CHAPTER paign, and the basis of which was a coöperation with a French fleet and army. Lafayette was to have full instructions for arranging the matter with the court of Versailles, aided by the counsel and support of Dr. Franklin, then the American plenipotentiary in France.

XI. 1778.

Plan of a combined attack on Canada,

Opposed by Washington.

Political reasons for not attack

ing Canada.

The plan was on a very large scale. Attacks were to be made by the American army at three points far distant from each other, namely, Detroit, Niagara, and by way of the Connecticut River; while a French fleet should ascend the St. Lawrence, with four or five thousand troops, and act against Quebec. The scheme was discussed, matured, and approved with much unanimity in Congress, and then sent to Washington with the request that he would communicate his sentiments. He replied in a long despatch, entering minutely into the subject, and showing that the plan was impracticable; that it required resources in troops and money, which were not to be had; that it would involve Congress in engagements to their ally, which it would be impossible to fulfil; and that it was in itself so extensive and complicated, as to hold out no reasonable hope of success, even with all the requisite means of pursuing it.

Such was his opinion in a military view. But the subject presented itself to him in another aspect, in which he thought it deserved special consideration. Canada formerly belonged to France, and had been severed from her in a manner, which, if not humiliating to her pride, contributed nothing to her glory. Would she not be eager to recover this lost province? If it should be conquered with her aid, would she not claim it at the peace as rightfully belonging to her, and be able to advance plausible reasons for such a demand? Would not the acquisition itself hold out a strong temptation? The territory abounded in supplies for the use of her Islands, it opened a wide field of commerce with the Indian nations, it would give her the command of posts on this continent independent of the precarious good will of an ally, it would put her in a condition to engross the whole trade of

XI.

1778.

Canada, if would re

conquered,

vert to

France at a

treaty of

Newfoundland, and above all, it would afford her facilities CHAPTER for awing and controlling the United States, "the natural and most formidable rival of every maritime power in Europe." He added, "France, acknowledged for some time past the most powerful monarchy in Europe by land, able now to dispute the empire of the sea with Great Britain, and, if joined with Spain, I may say, certainly superior, possessed of New Orleans on our right, Canada on our left, and seconded by the numerous tribes of Indians in our rear from one extremity to the other, a people so generally friendly to her, and whom she knows so well how to conciliate, would, it is much to be apprehended, have it in her power to give law to these States." These sentiments, he said, did not grow out of any distrust of the good faith of France in the alliance she had formed. On the contrary, he was willing to entertain and cherish the most favorable impressions, in regard peace. to her motives and aims. "But," he added again, "it is a maxim founded on the universal experience of mankind, that no nation is to be trusted farther than it is bound by its interest; and no prudent statesman or politician will venture to depart from it. In our circumstances we ought to be particularly cautious; for we have not yet attained sufficient vigor and maturity to recover from the shock of any false step, into which we may unwarily fall. If France should even engage in the scheme, in the first instance, with the purest intentions, there is the greatest danger, that, in the progress of the business, invited to it by circumstances, and perhaps urged on by the solicitations and wishes of the Canadians, she would alter her views." In short, allowing all his apprehensions to be unfounded, he was still reluctant to multiply national obligations, or to give to any foreign power claims of merit for services performed beyond what was absolutely indispensable.

not satisfac

The observations and reasonings of the Commander-in- Objections chief were so far operative on Congress, as to induce them tory to Conat once to narrow their scheme, though not entirely to

gress.

CHAPTER give it up.

XI.

1778.

Washington attends Congress.

Views of the French

in regard to Canada.

They participated in the general opinion, that the war with France would necessarily employ the British fleet and troops in other parts of the world, and that they would soon evacuate the towns on the seacoast of the United States. In this event, they thought an expedition against Canada should still be the object of the campaign, and that preparations should accordingly be made. They requested General Washington to write to Dr. Franklin, and the Marquis de Lafayette, who was then at Boston, ready to depart for Europe, and state to them such details as might be laid before the French court, in order that eventual measures might be taken for coöperation in case an armament should be sent to Quebec from France. The plan in this shape, however, was not more satisfactory to him, than in its original form. He saw no reason for supposing the British would evacuate the States, and he believed a system of operations built upon that basis would fail. At any rate he was not prepared to hazard the responsibility of drawing the French government into a measure so full of uncertainty, and depending on so many contingencies.

The army being now in winter quarters, and his presence with it not being essential, he suggested the expediency of a personal interview with the members of Congress, in which his sentiments could he more fully explained than by writing. This proposition was approved. He arrived in Philadelphia on the 24th of December, and, after several discussions between him and a committee of Congress, the Canada scheme was wholly laid aside.

It is a remarkable fact, as connected with the above government suspicions on political grounds, that the French government was decidedly opposed to an expedition against Canada. The French minister in the United States was instructed, before he left France, not to favor any projects of conquest; and it was the policy of the court of Versailles, that Canada and Nova Scotia should remain in the power of Great Britain. The reasons for this policy may

XI.

1778.

not be obvious; but the fact is unquestionable. It is to CHAPTER be considered, however, that France had by treaty pledged herself to carry on the war, till the independence of the United States should be secured; but she had not engaged to fight for conquests, nor for the extension of the territories of the United States beyond their original limits. Such an engagement would have bound her to continue the war indefinitely, with no other object than to gratify the ambition or enmity of her ally, while every motive of interest and of national honor might prompt her to seek for peace. It was evident, too, that the pride of England, humbled by conceding the independence of her revolted colonies, would never brook the severance of her other provinces by the direct agency of France. All conquests thus made, therefore, would perplex the negotiations for peace, and might involve France in a protracted war, without the least prospect of advantage to herself. Hence she resolved to adhere strictly to her pledge in the treaty of alliance. But, although the French minister in America was instructed not to hold out encouragement of cooperation in plans of conquest, yet he was at the same time directed not to throw any obstacles in the way; thus leaving the United States to decide and act for themselves. Should they gain conquests by their own strength, these might reasonably be claimed by them in a treaty of peace, without embarrassing the relations between France and England.

CHAPTER

XII.

1779.

campaign.

CHAPTER XII.

Conferences with a Committee of Congress, and Plans for the next Campaign. Sullivan's Expedition against the Indians. The Enemy commence a predatory Warfare. - The Burning of New Haven, Fairfield, and Norwalk. Stony Point stormed and taken. - Successful Enterprise against Paulus Hook. Washington's Interviews with the French Minister. Plans proposed for cooperating with Count d'Estaing. The Army goes into Winter Quarters.- Depreciation of the Currency, and its Effects. Arrival of the Marquis de Lafayette, with the Intelligence that a French Armament was on its Way to the United States - The Army takes a Position near Hudson's River.-The French Squadron arrives at Newport. Count de Rochambeau's Instructions. · French Fleet blockaded. - Interview between General Washington and the French Commander at Hartford. - The Treason of Arnold. Plans for attacking New York.

GENERAL Washington remained in Philadelphia about five weeks, holding conferences with a committee of Congress, and making arrangements for the campaign of 1779. Plans for the He suggested three plans, with remarks on the mode of executing them, and the probable result of each. The first plan had in view an attempt to drive the enemy from their posts on the seacoast; the second, an attack on Niagara, and an offensive position in that quarter; and, by the third, it was proposed to hold the army entirely on the defensive, except such operations as would be necessary to chastise the Indians, who had committed depredations on the frontiers during the past year, and who, emboldened by success, might be expected to repeat their ravages.

Defensive plan adopted.

After mature deliberation, and taking into the account the exhausted state of the country in regard both to pecuniary resources and supplies for an army, it was decided to adopt the third plan as the best suited to circumstances, the least expensive, and perhaps the most beneficial in its ultimate effects. It would afford an opportunity to