abundant resources; its treasury was well stored; its trade was in a flourishing state; and, whatever had been said to the contrary, it could subsist without the aid of Britain. An union, far from being necessary for the augmentation of the prosperity of the country, would, he feared, have a very different effect.

Mr. WILLIAM SMITH now rose; and, as he discussed the great question with an ability which his adversaries were constrained to acknowlege, we shall more fully state the substance of his speech than his former political obscurity would otherwise have induced us.

As the British islands formed one empire, not from a temporary and accidental union of their crowns on the same head, but from the constitutional conjunction of their crowns, he argued, à priori, that one legislature was better adapted to such a government than two par liaments were; that the latter system involved, at the first aspect, a dangerous anomaly; and that an empire thus constituted contained in itself the seeds of contest and of future separation. So far, therefore, as the tendency of union was to limit the British empire to one legislature, its operation, he said, would be to fortify that empire, and destroy those seeds of discord which might otherwise produce a separation. Some might reply, that British influence would operate as an antidote to the mischiefs apprehended, and would prevent legislative dissensions from weakening and tearing asunder the energies of the empire, or Irish independence from checking the views or injuring the interests of Britain. But this supposition, he thought, insultingly derogated from the practical independence of the Irish parliament, which was thus allowed to be subordinate to that of Great-Britain. Where an actual

subjection thus existed, it might be rendered only the more mischievous and oppressive, by being concealed behind a mask of nominal independence; and the desired antidote would be more effectually found in an union than in a division of legislatures. To an objection, that the paucity of representatives of Ireland in the imperial parliament would leave that country at the mercy of Britain, he replied, that the Irish representation would be commensurate to Irish power, resources, and contribution, and that an unity of interest would secure the rights and the welfare of every part of the empire. If, in the first instance, one legislature would have been desirable for one empire, it would also be now preferable, after Ireland had long possessed a distinct parliament. By obtaining an union upon just and equitable terms, she would exchange her separate legislature for such an efficient share in the imperial councils, as would ensure a full participation in the benefits of the British constitution; and she would thus gain all that she would originally have been entitled to demand.' For a change so beneficial, it might be expedient to sacrifice some portion of parade and splendor.

In support of his opinion of the mischiefs of a double legislature, he instanced the case of the regency, when the lords and commons of Ireland, having nominated a regent for that kingdom, intrusted to him a degree of authority different from, and superior to, that which the British regent would have possessed. This practical assertion of legislative independence tended, he said, to produce two independent executives for one empire: it risqued intrusting the executive authority to different hands, and set different limits, in each island, to its power.' Did not this act tend to dismember the

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empire?

empire? The king of England being, ipso facto and necessarily, king of Ireland, not only the regent of one realm ought to be regent of the other, but the prerogative of the executive magistrate ought to have precisely the same limits in both countries. The Irish houses of parliament, therefore, violated at that time the spirit of a fundamental maxim of the constitution. It would not be sufficient to say, that the recurrence of this evil might be prevented by a particular statute relative to a state of regency. A mere remedy for a particular mischief would not be generally satisfactory. The source being copious enough to be the parent of many mischiefs,' it was highly expedient that it should be completely dried up.-The affair of the commercial propositions might be adduced as another example of the ill effect of legislative distinctness. In consideration of commercial advantages which were to be granted to the Irish, the legislature of Great-Britain required that the parliament of the sister kingdom should adopt such laws as might be prescribed to it for the regulation of certain branches of trade and points of navigation. But the offer was rejected, chiefly on account of this demand; and thus legislative distinctness obstructed the prosperity of Ireland, by dissuading her from an acceptance of considerable benefits, on the only terms on which Britain could be expected to concede them.The idea of reform suggested another possible mischief. If one of the proposed plans of radical reform had been adopted by the Irish house of commons, the legis lature would have been differently constituted from that of Britain; the influence or prerogative of the sove reign would have been different from that which he possessed in England; and the change would have tended to separate the two countries.

Of

Of the competency of parliament to the enactment of such reform he had never heard any doubts expressed; and the arguments which, he thought, might be offered against the alleged right were inconclusive, yet perhaps as plausible as any that could be urged against the competency of the legislature to a decree of union. That the authority of the parliament had this extent, he had not the slightest doubt. His opinion, he said, was founded on precedent, on the mischiefs which would result from a contrary doctrine, on the express authority of constitutional writers, and on the genuine principles of the constitution. By enacting an union, parliament would do no more than change (it would not surrender or subvert) the constitution. Ireland, after a legislative incorporation, would be still governed by three estates; and her inhabitants would enjoy all their privileges unimpaired. If the legislature could newmodel the succession to the crown, or change the established religion, it might certainly ordain those alterations which an union would involve. To controvert its right would be to deny the validity of the act for the incorporation of Scotland with England and Wales. On the legitimacy of that act depended the title of his majesty to the crown of the united kingdom; for the second article of the agreement was the only act of settlement that limited to the house of Hanover, in repugnance to the strict hereditary principle of the Scotish constitution, the succession to that united monarchy which the first article had created..

He observed, that the mischiefs which would attend the impeachment of the Scotish union, were numerous, Scotland, in case of the invalidity of that act, would not be bound by any legislative ordinances which had been promulgated since the year 1707; nor would any

part

part of Britain be constitutionally subject to the laws of that parliament which had met at Westminster for the last ninety years. Even the act of renunciation, which Ireland considered as the corner-stone of her liberties and constitution,' would in that case not be obligatory.

As it had been hinted, that, from the different organisation of the Scotish and Irish parliaments, the competence of the former would not establish that of the latter, he answered that the difference was far from being material, and that one partook, as much as the other, of the general powers allowed to parliament by our constitution. He then referred to sir Edward Coke and sir William Blackstone, to prove that the power of parliament, whether in England, Scotland, or Ireland, was transcendent and absolute. As this assertion led to a difficulty, implying that the future imperial parliament might at any time abrogate even the articles of union, he explained away that point in a manner which zealous anti-jacobins will not approve, by saying that it might so act, but that it would thus incur the risque ' of entitling the subject to throw off that government which had become an instrument of oppression, and recur to first principles, to resistance, and insurrection." He added, In the danger of the attempt [to violate or repeal the act of union] I see some security against its being made; and mean-while, in the identity of imperial interests, in the Irish share in imperial councils, and in the due proportion of lords and commons to be sent by Ireland to the common legislature, I discern some protection of Irish rights, and some guaranty against their violation. The united legislature may be competent to disfranchise Wales or Yorkshire, or to violate the terms on which the sister countries were incorporated;