by the author of the "Appeal to the Public" on the same interesting subject. Before proceeding to the matters discussed by the two pamphleteers, whom we have now at our tribunal, we meant to have regaled our readers with a few of the predictions and evil omens, which have long threatened us with the financial catastrophe of this flourishing kingdom. Our object in this was not to ridicule the phantoms of danger which are thus so patriotically raised up around us, but simply to shew that the gloomy views of certain writers have not had a more solid foundation than the romantic schemes and flattering pictures of that other class of authors, who have gilded futurity with the brightness of their own dreams. Had there been any truth in the prophetic gifts of political soothsayers, we must have long ere now drunk deep of all the miseries attending national bankruptcy and individual ruin ;—a consummation which, we hope, is still far distant, and by no means inevitably connected with our financial system. The views suggested by Mr. Brickwood and his anonymous coadjutor are worthy of attention, as well on account of their intrinsic ingenuity, as of the plausible means which they seem to present for lightening a material portion of our public burdens. They remind us, however, of a conversation which took place in a stage-coach between a late professor of law and an honest quaker, on the same subject of national encumbrances. The lawyer was profuse in his expedients for lessening the pressure, which at that time bore hard on the public purse; and among other devices he proposed to reduce the interest on the whole amount of national securities, and even, like our authors, to diminish the principal itself, by changing the 3 and 4 per cents into a higher denomination of capital. The quaker urged objections to every point of this perilous innovation. His antagonist replied with much volubility, maintaining at once the expediency and the justice of the proposed measure. Broadbrim at length, eyeing the professor with a species of malignant gravity, and raising his voice to a somewhat higher pitch, said, Friend, I perceive thou hast no money in the funds." 66 We are far from wishing to extend this argumentum ad hominem to the two gentlemen now before us, and who have entered so warmly into the said professor's views; but we cannot help observing, that their zeal is much more accessible to motives of national concern than to the particular interests of the devoted fundholders. The objects contemplated by the two authors are almost entirely the same, and evince a degree of unity both in the end and in the means that is very rarely to be met with in political projects. Our readers are aware, that ever since the middle of last century, when the system of funding by an increase of capital was first introduced, the sums for which the Government acknowledges itself a debtor to those who have advanced loans, are much greater than the actual amount of the money furnished by these lenders. Since the year 1793, the nominal sum added to our national debt has exceeded the sum actually received by more than 300,000,0007. The three per cents alone amount to about 500,000,000l.; and as this stock was funded on the average at 591. per cent. the increase of capital in this one denomination of public debt exceeds 200,000,000l. In other words, for every 591. lent to the country, an obligation was given to pay 1007. besides the interest at somewhat more than 5 per cent. It is superfluous to observe, that such a system opposes a great obstacle to the payment of the National Debt, because it must be obvious in the first place, that if ever the 3 per cents shall be redeemed at par, the country will have to pay fully two-thirds more than it received when the several loans were contracted for; and secondly, that, in proportion as interest falls,-an event which, in other circumstances, would afford the greatest facility for diminishing the weight of public burdens-the funds necessarily rise, and of course, aggravate the evil which has just been mentioned. We have already remarked, that the 3 per cents were funded at about 591. for each 1007. of nominal capital; and every one knows that this stock, since the peace, has been frequently above 801. and in general above 751. Whenever, therefore, the Commissioners for the National Debt bought 3 per cents at 807. it is evident that they paid 217. more than had been advanced by the original creditor. Even at the present moment, when by the unsettled state of political affairs abroad, public securities are somewhat lowered in value, the stock now mentioned is 157. above the rate at which it was funded. But the main consideration turns upon the important fact, that Government is bound to give 1007. for every 597. which it received, being 417. per cent. more than was paid into the Exchequer. We know not any good reason, and cannot imagine any adequate apology, for having so long persevered in a system which, even if attended with a small temporary advantage, is obviously pregnant with the most grievous incumbrances upon posterity. Loans might, no doubt, be obtained at a rate of interest somewhat lower, when monied men were bribed with such an addition to the capital in which those loans were funded. But any moderate rise of interest would have been amply compensated for by the convenience secured to succeeding generations, for throwing off the load with which their predecessors have thought fit to burden them; and when we consider that the average interest on all the loans, during the late war, was not under 57. 2s. 6d. we can discover no necessity for the immense premium that was added in the form of increased capital. The object of the little works now before us is, as we have already hinted, to remedy this evil, even at the expence of some present pecuniary sacrifice, should that be found necessary or inevitable. It is proposed by both authors, to convert all the stocks into a general fund, bearing interest at 5 per cent, a measure which would at once reduce the capital of the public debt by a sum of more than 200,000,0007. The value of the several species of stock is to be estimated according to the annuity which they respectively afford; a tolerably correct idea of which may be formed from the following table, which is constructed so as to present the relative price of a 3 per cent. 4 per cent. and 5 per cent. fund, yielding the same rate of interest. If the various kinds of stock were estimated in the money market on no other ground than that of the annuity which they afford, the funds would always be found quoted at the relative prices which we have now stated; for as the 3 per cents. at 801. for example, the 4 per cents. at 1067. 13s. 4d. and the 5 per cents. at 1337. 6s. 8d. yield precisely the same rate of interest on every 1007. sterling invested in them, it would be a matter of absolute indifference to the purchaser in which of them he should make his bargain. But the 4 and 5 per cents. are never observed to rise in proportion to the 3 per cents. ; and the reason is, that as all the funds are redeemable at par, and may be paid off whenever government finds it convenient, there is a risk that the man who should buy 5 per cents. at 1407. this year, would be compelled to resign them at 1007. upon the next meeting of parliament. On this principle it is very clear that the national funds will never rise greatly above par, because when they are so the holder is always subject to the loss of the difference between his purchase money and 1007.; and it is this circumstance that explains the great and universal preference which is shewn in the money market for the 3 per cents. It is not to be imagined, therefore, that the public creditors will consent to the proposed commutation, and be satisfied with the same annuity from a 5 per cent. fund, that they now derive from the 3 per cents.; because, without any additional income in the meantime, they would sacrifice all the advantages which they have a right to expect from the improvable nature of their property, and even from the prospect, however remote, of its redemption by the state, at the full amount of the nominal capital. To ensure a species of compensation, Mr. Brickwood proposes that a bonus of 5 per cent. shall be allowed to the holders of the new stock, and moreover that the said stock shall not be redeemable for twenty-five or thirty years. We know not whether such an advantage would be considered as a full indemnification for the loss of about two-fifths of their rated capital. It is very probable that it would be rejected; and as every such arrangement depends entirely on [the pleasure of the proprietors, there is great reason to apprehend that the success of the measure would be very limited. He pro The other author, who addresses the members of the House of Commons, in the character of " One of themselves," recommends a plan somewhat different in appearance, although, in fact, materially the same in its result. poses that a committee shall be appointed to inquire what part of our nominal debt consists of capital really advanced to the state, and to what interest the public creditor is entitled for the use of it--a point which must of course be determined by the circumstances under which the advances were originally made. "If," says he," it shall be found that the annual dividends which the fundholder has been receiving are insufficient, it will be proper to allow him a proportionate additional annuity, to be computed from the time when the debt was contracted; the amount of the arrears of such annuity with interest from year to year, to be added to the capital originally advanced, and this amount to constitute the price of redemption, or rate at which the debt is to be discharged." It is not meant that every particular loan shall be minutely traced, first to the original contractors, and then through the hands of all the purchasers who have from time to time obtained shares of the stock at the market price. Such an attempt would be equally useless and impracticable. The public debt must be regarded as one indiscriminate mass; and viewing it in this light, it would, the author thinks, be sufficient for the committee to inquire what is the aggregate of the sums raised by funding, from the commencement of the war in 1793, to the present time, and what the amount of the several stocks so created. The proportion which the money advanced and stock created bear to each other, will shew what proportion of the several stocks which now constitute the unredeemed national debt, consists of capital actually received; and a comparison of the amount of the annual dividends on the several stocks, with that of the common interest on such real capital, will ascertain the average rate of interest hitherto received by the fundholders for the use of their money. It is next proposed that the committee shall determine what additional interest would have been required by the public creditor, beyond that which the dividends on his stock have actually afforded him, had his money been originally funded without increase of capital, it being the object of the author, by virtue of the projected arrangement, to place both the fundholder and the public as nearly as possible in the situation in which they would have been if the sum funded had been restricted to the sum advanced. In this part of the undertaking, there would we think be much more difficulty than seems to be contemplated, it being next to impossible to recall and estimate correctly all the circumstances which, at the time of every particular loan, influenced the state of public credit and determined the value of money. No criterion, it appears to us, can be established for ascertaining these points, except the premium which was actually granted to the lender, in the shape both of annuity and of increased capital. The transactions themselves, in short, afford the only principle which can fix the grounds on which they took place. As, however, the measure proposed is meant to be general, and to proceed without any reference to individual negociations, we see no reason for any minute inquiry into the dealings of every particular year, or for weighing very minutely the effects of any political crisis on the imagination of the usurer. In advancing to the details of the plan, the first question to be put by the committee, in regard to the actual fund |