XII. 1779. six feet, which without them would be nearly twelve CHAPTER feet apart. Of late he has had the surprising sagacity to discover, that apples will make pies; and it is a question, if, in the violence of his efforts, we do not get one of apples, instead of having both of beefsteaks. If the ladies can put up with such entertainment, and will submit to partake of it on plates, once tin but now iron (not become so by the labor of scouring), I shall be happy to see them; and am, dear Doctor, yours." Sir Henry Clinton, disappointed in not receiving additions to his army from Europe, began to be weary of his situation, and to despair of effecting any thing that would either redound to the glory of the British arms, or answer the expectations of his employers. On the 21st of August he said, in a letter to Lord George Germain, British Gentates an atSouth Caro eral medi tack on lina. plan of ac the French during tion between had a squadron It was and American forces. After Count d'Estaing left the harbor of Boston, he Concerted proceeded to the West Indies, where he operated the winter, took St. Vincent and Grenada, and naval engagement with Admiral Byron's fleet. expected, that he would return to the United States in the course of the summer, and M. Gérard, the French minister in Philadelphia, held several conferences with a committee of Congress respecting a concerted plan of action between the French squadron and the American forces. For the same object M. Gérard went to camp, and held interviews with the Commander-in-chief, to whom Congress delegated the power of arranging and executing XII. 1779. CHAPTER the whole business in such a manner as his judgment and prudence should dictate. Various plans were suggested and partly matured; but, as the unfortunate repulse of the French and American troops in their assault on Savannah, and the subsequent departure of Count d'Estaing from the coast, prevented their being carried into execution, they need not be explained in this place. French minister's opinion of Washington. Rhode Island evacu ated. The intercourse with Washington on this occasion left favorable impressions on the mind of the French minister. In a letter to Count de Vergennes, written from camp, he said; "I have had many conversations with General Washington, some of which have continued for three hours. It is impossible for me briefly to communicate the fund of intelligence, which I have derived from him; but I shall do it in my letters as occasions shall present themselves. I will now say only, that I have formed as high an opinion of the powers of his mind, his moderation, his patriotism, and his virtues, as I had before from common report conceived of his military talents, and of the incalculable services he has rendered to his country." The same sentiments were often repeated by the successor of M. Gérard, and contributed to establish the unbounded confidence, which the French government placed in the American commander during the war. Although the plans of cooperation failed, yet they were serviceable in embarrassing the schemes of the enemy. As soon as it was known that Count d'Estaing had arrived in Georgia, Sir Henry Clinton naturally supposed that he would proceed northward, and unite with Washington in a combined attack on New York. Alarmed for his safety in such an event, he caused Rhode Island to be evacuated, and drew to New York the garrison, which had been stationed nearly three years at that place, consisting at times of about six thousand men. October 21. Stony Point and Verplanck's Point were likewise evacuated. The appearance of Count d'Estaing's fleet on the coast retarded Sir Henry Clinton's southern expedition till near the end of December, when, having received rein XII. forcements from Europe, he embarked about seven thou- CHAPTER sand troops, and sailed for South Carolina, under the convoy of Admiral Arbuthnot. the The campaign being now at an end, the army was again put into winter quarters, the main body in neighborhood of Morristown, strong detachments at West Point and other posts near the Hudson, and the cavalry in Connecticut. The head-quarters were at Morristown. The ill success of the allied arms at Savannah, and the indications of Sir Henry Clinton's designs against South Carolina, were reasons for sending more troops to General Lincoln's army; and, before the middle of December, two of the North Carolina regiments and the whole of the Virginia line marched to the south. The winter set in with so much severity, that the channels of transportation were closed, and the troops were reduced to the greatest distress for the want of provisions. In this extremity, it was necessary to levy supplies upon the inhabitants, and send out officers to collect them. By their instructions, these officers were first to call on the magistrates, and solicit their aid in procuring provisions of grain and cattle, and in apportioning to each person such a quantity as he could spare without injury to his family. Certificates were then to be given, specifying the quantity, leaving it optional with the owner to fix the price by a fair valuation on the spot, or to receive the market price at the time the certificates should be paid. If this plan proved unsuccessful, the officers were to proceed according to the usual method of military impressments. There was no occasion, however, for this latter measure. By the zeal and activity of the magistrates, coöperating with the good disposition of the inhabitants, a sufficient quantity of voluntary supplies was soon brought to the camp. 1780. upon Staten A descent upon Staten Island by a party under Lord Descent Stirling, a retaliatory incursion of the enemy into New Island. Jersey at Elizabethtown, and a skirmish near White Plains, were the only military events during the winter. CHAPTER XII. 1780. Nominal strength of the army. Depreciation of the currency. System of specific sup tual. The army for the campaign in 1780 was nominally fixed by Congress at thirty-five thousand two hundred and eleven men. Each State was required to furnish its quota by the first day of April. No definite plan was adopted for the campaign, as the operations must depend on circumstances and the strength and condition of the enemy. One of the greatest evils, which now afflicted the country, and which threatened the most alarming consequences, was the depreciation of the currency. Destitute of pecuniary resources, and without the power of imposing direct taxes, Congress had, early in the war, resorted to the expedient of paper money. For a time, while the quantity was comparatively small, its credit was good; but in March, 1780, the enormous amount of two hundred millions of dollars had been issued, no part of which had been redeemed. At this time forty paper dollars were worth only one in specie. Prices rose as the money sank in value, and every branch of trade was unsettled and deranged. The effect was peculiarly oppressive on the troops, and was a principal reason for the exorbitant bounties allowed to them in the latter years of the war. The separate States likewise issued paper money, which increased the evil, without affording any adequate relief. The only remedy was taxation; but this was seldom pursued with vigor, owing, in part, to the distracted state of the times and the exhausted condition of the country, and in part also to State jealousy. As each State felt its burdens to be heavy, it was cautious how it added to them in a greater proportion than its neighbors; and thus all were reluctant to act, till impelled by the pressure of necessity. So low had the credit of the currency fallen, that the plies ineffec- commissaries found it extremely difficult, and in some cases impossible to purchase supplies for the army. Congress adopted a new method, by requiring each State to furnish a certain quantity of beef, pork, flour, corn, forage, and other articles, which were to be deposited in such places. as the Commander-in-chief should determine. The States were to be credited for the amount at a fixed valuation CHAPTER in specie. The system turned out to be impracticable. The multitude of hands into which the business was thrown, the want of proper authority to compel its prompt execution, the distance of several of the States from the army, and the consequent difficulties of transportation, all conspired to make it the most expensive, the most uncertain, and the least effectual method that could be devised. It added greatly to the embarrassments of the military affairs, and to the labor and perplexities of the Commander-in-chief, till it was abandoned. To keep up the credit of the currency, Congress recommended to the States to pass laws making paper money a legal tender at its nominal value for the discharge of debts, which had been contracted to be paid in gold or silver. Such laws were enacted, and many debtors took advantage of them. When the army was at Morristown, a man of respectable standing lived in the neighborhood, who was assiduous in his civilities to Washington, which were kindly received and reciprocated. Unluckily this man paid his debts in the depreciated currency. Some time afterwards he called at head-quarters, and was introduced as usual to the General's apartment, where he was then conversing with some of his officers. He bestowed very little attention upon the visiter. The same thing occurred a second time, when he was more reserved than before. This was so different from his customary manner, that Lafayette, who was present on both occasions, could not help remarking it, and he said, after the man was gone; General, this man seems to be much devoted to you, and yet you have scarcely noticed him." Washington replied, smiling; "I know I have not been cordial; I tried hard to be civil, and attempted to speak to him two or three times, but that Continental money stopped my mouth." He considered these laws unjust in principle, and iniquitous in their effects. He was himself a loser to a considerable amount by their operation. At the beginning of April, when the States were to XII. 1780. Paper mo ney made a legal tender. |