SHOULD it be asked, whether Time it self may not become upon occasion the Verb's principal Signification; it is answered, No. And this appears, because the same Time may be denoted by different verbs (as in the words, writeth and speaketh) and different Times by the same Verb (as in the words, writeth and wrote) neither of which could happen, were Time any thing more, than a mere Concomitant. Add to this, that when words denote Time, not collaterally, but principally, they cease to be verbs, and become either adjectives, or substantives. Of the adjective kind are Timely, Yearly, Dayly, Hourly, &c. of the substantive kind are Time, Year, Day, Hour, &c.

THE most obvious division of TIME is into Present, Past, and Future, nor is any language complete, whose Verbs have not TENSES, to mark these distinctions. But we may go still further. Time past and future are both infinitely extended.

H

Ch. VI.

1

Ch. VI. extended. Hence it is that in universal

Time past we may assume many particular Times past, and in universal Time future, many particular Times future, some more, some less remote, and corresponding to each other under different relations. Even present Time itself is not exempt from these differences, and as necessarily implies some degree of Extension, as does every given line, however minute.

HERE then we are to seek for the reason, which first introduced into language that variety of Tenses. It was not it seems enough to denote indefinitely (or by Aorists) mere Present, Past, or Future, but it was necessary on many occasions to define with more precision, what kind of Past, Present, or Future. And hence the multiplicitly of Futures, Præterits, and even Present Tenses, with which all languages are found to abound, and without which it would be difficult to ascertain our Ideas.

HOWEVER

HOWEVER as the knowledge of Ch. VI. TENSES depends on the Theory of TIME, and this is a subject of no mean speculation, we shall reserve it by itself for the following chapter.

CHAP. VII.

Concerning Time, and Tenses.

TIME and SPACE have this in common, that they are both of them by nature things continuous, and as such they both of them imply Extension. Thus between London and Salisbury there is the Extension of Space, and between Yesterday and To-morrow, the Extension of Time. But in this they differ, that all the parts of Space exist at once and together, while those of Time only exist in Transition or Succession(a). Hence then we may gain some Idea of TIME, by considering it under

(a) See Vol. I. p. 275. Note XIII. To which we may add, what is said by Ammonius—övde yàg ô Xçó»@ ὅλ ̓ ἅμα ὑφίςαται, ἀλλ ̓ ἢ κατὰ μόνον τὸ ΝΥΝ· ἐν γὰρ τῷ γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει. TIME doth not subsist the whole at once, but only in a single Now or INSTANT; for it hath its Existence in becoming and in ceasing to be. Amm, in Predicam. p. 82. b.

under the notion of a transient Conti- C. VII.

nuity. Hence also, as far as the af

fections and properties of Transition go, Time is different from Space; but as to those of Extension and Continuity, they perfectly coincide.

LET us take, for example, such a part of Space, as a Line. In every given LINE we may assume any where a Point, and therefore in every given Line there may be assumed infinite Points. So in every given TIME Wę may assume any where a Now or Instant, and therefore in every given Time there may be assumed infinite Nows or Instants.

FARTHER still-A POINT is the Bound of every infinite Line; and a Now or INSTANT, of every finite Time. But altho' they are Bounds, they are neither of them Parts, neither the Point of any Line, nor the Now or Instant of

any Time. If this appear strange, we