CHAPTER VII.

NEGOTIATION OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

1667-1668.

FROM the instructions now received*, it appeared, that the Dutch ambassadors had been commissioned to propose a mediation, with a determination to use force against the party which should refuse the peace upon "fair conditions." An apprehension is expressed, founded, avowedly, upon what had been "hinted to the King out of France," that the object of the Dutch in this proposal was, to embroil England with France, and then leave her in a separate war with that power. Temple was therefore to ascertain, from De Witt himself, "whether the States would really and effectively enter into a league offensive and defensive with us for the protection of the Spanish Netherlands, and, if the interests of both nations should require it, even against France itself, whose successful progress in those countries the States have so much reason to apprehend, as well the daily improving strength of their force by sea; from both which they can no way be secured but by a firm union with England upon the old foundations of amity betwixt this crown and them,

* Nov. 25. 1667. Appendix, B.

and not the particular advantages gained in the last treaty of peace. On the other hand, he was to throw out a hint of the possibility of a junction between England and France ;-"Despairing to agree the two crowns, it will behove us to secure our own interests the best we can ;-let him bethink himself what an accession it would be to the French King's strength, if we should lend him a considerable body of foot the next campaign, and in that case, what would become of Flanders, and even Holland itself?" This communication, at once conciliatory and minacious, was to be prefaced by an assurance from the King himself to De Witt, that "his personal honour and engagement was the best security he was willing to depend upon in the negotiation." The natural apprehensions of De Witt in regard to the Prince of Orange were to be allayed by an assurance, that "although the King had all possible kindness for his nephew," and even a hope was expressed that he would, in due time, have suitable employments in the state, "yet, that the consideration of his interests at that time should not at all interfere with the great interest betwixt the nations." This discourse concerning the Prince was not to be commenced until De Witt should appear inclinable to the main proposition.

To the Marquis, Temple was instructed to speak of his journey as occasioned by a domestic occurrence: he was to press him for an unreserved communication of the prospects of Spain, and to apprise him generally of his intention to converse with De Witt.

Temple set off with all speed to Antwerp, and made his communication to the Marquis. The Spaniard did all that he could to persuade him to a declaration from England in behalf of Flanders, assuring him that Spain had concluded subsisting treaties with the dukes of Brandenburg and Lunenburg; that the Emperor would certainly give his assistance; that the peace with Portugal was nearly concluded, and that it had been resolved to send Don John of Austria into Flanders.*

There was nothing in this information to slacken the zeal of Temple in the further pursuit of his instructions. He repaired with his usual activity to the Hague, and at once proposed to De Witt a defensive and offensive alliance. De Witt treated him with much of the frankness which characterised the future communications between these two statesmen. He avowed that it had been the States' intention to co-operate with Spain in the defence of Flanders, but that difficulties had arisen as to the terms: the States required Ostend and Bruges for themselves, unless England should join with them, in which case they would be contented with Bruges. There had been much dissatisfaction between the States and the Marquis on this occasion, and they were now resolved† to attempt a

* Arl. 191.

+ This resolution was adopted by the States "at their last separation," and is probably that upon which the instructions to the Dutch ambassadors, which gave rise to those of the 25th of November from England, was founded. De Witt's statement of the proposition concerning Ostend and Bruges did not differ much from that of the Marquis, who had, moreover, acknowledged, notwithstanding the declaration

mediation, jointly with their allies, between the two crowns; with the view of "obliging France to accept the peace upon the terms now of fered by Louis; namely, that France should either retain the conquests of the last campaign, or receive instead of them, Aire, St. Omer, Cambray, Douay, and either Luxemburg, or the county of Burgundy."*

There was also to be an immediate suspension of arms; and the peace, when made upon these terms, was to be guaranteed by the mediating powers, who were to furnish each a specified force, and among whom it was hoped to include Sweden.

"Upon my objections," says Temple in his report of this conference†, "against the honour, as well as the safety of this proceeding, in comparison of entering jointly with their allies upon the protection of Flanders, and my insinuating the likelihood of

made to D'Estrades, that Spain was in treaty with Holland for a loan of 5,000,000 guilders on the security of the Pais de Waas.

* Sept. 21. 1667. D'Estrades, vi. 46. This offer included a suspension of arms to the end of March. Charleroi and Douay were omitted, on condition that Spain acknowledged the king of Portugal.

+"Sir W. Temple's conference with M. De Witt, December, 1667.” (In Arl. 191.) In his letter to the Lord Keeper Bridgeman, written after the conclusion of the Triple Alliance, Temple gives an account of this previous conversation with M. De Witt. There is nothing absolutely inconsistent with the official report to which the text refers: but no notice is taken of Temple's objection to the mediation upon the score of honour or safety, still less of De Witt's admitting the force of the objection. Nor does anything appear of the threat thrown out, of England's taking part with France. (Temple, i. 308.) This omission of points so important throws some doubt upon the completeness of Temple's reports. Our rule has been, to give the preference to official and primary communications, where such exist: it is unfortunate when, as in the present instance, the account of a transaction must be taken partly from the one and partly from the other species of document.

his Majesty's taking part on some side in this quarrel, which if with Spain, might give us their sea towns, or anything else in their despair; if with France, would make that power unresistible either by Holland or the Princes of the Empire, M. De Witt confessed I had reason, both in the points of honour and safety."

This minacious insinuation, that England, if not supported in her own way by Holland on one side, would take the other, was clearly warranted by Temple's instructions; and as these instructions said nothing of mediation, it was his duty to propose, in preference, the offensive league which his instructions suggested. In the observation, in which De Witt is said to have concurred, upon the points of honour and safety, it would appear that Temple intended to say, that it would neither be honourable to acquiesce in terms dictated by France, or safe to adopt those which Louis had specifically offered. All that is known of De Witt's sentiments makes it probable, that he admitted the inadequacy of the terms, to the adoption whereof the States had been driven by the tardiness of the King of England. "It was unhappy his Majesty had discovered nothing of his intentions in so many months." To the proposal of a league De Witt answered, "That the States had never made any league offensive, and that it was their maxim,” (and it is a maxim consistent with true policy,) "never to do it; nor so much as a clause in a defensive, which might in time, or by change of accidents,