of which was, that we should withdraw all protection from Spain, and leave it to the mercy of the tyranny that was preparing to overwhelm it. With respect to the transactions in Portugal, there was some satisfaction in knowing, that whatever difference of opinion might have prevailed respecting the convention of Cintra, there was none respecting the bravery of that portion of the British army which so gloriously distinguished itself on that occasion. The noble earl then briefly touched on the ne cessity of augmenting our military force; of supporting Sweden; of affording every assistance in our power to Spain; congratulated their lordships on the flourishing state of the revenue; thanked them for the indulgence with which they heard him, and concluded with reading the address.

Lord Sheffield rose to second the address, and said, We cannot express too strongly our gratitude to his majesty, not only for the transcendent situation in which we now stand as a nation, but for the whole of his able and judicious government during so long a reign, and under circumstances of unexampled difficulty. His majesty graciously acquaints us, that he has renewed his engage ments with Spain, and observes, that there is no hope of safety but through a vigorous and persevering prosecution of the war, of which, I flatter myself, the great mass of this country is perfectly convinced; and it must be highly consoling to all Europe, to learn that his majesty is resolved most strenuously to support the cause of Spain, as long as the people shall remain true to themselves. It is our own cause; it is the cause of Europe and of the world and we cannot but concur in applauding the determination of the Spaniards to persevere, to the last extremity, in the glorious contest for their liberty-a resolu tion worthy of that noble nation. We cannot but admire their spirit, when we reflect on the completely disorganized state, into which they were thrown, by the treachery of an implacable usurper. If they should not, in every instance, act according to our notion of what is expedient, or even if prejudice should prevent them from receiving assist. ance in the way we think advisable; if their communi. cations among themselves, and with us, should not be so prompt and perfect, as might be expected from a country whose government, and every thing derived from it, had not been recently dissolved and overthrown; if we should

observe among them, a degree of party spirit or struggles for power, we should consider it as the lot of human nature; and when we look among ourselves, (and it is highly to be lamented, especially at this crisis), we disco ver the same. Even if all these circumstances should exist, we ought still to respect and admire their general conduct, and not despond, even though great reverses should take place. The military spirit of the Spaniards is wonderful, if we consider the numerous veteran armies to which they are opposed; and as to our own troops, we have the best reason to expect from them, every thing that can be done by men. They have the highest confidence in their general, whether he advances or retreats, and we should be satisfied that whatever may happen, a British army, so commanded, will not disgrace the character of our country. I believe there are few among us who are not convinced, that general ruin must ensue if the war is not carried on with the utmost vigour, and that Spain is the country where the great effort should be made; and how great should be our exultation when we hear that, during such a war, our trade, on the whole, is not diminished. The export of certain manufactures decreased for a time, but not very considerably, and by no means as much as was supposed. Buonaparte threatened to subdue us by ruining our commerce, or by the expense of the war. We may now thank him for having made the experiment; we are relieved from all apprehensions on those points, for it is proved that neither decrees or embargoes can materially affect our trade, and that the flourishing state of our finances enables us to carry on this expensive war without any considerable loan or new taxes. As to the embargo laid by the American states, I am confirmed in the opinion I always entertained, that it will prove more beneficial to the empire, than injurious: and we are indebted to the firmness of the present administration for a very great improvement in our situation, in respect to that country, and for the expectation that no machinations or menacing measures shall make us abandon those principles and that system, on which its greatness and power have been established. It is by contemplating these circumstances that we discover the real greatness and power of this country, and which I conceive can never be destroyed, but through our own misconduct. Look fround the British empire; look to the east, and to

the west, and we shall find it, notwithstanding this rancorous war, in as good a state, in all parts, as at any period; but these matters will be much more ably stated to the house, by those who are capable of rendering them interesting to your lordships.

The Earl of St. Vincent observed, that he could not suffer the question to be put on the address, without claiming their lordships' attention for a few moments. Though he could not concur in every part of it, yet it was not his intention to propose any amendment. His principal motive for rising was, to express his unqualified disapprobation of the whole of the conduct of ministers; of every thing they had done with respect to Spain, of every thing they had done with respect to Portugal, of almost every thing they had done since they came into power, and particularly for the last six months. The noble lord who seconded the address talked of the vigour and efficacy of their measures. Vigour and efficacy indeed! when their whole conduct was marked by vacillation and incompetence. If such men, so notoriously incapable, were not immediately removed, the country was undone. There was one part, however, of the address and of the speech in which he cordially agreed, that which condemned the armistice and convention. It was the greatest disgrace that had befallen the British arms, the greatest stain that had been affixed to the honour of the country since the Revolution. He was not at present disposed to enter into an examination of the manner in which the naval part of that expedition had been conducted: opportunity would arise for discussing the extraordinary arrangement that had been made respecting the flect in the Tagus. He would not withhold from ministers whatever praise might be due to them. He would give them credit for providing plenty of transports; but what was the merit of these exertions? Any one who offered a little more than the common market price might hire as many as he pleased; but ministers not only offered that market price, but a great deal more than they should have done. And how were these employed? Why in conveying Junot and his runaway ruffians, with their plunder and exactions, all the plate and precious stones, and rare exhibitions of art, the fruits of their robberies of churches, palaces, and private houses, to France. It was with shame and sorrow that he saw men of the highest

rank in the British army and navy superintending the embarkation of this enormous fund of rapine and confiscation, and conducting it, and the devils who had thus acquired a property in it, to those parts of France nearest to Spain, who were thus enabled to enter that country sooner than the brave fellows to whom they surrendered, and were now actually engaged in chasing Sir John Moore from the Peninsula. If they meant really to assist the Spaniards, why did not ministers send troops in the first instance to the North of Spain? Why did they send one part of them to Lisbon, and another to Corunna, from which points no junction could be effected without being exposed to toilsome marches, and such privations, as could hardly be conceived by persons not acquainted with those countries? It seemed to him as if they were totally ignorant of the geography of the country they appeared so eager and zealous to defend. He had indeed, heard of a "heaven born" minister, who, at the first cabinet council he attended, asked whether port Mahon was an island, or on the continent. This, to be sure, was bad enough; but it did not betray half the ignorance that the conduct of ministers did in every measure relating to Spain and Portugal. He would say to his majesty, that if these men were not removed, the kingdom was lost. There was no part of the conduct of ministers liable to greater ccusure than that which related to the command of the army. He would be the last man in the kingdom who would wish to detract from the professional character of the officers employed; but on so momentous an occasion, he wished to see some of the princes of the blood, who had been trained to arms from their youth, and many of whom had seen a great deal of arduous and dangerous service he alluded particularly to one (the Duke of Kent) who would have fallen the victim of his zeal in the West Indies, had he not been forcibly sent home from that pernicious climate, by himself and Sir Charles Grey. These were the proper men to command the British army on this occasion. If it was not thought proper to employ these illustrious persons, there were others to whom the country and the army looked up. There was one (the Earl of Moira, we believe), who, from his early career of glory, from his princely munificence, and from the unbounded confidence which the army would place in him, whether they were ordered to advance or retreat,

who was peculiarly qualified for a command of this description; a man who, possibly, might prove a second Earl of Peterborough ; a man, in short, who would have acted from himself, and who would have acted vigorously and successfully. The noble earl next adverted to the court of inquiry, which he considered as an expedient rather to cover some blot in their own conduct, than to do justice to the officers who were the ostensible objects of its proceedings, or to satisfy the country. The case of the senior officer on that occasion was particularly hard; he was to be responsible for every thing, and yet he was to do nothing without consulting the third in command. He was fettered by his instructions; he was, in fact, to have no will, no discretion of his own. This odious restraint did not, to be sure, appear on the face of his instructions; but it was conveyed in a manner equally binding upon him, in the suspicious form of a private letter, a letter of council and recommendation, a detestable mode of proceeding, to which he never had, or would have recourse. An attempt had been made to justify the convention of Cintra by stating, that the French could have crossed the Tagus, and got into Spain in defiance of any exertions of the army by which they were beaten. French cross the Tagus! If they did, he would be bold to say, that every man of them must have passed under the yoke. They would have to fight their way through as brave a population as any in Europe. The Portuguese were not inferior in bravery to the Spaniards, and there were no men more gallant than the latter. He spoke of the Portuguese peasantry, for he would admit that there were no people in the world upon whom less reliance for a vigorous resistance could be placed than on the inhabitants of Lisbon. He begged pardon for having taken up so much of their lordships' time; but he could not refrain from expressing his decided disapprobation of the conduct of ministers. If the house would do their duty, they would go in that dignified manner that became them to the foot of the throne, and implore his majesty to remove from bis councils those men whose measures would bring inevitable ruin on the country. In earnestly recommending this, he was not swayed by personal considerations. In a few hours he would enter into his 75th year, 61 of which he had been in his majesty's service. At this time o life, and under the existing and VOL. I.-1809. C

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