Ch. IV. of Species): GENDER on the contrary stops not here, but descends to every Individual, however diversified. And so much for SUBSTANTIVES, PROPER LY SO CALLED. (*) The reason why Number goes no lower, is that it does not naturally appertain to Individuals: the cause of which see before, p. 39. CHAP. CHAP. V. Concerning Substantives of the Secondary WE are now to proceed to a SECON- Ch. V. DARY RACE of SUBSTANTIVES, a Race quite different from any already mentioned, and whose Nature may be explained in the following manner. EVERY Object which presents itself to the Senses or the Intellect, is either then perceived for the first time, or else is recognized as having been perceived before. In the former case it is called an Object της πρώτης γνώσεως, of the first knowledge or acquaintance(a); in the latter (a) See Apoll. de Syntaxi, 1. 1. c. 16. p. 49. 1. 2. c. 3. p. 103. Thus Priscian-Interest autem inter demonstrationem & relationem hoc; quod demonstratio, interrógátioni reddita, Primam Cognitionem ostendit; Quis Ch. V. latter it is called an Object Tйs devTegas yvάrews of the second knowledge or acquaintance. Now as all Conversation passes between Particulars or Individuals, these. will often happen to be reciprocally Objects τῆς πρώτης γνώσεως, that is to say, till that instant unacquainted with each other. What then is to be done? How shall the Speaker address the other, when he knows not his Name? or how explain himself by his own Name, of which the other is wholly ignorant? Nouns, as they have been described, cannot answer the purpose. The first expedient upon this occasion seems to have been As, that is, Pointing, or Indication by the Finger or Hand, some traces of which are still to be observed, as a part of that Action, which naturally attends our speaking. But fecit? Ego: relatio vero Secundam Cognitionem signifi cat, ut, Is, de quo jam dixi. Lib. XII. p. 936. Edit. Putschii. 1 But the Authors of Language were not Ch. V. content with this. They invented a race of Words to supply this Pointing; which Words, as they always stood for Substantives or Nouns, were characterized by the Name of 'AvTwvuμíaι, or PRONOUNS. These also they distinguished into three several sorts, calling them Pronouns of the First, the Second, and the Third Person, with a view to certain distinctions, which may be explained as follows. SUPPOSE the Parties conversing to be wholly unacquainted, neither Name nor Countenance on either side known, and the (6) ̓Εκεῖνο ὧν ̓Αντωνυμία, τὸ μετὰ ΔΕΙΞΕΩΣ ἢ ἀναφορᾶς 'ANTONOMAZOMENON. Apoll. de Synt. L. II. c. 5. p. 106. Priscian seems to consider them so peculiarly destined to the expression of Individuals, that he does not say they supply the place of any Noun, but that of the proper Name only. And this undoubtedly was their original, and still is their true and natural use. PRONOMEN est pars orationis, quæ pro nomine proprio uniuscujusque accipitur. Prisc. L. XII. See also Apoll. Ch. V. the Subject of the Conversation to be I the Speaker himself. Here, to supply the place of Pointing by a Word of equal Power, they furnished the Speaker with the Pronoun, I. I write, I say, desire, &c. and as the Speaker is always principal with respect to his own discourse, this they called for that reason the Pronoun of the First Person. AGAIN, suppose the Subject of the Conversation to be the Party addrest. Here for similar reasons they invented the Pronoun, THOU. Thou writest, Thou walkest, &c. and as the Party addrest is next in dignity to the Speaker, or at least comes next with reference to the discourse; this Pronoun they therefore called the Pronoun of the Second Person. LASTLY, Suppose the Subject of Conversation neither the Speaker, nor the Party addrest, but some Third Object, Here they provided different from both. HE, SHE, or IT, which |