which partly date back as far as the eighth century; the 'Tabula Amalfitana,' the maritime laws of the town of Amalfi in Italy, which date, at latest, from the tenth century; the 'Leges Wisbuensis,' a collection of maritime laws of Wisby on the island of Gothland, in Sweden, dating from the fourteenth century."

7. Codification of international law.-A movement towards. bringing international law into a similar condition, in some respects, as national or municipal law is progressing by means of partial codifications of international law. It is true that these are fragmentary and varying as to definiteness in statement, but it is best that the progress should be in that manner. It allows more time for deliberation and amendment in the formative process, and bases codification upon international agreements, upon established uses and upon the general consensus of expert opinion. The uncodified law, like the lex non scripta or common law of municipal law, then remains so far as determined authoritative and in force. 8. Recent progress in codification.-Codification of international law is a matter of recent times, and can be found in various individual efforts, national codes, agreements like the Declarations of Paris and St. Petersburg, and also the results of the Geneva Conventions for the amelioration of warfare, The Hague Conferences, and the International Naval Conference of London.

9. Observance of international law.-Finally, as to the matter of the observance of international law by its subjectsthe civilized countries of the world-it must be stated here that international law cannot be restricted to any group of civilized nations, formed geographically or politically. It is not even limited to Christian communities, the moment a nation attains and exhibits sufficient civilization and independence she enters into the body of states to whom international law applies. Concerning the observance of this law

by states, I can do no better than quote from Lawrence's Principles of International Law as to this matter."

"The governments of all states, whether civilized or barbarous, are compelled to exert activity, not merely in conducting their internal affairs, but also in regulating their conduct towards governments and peoples of other states. Even where a state adopts a self-sufficient theory of national life, and endeavors, as China did till quite recent times, to keep its people from all intercourse with foreigners, it does not escape from the necessity of dealing with them. It cannot act as if it were alone in the world, for the simple reason that it is not alone. The whole machinery of non-intercourse is created with a view to other states, and absorbs in its working no small care and attention of the government. If, then, external affairs have from the necessity of the case to be dealt with by states which have adopted a policy of the most rigorous isolation, it is clear that the vast majority of peoples, who desire a greater or less amount of intercourse with their neighbors, impose thereby upon their rulers the task of dealing to a very large extent with foreign nations. The coexistence of states in proximity to one another renders it necessary for them to pay some sort of regard to each other; and the more civilized the states the more intimate the intercourse. Civilization not only provides men with many interests in common, but also tends to remove man's suspicion of his brother man. Commerce, intermarriage, scientific discovery, community of religion, harmony in political ideas, mutual admiration as regards achievements in art and literature, identity of interests or even of passions and prejudices— all these, and countless other causes, tend to knit states toget er in a social bond somewhat analogous to the bond be

Principles of International Law, T. J. Lawrence, pp. 3 and 4, 3d edn.

tween the individual man and his fellows. But just as men could not live together in a society without laws and customs to regulate their actions, so states could not have mutual intercourse without rules to regulate their conduct. The body of such rules is called international law. We do not say that it is invariably observed. Like other law it is sometimes disregarded by those who are supposed to submit to it; and owing to the absence of coercive force to compel nations to obedience, it is more liable to be violated than are the laws laid down by the sovereign power in a state for the guidance of its subjects. But all statements to the contrary notwithstanding, it is generally observed."

10. Navy regulations as to observance of the law of nations.It may be well here to call attention to the following articles of the Regulations for the Government of the Navy of the United States (1913) which read as follows:

1502. All officers in their relation with foreign States, and with the governments or agents thereof, shall observe and obey the law of nations.

1646. On occasions where injury to the United States or to citizens thereof is committed or threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or treaty rights, he (the commander-in-chief) shall consult with the diplomatic representative or consul of the United States, and take such steps as the gravity of the case demands, reporting immediately to the Secretary of the Navy all the facts. The responsibility for any action taken by a naval force, however, rests wholly upon the commanding officer thereof.

11. Force of usage and custom.-In closing this introductory chapter it is well to emphasize the importance of custom and international usage as a ruling matter in and also a source of the determination of international law. When rules apparently sound conflict in findings, then usage, prevailing usage, determines the rules to be followed.

A distinguished American jurist expresses himself somewhat similarly in treating of law in general. He says, "The final conclusion of the inquiry, what rule or rules in point of fact governed human conduct, was that, so far as social conduct is concerned, custom is not simply one of the sources of law from which selections may be made and converted into law by the independent and arbitrary fiat of a legislature or a court, but that law, with the narrow exception of legislation, is custom, and like custom, self-existing and irrepealable."

5

James C. Carter, "Law: its Origin, Growth and Function," p. 173.