I am well aware, that I fhall hear Locke, Sidney, Selden, and many other great names quoted, to prove that every Englishman, whether he has a right to vote for a reprefentative or not, is ftill represented in the British parliament; in which opinion they all agree: on what principle of common fenfe this opinion is founded I comprehend not, but on the authority of fuch refpectable names I fhall acknowledge its truth; but then I will ask one question, and on that I will reft the whole merits of the caufe: Why does not this imaginary reprefentation extend to America, as well as over the whole ifland of Great Britain? If it can travel three hundred miles, why not three thousand? if it can jump over rivers and mountains, why cannot it fail over the ocean? If the towns of Manchester and Birmingham fending no reprefentatives to parliament, are notwithstanding there reprefented, why are not the cities of Albany and Boston equally reprefented in that affembly? Are they not alike British fubjects? are they VOL. II.

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not Englishmen? or are they only Englishmen when they folicit for protection, but not Englishmen when taxes are required to enable this country to protect them?

But it is urged, that the colonies are by their charters placed under diftinct governments, each of which has a legislative power within itself, by which alone it ought to be taxed; that if this privilege is once given up, that liberty which every Englishman has a right to, is torn from them, they are all flaves, and all is loft.

The liberty of an Englishman is a phrase of fo various a fignification, having within these few years been used as a synonymous term for blafphemy, bawdy, treafon, libels, strong beer, and cyder, that I fhall not here presume to define its meaning; but I fhall venture to affert what it cannot mean; that is, an exemption from taxes imposed by the authority of the parliament of Great Britain; nor is there any charter, that ever pretended to grant fuch a privilege to any colony in America;

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and had they granted it, it could have had no force their charters being derived from the crown, and no charter from the crown can poffibly fuperfede the right of the whole legislature: their charters are undoubtedly no more than those of all corporations, which empower them to make bye laws, and raife duties for the purposes of their own police, for ever subject to the fuperior authority of parliament; and in fome of their charters, the manner of exercifing these powers is fpecified in thefe exprefs words, " according to "the course of other corporations in Great "Britain;" and therefore they can have no more pretence to plead an exemption from this parliamentary authority, than any other corporation in England.

It has been moreover alledged, that, though parliament may have power to impose taxes on the colonies, they have no right to use it, because it would be an unjust tax; and no fupreme or legislative power can have a right to enact any law

in its nature unjust: to this, I fhall only make this short reply, that if Parliament can impofe no taxes but what are equitable, and the perfons taxed are to be the judges of that equity, they will in effect have no power to lay any tax at all. No tax can be impofed exactly equal on all; and if it is not equal, it cannot be juft; and if it is not juft, no power whatever can impofe it; by which fhort fyllogifm, all taxation is at an end; but why it fhould not be ufed by Englishmen on this fide the Atlantic, as well as by thofe on the other, I do not comprehend.

Thus much for the right. Let us now a little enquire into the expediency of this measure; to which two objections have been made; that the time is improper, and the manner wrong.

As to the firft, can any time be more proper to require fome affiftance from our colonies, to preferve to themselves their prefent fafety, than when this country is almost undone by procuring it? Can any

time be more proper to impofe fome tax upon their trade, than when they are enabled to rival us in our manufactures, by the encouragement and protection which we have given them? Can any time be more proper to obligé them to fettle handfome incomes on their governors, than when we find them unable to procure fubfiftence on any other terms than those of breaking all their inftructions, and betraying the rights of their fovereign? Can there be a more proper time to compel them to fix certain falaries on their judges, than when we fee them fo dependent on the humours of their affemblies, that they can obtain a livelihood no longer than quam diu fe male gefferint? Can' there be a more proper time to force them to maintain an army at their expence, than when that army is neceffary for their own protection, and we are utterly unable to fupport it? Laftly, can there be a more proper time for this mother country to leave off feeding out of her own vitals, thefe

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