constitutionality oi the measure—whether I reflect on the magnitude of the question on the one haud, or my FXBKUABT, 1802.]

inability on the other, I am, indeed, humbled 1>efore the undertaking.

Without examining whether Government, acoording to the modern opinion, should be founded on the reason and sense of justice of man, it is certain onr Government is calculated to guard against his weakness and his wickedness. Our Government has been particularly cautious on this subject; it has left nothing to the hazard of reason or sense of justice; it has carefully delegated powers to three distinct departments, and separated these departments by boundaries plainly marked and formed, each so as not to control, at least to check, the other. The Legislative powers, though vested in men chosen frequently and by the people themselves in one branch, and by the immediate agents of the people in the other, are nevertheless the object of suspicion and caution. Their powers, far from resting on their discretion or sense of exency, are expressly and cautiously limited. Executive conditional veto forms one check on the Legislature; the Judiciary, I shall contend, are a check on both. Here, permit me to a*y, that from the spirit and the words of our constitution, I infer that the Judiciary are a coordinate department with the Executive and Legislative. The framers of otic constitution, satisfied that the powers of well-organized Governments ought to be divided into three branches—Legislative, Executive, and Judicial —have nowhere expressly declared there shall be such departments, but, after premising the objects of the Government, proceed to ordain how the Legislature shall be composed; and article two, section two, declares, "The power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America; he shall hold his office during the term of four years," and prescribes the mode of election. Article three, section one, also declares, "The Judicial power of the United States ^hall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," and the judges of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold, &c., during good behavior. By comparing these sections of the constitution, it appears the Judiciary and the Executive are expressly created by the constitution, and nothing is left to the discretion of Congress, as to the existence of these departments; they are created by the same words; and if the Legislature claim a right to put down the Judiciary at pleasure, before the happening of that event till which the constitution secures their offices—their misbehavior—they may as well assume the right to remove the President before the happening of that event till which his office is secured, to wit, the expiration of four years. I shall attempt to establish as a first principle, that the Judiciary are a check on the Legislature, and thence to show first, that, by the spirit of our constitution, the Judiciary ought to be independent, beyond the control or influence of either of the other departments of power; and secondly, that, by the words of the constitution, they are so secured.

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First, then, that the Judiciary are a check on the Legislature. In the constitution, we find certain powers delegated to Congress; we also find they are prohibited from exercising certain powers; among which are, they shall pass no ex post facto law, no bill of attainder, no law respecting religion, &c. Should, unhappily, a Legislature be found who, from weakness or wickedness, or the union of both, should transgress the bounds prescribed, what is the security of the citizen t After all the experience derived from the example of other Governments, after all the deliberation and wisdom of our sages who framed the constitution, are we left, in this important instance, ns under the despotism of a monarch, to seek redress through the throes and convulsions of a revolution? No, sir. The Judiciary are our security. The Legislature may enact penalties, and denounce punishments against those who do not yield obedience to their unconstitutional acts; their penalties cannot be exacted, nor punishments inflicted, without the judgment of a court. The judges are to expound the law, and that fundamental, paramount law, the constitution. To this purpose they are sworn to support the constitution. While tne Judiciary firmly, independently, and uprightly, discharge their duty and declare the act of the Legislature contrary to the constitution, to be void, the Legislature are checked, and the citizen shielded from oppression and persecution. But, ask gentlemen, whence do the courts derive this power, and the honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. TnoifPSON) says, we are contending for this common law doctrine, that the courts are a check on the Legislature. If I misunderstood the gentleman, I trust he will correct me. Sir, that gentleman, I am willing to presume, knows, what I assure him no gentleman with whom on this occasion I act, is ignorant of, that this is not a common law doctrine; that in England their courts have no check on the Legislature—their Parliament are emphatically styled omnipotent, and if they violate the few natural rights that remain to the citizens, they have no remedy but in a resort to revolutionary principles; it was the want of this check to the oppressions of their rulers, which has produced civil wars, and driven one monarch from his kingdom, and sent another to the scaffold. This power exists in no other Government, because under no other Government does there exist a Legislature with limited powers; under our Government it is the very essence, the constitution of a court, the oath enjoined on them to support the constitution. The exercise and the admission of this right are not new in America; instances must be in the recollection of every gentleman. I will cite a few most prominent: The honorable member (Mr. Thompson) has been pleased to call the attention of the committee to the examples drawn from his State; I beg leave to profit from the same source. In 1787, tho Legislature of that State passed an act making new arrangements in the jurisdiction of tho courts. The

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judges, among whom was that venerable gentleman mentioned by the member from that State, whose merits and worth command the sincere homage of my respects, protested agauvst this act, and refused to carry it into effect; the Legislature acquiesced, and the law was repealed.

Upon the imposition of the carriage tax by Congress, a citizen of Virginia refused to pay the tax, on the ground that it was unconstitutionally laid. He was sued for the penalty in the circuit court of that State, from whence, by writ of error, the suit came before the Supreme Court; in this case the defendant relied solely on the unconstitutionality of the act of Congress, and on this ground was defended by the attorney general of the State of Virginia, and the attorney general of the State of Pennsylvania. At this time, then, it appears that these learned gentlemen, the judges, and the citizens, thought the court competent to relieve in n«e the law was judged to be unconstitutional. In 1792, Congress passed an act imposing certain duties respecting invalid pensioners, upon the judges of the circuit court. The judges, at the first court after this act, protested against it; their protests were transmitted to the President of the United States—that President, who had presided in the General Convention which framed the constitution, and, therefore, as likely to understand the powers of Congress on the Judiciary as any other man, so fur sanctioned their opinions as to transmit them to the next Congress, where the act was reconsidered and repealed. I beg leave, also, to allude to the authority before mentioned by my friend from Pennsylvania, (Mr. HempHill,) which I should think of some weight here. It is the opinion of a gentleman, venerable for his age, respectable for legal knowledge, and distinguished for what, in the fashionable language of the day, are termed republican principles. I mean the Executive of Pennsylvania; that gentleman, in assigning to the Legislature of his State his reasons for not approving an act they had laid before him, after expressing his doubts of the constitutionality of the act, declares, "he cannot, from a confidence in the legal knowledge, integrity, and fortitude of his former brethren in the Supreme Court, risk his character in a judicial decision on this question, when he does not see any advantage to be derived to his country from a possibility of success." If any words can make more plain the opinion here conveyed, it is that he considers the judges have the power and will exercise it, to declare the act unconstitutional.

To my mind, these considerations are satisfactory, that, from the very constitution of our courts, from the practice and admission of our State courts and State Legislatures, and Federal courts, and Federal Legislature, that the judges of the United States, sitting in court, have the power, and by oath are bound to pronounce, that, an act contrary to the constitution, is void. From the establishment of this proposition, that the judges are the expounders of the constitution, and the laws made under it, and

that they are thereby a check on the Legislature. I shall infer that, by the spirit of our consticstion, they ought to be independent of the oth<r branches of Government, but particularly so the Legislature. The concentrating the brancha of power either Executive and Legislative.» Legislative and Judiciary, in the same hands is the very essence of tyranny; in proportion » we advance toward* the union of those powers, in the same proportion do we recede froa liberty. Are these departments separate, unconnected—if the Legislature by any mess procure their will either directly or indirectly, to be substituted for or to overrule judicial judgment t Whether the Legislature expound and adjudge their acts themselves, or submit then to the exposition and judgment of a judiciary subservient to them, is essentially the same. It the Legislature exercise the power of removal from office by the direct means of a vote of removal, or by the indirect means, the legislative legerdemain of a repeah. g act, is precisely the same thing, the judges are no longer indepeadent, but dependent on the Legislature for their offices, and subject to their control; a consequence entirely repugnant to the spirit of oar constitution. I shall attempt to show, that by the words of our constitution, the judges are placed beyond Legislative control. Article three, section one: "The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices daring good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." Until the contemplation of the present measure, I incline to believe, it never entered the mind of any man acquainted with this clause of the constitution, that judges should be removed otherwise than by impeachment for misdemeanor. The advocates for this Legislative power contend that the tenure of " good behavior" in this article of the constitution is intended to restrict Executive and not Legislative power. It does not appear probable that an express restriction should be introduced against a power which is nowhere expressly granted; for gentlemen know that the Executive power of removal from office is a' power admitted from construction, and not founded on any thing drawn from the constitution. I say this rather, because, by the constitution, the aid of the Senate is necessary to appoint, and a fortiori should be necessary to remove. It is important to ascertain what was the intention of the framers of the constitution in introducing the words "good behavior." The most correct source in our power from which this aid may be derived, is the writings and opinions at that day of thoso who aided in the great work. Among those publications whicli were written for the purpose of explaining and recommending this constitution, the most celebrated are those pieces over the signature of " Publius," written by the pens of gentlemen of leading influence in the Convention, and whose talents and patriotism are still honored by the nation. In that part of this

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irork which treats of the tenure of the office of utlge during "good behavior," I find this strong expression:

"The standard of good behavior for the continuance tn office of the judicial magistracy U certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of Government. In a monarchy, it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince. In a republic, it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body."

This, sir, to my mind, is conclusive, that the convention intended this tenure as a restriction no less on Legislative than on Executive power, and that, in this sense of the phrase, the people of America received this part of the constitution. In ascertaining the import of the •words "during good behavior," it is certainly important to inquire the end to which they have l>een used in other similar cases. My colleague (Mr. Henderson) has, with much abler talents, shown that, in most of the State constitutions, which existed before our Federal constitution, these words are used to fix the tenure of offices where the Executive have neither express nor constructive power of removal; consequently, they are in those constitutions restrictive of the Legislative power. If, then, the framers of our constitution borrowed this tenure from these State constitutions, it is fair and reasonable to conclude they used them in the sense in which they were previously received. But, says my colleague on the other side of the House, (Mr. Robert Williams,) the judges in England hold their offices by the tenure of "good behavior," and yet are removable on an address from both Houses of Parliament, and he infers that the terms may have been taken from England. To this I will first observe, that no fair argument can be drawn from the existence of this Legislative power there, for the exercise here. The mode of appointment there may render such control over the Executive necessary, which, from the provisions of our constitution, are not wanted here. In England, the King has the sole power of appointment—the people have no previous check. In this country, the Executive appointment is checked by the requisite sanction of the Senate. But is this Legislative power in Great Britain usurped by construction? No, if the gentleman will read-again the statute of 18 William III., he will find that this power of removal is expressly granted by the Crown to Parliament. If, then, one convention had this statute before them, in adopting that part which relates to the tenure of office, and omitting that part which gives the power of removal, it is not to be presumed they intended so important a power should depend on construction. The same gentleman (Mr. Robert Ayilljams) also contended that it could not be presumed the convention intended to restrict the power of the Representatives of the people, the friends of the people. What will the gentleman say of the correctness of his opinion, when I remind him that our powers

are all expressly restricted; that the same article which fixes the tenure of "good behavior," expressly and undoubtedly guards against the power of the Representatives of the people, the friends of the people, by securing the salaries of the judges undiminished during their continuance in office.

Mr. Giles said that he felt some degree of apprehension, that, in the course he deemed it necessary to take in the discussion of this question, some observations might fall from him which might not be in strict harmony with the feelings of some gentlemen of the committee. He should regret, however, if a compliance with a sense of duty should produce that effect. He said, therefore, that he wished to apprise gentlemen that he intended to direct his observations as much as possible to the effects and tendencies of measures; and that when he was constrained to speak of the views of gentlemen, it would be with respect to what he conceived to be their opinions in relation to the general interests, and not to private gratifications. He said it was natural that men should differ in the choice of means to produce a given end, and more natural that they should differ in the choice of political means than any other; because the subject presented more complicated and variable objects, out of which to make a choice. Accordingly, a great portion of the human mind has been at all times directed towards monarchy, as the best form of government to enforce obedience and ensure the general happiness: whereas another portion of the human mind has given a preference to the republican form, as best calculated to produce the same end; and there is no reason for applying improper motives to individuals who should give a preference to either of the principles, provided in doing so they follow the honest dictates of their own judgments. It must be obvious to the most common observer, that, from the commencement of the Government of the United States, and perhaps before it, a difference of opinion existed among the citizens, having more or less reference to these two extreme fundamental points, and that it manifested itself in the modification or administration of the Government as soon as it was put in operation. On one side, it was contended, that in the organization of the constitution a due apportionment of authority had not been made among the several departments; that the Legislature was too powerful for the Executive Department; and to create and preserve a proper equipoise, it was necessary to infuse into the Executive Department, by legislation, all artificial powers compatible with the constitution, upon which the most diffusive construction was given; or, in other words, to place in Executive hands all the patronage it was possible to create, for the purpose of protecting the President against the full force of his constitutional responsibility to the people. On the other side, it was contended, that the doctrine of patronage was repugnant to the opinions and feelings of the people; that

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