FRIDAY, February 12. State Balances. Mr. THOMAS called up his motion respecting State Balances, which is as follows: "Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the expediency of extinguishing the claims of the United States for certain balances, which, by the Commissioners appointed to settle the accounts between the United States and the individual States, were reported to be due from several of the States to the United States, and that the said committee have leave to report by bill or otherwise." [FEBRUARY, 19 just but unconstitutional. The constitution Mr. MITOHILL was in favor of the resoluti Mr. BAYARD hoped the resolution would prevail. The debtor States, not satisfied with the settlement made by the Board of Commissioners, had asked for information respecting the grounds on which it had been made. The information had been imperiously refused. In his opinion it was but right, if the debtor States did not dispute the validity of the debts due to the creditor States, that they should agree to expunge the claims against the debtor States. Indeed, he had been assured that the commission was not instituted with a view of sustain-report, it was the fortune of certain States, ing any charges against the debtor States, but for ascertaining the amount due to the creditor States, and funding them; and he believed it had been so understood at the time. This was an affair not determinable by the ordinary rules applied to individual cases. Many of the States, not expecting a settlement, had kept no accounts or vouchers; and however great the supplies they contributed under such circumstances, they received no credits for them; while those States which had been most careful in the preservation of vouchers, shared a different and a better fate. Mr. B. believed it was the true policy of the creditor States to agree to the extinguishment of these balances. He believed they never could be paid, because no State allowed them to be due. They would not, therefore, be paid voluntarily; and he knew of no force in the United States to compel payment. Why, then, keep up a source of irritation, which could do no possible good, and which could only tend to repel some States from that constitution, which we all ought to endeavor to make the object of general affection? Mr. SOUTHARD said, he had yet heard no reason that convinced him that the resolution of fered was just or proper. It would be recollected that this contract was made under the confederation. In the establishment of our independence, great and various exertions had been made. In the contributions made, great inequalities took place, which were unavoidable. Generally, where the war existed, the States became creditor States. It was just that those States which had contributed more than their share should be repaid, and that those who had paid less should make up the deficiency. If the debtor States were not to pay their balances, why settle the accounts? To relinquish the payment would be, in his opinion, not only un withstanding the greatness of their conte tions, to be reported debtor States. The States became debtors from the independe spirit with which they asserted their sovere rights. Not relying on the general contrib tions, they furnished great supplies wither making any charge to the Union; by exerti all their strength, they paid as they went, preserved no vouchers of what they paid. T he averred, was the case as to the State wh he had the honor in part to represent; a State as willing as able to contribute, and which contribute to a great extent; but which neglected to preserve her vouchers, the preser vation of which would have made her a cred tor State. He believed, therefore, that in equity the States were not bound to pay these balances But to this it is replied, the award is final. He would not agree to that; he denied it. Besides there was a want of coercive power in the Un ted States to enforce those demands. From this consideration alone, we ought to proce with lenity, and endeavor to make the setti ment a peaceable one. As in other circumstances, we ought to make a virtue of necessity, Mr. S. SMITH said, he did not rise to take any part in the debate, but in order to bring the subject directly before the committee. To de which, he moved so to amend the resolution as to make it read, "Resolved, That it is expedient to extinguish the claims," &c. Mr. LOWNDES hoped the amendment would not be agreed to. He did not see the expediency of volunteering a relinquishment of the claims established against several of the States. The amendment was calculated to take the committee by surprise. The original resolution went merely to consider the expediency of s relinquishment; the amendment involved the principle itself. Mr. HILL was desirous the amendment should FEBRUARY, 1802.] State Balances. [H. OF R. All It seemed almost useless to go into arguments to show the injustice of the claim, and of consequence, the justice of the resolution. It had been justly said, that those States which had contributed the 'nost, had, by the report of the Commissioners, the most to pay; and this was peculiarly so with the State of North Carolina. not be made, not from any indisposition himself the amendment, because the principle ought to to agree to it, but from a regard to the senti- | be decided here, and not in a select committee. ments of other gentlemen. Even if it was as- What, indeed, could such committee report? certained that these debts had arisen on a just There were no vouchers or books whereon the consideration, yet, in his opinion, they ought to settlement had been made to be got at. be extinguished, from the principle that, in our they could do, then, would be to report the balGovernment, whatever hazarded the harmony ances alleged to be due, which any member of the Union, ought to be avoided. Precedents could at any time learn. were not wanting in which sacrifices were made to this principle. He alluded to the quieting the claims under Connecticut rights. But, whatever might be the general ideas on this subject elsewhere, he knew not a man in North Carolina, who did not believe the adjustment iniquitous. To show the committee how the citizens of that State felt, he would state a case that had occurred before the Board of Commissioners. Two claims had been made, both for the same amount and the same description of supplies, one on one side and one on the other side, of Pedee River; one in North, and the other in South Carolina; and, in one case, seven shillings had been allowed, and in the other, only sixpence for the bushel of wheat. The business generally was entitled to the attention of Congress. It had, in fact, already been attended to at different times. New York had extin- Mr. T. MORRIS said, it was contended that the guished eight hundred thousand dollars of her accounts should be opened anew and re-examinbalance under certain provisions applied to hered. The fears, therefore, of the gentleman from case. Mr. BACON said, if the object of the motion was to go into a new liquidation of the old accounts between the United States and the several States, it would not only take up every day of the present session, but the work would be left unfinished for our successors. These debts had been incurred in a common cause, in which each State was equally interested, and towards which each State was bound equally to contribute. When Congress made requisitions on this principle, they were accompanied by a promise that there should be a final liquidation. This liquidation was made; the settlement was complete. But this settlement is now objected to, and what is to be done? Why we must annul the contract. This might satisfy some of the States, but he was sure it would dissatisfy others. He saw, therefore, no end to be answered by the motion. We must either set aside all that had been done, and begin de novo, to which this body is incompetent, or rest satisfied with what is already done. Mr. R. WILLIAMS observed, that since he had held a seat in the House, this subject had been almost every session called up. The more he had heard it discussed, the more he became convinced of the necessity of getting it out of the way. He found that whenever it was brought up, all was imagination. One State contended that it had contributed largely, and another, that its exertions had not been surpassed. We are asked, why relinquish these balances before we are solicited by the States? He would reply that North Carolina never had recognized the debt, and, in his opinion, never would apply for its extinguishment. He was in favor of Mr. W. had forborne to dwell on the injustice of these demands. But were he to enter on that branch of the discussion, he should say that the very act of destroying all the vouchers was of itself sufficient to justify any suspicion. He should say, that for what, in some States, there had been an allowance of one hundred pounds, North Carolina had not been allowed twenty shillings. Could, then, gentlemen talk of moral obligation, and say that this was a just debt? Massachusetts, were entirely visionary. The resolution was a simple one. It proposes to inquire into the expediency of doing away these debts. The amendment goes to determine the principle here. He thought it proper the principle should be settled here. But gentlemen say they want information. If so, after the amendment is agreed to, they may move for a postponement. If the amendment were carried, he would himself move a postponement. It had been said that New York had had eight hundred thousand dollars of her debt remitted by the United States. But how did the case really stand? New York had availed herself of the act of Congress, not because she acknowledged the debt to be just, but because she preferred doing something to remaining in the situation towards the United States in which she stood. It was strange, then, to hear gentlemen say that New York had been favored. What was the fact? North Carolina, according to the gentleman, had not, and would not, pay one cent; and New York had discharged a greater sum than was due by all the other debtor States, with the exception of Delaware. She was, therefore, instead of being favored, placed in a worse situation than any other State. It was from the existence of this state of things that he wished a final decision to be made this session. New York having agreed to make certain payments to the United States, it was important to her to know whether the United States meant to enforce payment by the other States. Her situation would be truly unfortunate, if after agreeing to pay, the United States suffered her claims against the other States to sleep. She would not only have to H. or R.] Judiciary System. [FEBRUARY, 1802 pay her quota of the debts, but would see no | ion on this subject. As to a reference of it to prospect of deriving her share of benefit from the payments of the other debtor States. Mr. MACON said the subject was a very old one, which had occupied much time every session for many years, and he thought it would be as well to try the question now as at any other time. No information of a select committee could throw any new light upon it. committee, I think their investigation may be useful, and after we get that, we may take time to decide. But now the plan is changed, and we are called upon to decide at once the princ ple. This mode of transacting business may be called an economy of time. You may give t the name, but it is not the substance. For my part, I desire to proceed according to our cl plan, and go through the slow process of inves rest assured that this mode of hurrying business is not the way to save time, but to lose it. There was a fact which ought to have great weight with the committee. One of the Com-tigation. This is my way, and gentlemen may missioners who made the settlement, who was a member of this House, had, after the settlement, proposed a resolution to extinguish the balances of the debtor States; and he had stated, as a reason for this measure, that the principle adopted by the board had operated very harshly upon particular States. Mr. M. had it from authority not to be questioned, that in the settlement by the Commissioners, teams, with the usual number of horses, had not produced twenty shillings. This subject had hung over our heads for eight years, and no scheme was yet devised for collecting the balances. How could they be collected? Congress had, it is true, authorized expenditures by the States in the erection of fortifications; but this very act was a tacit confession of the impracticability of getting the money into the public Treasury. As to a settlement with North Carolina, it was involved in great difficulty. In the act of cession of lands by that State to the United States, it was provided that the territory ceded should be pledged to pay a proportional share of the balance due the United States. How could that share be estimated? Mr. M. regretted that this subject had been brought up. He should not himself have been for bringing it up, for he thought the claims of the United States not worth a rush. The truth was, the States had all exerted themselves in one great and common cause; they had done their best; they had acted with great glory. As to the State which he represented, he would ask if the first blood that had been spilled after that shed at Boston was not in North Carolina? and that was the blood of brother against brother. He desired not, however, to make comparisons, which were always unpleasant, but to show that North Carolina had no reason to shrink from an inquiry which would demonstrate that she had fully contributed her share in the common cause, without meaning to assert that she had done more than other States. Let, then, Congress decide at once, and abandon the claims altogether, or devise some plan for collecting them, that we may know how we stand. Mr. DANA said, I hope the amendment will not be agreed to. However gentlemen may be possessed of a wholesale intellect, that enables them to decide on interesting questions without a moment's reflection, I confess I am not blessed with so happy an intuition. I do not know that I have ever been called upon to form an opin Mr. BAYARD declared himself in favor of the amendment, and he could not think, notwith standing the remarks of his honorable friend from Connecticut, that any gentleman in the House was unprepared to vote upon it. The subject had been frequently discussed, and le believed that the House was then as well prepared for a decision as they would be for a cer tury to come. It involved but a single princi ple; and, as to information, he could scarcely tell what information was wanted. He felt much of the indifference of the gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. MACON.) He was sure the United States had neither the right, nor the power to recover these balances; and he re peated it as his opinion, that it had not been the original intention that the debtor States should pay them. Will gentlemen recollect that the commission was instituted under the ol Confederation. Had Congress, then, a right to do any thing to bind the sovereignties of the independent States? All they could do was to pass resolutions making requisitions, which the States might or might not comply with. They could appoint Commissioners to settle the se counts, but could they impose the debts upon the States? No, they could not. It, therefore, never could have been contemplated that they would establish those debts. The only effect that could have been contemplated, was, that the creditor States might rely that, on a settlement, Congress would assume their balances. On the question being put, the amendment was lost-yeas 41, nays 46. When the original resolution for referring to a select committee the consideration of the expediency of extinguishing the balances was carried. Ordered, That Mr. THOMAS, Mr. BAYARD, Mr. DANA, Mr. HILL, and Mr. BUTLER, be appointed committee, pursuant to the said resolution. And the House adjourned. a TUESDAY, February 16. Judiciary System. The House then went into Committee of the Whole on the Judiciary bill from the Senate.* * A debate of great length and earnestness now took place in the House on this repealing bill sent down from the Senate, and passed there by a majority of only one. The two parties Mr. HENDERSON.-I should not rise to offer my opinion on the great question before the committee, were I not placed in a situation different from that in which I have been since I have had the honor of a seat in this House. The Legislature of the State of North Carolina, one of whose representatives I am on this floor, have seen proper to instruct their Senators and to recommend to their Representatives in Congress, to use their exertions to procure a repeal of the law passed the last session of Congress, for the more convenient organization of the Courts of the United States, and the bill on your table has for its object the repeal of this law, and as I shall probably vote against its passage, a decent respect for the opinions of those who have framed and sent forward those resolutions, demands that I should give the reasons which influence my conduct. [H. OF R. have therefore erected another branch of the Legislature, called the Senate, the members of which are not to be elected by the people immediately, but by the sovereignties of the several States; they are to be chosen for six years, and not for two; and the qualifications requisite to entitle those to a seat is different from that of a member of this House. To these bodies are given the power of initiating all laws; but after a bill has passed both of these Houses, before it becomes of binding obligation on the nation, it must be approved of by the President; it is a dead letter until life is given by the Executive. The President is elected not by the people, not by the Legislatures of the several States, not by either House of Congress, but by Electors chosen by the people. He is to hold his office during four years. This is the second great department of the GovernThe people of America have obtained and es- ment. It will be easily discovered from this tablished that the powers of Government shall cursory view of our constitution, the caution be vested in three great departments; the Legis- and jealousy with which the people have conlative, the Executive, and the Judicial. They ferred the power of making laws, of commandhave said that there shall be a House of Repre- ing what is right, and prohibiting what is sentatives, the members of which shall be chosen wrong. But, sir, after this law was made, after by the people of the several States every second its authoritative mandate was acknowledged by year. Though this House is composed of mem- the nation, it became necessary to establish bers chosen by the people immediately; though some tribunal to judge of the extent and oblithey can have no other interest than the great gation of this law. The people did not see procommunity from which they were sent; though per to intrust this power of judging of the meanthey must return to the common mass in the ing of their laws, either to the Legislative or to short period of two years; yet enlightened the Executive, because they participated in the America did not see proper to intrust the pow-making of these laws; and experience had er of making laws to this body alone; they shown that it is essential for the preservation knew that the history of man, and the experience of ages, bore testimony against the safety of committing this high power to any one Assembly not checked by any other body. They seemed to have staked themselves upon it, not before the House, (where the issue was certain,) but before the coun of liberty that the Judicial and Legislative authorities should be kept separate and distinct. They therefore enacted a third department, called the Judicial, and said that "the Judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges both of the Supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shal not be diminished during their continuance in office." The try, to the arbitrament of which the great appeal was made. Above thirty members delivered elaborate speeches, of which but small parts can be given in an abridgment-the less to be regretted, as the staple of each was, of necessity, much the same—but varied, enlivened and enforced by the peculiar talent, learning and ability of different speakers. Their names were-for the repeal: John Bacon, of Massa- It is admitted, I understand, by all parties, by chusetts; John Clopton, of Virginia; Thomas T. Davis, of every description of persons, that these words, Kentucky; John Dawson, of Virginia; William B. Giles, of "shall hold their offices during good behavior," Virginia; Andrew Gregg, of Pennsylvania; Nathaniel Ma- are intended as a limitation of power. con, of North Carolina; John Milledge, of Georgia; Thomas question is, what power is thus to be limited Morris, of New York; Joseph H. Nicholson, of Maryland; and checked? I answer, that all and every John Randolph, of Virginia; General Samuel Smith, of power which would have had the authority of Maryland; Philip R. Thompson, of Virginia; James Hol-impairing the tenure by which the judges hold land and Robert Williams, of North Carolina.-Against the their offices, (if these words were not inserted,) repeal: James A. Bayard, of Delaware; Manasseh Cutter, of is checked and limited by these words; whether Massachusetts; Samuel W. Dana, of Connecticut; John that power should be found to reside in ConEustis, of Massachusetts; Calvin Goddard, of Connecticut; gress, or in the Executive. These words are Roger Griswold, of Connecticut; Seth Hastings, of Massa- broad and extensive in their signification, and chusetts; Joseph Hemphill, of Pennsylvania; Archibald can only be satisfied by being construed to conHenderson, of North Carolina; William H. Hill, of North Carolina; Benjamin Huger, of South Carolina; Thomas Lowndes, of South Carolina; John Rutledge, of South Carolina; John Stanley, of North Carolina; Benjamin Tallmadge, Dennis, of Maryland; Thomas Plater, of Maryland; William of New York. trol the Legislative as well as the Executive power. But gentlemen contend that they must be confined to limiting the power of the President. I ask gentlemen, what is there in the constitution to prove their signification to this H. OF R.] Judiciary System. [FEBRUARY, 188 end alone? When you erect a court and fill | But it has been said that the powers of each it with a judge, and tell him in plain, simple Congress are equal, and that a subsequent Legs language, that he shall hold his office during lature can repeal the acts of a former; and s good behavior, or as long as he shall behave this law was passed by the last Congress, well; what, I beseech you, sir, will any man, have the same power to repeal it which they whose mind is not bewildered in the mazes of had to enact it. This objection is more plas modern metaphysics, infer from the declaration? ble than solid. It is not contended by us the Certainly that the office will not be taken from legislatures who are not limited in their powes him until he misbehaves; nor that he will be have not the same authority. The question is taken from the office during his good beha- not what omnipotent Assemblies can do, b vior. Under this impression he enters upon what we can do under a constitution defining his duty, performing it with the most perfect and limiting with accuracy the extent and satisfaction to all persons who have business boundaries of our authority. The very section before him; and the Legislature, without whis- in the constitution (sec. third, art. first) which pering a complaint, abolishes the office and I have read, is a proof against the power of thereby turns out the judge. The judge is told every Congress to repeal the acts of their prethis is no violation of the compact; although decessors. In the latter part of the eighth se you have behaved well, although we have pro- tion it is proposed that the judges shall receive mised that as long as you did behave well you for their services a compensation which shall should continue in office, yet, there is now no not be diminished during their continuance in further necessity for your services, and you office; and yet the salary was ascertained and may retire. These words, "during good beha- fixed by a former Congress. The same observior," are intended to prevent the President vations may be made with respect to comper from dismissing you from office, and not the sation for the President, which can neither be Legislature from destroying your office. Do increased nor diminished during the period for you suppose, sir, that there is a man of common which he shall have been elected. It is not understanding in the nation, whose mind is not competent for this Congress to vary the com alive to the influence of party spirit, that would pensation to him which has been fixed by a yield his assent to this reasoning? I hope and prior Legislature. It is clearly seen, upon a believe there is not. But, sir, how is it proved little investigation, that the position which get that the President would have had the power tlemen take is too extensive, and leads imme of removing the judges from their office, if these diately to a destruction of the constitution. It words, "during good behavior," had not been does away all check, and makes the Legislature inserted in the constitution? Are there any omnipotent. It has been asked, that if a cor words in that instrument which give the rupt and unprincipled Congress should make an President expressly the power of removing any army of judges, have not a subsequent Congress officer at pleasure? If there are, I call upon the right of repealing the law establishing this gentlemen to point them out; it does not result monstrous judicial system? I answer that ther from the fashionable axiom, that the power have not; the same mode of reasoning which which can create can destroy. The President attempts to prove this right from an abuse of can nominate, but he can appoint to office only power will also prove that you may lessen the by the advice and consent of the Senate. There- compensation of your judges. May not equal fore, it would follow, if the power of displacing oppression be imposed upon the people by givresults from that of creating, that the Senate ing your judges exorbitant salaries as by increas should participate in displacing as well as creating their numbers? May not the same corrupt ing officers. But however this may be, it is certainly a mere constructive power which he has exercised, because the Legislature have, from motives of expediency, acknowledged that he had it. If the constitution does not necessarily give the President the right of removing officers at pleasure, and if that right depend upon Legislative acts or constructions, where would have been the necessity for inserting these emphatic words as a check and limitation of Executive power, where without them the President has no such power? You are taking great pains to control a power which does not exist. The persons who framed our constitution knew that a power of removal in ordinary cases must exist somewhere. They took care, therefore, that in whatever hands it might fall, the language of the constitution respecting the tenure of the office of a judge should be co-extensive with the whole power of removal, whether it should reside in one or in more hands. and unprincipled motive which would lead men to the raising of an army of judges lead them to squander the public money? And may they not, instead of giving their judges two thou sand dollars a year, give them two hundred thousand? And yet, sir, if it were to take place, I know of no authority under the constitution to lessen that exorbitant compensation. The Government of our country is predicated upon a reasonable confidence in those who administer our public affairs. They must have the power of acting for the public welfare, and this would never have been given them if the possible abuse of this power were a sufficient reason for withholding it. Again, sir, the construction which gentlemen on the other side of the House contend for, tends to the concentration of Legislative and Executive powers in the same hands. If Con gress, who have the power of making laws, can also displace their judges by repealing that |