Page images
PDF
EPUB

ten and one, ten and two, &c., to twain tens, when you must begin again as before. Score is the past participle of rcipan to shear, to separate; and means separated parcels or talleys. The ordinal numbers, as they are called, are formed like the abstract nouns in eth; fifth, sixth, tenth, &c. is the unit which fir-eth, six-eth, ten-eth, i. e. makes up the number five, six, ten, &c. The ordinal numerals are obviously abbreviations of expression, for one, and one, and one, &c.; and we need not be surprised, as they are continually used, and were so originally, without any noun following them, to find them occasionally receiving the variations of the noun.

III. Of the Pronoun.

26. So much has already been said respecting the force of the pronoun, that it is unnecessary to enlarge upon it here. Mr. H. Tooke's derivation of it must however be stated, as it shews what have been the actual procedures of language in the formation of one of our pronouns, and gives an insight into the probable origin of the rest. It, formerly written hit and het, is the past participle of the verb HAITAN to name, and therefore means the person or persons, thing or things named, or afore-said: and accordingly was applied by all our old writers indifferently to plural and to singular nouns. We do not know whether a similar opinion, as to the origin of pronouns, has been before laid before the public, but the philosophical Greek professor of Glasgow, (whose prelections have often anticipated Mr. H. Tooke) long ago delivered it as his opinion, that some, at least, of the pronouns are participles; and, if we mistake not, traced the origin of yw, and ipse, as follows. Eyw, in the more ancient dialect of Greece, was ry, which is an obvious abbreviation or corruption of Arywv; so that yw (whence the Latin and other languages have their first person) signifies the speaking person. Ipse is the Latin past participle from w; and though this verb is not to be found in Latin writers, those who know how much the Latin is a dialect of the Greek, will not feel this a material difficulty: on this derivation ipse signifies the said person, &c. These speculations might be advantageously extended, would our limits permit; but sufficient has been said to show, that these words are not of that unintelligible nature which has been usually supposed.

27. Respecting the inflection of pro

nouns, the same general principles are ap plicable, as respecting that of nouns. His is obviously he's; and whatever be the origin of the possessive termination of the noun, it has the same origin here. Mine, thine, and hern and theirn still retained in some of our dialects, have apparently the same origin as wooden, wochen, &c. The objective form is merely a grammatical appropriation of one of the forms of the pronouns, to a particular purpose; and we still find that her, among the vulgar, is commonly employed as the subject of verbs instead of she.

28. Though we see no reason to give the appellation pronoun to those words which are called adjective pronouns, (and accordingly we class them as restrictives), yet there is one word of peculiar importance, which seems properly a pronoun, and to which some attention is necessary; viz. the relative. We have already observed several of the contrivances of language to particularize general terms; another is, to restrict or explain the general term by means of a dependent sentence connected with it by a relative. We will first consider what the relative performs, and then how it performs it. Take the following examples; every man, who loves truth, abhors falsehood; and John, who loves truth, hates falsehood. If the relative clause had been omitted in the former sentence, the remaining assertion would have been false; here then it is restrictive: in the second it is merely explanatory, and in such cases, so far from being necessary, may even destroy the unity and force of the sentence. To explain the subject of discourse, and to restrict its signification, are the two offices of the relative. If the custom of language allowed it, precisely the same purpose might be answered by an adjective or participle connected with the term, as, every man loving truth, &c. and it might seem useless to introduce a new procedure; but the utility of the present plan is obvious, when we consider the immense number of new words which must be introduc. ed to supply the place of the relative, and further that it enables us to state a greater variety of circumstances in connection with the antecedent, and occasionally to state them more forcibly. The relative is equivalent to a personal pronoun with a connective of general signification. We do not mean to affirm that in the original signification that connective will be found;

but that such is the present force. The dependent clause may be joined to the principal, either by simple juxtaposition, or by means of a connecting particle, or lastly by a word including the force of a connective particle. Instances of the first are, The ship he commanded was wrecked, and, The man that (i. e. that man) loves wisdom shall find her: in both of which the dependent clause is connected in that natural manner which is frequently adopted in our simple language to express connexion in ideas; and in the same manner the early Greek writers employ their definite article for their relative. As an instance of the second kind we may adduce this mode of expression; A man if he do not love truth cannot be virtuous: in which the dependent clause is joined by a connective, though of a less general kind than what is implied in the relative. This last mode is the most general, and on the whole the most useful, because most general and least ambiguous. Without venturing to assert that who essentially differs in its original signification from that, it certainly does now include more signification; and that additional signification we think to be what is expressed by and, so that, Every man who loves truth hates falsehood, means, Every man and he loves truth, hates falsehood, i. e. as Mr. H. Tooke has shewn us, Every man add (this circumstance) he loves truth, &c.

IV. Of the Verb.

29. As we do not profess to consider the theory of grammar in general, we have not much occasion to enlarge respecting this important sort of words; for our language, simple in most of its procedures, is here almost at the verge of simplicity. Some languages have a great variety of changes in the form of the verb to denote the subject of affirmation, and the mode and time in which the affirmation is to be taken: we have only four, and of those three are to say the least in no way necessary. We have already said enough respecting the nature of the verb (§ 10.) to render it unnecessary to recur again to that point, and we shall here direct the attention of our readers to the modes of signification assumed by the English verb: only repeating, that the verb, is a word which when preceded by a noun or pronoun, or by what may be represented by it expresses affirmation. In English and in other languages, words appropriated to express affirmation are often used without

any such force: in such cases it might in some respects be more scientific to cease to give them the appellation of verbs, but it would be inconvenient in practice, and we prefer speaking of them as in the nounstate of the verb; so in the expressions, Eat this, and He dares not eat it, eat is in the noun-state.

30. To denote that a name was appropriated to be used as a verb, our ancestors added a distinguishing termination, like all other common terminations, almost certainly significant in its original state. Why that was dropped does not appear: but since it was dropped the verb in many instances ceases to have any thing in its form to distinguish it from the noun, and in a great variety of instances it is used exactly as a noun. It is true, it is generally, when in the nounstate preceded by the particle to; but in most instances to is used in its most customary sense, and in the few instances in which it seems to have merely the force of the Anglo-Saxon termination, it has a sense equally accordant with the original force of the word. Mr. H. Tooke has shewn that to (as well as do which is certainly the same word), is a particle of a gothic substantive signifying act, effect, and we presume object; now when we say, I am going to walk, to shows that walk (which is still the name of an action) is the object of my going: but when we say, To walk is healthful, to designates the word following as the name of an action, and the expression means, the aet (riz.) walk is healthful. We must however admit, that the use of to before the noun-state of verbs, does not seem to be in every case consistent with its meaning; but such cases may fairly be referred to the general tendency there is to lose sight of the original force of words, in the stress laid on them in particular cases, or in the mode of their employment in particular cases; and hence by degrees to extend the employment of them to similar cases without reference to their primary signification.

31. The infinite mood, as it is commonly called, is the verb, divested of its peculiar force, viz. of affirmation, and uncompounded with those words which render it expressive of person, number, &c. and in the modern languages of time; but it seems erroneous to consider this as the fundamental form of the verb, where it has any distinguishing termination: it is then the noun-state of the word with a termination added to it, to show that it is to be employ ed as a verb. Thus in the Anglo-Saxon

dean, de is the fundamental form of the verb, and AN is the verbalising adjunct. Now as the imperative form of the verb, is nothing more or less than the simple verbal name unattended with the inference of affirmation, this may be considered as the fundamental form and in the Latin, in particular, the variations of flexion are traced with the greatest advantage from this source. But without enlarging on this point, with which our language in the present state of it has no concern, we must repeat, that the imperative form of the verb is merely the noun-state, or verbal name; and that command, entreaty, &c. supposed to be conveyed by it are merely the inference of custom. If I say to a servant, Bread, it is understood that I wish him to bring me bread, but it is not said: if I say, Bring some bread, in like manner it is understood, that I wish him to bring me bread, but all that is expressed, is the name of the action, and the object of the action. It has, indeed, been supposed, that an affirmation is understood, as, I desire you to bring some bread; but this supposi tion is rather to show, that bring, &c., in such situations, are verbs, than to show the actual procedure. The fact is, full as much is done by inference, as by actual expression, in every branch of language, and even as it is, thought is too quick for words. Admitting the justness of this account of the imperative mood we need not be surprised at the plan adopted by the Greek writers, of using the infinitive instead of it; nor need we resort to a sub-auditur, in order to show the ground of this use, or to complete the grammatical construction. And it may be considered as confirmatory of it, that the Hebrew imperative is the same with the radical form of the verb in its several conjugations, excepting Niphal, where it is the same as the infinitive.

32. When the verbal energy is referred to past time, a change is made in the form of nearly all our English verbs: the greater proportion of them add ed to the noun state. Whether this alteration was originally in tended to refer the meaning of the verb to past time, or that the change had a different object, and the reference has been gradually formed in consequence of an appropriation similar to what we spoke of respecting the objective form of pronouns we have yet to learn; but there seems little room to doubt but that all the common changes which have taken place in the verbs of all languages, whether to denote time, person,

number, or mode of signification, have been formed in consequence of the coalescence of words of appropriate signification; and though the gradual refinements of language may have greatly varied the associations of words from what they originally possessed, yet that these changes were originally found sufficient to answer their respective purposes. In some cases the contrivances adopted can be traced even yet; and from the new turn which has lately been given to etymological investigation, we may expect other discoveries respecting the causes or origin of particular flexions: the future of the French verb is nothing more than the infinitive of the verb, with the present tense of aroir following it; thus, blâmer-ai is ai blâmer, and je blâmerai means I have to blame, which mode of expression is in our own language used with a future force: the leading distinction between the past and future tense of the Hebrew verb is, that in the former the verb is placed before the fragment of the pronoun forming the person, and in the latter after it, as one would suppose to indicate that the verbal denotement is in one case past, in the other case future.

33. Similar observations may be made respecting the persons of verbs. In the Hebrew they are formed, as one would expect, by the coalescence of syllables, which are still acknowledged as pronouns: the same plan has doubtless been adopted in the Latin and Greek verbs, and in some few cases it can be traced with much probability. In our own language there are additions made to the verb, in both the past and present form, when thou is the subject of affirmation, and in the present, when any singular word excepting I and thou is the subject. We are not aware of any adyantage derived from these changes (and the same remark may be applied to the French verb;) for they do not supersede the necessity of expressing the subject of affirmation, as in the case of the Latin and Greek verbs; but probably in their original import they contained in them the subject of affirmation, unless indeed they were dif ferent dialects of the verb, which by degrees were appropriated to particular subjects.

34. The variations in the Greek and Latin verbs, which denote time and manner of signification, are supplied in English by other verbs, which, from their employment, are called auxiliary, or helping verbs: these are be, do, have, shall, will, may, and can, which admit of the variations of other verbs,

and must and let, which are unvaried. Do in its present use is merely emphatic; and assists in producing a discrimination which cannot be denoted in other languages; but from its general resemblance to the other auxiliaries we have mentioned it among them. It is obviously the same word, both in appearance and in force, with the word do, when not employed as an auxiliary. Shall signifies owe, and was formerly used as a simple verb. Will we use at present as a simple verb. These two words are employed as the principal denotements of future time; and though their original signification has in some degree yielded to that with which custom has invested them, the former is usually to be traced. May signifies to be able. Can signifies to know, to ken, and thence to be able. These words are all employed as auxiliaries, in their past as well as present tenses. Must signifies to be obliged. Let is the noun-state imperative of to let, signifying to permit. Have as an auxiliary has the same force with the simple verb; it means to possess. How this meaning is preserved in the complex expression I have loved, or similar cases, we shall see in what will be said respecting the participle.

35. We have an abbreviated mode of expression in English, which has given some trouble to the grammarian, but is now pret ty well understood, the subjunctive mode, or future contingent form. This arises from the omission of the future auxiliary shall or will after words which render the affirmation contingent: thus, instead of saying, If thou shalt or shouldst love, we may say, If thou love. In all other cases in which affirmation is made, we say the verb is in the indicative mood. On this mood we have only to make one remark, respecting the interrogative employment of it. In interrogations we may simply state the thing, or the assertion respecting which we require information, leaving our wishes to be inferred by the reader from the connection, or some word or mark of interrogation, or by the hearer from a variation in our tone; or, which is certainly preferable, we may make such a change in the order of the words as may leave our meaning out of doubt. This is effected in our own language by putting the subject after the verb; but this is not to be considered as making any change on the mode of its signification, but merely as indicating to the eye or ear the wish of the speaker to gain information respecting the affirmation.

V. Of the Participle.

36. Participles are formed from verbs, generally by the addition of terminations, originally without doubt expressive, but now ceasing to have in themselves considered any force. What their original force was will probably be shown us in future conversations at Purley; their present force is all into which we can as yet enter. Those participles which are formed by the addition of ing to the noun-state of verbal denotement; and as it is frequently the verb, express a continued state of the implied that what is meant by the verb is they are called present participles. Those being continued at sometime referred to, which are formed by the addition of ed or en to the nonn-state, or by some change in the characteristic letters of the verb, usually denote the completed state of what is meant by the verb: hence they are called perfect participles, or sometimes, with less prodoes not seem to be any material difficulty priety, past or passive participles. There attending the employment of these words, except in the case where a perfect particihave learned my lesson. It has been supple is employed after the verb have, as, I posed that this means, I possess the finished act of learning my lesson: we think it more probable that it means, I possess my lesson in that state which is called learned; in which case it is exactly equivalent to the Latin habere, followed by a participle in agreement with a noun. We readily admit that by, I have learned it, there is an inference brought into view which is not by, I have it learned; but it seems to be merely the inference of custom, not resulting from any essential difference in the mode of ex pression.

VI. Of the Adverb.

37. We have already given a general account of the class of words called adverbs. Those to which our definition will apply, and to which alone the term should be appropriated, are principally adnouns with or without nouus connected with them; others are prepositions with nouns following them; and the remainder are participles. The chief class of adverbs are those which end in ly; which termination is an abbreviation of the adnoun now spelt like, which is still frequently used by our northern neighbours as we use ly; thus, for wisely, they say wiselike. Of this class, a large proportion are formed by adding ly to adnouns; another set by adding the termi

nation to nouns, as manly, early (from aen,
morning) &c.; and these last are also used
as adnouns. Abed, aboard, ashore, &c.; and
perchance, perhaps, are prepositions with
nouns; a signifying on, in, or at, and per be-
ing the Latin preposition. Why, how, &c.
seem to be restrictives, their nouns being
understood; as, why signifying what, cause
or reason being understood; how signifying
which, way or manner being understood.
Several adverbs besides those before-men-
tioned ending in ly, are used either as ad-
nouns or adverbs; such as well, ill, much,
worse, better, &c.; in all such cases it must
be remembered that not the manner of sig-
nification, but merely the manner of em-
ployment, is changed. On the origin of
most of those adverbs which are less ob-
viously formed from other sorts of words,
Mr. H. Tooke has thrown great light; some
of his derivations we may briefly state,
but our limits will not allow of our doing
more. The following are past participles
of Anglo-Saxon verbs: ago signifying gone
(time); adrift signifies driven; asunder
means separated; fain, rejoiced; lief, be-
loved; astray, strayed or scattered. Needs
is need-is, used parenthetically. Belike is
by lykke, by chance. Aloft is on or in lyft,
i. e. the air, clouds, &c. Much is from mo,
a heap; and is merely the diminutive of this
word; passing through the gradual changes
of mokel, mykel, mochil, muchel (still used
in Scotland), moche, much. Rather is the
comparative of rath, swift. Quickly is
quicklike, epic, a past participle signifying
enlivened; and it means in a lifelike or lively
manner. Very is merely the French ad-
jective trai, anciently written veray, from
the Latin verus. Some words usually class-
ed with adverbs, seem to have no common
link of union with the genuine adverb; such
are yes, aye, yea, and no: indeed Mr. H.
Tooke speaks of this class of words as the
common sink and repository of all hetero-
geneous, unknown corruptions. Aye, or
you, is the imperative of a verb of northern
extraction,' and means have it; and yes is
ay-es, have that. Not (a genuine adverb)
and no, its derivative, have their origin in
the word from which arise the Dutch noode,
node, no, meaning averse, unwilling.

VII. Of the Connective.

39. The precise nature of the words usually denominated conjunctions and prepositions, was very little known, and not generally even suspected, till the publica.

tion of the "Diversions of Purley" since
that time, though philologists do not seem
willing to admit, in all cases, the correct-
ness of Mr. H. Tooke's derivations, yet his
general principle is, we suppose, universally
considered as completely established. Be-
fore his discoveries, it was the common
opinion respecting the conjunction, that it
is "a part of speech void of signification it-
self, but so formed as to help signification,
by making two or more significant sen-
tences to be one significant sentence;" and
respecting the preposition, that it is "a part
of speech, devoid itself of signification, but
so formed as to unite two words that are
significant, and that refuse to coalesce or
unite of themselves." Our limits will not
allow us to enter here into the arguments
against these definitions, and the doctrine
on which they are founded, nor indeed is
it necessary; for, like the doctrine of in-
stincts in mental philosophy, it solely de-
pends on an appeal to ignorance, and falls
to the ground when a probable account
is given of those procedures which it is
supposed to explain. The distinction be-
tween prepositions and conjunctions we
consider as merely technical, referring to
the grammatical usage of employing the
objective form of pronouns after the former,
and not after the latter, unless there be
some word understood which requires it:
for it will be obvious to any one that some
conjunctions are still used" to unite words"
as well as sentences, and that some prepo-
sitions are still used to unite sentences.
The general principle before referred to is,
"that all those words which are usually
termed conjunctions or prepositions, are
the abbreviations or corruptions of nouns
or verbs, and are still employed with a
sense (directly) referable to that which
they bore when in the acknowledged form
of nouns or verbs." We believe this to be
a correct statement of Mr. Tooke's theory;
to adapt it to our own arrangements we
must include our adjectives under the term
nouns, and our participles under the term
verbs: and in addition to this remark,
which is merely verbal, we must add, that
in some instances this great philologist ap-
pears to have too much overlooked a pro-
cedure which meets us in various stages of
language, viz. that among the ideas connect-
ed with a word, that which was originally
of primary importance, becomes, by acci-
dental circumstances in the mode of ap-
plication, secondary only, and sometimes
by degrees is altogether lost from the view

« PreviousContinue »