The Politics of Shared Power: Congress and the Executive

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Texas A&M University Press, 1998 - Political Science - 309 pages
As Congress and the president battle out the federal deficit, foreign involvements, health care, and other policies of grave national import, the underlying constitutional issue is always the separation of powers doctrine. In The Politics of Shared Power, a classic text in the field of executive-legislative relations, Louis Fisher explains clearly and perceptively the points at which congressional and presidential interests converge and diverge, the institutional patterns that persist from one administration and one Congress to another, and the partisan dimensions resulting from the two-party system.

Fisher also discusses the role of the courts in reviewing cases brought to them by members of Congress, the president, agency heads, and political activists, illustrating how court decisions affect the allocation of federal funds and the development and implementation of public policy.

He examines how the president participates as legislator and how Congress intervenes in administrative matters. Separate chapters on the bureaucracy, the independent regulatory commissions, and the budgetary process probe these questions from different angles. The new fourth edition addresses the line item veto and its tortuous history and prospects.

A chapter on war powers and foreign affairs studies executive-legislative disputes that affect global relations, including the Iran-Contra affair, the Persian Gulf War in 1991, and American presence in conflicts such as Haiti and Bosnia. An important new discussion focuses on interbranch collisions and gridlock as they have developed since 1992.

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Contents

Techniques of ExecutiveLegislative Control
153
More Power to the President?
167
Conclusions
174
WAR POWERS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
177
Foreign and Domestic Affairs
178
The TreatyMaking Power
182
The War Power
191
Covert Operations
206

Executive Lobbying
51
Restrictions on Executive Lobbying
58
Conclusions
65
CONGRESS AS ADMINISTRATOR
68
Constitutional Basis
69
Instruments of Legislative Control
71
The Growth of Formal Controls
83
Legislative Veto
91
Conclusions
104
BUREAUCRACY AGENT OF CONGRESS OR THE PRESIDENT?
106
Creating the Executive Departments
107
Control of Federal Personnel
118
Autonomy of Agency Proceedings
129
The Presidents Inner Circle
132
Conclusions
145
THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSION MAHOMETS COFFIN
146
Conflicting Assessments
148
The Need for Comity
213
Conclusions
215
BUDGETARY CONTROL
218
Evolution of National Structures
219
Budget and Accounting Act
222
Budget Act of 1974
227
GrammRudmanHollings
236
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990
239
The Item Veto
242
Conclusions
250
Epilogue
252
Notes
257
Selected Bibliography
293
Index of Cases
299
Index
303
Copyright

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Page 59 - No part of the money appropriated by any enactment of Congress shall, in the absence of express authorization by Congress, be used directly or indirectly to pay for any personal service, advertisement, telegram, telephone, letter, printed or written matter, or other device...
Page 82 - US astronomy and astrophysics over the past decades through the scientific programs of the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and other federal agencies.
Page 195 - Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and you allow him to do so, whenever he may choose to say he deems it necessary for such purpose— and you allow him to make war at pleasure...
Page 128 - There are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive department, the discharge of which is under the direction of the President. But it would be an alarming doctrine, that congress cannot impose upon any executive officer any duty they may think proper, which is not repugnant to any rights secured and protected by the constitution; and in such cases, the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject to the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President.
Page 70 - Executive power in a single person, though he was not for giving him the power of war and peace. A single man would feel the greatest responsibility and administer the public affairs best. MR. SHERMAN said he considered the Executive magistracy as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect...
Page 195 - Congress ex majore cautela and in anticipation of such astute objections, passing an act "approving, legalizing, and making valid all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President, etc., as if they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the United States.
Page 5 - While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.

About the author (1998)

LOUIS FISHER, a senior specialist in separation of powers with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, is an acknowledged leader in the field of executive-legislative relations. In addition to his duties at the Library of Congress, he has served as an expert witness before Congress on such constitutional issues as the legislative veto and executive privilege. His numerous books include Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President and Presidential War Power.

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