ments on both sides of the question had been heard and concluded. He understood that papers of wit and humour were regularly published on the subject of the trial; to them, if any such there were, (for he had not seen them) he professed no sort of hostility. But a settled plan of daily misrepresentation, replete with the most libellous and licentious abuse of those who were authorized by that House to conduct the prosecution, might become a serious consideration before the House. For his part, revering, as he did, all the essential aids of the constitution, he thought that if the licence of the press went on that way, the liberty of the press was going; being convinced that the liberty could not have a deadlier foe than the licence, and especially if that licence were exercised through corruption, and at the suggestion of the money of a party interested. At the same time that he gave notice, therefore, that this slanderous series of misrepresentations might hereafter be submitted formally to the consideration of that House, he desired, whatever part he might take in it, as one among others, not to be considered as actuated by any personal motives, or by any feelings of his own in consequence of newspaper attacks. He should ground his conduct in this, as in every other public proceeding, upon public principles and public principles only.

ARMY ESTIMATES-FRENCH REVOLUTION-DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN MR. BURKE AND MR. Fox.

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February 9. 1790.

On the fifth of February, the army estimates were brought forward by Sir George Young, the secretary at war. The estimates were nearly the same with those of the preceding year, and were not voted without some objections from the side of opposition. It was observed by Sir Grey Cooper, Mr.

Marsham, and others, that eight years of peace had elapsed, and that the military estimates were not yet reduced even to the peace establishment of 1775, though the committee of finance which sat in the year 1786, had presumed upon a still greater reduction. That there was nothing in the actual situation of affairs that called for this extraordinary military force; but on the contrary, that his majesty had assured them of the pacific disposition of all the foreign powers: that France, our ancient rival and enemy, in consequence of her internal disturbances, would probably be disabled from giving us any molestation for a long course of years; and lastly, that the alliances we had made, and the subsidiary treaties we had entered into on the continent, inasmuch as they multiplied the chances of our being involved in war, were proportionably mischievous, if they did not enable us to reduce our expences in time of peace. To these arguments it was answered in general by Mr. Secretary Grenville and Mr. Pitt, that though there was no reason at present to apprehend that we should be engaged in hostilities with any foreign power, yet the unsettled state of Europe, and the internal situation of several parts of it, made it necessary for us to keep ourselves in such a state, as might enable us to act with vigour and effect, if occasion should require. That it was a preposterous economy to tempt an attack by our weakness, and for a miserable present saving to hazard a great future expence. That our foreign alliances, which had been approved of by all parties as necessary for the preservation of that balance of power in Europe, upon which the permanence of its tranquillity depended, could only be rendered effectual for that purpose, by our being able to support them with an adequate force; and, lastly, that it would be found, upon an examination of the detail of all our military establishments, that they could not, with common prudence, be reduced to a narrower scale.

In the course of the debate upon this subject, Mr. Fox took occasion to remark, that the conduct of the French soldiers, during the late commotions, tended greatly to remove one of the objections, which he had always entertained against standing armies. That army, by refusing to obey the dictates of the court, had set a glorious example to all the military of Europe, and had shewn, that men, by becoming soldiers, did not cease to be citizens. Colonel Phipps begged leave to enter his protest against the compliment which had been paid

to the profession to which he had the honour to belong, so far as it was connected with any approbation of the proceedings of the French army. He conceived that the conduct of the British army in the year 1780, might have furnished the right honourable gentleman with a much more unexceptionable ground of panegyric. He would there have found the soldiery of this nation not joining those who were riotously disturbing the public peace and scattering ruin among individuals; not the first, in violation of their oaths and of their allegiance, to head anarchy and rebellion; but men really feeling as citizens and soldiers, patiently submitting to the insults of the populace, and, in spite of provocation, maintaining the laws, and acting under the constituted

authorities of the realm.

On the 9th of February the army estimates were reported from the committee, when a farther debate took place. The estimates were defended by Mr. Secretary Grenville. He acknowledged that he did not think France very formidable when the augmentation was made two years ago; but he was of opinion then, as he was now, that such a number of troops ought to be kept in each island, as might be able to defend it, in case of attack, till the arrival of a fleet. If the situation of France rendered her less formidable now than she was then, still it was not politic to alter our establishment on every alteration in the circumstances of rival powers. France, three years ago, had, he said, been declared by Mr. Fox to be more formidable than even in the reign of Lewis XIV. A few years had produced the present alteration, and a few years more might produce another. It was, therefore, the policy of this country to maintain a peace-establishment on a general prin ciple, and not on a partial view of the comparative situation of France. - Mr. Fox replied to Mr. Grenville. In the course of his speech he observed, that the situation of France was, in his mind, a material reason why the present establishment was not necessary; for, after her late behaviour in the Dutch dispute, it was not very likely she should wish to commence hostilities against this country. He was not mortified by the right honourable secretary's noticing his being mistaken in his speculation made three years since, of the power of France; a change, as sudden as unexpected, had taken place in her affairs, in which some exulted, and of which number, in one point of view, he considered himself as included, from feelings and from principle. To the insinuation which the right honourable

secretary had brought against his supposed want of political foresight, he could, without vanity, answer, that there were few mistakes indeed, of which he should be less ashamed; because, even if a person, possessing the gift of prophecy, had appeared in any part of Europe, in Paris or in London, and foretold those extraordinary occurrences which had since arisen, every word issuing from his lips would only have been regarded as a corroboration of his insanity. In three years more, it was possible, she might again have a turn in her affairs, and become more formidable than ever it was not likely, however, that the growth of power should be so sudden, as to prevent our ability of providing against any of its inimical effects. The difference of pulling down and building up, was very material; a state might fall from a pinnacle of power to actual inertness, but to rise to a state of grandeur on a sudden, was impossible. The right honourable secretary had observed, that it was good to be secure, and not to tempt an attack. Certainly. To this he would reply, that if France were at this moment insecure, and tempting an attack, it arose not from a neglect of her garrisons, or of her large establishments. This country could not bear such immense establishments; the being armed at all points, cap-a-pe, would ultimately prove her ruin her reliance ought to be on her revenue, and, by a saving from the establishment in the West Indies, she would strengthen herself. He believed it would be difficult for the right honourable gentleman to prove that any of the islands which were lost, could have been saved by the troops now proposed to be sent. He contended, that it was fit the House should, every year, consider the establishment according to the state of the powers of Europe. At present, viewing those powers, he saw no necessity for our keeping up so large an army. The defence of the East Indies, he imagined, would be more advantageously left to the native troops than to Europeans, who could not endure the climate. He observed the army to be continually increasing; that every pretence was seized to increase it, but none to diminish it. The principle upon which the right honourable secretary went for the defence of the West Indies would ultimately prove the present establishment to be too small; and, another year, a further increase might be expected to be proposed: the principle he went upon proved the present establishment to be too great. The House, if it voted the present establishment, without the knowledge of

the number of troops meant to defend each island, must give their vote in a blind confidence. Reverting to the subject of France, Mr. Fox described her as in a state which could neither fill us with alarm, nor excite us to indignation. Surrounded and oppressed by internal divisions and calamities, she could not so suddenly rise superior to their pressure, as to preclude us from a preparation against an impending storm. Had France remained in that formidable and triumphant state by which she was distinguished in the year 1783, he would be one of the first in the House to applaud an augmentation of our peaceestablishment. In all our contests with that ancient enemy, our intemperance had seduced us into very disagreeable situations; and we had been frequently obliged to accept of terms which we might have obtained several years before such an agreement. If fortune had now humbled the pride and ambition of this mighty empire if that anarchy and confusion incidental to such a revolution had struck her people with inertness and inactivity - why should we dread her sudden declaration of hostilities?

After the estimates had been defended by Mr. Pitt, Mr. Burke rose and addressed the House. The following report of his speech upon this occasion was published by authority, with this short introduction:

"Mr. Burke's speech on the report of the army estimates has not been correctly stated in some of the public papers. It is of consequence to him not to be misunderstood. The matter which incidentally came into discussion is of the most serious importance. It is thought that the heads and substance of the speech will answer the purpose sufficiently. If in making the abstract, through defect of memory, in the person who now gives it, any difference at all should be perceived from the speech as it was spoken, it will not, the editor imagines, be found in any thing which may amount to a retraction of the opinions he then maintained, or to any softening in the expressions in which they were conveyed."

Mr. BURKE spoke a considerable time in answer to various arguments which had been insisted upon by Mr. Grenville and Mr. Pitt, for keeping an increased peace establishment, and against an improper jealousy of the ministers, in whom a full confidence, subject to respon