II. 1. ii. c. 74 resolved into, and are supposed to be compounded of, CHAP. either have been or can be proved to exist separate from and antecedent to those bodies which they compound, what then becomes of all our company of atoms, which are supposed, by their concourse in an infinite space, to be the origin of the world? I know not where to find them, unless dancing with the schoolmen's chimeras in a vacuum, or in a space as empty as the infinite one, viz. some Epicurean's brains. Neither therein will they be much unlike their great master Epicurus, if we believe the character which the Stoic in Tully gives of him; who saith, he was homo sine arte, sine literis, insultans in Cicero de omnes, sine acumine ullo, sine auctoritate, sine lepore. But Nat. Deor. allowing the Stoic some of that passion (which he disclaimed so much) in these words, yet we may rather believe what Tully himself elsewhere speaks of Epicurus's sentiments, that they were none of them handsome, or becoming a man. At ille quid sentit? saith he of Epi- Idem de curus; and soon replies, sentit autem nihil unquam ele- Divinat gans, nihil decorum. And in another place, speaking of his morals, he saith, nihil generosum sapit atque magnifi- nibus, 1. i. cum, there was nothing noble and generous in him; which censure of Epicurus, all the pains that P. Gassendus hath taken in the vindication of the life and opinions of Epicurus, hath not been able to wipe off. For although we should yield what that learned man so much contends for, that all the calumnies which were cast on Epicurus arise from the antipathy between Zeno and the following Stoics, and the school of Epicurus; yet all this will not make Epicurus to have been comparable with some other philosophers for parts and judgment, whose principles have somewhat more generous and venerable in them than the morals of Epicurus had, taking them in their more refined sense. Idem de Fi in But it is not the morality of Epicurus which we now enquire after; our business is to see how well he acquits himself in rendering an account of the origin of the universe without a Deity. And so we come to consider the hypothesis itself, whether it be rational or no, or consistent with the catholic laws of nature which appear the world. Two things I shall here enquire into, which are the main principles of Epicurus, viz. the motion of these atoms in the infinite space, and the manner of the concretion of bodies by the concourse of these atoms. 1. I begin with their motion; which Epicurus attributes to his atoms without any hesitation, and yet never XIV. BOOK undertakes to give an account of the origin of that moIII. tion; which argues his whole hypothesis to be extremely precarious. The thing then (which he must assume as his main principle, without which all his other do nothing) is, that motion doth inseparably belong to the least atom or insensible particle; for without this there cannot be imagined any concourse of atoms at all, much less any such contexture of bodies out of them. But for one to say that atoms move, because it is their nature to move, and give no other account of it, is so precarious, that it will never give the least satisfaction to an inquisitive mind and it will be the least of all pardonable in the exploders of substantial forms and occult qualities, when the origin of the whole world is resolved into an occult quality which gives motion to atoms. And herein the Atomists outdo the most credulous Peripatetics, seeing they lay the prime foundation of the world and of their own philosophy together in a thing they can give no rational account of at all; which is, the motion of atoms in an infinite vacuity. If it be replied, which is all Epicurus hath to say, that the motion of atoms depends upon their gravity, the question returns upon him with the same violence; how comes this gravity to belong to these atoms in such an empty space, where there can be no impulsion from other bodies, no attraction from any magnetic particles, which are supposed to be the causes Gassendus of the descent of heavy bodies? Nay, Epicurus himself Phys. sect. takes away any centre of that motion of atoms, and yet i. 1. iii. c. 7. attributes a necessary descent to his atoms by virtue of rent. Mag- their gravity; and if a philosopher may beg such things nitud. Solis as these are, so repugnant to the phenomena of nature, humilis et without assigning any other reason for them, but that it sublimis, Ep. iv. sect. is their nature, let us never venture philosophizing more, but sit down in that contented piece of ignorance, which attributes the causes of every thing unto specific forms and occult qualities; for this is so shameful a piece of beggary, that P. Gassendus doth more than once disclaim it; and in his discourse of motion doth prove an impossibility of motion in an infinite empty space. Might translato, not Epicurus then have saved his credit better by sitting tom. iii.Op. down with the opinions of his forefathers, than thus to go a begging for such hypotheses, which none, who are not resolved to be ignorant, will be ready to grant him? De appa iii. De Motu presso a XV. But yet this is not all: but according to this fundamental principle of Epicurus, viz. that there is a principle of motion in every insensible particle of matter, he plainly overthrows another principle of his, which is, the solidity CHAP. and different magnitude of these atoms. These particles are supposed so solid, that Dionysius in Eusebius tells us, Euseb. the account given why they are called άτομοι was, διὰ τὴν Prep. AUTOν Seppornτα, because of their indissoluble firmness; xiv. C. 23. Evang. 1. and the different sizes of these atoms is so necessary a principle, that from thence they undertake to resolve many phenomena of the universe. Let us now see how consistent these things are with the inseparable property of motion belonging to atoms: for if there be particles of such different sizes, then it is plain that there are some particles which may not only be conceived to be bigger than others, but are really so; and so there must be more parts of matter imagined in this bigger particle than in another less; and if there be more parts, these parts may be conceived separate from each other, that this particle may be equal to the other. Now then I demand, if motion doth inseparably belong to the least particle of matter, how comes one to be bigger than the other? For herein we see that every particle is not in distinct motion: for there cannot but be more imaginable particles in an atom of a bigger size than in a less; and if so, there must be some union of those imaginable particles in that bigger atom; and how could such an union be without rest, and what rest could there be, if motion doth inseparably belong to every particle of matter? And so it must be in all those atoms which are supposed to have angles and hooks, in order to their better catching hold of each other for the composition of bodies; how come these hooks and angles to be annexed to this atom? For an atom may be without them; whence comes this union, if such a principle of motion be in each particle? If it be answered, that motion did belong to all these particles, but by degrees the lesser particles hitting together made up these angled and hooked particles; I soon reply, that the difficulty returns more strongly for if these angled and hooked particles be supposed necessary to the contexture and union of bodies, how came those least imaginable particles ever to unite without such hooks and angles? And so the question will return in infinitum. If then the solidity and indivisibility of these angled atoms doth depend on the union and rest of those lesser imaginable particles joined together, then it is evident that motion is no inseparable property of all these particles, but some are capable of union, in order to the making of such hooks and angles, which are necessary for the contexture III. BOOK of bodies; and where there is union and solidity, there is rest, which is at least accompanied with it, if it be not one of the great causes of it: and without which the Atomists, of all other philosophers, will be least able to give an account of firmness in bodies, when they make V. Descar- bodies to consist of an aggregation of particles; by which tes, Prin- it will be very hard finding a sufficient account of the difcip. p. ii. ference between fluid and firm bodies, unless it be from art. 54, 55, 56. the quicker motion and agitation of the particles of fluid bodies, and the rest of the small and contiguous parts that make up the firm body, according to that catholic law of nature whereby things continue in the state they are in till some stronger force puts them out of it. The only thing which the Epicurean Atomists have left to give any account of the solidity of particles of such different sizes, is, the want of vacuity: for, say they, the ground of divisibility of bodies is the interspersion of a disseminated vacuum: now where there is no vacuity, though the particles be of different size, yet they may be solid and History of indivisible. But this is taken off by the instance produced Fluid. and against other persons, by that ingenious and honourable person Mr. Boyle, in his Physiological Essays, which is to this purpose. Suppose two of these presumed indivisible particles, both smooth and of a cubical figure, should happen to lie upon one another, and a third should chance to be fitly placed upon the upper of the two, what should hinder but that this aggregate may, by the violent knock of some other corpuscles, be broken in the midst of the whole concretion, and consequently in the middlemost body? For suppose them as solid as may be, yet since corpuscles as hard as they can be made very violently to knock against them, why may not those grate or break the middlemost corpuscles, or any of the others? And if there be a possibility of breaking off these cubical particles in the middle, then mere want of vacuity is no sufficient account of their being indivisible. By this we see how far the Atomists are from giving any rational account of the origin of the motion of the atoms themselves without a Deity. Firm. p. 202. XVI. 2. Supposing this motion to be granted them, yet they cannot give any satisfactory account of the manner of concretion of bodies, by the casual occursions of these atoms moving in an infinite empty space; which appears from those gross and extravagant suppositions of Epicurus, in order to the making these atoms of his so hit together that they make up any bodies by their contexture. 1. He supposeth as it were two regions, a superior and 11. sect. i. inferior, in an infinite empty space, which hath no centre CHAP. at all in it, nor any body, from which to measure those respects of above and below, as appears by his Epistle to Herodotus, wherein he saith, These terms of avw and xáτw, or upwards and downwards, must be conceived without any bounds or limits at all. So that though we conceive some thing superior, we must imagine nothing supreme; and so on the contrary. Whereby it is evident, as Gassendus con- Gassend. fesseth, that Epicurus thought the surface of the earth Physic. to be a plane, and this plane to be continued up in a level 1. iii. c. 7. superficies to the heavens, and so to all that immense space of the universe; so that all those heavy bodies which should fall downwards in any parts of the widest distance on the earth, as in Europe, Asia, and Africa, would never meet (if they continued their motion) in the centre of the earth, but would continue their motion still in a parallel line; and so he imagined that which is said to be above as to us, was really the upper part of the world, and so the descent of his atoms must necessarily be downwards towards the earth, according to the weight of them. And was not this a worthy mathematical supposition, for one who would undertake to give an account of the origin of the universe without a Deity? This motion of descent, by reason of the gravity of atoms, would not serve his turn; for if the atoms moved downwards thus in a parallel line, how was it possible for them ever to meet for the contexture of bodies? Now for this purpose he invented a motion of declination; for finding the motion ad lineam, or ad perpendiculum as some call it, could not possibly produce those varieties of bodies which are in the universe, he supposed therefore the descent not to be in a perpendicular right line, but to decline a little, that so several particles, in their descent, might make some occursions one upon another. And this Epicurus added to Democritus; but therein, as Cicero de Tully observes, was very unhappy; that where he adds Fin. 1. i. to Democritus, ea quæ corrigere vult, mihi quidem depravare videatur; that he marred what Democritus had said, by mending of it. The reason of which motion of declination is thus given by Lucretius: Quod nisi declinare solerent, omnia deorsum, It was obvious to object, that, according to the principles Lucret. 1. ii. |