rarely sufficiently advanced to allow them to enter on a diplomatic career: hence, they remain at home, and maintain a caste. They are jealous and envious of each other, for they fear that if a family draw near the imperial court, it may attain honour and riches. The bourgeoisie and the lettered classes entertain the same feelings, heightened in the latter by the national self-love produced by the perusal of poets and historians, from Dante's "Divina Commedia" to the sonnets of Filicaja. All these causes united keep up a spirit of hostility against the imperial government, which resists all the generous efforts made to conquer it. The mistake committed, according to our author, was in placing any trust in popular gratitude: the Italians require a firm government, and officials at once severe and civil, whose unbending nature should prove to everybody that they would not refrain from the most energetic measures in order to maintain public order. Hence, then, the idea of forming a powerful state in Upper Italy is fallacious, for the other sovereigns of the peninsula would be at the mercy of the revolutionary party; the latter being encouraged by the head of the new state, who would strive to gain the whole of Italy for a season. M. de Rayneval avowed that the papacy could not in any way be maintained without the assistance of foreign troops, and that it was impossible to foresee the termination of such a state of things. Among other publications, which the present crisis has evoked, we must devote our remaining space to an interesting work by the Abbé Michon, called "L'Italie politique et religieuse," which supplies much useful information as to the present condition of Italy. The abbé is decidedly a curiosity, in so far as he is a liberal priest, and his views, although opposed to our own, are so fairly expressed, that we should be unjust were we not to make them known to our readers. According to his opinion there is only one chance for Italy: either the kings must grant constitutional governments, or the country will become republican, for it cannot go on in its present abnormal condition. Still, he considers that there are faults on both sides, and the advice he gives Sardinia is very opportune: It ever seems to me that the statesmen of Piedmont pay too much attention to the dangers Austria may make their independence incur. They forget that, in the present state of the map of Europe, Austria cannot tear away a strip of Sardinian territory without experiencing at the moment, from the combined diplomacy of Europe, a resistance which she dare not brave. And, in the hypothesis of a European conflagration, the question would no longer be a war between two states: all Italy, united in a supreme struggle for independence, would carry the scene of war to the northern frontiers of the Lombardo-Venetese. Italy would only be saved in that case by an offensive war, which would force Austria to fear for her own security, and be glad to keep her natural limits. Piedmont, then, can peacefully continue that development which her genius for commerce produces, until eventualities occur of which time alone possesses the secret. She runs little risk in braving the petulance of Austria. She is better defended against her by diplomatic notes than by the guns of Alexandria. On arriving at Rome, our abbé's first object was to inquire into the political condition of the country. He found opinions greatly divided as to the necessity of a French garrison, but it was generally considered that it could not yet be given up, as the Papal troops-principally consisting of mercenaries-could not be trusted to any great extent. Cardinal Antonelli, on the other hand, was decidedly opposed to the French occupation, and it was continued much against his wishes. According to the Abbé Michon, the garrison would not prove of much assistance in the case of insurrection, for the troops were isolated in seventeen small barracks. Only the soldiers living in the citadel would be in safety if the populace broke loose. The Roman clergy, all reactionists, do not like the French. They reproach them with not having shot all the republicans when they had the opportunity. Of course the republicans are not partial to the French, whom they detest as a government, although they admire them as a nation. They cannot forget that the French republic put down the Roman republic. The French troops quite reciprocate the feeling. A soldier said to the abbé, "The Romans would knife us all, if they could." The Papal government is essentially hostile to everything French. The service rendered them was only accepted by force, and they would have preferred receiving it from any other nation than the French. In the Sacred College there are two distinct parties, the Austrian or purely absolutistic being the dominant. This party stopped Pio Nono's reform tendencies, and urged the country clergy to preach against him. The French or Liberal party is represented by the Pope himself and four or five cardinals: hence it is quite powerless. The Pope's political position is so embarrassed that, despite his wishes to introduce a few slight reforms, which would satisfy public opinion, and perhaps render the removal of the French troops possible, he is forced to keep as his acting minister Cardinal Antonelli, who is entirely devoted to the Austrian party. Since the Emperor Napoleon gave rise to apparently well-founded expectations of an imminent war, public opinion has been divided into three distinct categories. The adherents of the first say, Treaties must be respected: the Lombardo-Venetese belongs to Austria, and it is unfortunate that Italy cannot be emancipated without infringing the rights of Austria. Hence this party decides for the status quo, while sympathising with the condition of the Italian peoples. Another party says, The power of Austria in Northern Italy, and her well-known influence over the rest of the peninsula, constitute a rupture of the European balance. This influence must not be allowed to grow menacing for the future. A remedy must be applied in time. Hence this party proposes diplomatic intervention to regulate the dispute, and by concessions to the legitimate demands of Italy, weaken the excessive preponderance of Austria in Italy. The third party, finally, desire, as expressed in the pamphlet "Napoleon III. et l'Italie," an Italian Confederation, with the Pope at its head, thus bringing up again the plans raised for Italy from the time of Henri IV. down to Gioberti and Manin. The last being at present the favourite view on the Continent, we may be allowed to add a few remarks to those we offered last month, as further confirmation of the fallacy contained in Napoleon's proposition for settling the Italian question permanently. Such a confederation would comprise in an offensive and defensive alliance the Pope, the King of Naples, the Grand-Duke of Tuscany, the Duke of Modena, the Duchess of Parma, and the King of Sardinia. This alliance formed, they would have to engage in a terrible war with Austria, who, even if beaten by accident, would return again and again to the combat, and the fertile plains of Lombardy would be deluged with blood for years. But the very idea of such a confederation is an absurdity: the King of Naples feels himself only strong in the support of Austria, while the smaller Italian princes regard the Germans as their sole resource in time of trouble. The only exception is the Duchess of Parma, who realises the old proverb about the Bourbons, that in that family the women are the men, and she would probably join the confederation sincerely. As for the Pope, our paper has sufficiently proved that he is bound hand and foot; he could not institute any popular movement without a fear of revolution, and hence he could not be expected to join such a confederation heartily. The only chance of success, then, would be by Napoleon throwing an enormous force on the side of the confederated states, and though he might secure his object, it is quite certain now that Europe would combine to thwart him. Whether the knowledge the emperor has gained of the public feeling during the last few weeks will cause a change in his views it is impossible to say, but it is quite evident that his favourite Italian Confederation could not be produced except by his armed interference. We doubt, then, whether he would engage in a war with Austria for so dubious a result, and we are inclined to believe that, in the event of Italy becoming a battle-field, he would be compelled, for his own security, to follow in the exact footsteps of his uncle. Such a result, however, it is impossible that he can desire. It has been argued, however, that interference in Italy has become absolutely necessary; the tottering throne of the Pope, like that of the other spiritual ruler, must collapse, and Austria would then seize upon the whole littoral of the Adriatic. There is some truth in this view, for there is no doubt Austria anticipates some reward for her constant interference in Italian affairs. But the same argument is equally applicable to Turkey in that case Europe has agreed to await the course of events, and we think the same plan should be applied to Italy. The plain truth is, Europe requires no war at present; nations are gradually awakening to the folly of brute force, and want breathing time to recover from the exhaustion of the war that threw the whole Continent back so short a time ago. Hence they look with an angry eye upon any disturber of the public peace; and, though not particularly partial to the Austrian dominion in Italy, they consider it, under the circumstances, preferable to a general conflagration, by which nobody would gain, and of which no one can foresee the end. Hence, then, the general anger felt at the mere suggestion of a French interference which might precipitate events. No good was ever yet produced by an arbitrary interference to secure the liberty of a nation; unless a people can assert its own independence, all foreign aid is futile. To England it is a matter of indifference whether the Italians become free or Austria continue to be the gendarme of Europe; but we are not disposed to let another party interfere. The Italian question is essentially one fitted for diplomacy; a display of brute force would supply no useful argument, and although Italy might be liberated temporarily by the French arms, past history teaches us that she cannot maintain her independence for any length of time. It is a misfortune inherent in the nation; the Italians have ever been prone to neglect nationality for the sake of local aggrandisement, and the result would be the same over and over again. If, then, the Italians consider themselves strong enough to expel the Austrians, and possess sufficient confidence in their unity, let them recommence the business of 1848. If they are wise, however, they will remain as they are, for it is better to bear the ills you know of than fly to others that you know not of. At the present moment Austria is stronger than she has ever been: her army is magnificently disciplined and equipped, and she is prepared to defend her own against all comers. Strong in the justice of her cause, she will not yield to the dictation of France, and we cannot blame her if she drive matters to extremes. Ever since the Crimean war terminated, Sardinia has continued a system of irritation, which was contemptible so long as no one backed her up, but now that France is so strongly supporting her, Austria feels her dignity at stake, and she will not grant the slightest concession which might be attributable to coercion. As matters stand, then, the only chance of hostilities being prevented depends on the Emperor Napoleon making the amende to Austria. Any moment may bring us news of a collision between the Austrians and Sardinians; and if such should occur, and the Austrians cross the Ticino, Europe will hold the Emperor Napoleon responsible for the catastrophe. He has allowed matters to reach a point which he might have prevented long ago, and we are being most unwillingly forced into the conviction that, for some motive of his own, he desires to see the commencement of a war which will permit his interference. And if it be so-if the Emperor Napoleon listen to the insidious whispers of his courtiers, while neglecting the advice of his honest and disinterested ally-if he decide on kindling a flame in Europe which will rapidly grow over his head and defy all his efforts to extinguish-if he alienate the affection of the people that elevated him to the purple, and placed a confidence in him unknown since the revolution-a people that, in the enjoyment of material prosperity, allowed him to exercise unbounded authority, greater than that swayed by any Bourbon-if he petulantly neglect the warnings of the past and the treachery of the present,-much as we should regret his disappointment, we could not afford him any pity. If the war commenced to-day, to-morrow, or in ten years' time, we cannot hold any other opinion as to its merits; we consider it unjust and unnecessary, and our fervent aspiration, ere the combatants meet in the first furious clash of arms, will ever be, "MAY GOD DEFEND THE RIGHT!" [Since this article was sent to press, rumours have been rife as to the assembling of a congress to regulate the affairs of Italy. We trust it may be so; but we consider that the peace of Europe will never be secured so long as the French army remains a standing menace to the Continent. Hence, then, we have but slight hope of the danger of war being more than deferred.] LITERATURE OF THE MONTH. MR. KELLY went to Port Phillip in the latter end of 1852 with the intention of making a rapid but observant tour of that colony, and giving the results to the public in the following year. But he admits that the glowing temptations to speculate, and the rich visions of yellow nuggets, contrasted so alluringly with the stunted rewards of literary labour, that he soon abandoned the aspiration of flourishing on paper for the expectation of figuring more profitably in trading, land-jobbing, or digging pursuits. And lucky it is for the reader that he did so, for without the hard experiences, earned only by practice, Mr. Kelly could never have written so minute and detailed a portraiture as he has done of the social and economical condition of "a nascent empire beating throughout its remotest extremities with the strong, sometimes coarse, but healthy pulse of a progressive civilisation, attracting commerce and settlers from every quarter of the globe, and feeding the mills and mints of the universe with her staple products."* Mr. Kelly's book is a lively, graphic, and coloured sketch of the colony in its auriferous, agricultural, social, and political aspects, during what will probably ever remain the most eventful period of its history. The time has not yet come for a complete history of the mutiny in India. The last scene in the melancholy drama has not yet been enacted. In the mean time, a considerable mass of valuable materials have accumulated, and foremost in the rank of these may be placed "A Year's Campaigning in India," by Captain Medley. This is a straightforward, soldier-like narrative of the siege of Delhi and Lucknow, and of the events connected therewith. Professionally accurate as well as correct in its details, the work will be indispensable to the future historian. Connected with the same subject, we have "A Widow's Reminiscences of the Siege of Lucknow"-one of those sad stories that make the blood run cold and awaken feelings of rancour which we in vain endeavour to subdue. Poor Mrs. Bartrum! "Painting popularly Explained," by Thomas John Gullick and John Timbs, F.S.A.,§ is a kind of book which was very much wanted. Nowhere do we see the proverbial danger of a little knowledge more glaringly exhibited than in the criticisms so glibly volunteered on all sides on art. A work like the present was a positive desideratum; it is full of delightful information for modest inquirers, and may be of considerable benefit to hasty and superficial talkers. Another work by Mr. Timbs, "Curiosities of Science Past and Present: a Book for the Old and Young," like all its author's industrious compilations, possesses infinite merit. It is a very vade-mecum of desirable and useful information. Ever since old Izaak Walton set the example, fishermen have considered themselves entitled to chat upon fish, and all other matters. * Life in Victoria. By William Kelly. Chapman and Hall. Kent and Co. April-VOL. CXV. NO. CCCCLX. § Kent and Co. 2 L |