bid that he should contract for and receive a reward for such services.Bronnenberg v. Coburn, 110 Ind. 169, 11 N. E. 29.

[c] (Iowa, 1886) Where defendant, the surety on the appeal bond of a convict who has fled from the state, enters into a contract with plaintiff, a sheriff, to pay him the reasonable value of his services, if he would ascertain the whereabouts, and arrest and return such convict to the state, and plaintiff, having ascertained that said convict was in Kansas, is appointed by the governor an agent to demand of the executive of Kansas the surrender of such convict, and return him to the state, and plaintiff recovers and delivers him to the sheriff of the proper county, the plaintiff cannot recover against defendant on his undertaking to pay him, for the reason that, being a public officer, and the proceedings being taken under the statutes relating to fugitives from justice, plaintiff is forbidden by Code 1873, § 4172, to accept any other compensation for his services than that provided by law, and hence the contract is illegal.-Day v. Townsend, 70 Iowa, 538, 30 N. W. 753.

[d] (Iowa, 1898) A contract whereby an officer agrees to accept a different compensation from that provided by statute for his official acts, or whereby he agrees not to avail himself of the statutory method of enforcing collection of his fees, is contrary to public policy, and void.-Peters v. City of Davenport, 74 N. W. 6.

[e] (Ky. 1856) A prisoner's promise to pay a jailer for services which he was under no legal obligation to perform is not void as against public policy.— Trundle v. Riley, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 396.

[f] (Ky. 1856) An agreement by a prisoner confined in jail to pay the jailer for services which it is his duty to perform is not binding.-Trundle v. Riley, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 396.

[g] (N. Y. 1823) Any agreement by private individuals to pay to an officer in the navy, or other public officer, a compensation for his services while engaged in his official duties, whether such services were within the line of the duty which he was bound to perform or otherwise, is illegal and void.-Weaver v. Whitney, Hopk. Ch. 11.

[h] (N. Y. 1882) If not illegally extorted, an agreement to pay keeper's fees is valid, the service not being one for which the law fixes or allows any compensation.-Maquin v. Rosenthal, 62 How. Prac. 504.

[i] (Pa. 1864) Where fees are established for the services of public officers, the policy of the law forbids special contracts as to compensation between them and the parties.-Hahn v. Derr, 1 Woodw. Dec. 178.

[j] (Tenn. 1848) Where the defendant in an execution paid commissions to a constable, with an agreement that the constable should refund such commissions if he was not entitled to them, it was held, that this was a valid agreement, and that, if the constable was not entitled to the commissions, the defendant was entitled to recover them back.-Smith v. Keith, 28 Tenn. (9 Humph.) 116.

[a] (Cal. 1894) An agreement by a constable to make a levy on execution issued, and to take less than his legal fees therefor, making, in his return, full charges, where the value of the property levied upon is presumably less than the judgment and fees, is not void as against public policy.-Bloom v. Hazzard, 104 Cal. 310, 37 Pac. 1037.

[b] (D. C. 1896) An agreement between a bank and a notary public that, in consideration of the notary's being given all the bank's notarial work, he will accept one-half the legal fees therefor, and permit the bank to retain the remainder collected, is void for want of consideration and as against public policy.-Ohio Nat. Bank v. Hopkins, 8 App. D. C. 146.

[c] (Iowa, 1875) A contract by a sheriff to receive for his services a less sum than the statutory fees, is void as against public policy.-Gilman v. Des Moines Val. R. Co., 40 Iowa, 200.

[d] (Neb. 1901) A contract between an appointive officer of a city, whose salary is fixed by statute or ordinance, and a city council, by which such appointive city officer agrees to perform the duties of his office for a sum less than that prescribed by law, is against public policy, and absolutely void.-Gallaher v. City of Lincoln, 88 N. W. 505.

[e] (N. Y. 1878) A board of officers having the power of appointment cannot make a contract with an appointee for a salary at a less sum than that fixed by statute for such office.-People v. Board of Police of City of New York, 75 N. Y. 38.

[a] (Cal. 1902) Under Civ. Code, § 1608, providing that if any part of a single consideration for one or more objects, or of several considerations for a single object, is unlawful, the entire contract is void, where a county clerk renders services in collecting data from his records and from other sources, and the whole of it is intermingled, his agreement for extra compensation, being void as to the portion for collecting data from his records, is void in toto.-Humboldt County v. Stern, 68 Pac. 324, 136 Cal. 63.

[b] (La. 1846) Where one compelled to employ a public officer, to avoid delay in his business, promises to pay an extra charge demanded for certain services, but accompanies the promise with a declaration that he does not acknowledge the legality of the charge, and will immediately sue to recover back the amount, the promise is not binding, and changes in no respect the rights of the parties.-Kernion v. Hills, 1 La. Ann. 419.

[e] (Mich. 1875) A sheriff cannot make a valid agreement with an execution debtor, or with his receiptor, for any additional compensation over and above that fixed by law for collecting executions.-Burk v. Webb, 32 Mich. 173. [d] (Miss. 1873) A promise to pay a public officer for doing that which the law did not suffer him to take anything for, or to pay more than was allowed by law, is void.-Hendricks v. Lowndes County Sup'rs, 49 Miss. 612.

[e, f] (N. H. 1901) Under Pub..St. c. 287, § 32, providing that if any person shall demand and take a greater fee for any service than is allowed by law, or any fee to which he is not by law entitled, he shall forfeit a certain amount for each offense, an agreement by which greater fees than the law allows are to be paid a sheriff by an attorney for serving writs and process cannot be enforced, as the imposition of the penalty implies a prohibition of the act punishable thereby.-Edgerly v. Hale, 51 Atl. 679, 71 N. H. 138.

[g] (N. H. 1901) The fact that there was a custom of sheriffs to charge, and attorneys to pay, larger fees, would not repeal the statute so as to make the agreement valid.-Edgerly v. Hale, 51 Atl. 679, 71 N. H. 138.

[h] (N. H. 1901) Since Pub. St. c. 287, § 32, makes the demanding and taking of fees in excess of those allowed by law, and not the making of the contract to pay the same, punishable, a sheriff is entitled to the fees fixed by law, notwithstanding an illegal contract with an attorney for the payment of fees greater than those allowed by law, for all services to which the agreement did not apply.-Edgerly v. Hale, 51 Atl. 679, 71 N. H. 138.

[i] (N. H. 1901) The sheriff is entitled to recover of the attorney money collected by the latter as fees for the former, to the extent of their legality, notwithstanding the illegality of the agreement.-Edgerly v. Hale, 51 Atl. 679, 71 N. H. 138.

[j] (N. J. 1810) A contract to pay a constable money for serving process in addition to his legal fees is opposed to public policy, as encouraging fraud and oppression.-Morris v. Goff, 3 N. J. Law (2 Penning.) 207.

[k] (N. J. 1853) A person accepting a public office with a fixed salary in a municipal corporation is bound to perform all the duties of that office for the salary. The promises by a committee of additional compensation do not bind the corporation. For services clearly extraofficial such person has a claim in his individual capacity.-Evans v. Trenton, 24 N. J. Law (4 Zab.) 764. [1] (N. Y. 1803) A contract with a branch pilot of New York to assist a vessel in distress for a certain extraordinary compensation is void, as assistance in such cases is, by statute, imposed on the pilot as a duty, and such contract might also lead to oppression.-Callagan v. Hallett, 1 Caines, 104. [m] (N. Y. 1835) Since an agreement to pay a constable extra compensation for the performance of official services is invalid, no action can be maintained thereon.-Hatch v. Mann, 15 Wend. 44.

[n] (N. Y. 1835) Where the fees of a constable are prescribed by law, an agreement to pay him a compensation for extra services is invalid, not

withstanding that he performs services beyond those legally required.-Hatch v. Mann, 15 Wend. 44, reversing (1832) 9 Wend. 262.

[o] (N. Y. 1858) An agreement, between the plaintiff and the constable who has the execution, for a compensation greater than that allowed by law, is void.-Downs v. McGlynn, 2 Hilt. 14.

[p] (N. Y. 1874) A promise to pay the sheriff extra compensation for extra services in the performance of his official duty, or such acts as are incident thereto, is void.-Crofut v. Brandt, 46 How. Prac. 481.

[q] (N. Y. 1881) A sheriff's fees can be taxed only in accordance with the provisions of the statute, and a promise on the part of one whose property has been attached to pay extra compensation for services within the line of the sheriff's official duty is void.-O'Connor v. O'Connor, 47 N. Y. Super. Ct. (15 Jones & S.) 498.

[r] (N. Y. 1884) The rate of compensation at which an official stenographer is bound to furnish, with reasonable diligence, copies of his notes, being fixed by statute, an agreement to pay a greater rate for furnishing copies more expeditiously than would otherwise be done cannot be upheld. -McCarthy v. Bonynge, 12 Daly, 356.

[s] (N. Y. 1884) A referee appointed to conduct a foreclosure sale cannot contract for more than the statutory fees.-Brady v. Kingsland, 67 How. Prac. 168, 5 Civ. Proc. R. 413.

[t] (Pa. 1889) Where county commissioners made an illegal contract with the county solicitor by which they agreed to pay him for certain services in addition to his regular salary, the solicitor could not recover, in an action on the contract, for part of the services which were performed under and in pursuance of the original contract after his term of office expired, there being no new agreement or modification of the original one, as, the contract being void, it could not be ratified by acquiescence in a continuation of the services after the expiration of the term of office.-Lancaster County v. Fulton, 128 Pa. 48, 18 Atl. 384, 24 Wkly. Notes Cas. 401, 5 L. R. A. 436. [u] (Tex. 1893) Under Pen. Code, art. 118, providing that "if any person who is * * * county surveyor shall receive any fee for * * * transacting any business connected with the duties of his office, other than the fees allowed by law, he shall be fined," etc., and article 240, providing that "any officer who willfully demands or receives higher fees than are allowed by law is guilty of extortion, and may be punished," a contract by a county surveyor, whereby he was to receive a greater compensation for his work than the law allowed, is void.-Keith v. Fountain, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 391, 22 S. W. 191.

*

*

[v] (Tex. 1893) The fact that one was a county surveyor when he made a contract to locate a head right, in consideration of a compensation other and greater than his official fees, does not invalidate said contract, when the land located was in another county, and not located by the contractor himself.-Ellis v. Stone, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 157, 23 S. W. 405.

XIV. AGREEMENTS TO RESIGN OR TO NOT EXERCISE DUTIES OF OFFICE. [a] (Ark. 1896) A contract for a sale of the fixtures of a postoffice, in which the seller, who was then postmaster, agrees to resign, and to use his influence to secure the appointment of the buyer to the office, is against public policy.-Edwards v. Randle, 38 S. W. 343, 63 Ark. 318, 36 L. R. A. 174.

[b] (R. I. 1856) An order for the payment of money, drawn by a physician of one of the marine hospitals of the United States upon the collector of the port, held, in a suit against the drawer, to be void as against public policy, it being proved to have been given in consideration that a former physician of the same hospital would resign the office in his favor; although the former physician had not promised to use any influence to procure the appointment of his successor, and was entitled to no retiring pension.-Eddy v. Capron, 4 R. I. 394, 67 Am. Dec. 541.

[c] (R. I. 1856) The facts that the retiring officer resigned because desirous to remove to a distant part of the country, and that, in requiring his successor to pay for his resignation, he was, in truth, only requiring him to

repay a portion of the money which that successor, having been his predecessor also in the same office, had obtained of him under a like contract, it was held not to vary the application of the rule of policy.-Eddy v. Capron, 4 R. I. 394, 67 Am. Dec. 541.

[d] (Tex. 1899) Where an officer, for a consideration, agrees not to exercise the duties of his office, it is not unjust to deny him a recovery under the agreement because it will deprive him of the emoluments of his office; for, if he desired such emoluments, he should have discharged his official duties.Burck v. Abbott, 54 S. W. 314, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 216.

[e] (Tex. 1899) An officer agreed with a combination of persons not to exercise the duties of his office. Subsequently the combination was dissolved, and one of the parties assumed the contract, which was continued under the same conditions. In an action to recover for services under the contract, the court refused to submit to the jury whether the contract was void as against public policy. Held error, as it was not undisputed that the contract after the dissolution was independent of the original.-Burck v. Abbott, 54 S. W. 314, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 216.

[f] (Tex. 1899) A contract of an officer appointed by the governor not to exercise the duties of his office, and to appoint such deputies as shall be named by the other parties to the contract, is void as against public policy.—Burck v. Abbott, 54 S. W. 314, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 216.

[g] (Vt. 1860) A note executed in consideration of the payee's agreement to resign public office in favor of the maker, and use his influence to secure the latter's appointment as his successor, is void, except in the hands of a bona fide holder.-Meacham v. Dow, 32 Vt. 721.

1. In General.

XV. EFFECT OF ILLEGALITY.

[a] (Minn. 1893) In an action for money had and received on certain city warrants, it appeared that defendant was city treasurer, and was charged with the duty of serving certain notices; that no provision for compensation had been made, though the city council had been accustomed to allow the bills for such expenses; that defendant employed plaintiff's intestate to serve the notices at a fixed salary, and with an agreement that defendant should receive whatever money the council allowed for the services; that the council did allow bills as presented as though for money due intestate; and that orders payable to intestate were, with his consent, indorsed and appropriated by defendant. Held that, even if the agreement was illegal, plaintiff could not recover, since it was fully executed.-Leveroos v. Reis, 52 Minn. 259, 53 N. W. 1155.

[b] (N. H. 1901) An agreement between a town and the town collector, who had guarantied the town against loss on account of unpaid taxes, made at a settlement between them, that the tax warrants shall continue in force after he shall have paid the town in full, and until the taxes are collected of the taxpayers, being a mere agreement that the collector shall have the benefit of the warrant for the purpose of enforcing reimbursement, and being unauthorized and void, payments made in pursuance thereof by the collector are inoperative and of no effect; and a property owner who has not paid his taxes continues subject to arrest by the collector because of his delinquencies.-Page v. Claggett, 51 Atl. 686, 71 N. H. 85.

[c] (N. J. 1810) Two constables, holding several executions against the same defendant, agreed to levy on certain property claimed by a third person, divide the proceeds, and jointly bear the expense of any suit brought against them by the claimant. Held, that since the contract was illegal, and the parties in pari delicto, neither could recover of the other for a violation of the agreement.-Bishop v. Harvey, 3 N. J. Law (2 Penning.) 644.

[d] (N. Y. 1865) Where a provost marshal takes a bond from a bounty broker indemnifying against apprehended desertion of the men which the bounty broker has produced or enlisted, and several of the men desert, an action by an assignee of the bounty broker against the provost marshal, alleging an unlawful detention of the bond, and claiming a restoration, could

not be maintained on the ground that the contract was unlawful, because, the contract having been executed, the court would leave the parties, if the contract was illegal, where it found them, and the fact that defendant was a public officer did not affect the rule.-Richardson v. Crandall, 30 How. Prac. 134, reversed in (1867) 47 Barb. 335, which is affirmed in (1872) 48 N. Y. 348.

[e] (Ohio, 1871) The acceptance of a banker's certificate of deposit by a county in reimbursement of a loss caused by the embezzlement of a county treasurer does not place the county in pari delicto, so as to vitiate the transfer, and avoid recovery on the certificate.-Shanklin v. Madison County, 21 Ohio St. 575.

[f] (Pa. 1849) Where A., who was clerk to the county commissioners, made an agreement with B., by which B. was to buy land at a sale for taxes for their joint benefit, each paying an equal share, which was done, and a deed executed to B., it was held that, even if the sale had been void on grounds of public policy, as between A. and the former owner, yet it would be good as between B. and A., the contract being executed by the deed to B.-Fox v. Cash, 11 Pa. (1 Jones) 207.

[g] (W. Va. 1896) A school commissioner of a district was notified to attend an adjourned meeting of the board of education, set to pass upon a proposed contract for the purchase of certain charts for the public schools of their district at the price of $750. He refused to go until the agent selling the charts handed him $2.50 in money to pay him for his time and reimburse him for loss sustained by closing his place of business. Then he attended the meeting of the board at the time and place fixed, and he and the president of the board voted for making the purchase and signed the contract; but the third commissioner voted against it, and refused to sign the contract. Held, that such contract is against public policy, and void for want of the sanction of a competent majority of the board.-Honaker v. Board of Education of Pocatalico Dist., 42 W. Va. 170, 24 S. E. 544.

2. Recovery of Payments.

[a] (Conn. 1817) Where the district attorney of the United States received from a defendant, against whom he had instituted a prosecution, a sum of money by way of costs, in consideration of discontinuing the prosecution, it was held that, supposing the act to be illegal, the money could not be recovered back, both parties being in pari delicto.—Merwin v. Huntington, 2 Conn. 209.

[b] (Ind.) An official who loans county money in violation of the statute cannot maintain an action to recover it, though the county might do so if necessary for its protection.-(1895) Winchester Electric Light Co. v. Veal, 145 Ind. 506, 41 N. E. 334; (1896) Id., 145 Ind. 506, 44 N. E. 353.

[c] (Me. 1870) Where town selectmen paid money to certain persons under an illegal contract with them to procure volunteers for the United States army on their false statement that they had procured the volunteers, the town may recover the money back from such persons, as it is not in pari delicto.-Inhabitants of Concord v. Delaney, 58 Me. 309.

[d] (N. Y. 1872) Where money or pledge is exacted by a public officer by color of his office, the parties are not in pari delicto, but the one from whom such pledge is exacted may maintain an action to recover the same.-Richardson v. Crandall, 48 N. Y. 348, affirming (1867) 47 Barb. 335, and reversing (1865) 30 How. Prac. 134.