The fact was that Prince Ferdinand must have been fenfible, that in quitting his camp at Kalle and taking post to the northward of the Dymel, he in a great measure laid open Caffel and the whole territory of Heffe to the French; nay, that by this movement nothing was left to hinder their entering the Hanoverian dominions on the right of the Wefer. But notwithstanding these risques, the ftep he took was prudent, and even neceffary. Had he fuffered the progrefs of the Chevalier de Muy, on the Dymel; had he permitted him to ftrengthen his pofts upon that river, his communication with Weftphalia had been inevitably cut off, and of courfe his fphere of fubfiftence greatly ftreightened. It would have had a worse effect. For he must have entirely loft the command of the Wefer, without which he could not have stood his ground a moment; and he would on that lofs have found himself compelled to retire into the heart of Hanover, where he must neceffarily be ftreightened in his winter cantonments, and where a blow of any confequence must be decifive against him.

He therefore fought the battle of Warbourg though he loft all Heffe by his victory; and he would not quit his pofts on the Dymel though he faw Gottingen and Munden in the hands of the French. He was not to be frighted from his fteady and well-chofen plan, by vain rumours or threatening appearances. He was by no means

in a condition to make large detachments; it was therefore neceffary to facrifice fomething; and he made the smallest facrifice that circumftances would admit. For he forefaw that the French army whilst he kept his pofition on the Dymel, could not poffibly take up their quarters in Hanover, or even act there in any confiderable body, and for any confiderable time, without fubjecting themselves to the fame or greater inconveniencies than thofe to which he would have been himself liable, had he in defending Heffe fuffered them to occupy thofe critical pofts, on the Dymel. He knew farther, that it would prove extremely dangerous for them to hazard themselves beyond Gottingen; and that it would be more difficult for the French army to fupport themselves in that advanced poft, than for him to annoy them there.

It is poffible that reasons somewhat like the foregoing, together with others propably far more cogent, might have determined that great commander to this conduct. But whilft he fecured that middle communication, and acted upon the defenfive plan, the troops were not idle; his detachments acted in many parts with spirit and effect. But we must defer for a while the narrative of these actions being called from this part of the theatre to the eastern parts of Germany, where about this time scenes of greater eclat were opened.

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CHAP.

F

ROM the time that the King of Pruffia found himself compelled to raise the fiege of Drefden, it was evident that he could have no hope of acting in Saxony to any good purpose. The bufy part of the campaign came on faft. Tho' Prince Henry had obliged Laudohn to retire from Breflaw; that general, able and lately victorious, was ftill formidable; he kept Neiffe and Schweidnitz blocked up; and waited to effect a junction with the Ruffians, by which he propofed to give the final blow to the king's power in Silefia. The Ruffians had now actually arrived in the frontier parts of that province, and wanted but a very few days eafy march to compleat that fatal and long dreaded junction. At the fame time another body of Ruffians had penetrated into pomerania; laid all the defencelefs parts under contribution, and threatened the fiege of Colberg. The Swedish army, faid to confift of, 22,000 men, commenced alfo, tho' with less vigour, their operations. In all that country the King of Pruffia had not 5000 men to oppofe them.

In these circumftances a plan of mere defence would have proved altogether without effect. The King of Pruffia had but two armies; and it was neceffary that one of them, at leaft, fhould make the most

rapid and fudden movements to oppofe fo many combinations. On the fide of Silefia the danger feemed moft preffing, and accordingly he marched to its relief; advanced near two hund 30th July.

red miles, and left Marshal Daun, who had confiderably the ftart, far

behind him. This march would

have been thought an aftonishing exploit in a partizan at the head of a fmall and difencumbered corps: but that a numerous army, clogged with its artillery, with above two thousand waggons, fhould in that time traverfe fuch a fpace, fhould pafs the Elbe, the Spree, the Neiffe, the Queifs, and the Bober, five confiderable rivers; that they should effect all this, with one army of the enemy on one fide of its flanks, another behind, and with a third in its front (the actual pofition of the Aftrians in Lufatia) was an action referved for, and only to be expected from the King of Pruffia. The attempt itself could have been juflified only by neceffity; and the neceffity was urgent. The Ruffians approached, M. Daun followed towards Silefia; and the king could hardly promise himself fuccefs but from a march of fuch rapidity as might enable him to try his fortune with Gen. Laudohn, before the tripple junction he apprehended had made his enemies irrefiftible.

But

But notwithstanding the hopes conceived from this march, before the king could come to an action three bodies of Auftrians had joined, Laudohn's, Daun's, and Lacy's; and extending themfelves along the Katsbach, a river which fails into the Order, occupied all the ground from Parchwitz to Coffendau, a space of little lefs than thirty English miles. But in this extent, their posts were every where ftrong, and their communications eafy. The king's camp was at Lignitz. It was in vain that for feveral days he attempted, by various devices, to detach one body of the enemy from the reft, or to turn their flanks and attack them at difadvantage. The nature of the ground or the skill of the oppofite generals always difappointed him.

At length M. Daun took himself the offenfive party. The advantage of his fituation, and the fuperiority of his numbers, prevailed over his cautions nature to rifque an attack. It was therefore refolved, after the fituation of Lignitz had been well reconnoitred, all circumftances maturely weighed, and the defign communicated to the other generals, to attempt the King of Pruffia in his camp, with the united strength of the three armies. To enfure fuccefs beyond a doubt, it was determined that this attempt fhould be made by furprize, and therefore in the night. M. Daun remembered the bad guard which had been kept by the Pruffians; and the advantage, which in the year 1758 he derived from a nightattack at the battle of Hohkirchen.

In confequence of this plan the whole army, as foon as it fhould begin to grow dark, was to march from their feveral pofts to fuch fituations as were marked out for each

corps; they were to strike their tents, but yet to keep up the fires in their camps, and to have the drums beat the tattoo as ufual.

Some time after Marshal Daun had began to move, to his astonishment the patroles he had fent out returned with the account, that they had met no out-posts. As foon as day broke, and the army had advanced, their apprehenfions were confirmed. They were disappointed in their defign, there was no enemy on the camp; but when they caft their eyes from thence, they could perceive at a distance the rifing of a thick fmoke, which left them no room to doubt that their fortune was then on the point of decifion, by a part of their forces only, and that the king and Baron Laudohn were on that moment hotly engaged: Daun could only look on and wait the event.

On the 13th of July the king was in his camp at Lignitz, when he received advice that the Ruffian army of 24,000 men, under Count Czernichew, had thrown bridges over the Oder, at a place called Auras, and that they were to pass the river on that very day. He fufpected alfo, that the enemy had formed the defign of a general attack. Troops which have been a long time oppofed to each other can reciprocally guess at each other's defigns; the method used by the enemies generals grows familiar, and the leaft motion they make discloses their defigns.

This is the account the Pruffians gave of the means by which they came to a knowledge of M. Daun's projects. The Austrians attributed this difcovery, not to the Pruffian fagacity, but to intelligence given by deferters.

What

Whatever the means were by which the King of Pruffia became fufpicious of this defign, it is certain, that he took the most early, the moft vigorous, and the most effective meatures to defeat it. He was thoroughly fenfible of the danger he ran of being furrounded, if be continued in his poft at Lignitz. Out of that very defign which was calculated for his ruin, his genius drew a new means of fafety. He faw at a glance, that the plan which the enemy had formed to furround him, at the fame time, neceffarily divided their own armies. And this divifion was the great object he had pursued fo long, and thro' fach difcouraging difappointments. His only business was to prevent their reuniting in a general attack upon bis quarters. Therefore in the very evening calculated for the attempt on his camp, he quitted it with as much privacy as the enemy had propofed to attack it, marched and took an advantageous poft on the way through which Laudohn was to pafs.

And now the decifive hour approached, in which he was to put to the rifque as great a stake as had been play'd for fince the beginning of the war. No vulgar advantage would fuffice in his fituation, and that very fituation in fome fort difabled him from attaining a great one. After four bloody campaigns, and the viciffitudes of a fuccefs in all its changes exhaufting, his old corps was nearly annihilated. Thofe who fucceeded to their places, had fcarcely feen the brilliant times of the king's fortune; and they inherited neither the fevere discipline, nor the undaunted spirit of the first companions of his hopes; they were Dew to fervice, yet difpirited with defeats. The king himfelf gave

life to the whole, he alone was to rectify a thousand faults, and to fupply a thousand deficiencies.

This rear

The poft which he chofe, was fuch, as whilft it ftopped the progrefs of Laudohn in front, if Daun fhould attempt his rear, would from the nature of the ground, lay him under great difficulties. he further ftrengthened with feveral batteries. As foon as his army was drawn up, he divided it, leaving his right on the ground, where it had been formed to obferve Marfhal Daun and to maintain that poft ; whilft with his left he turned in order to fall upon the corps under Laudohn.

No difpofitions could have been made with a more perfect skill.

Mean time Laudohn was advancing faft to the fnare which had been laid for him. Already he had paffed the Katsbach, and was moving towards Lignitz, full of the hopes of no fmall share in the glory of giving the final blow to the King of Pruffia, and had advanced as far as the village of Pfaffendorf, when by three in the morning, the day-light began to dawn; a thick fog that had covered all the adjoining grounds fuddenly cleared up, and like the opening of a great fscene disclosed at once the whole Pruffian army, regularly embattled, advantageously pofted, furnished with a dreadful and well-placed artillery.

He was now come

full upon his enemy. It 15th Aug. was impoffible to recede; the furprize he intended was turned upon himself. But this able general, though furprized, was not difordered. The beft difpofitions were made that the time would admit; a sharp and obftinate combat began; which continued without giving way on either fide, until fix. The King

of

of Pruffia exerted himself with incredible diligence to preferve an uniform ftrength in every part of his line, and hazarded his own life with a daring, which nothing but his fituation could excufe from temerity, His cloaths were shot through in feveral places, his horse was killed under him. But all these troubles and dangers were fully compenfated by the efforts of his troops, who maintained fo fteady a fire, and pushed the Auftrians with fo much ardour, that they at laft gave ground, and retreated with precipitation, though not without fome order, towards the Katsbach.

The king purfued them to this river, and no further. His advantage as it was gained by the most vigorous steps, fo bounds were fet to the ardour of improving it with the most guarded caution. He feared, if he purfued his fuccefs too far, it might disjoin the part of the army engaged from that which he had left to observe M. Daun; and perhaps give that general an opportunity of taking a fevere revenge on the right, for the fucceffes of the left. Notwithstanding this referve of the king, (a referve, the want of which was formerly the only failings in his military character, but which his misfortunes had now perfectly taught him,) notwithstanding, I fay he did not push his good fortune against Baron Laudohn to the utmost, the victory was compleat. glorious, and adorned with all the trophies. By their own confeffion, the Auftrians loft upwards of 6000 men, killed, wounded and prifoners. The Puffians made it amount, and not without probability, to 10,000. Among the prifoners, were two generals, and 84 officers; 82 pieces of cannon, and 23 pair of colours

were taken. On the fide of the conquerors, five hundred were killed, and 1200 wounded.

With regard to Silefia, the victory near Lignitz produced fome moit immediate, and most useful effects. Although M. Daun, not dispirited with his late mifadventure, and only. follicitous to repair his lofs, had detached a strong corps under Prince Lowenftein and Gen. Beck to ftrengthen the Ruffians and encourage them to advance, Count Czernichew was fo intimidated with the late defeat of the Auftrians, that he repaffed the Order by the fame bridges on which he had lately croffed it.

Thus one great end of the King of Pruffia's march was obtained. He prevented the dreaded junction of thofe two powers. In the other part of his defign, he did not fo perfectly fucceed. M. Daun fince the action of Pfaffendorf, could indeed make no progress in Silefia but on the other hand, the king was not able entirely to drive him out of that province. The Auftrians even after their defeat, far fuperior to the king, had been befides largely reinforced. The empress

exerted all her power, to remove the ill effect this late check might have had on the reputation of her arms: at the fame time that the augmented her troops, the comforted and encouraged Baron Laudohn, and by a very generous and gracious letter let him fee, that the was not a fovereign, in whole mind a late misfortune cancels the memory of paft fervices. In the praites which this letter bestowed on Laudohn, several were of opinion; was couched an indirect cenfure on the conduct of Count Daun, the flowness, of whofe temper fo ill

agreed