**

absurd to suppose, that the people of Gibeah, or tribe of Benjamin, would refuse to give up the criminals if they had known them; this is directly to contradict the history itself, which assures us, that they did refuse to deliver up the criminals when demanded, and who undoubtedly were known well enough. And supposing them to have been persons of great interest in Gibeah, and that Gibeah had a considerable interest in the rest of the tribe of Benjamin; there is nothing in all this but what is very accountable. It is not indeed to be supposed that they would have done this, if they had foreseen the utter destruction that this brought upon them, or had known that the whole tribe would have been cut in pieces and totally extirpated,' as this writer expresseth it: but it doth not appear that they had any apprehension of this. It is plain, from the account given of them, that the Benjamites were bold and warlike: our author himself says that they were the bravest men and the best soldiers in Israel,' p. 158. And they might have such an opinion of their own skill and courage, as to think themselves a match for the other tribes, whom they perhaps regarded as an undisciplined, unwarlike multitude; especially considering the advantageous situation of Gibeah, which was seated on an eminence, in a mountainous country. They were in hopes therefore to make them soon weary of the war; and this had like to have been the case in fact.

This writer next proceeds, p. 156, to consider the part the oracle had in this affair; which is the main thing he ought to prove. I had shown that there is not the least proof, from the whole story, that the oracle had any part in any thing that was really wrong or unjustifiable in this matter. The war itself was undertaken from a noble principle, and showed a great deal of national virtue, and a just abhorrence of vice and wickedness: it was strictly justifiable, as I observed, by the law of nature and nations. Nor has this author brought any reason, though a great deal of noise to the contrary. The utter destruction of the Benjamites and their cities, that followed the last battle, was indeed very wrong and unjustifiable; but this was done in the heat of blood and resentment, after the losses they had sustained; and there is not the least proof that this was by the direction of the oracle, or that they consulted the oracle at all about it: on the contrary, the elders, or heads of the tribes, plainly charged it upon their own rashness, chap. xxi. 20. To them also is the destruction of Jabesh Gilead ascribed; who evidently had the power in their hands, and the management of the whole affair, and not to any direction from the oracle, whom they did not consult about it. Whatever was wrong therefore in these matters, was not to be charged upon the oracle, as I plainly showed;+ nor has this author been able to return any answer to what was offered on these heads; yet still goes on to abuse the oracle, and is resolved that the oracle shall be charged with every thing that was

* See Divine Authority, p. 135, 136.

+ Ibid. pp. 136, 137.

done from first to last, and to abuse every body that will not join with him in charging it too.

As to the question he proposes to me, p. 157, 'whether the oracle knew before-hand that the tribes, in the two first attacks, would be repulsed with the loss of forty thousand men; and whether he had then thought of the method he put them in at last, for destroying the whole city by fire and sword? if he did not know and consider both these before, he could not be infallible; and if he did, he could not be just.' How does this follow? will he pretend there could be no just reasons why God should see fit to permit that slaughter of the Israelites, supposing their cause never so just, except he knows and is able to assign those reasons? it is very evident that in the course of Divine providence, a just cause is often suffered to be oppressed for a time; and that wicked men are often suffered to vanquish those that are much better than themselves. This author talks as if, whenever any army beats another, it is a declaration of providence, that the conquerors are in the right. For he saith, that the great defeat of the Israelites, by the Benjamites, seemed to be a plain indication of providence, that the cause of the Israelites was not just, p. 157. And he has it over again, in the same page, that this, one would think, must have been a sufficient declaration from providence of the injustice of their cause; and at that rate, when they overcame the Benjamites in the third battle, it was a declaration that their cause was just, and Benjamin in the wrong. So that, according to him, providence declared the same cause to be both just and unjust. But will this author, in good earnest, undertake to prove, that it is unjust in providence ever to suffer an army to be slaughtered that are engaged in a just war, and that have the better cause; or that God can have no reasons for permitting this, though we find in fact, he frequently permits it? He concludes what he had said about the affair of the Benjamite war, with an observation that is exactly of a piece with all the rest, and every way worthy of himself. I had said, that all this is commonly and justly thought to have happened between the death of Joshua and the elders who survived him, and the appointment of judges; the first of whom was Othniel.' He pronounces, that this is a very peculiar conceit. But, says he, 'there was really no such interval, nor is it thus commonly thought or supposed, by any learned man, that I know of, or by any man acquainted with the present state of chronology. It is now commonly thought, that the several intervals of servitude, mentioned in the book of Judges, must be included in the reigns of the judges themselves.' p. 159. This writer could not more effectually expose himself, than by talking at this rate. To what purpose is it to talk here of the intervals of servitude being included in the reigns of the judges, when, at the time of this war, the Israelites were not in a state of servitude at all? Sir John Marsham, who is one of the principal authors of the scheme he mentions, of including the years of servitude in the reigns of the judges, yet places the war with the Benjamites where I placed it, before Othniel, the first of the judges; and I suppose, he will allow

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him to have been a learned man, and well acquainted with chronology. Archbishop Usher does the same; and I suppose he will be allowed to have been a good chronologer too. I might add many more; nor do I know any chronologer of reputation, but what is of this opinion.

He next comes to vindicate what he had said concerning the order of academical prophets, as he calls them; and, which is pleasant enough, he finds fault with me for supposing, that schools of the prophets were public seminaries of learning, like our universities and academies now;' which he pronounces to be a mere fiction, p. 161. 161. But the fiction is his own; for I never supposed any such thing. I supposed them indeed to be employed in sacred exercises, in the knowledges of the law and of religion; and that they were instrumental to instruct the people, who were wont, at stated times, to have recourse to the prophets for instruction.† And this writer himself here supposes the same thing, p. 161. But I never imagined them to be professors of divinity, law, or physic; nor need he use any arguments to convince me that they were not so: though he himself, in his former book, had talked of their being devoted to learning, and studying history, rhetoric, poetry, and the knowledge of nature.' See Mor. Phil. vol. i. p. 282.

He begs leave to make two remarks before he enters on a particular consideration of what I had offered with regard to prophecy. The first is, that he had never denied the punctual circumstantial accomplishment of some of the prophecies; and that therefore what I offer on this head is nothing to the argument, so far as he is concerned in it. But I believe any one that considers the passages I had produced from his former book, will be of opinion, that he was very loth to own that the prophets were very particular and circumstantial in their prophecies as to time, place, persons,' &c, and therefore I thought it proper to produce several plain instances of such particular and circumstantial prophecies, and which cannot be accounted for, in the way he pretended to account for them, by mere human prudence; for he would not allow, that they had the 'knowledge of things future communicated to them in a supernatural way,' See Moral Phil. vol. i. pp. 288, 289. But however, I accept the author's present concession, and undertake to show, that the predictions I mentioned were of such a kind, that no human sagacity could have enabled any man to foretel them; and that there is no rational way of accounting for them, but in a way of supernatural extraordinary revelation from God himself.

Any one that reads the prophetical writings will find that they every where exhibit the noblest notions of the Deity, of his providence and perfections, and every where manifest a hearty concern for the divine glory, for the interests of piety and virtue, and a de

* See Marsham's Canon Chron. Sæcul. xi. Usher. Annal. Vet. Testam. p. mihi 42. + See "Divine Authority," p. 140.

testation of vice and wickedness; that the uniform tendency of all their writings, is to promote the cause of God and real religion in the world; that with an impartial zeal, they reprove the kings, princes, priests, and the body of the people; though thereby they exposed themselves to great sufferings and persecutions. And any one that considers this, cannot but conceive a high esteem for them as very excellent persons, filled with a zeal for goodness and righteousness; and when he farther considers that they professed to be extraordinarily sent of God, and delivered their messages in his name, and as what they received by immediate inspiration from him; and that, at the same time, they were enabled in many instances to give circumstantial predictions of future events, which it was impossible for human sagacity to foresee, and which could only be known to him who governs the world, whose eye penetrates through all ages, &c. This, joined with the other, furnishes an illustrious proof of their divine inspiration and mission; that they were indeed holy men of God, who 'spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost;' that therefore the highest regard is to be paid to the messages they delivered in his name, which are to be received and submitted to as of divine authority. It is nothing to the purpose to insinuate, as this writer does, p. 200, that the devil, or evil spirits, can foreknow things that we are ignorant of;' for though we may suppose that in many cases, by their greater sagacity and experience, they may foresee and give a much more probable conjecture at future events than the wisest of men; yet there are many of the predictions uttered by the prophets, which no evil spirits can be reasonably supposed to foreknow, except we suppose their understanding is infinite and capable of taking in the whole complexion of events; and that they have the government of the world in their hands, and can order the affairs of men according to their will. But besides this, if we should suppose it in their power to foretel such events, it is absurd to imagine that they would lend their assistance to give authority to those prophets, and the messages they delivered in the name of God; which were all manifestly intended, as has been shown, to restrain men from idolatry and sin, and to promote the cause of piety and virtue in the world. This writer himself, in his letter to Eusebius, pp. 61, 62, seems to own, that they might be ' immediately inspired of God and supernaturally assisted in the knowledge of future events; but that this cannot alter the nature and tendency of doctrines; that notwithstanding they might be greatly mistaken, and very erroneous in doctrinals of great consequence.' But since they delivered their messages as in the name and as by the immediate authority of God himself, with a Thus saith the Lord,' it cannot consistently be supposed that God would inspire them in so many wonderful instances with the infallible knowledge of future events, to give an authority to the messages they delivered in his name, if those messages did not indeed proceed from him, but were their own invention, abusing his sacred name and authority; and therefore what they thus delivered under his inspiration, must be to be depended on, if the Word of God be FF?

so. And a succession of such excellent persons, thus extraordinarily inspired from God, delivering messages in his name, all concurring to give a uniform testimony both to the divine authority of the dispensation they were then under, and to prepare men for a future dispensation that was to succeed, must have been of signal use, and have tended to give an illustrious atttestation and confirmation to both.

But our author's second remark is intended to deprive us of the advantage we might have hoped to make of his seeming concession in the first; for he tells us, that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for us now to distinguish what was really prophetic in those writings from what is barely historical.' His meaning evidently is, that we cannot now distinguish the original predictions, as written by the prophets themselves, from the additions that were inserted afterwards; for some persons, when an event was over, might insert passages in the prophetical writings, which seemed to foretel that event, on purpose that they might pass for predictions or prophecies. Thus, notwithstanding the concession he had made of the prophets having given circumstantial predictions of future events; yet, according to him, it is impossible to prove that ever they gave such predictions. But such a loose and general charge as this proves nothing at all but the author's inclination to destroy the authority of all prophecy, which we knew well enough before.

*

But let us hear what he offers to confirm this. He urges, that 'it is well known to the learned, that most or all of those books have been revised and altered by after-editors, who took the liberty to add or supply what they thought fit; and therefore they might sometimes supply the particular times and circumstances in prophecies, which at first had been delivered only in general.' But this is entirely misrepresented. It is true that some learned persons have been of opinion, that Ezra and the men of the great synagogue, who revised the sacred books after the return from the Babylonish captivity, and took care for a full and correct edition of them, did here and there insert some clauses for the illustration of some particular passages in those original records. They sometimes cast in things by way of parenthesis, for connecting and illustrating the text, in order to render the Scriptures more plain and intelligible to the people. Old names that were grown obsolete were sometimes changed for names that were better known; and where there were catalogues or genealogies, something was added, in some cases, to bring them down to their own times. These insertions are very few in number, and the sense will be found complete without them. I shall not at present inquire whether there be a just foundation for this supposition; though, as to the instances of this kind produced by the learned Dr. Prideaux, I think they are far from proving it, and that they may without much difficulty be otherwise accounted for. But not to insist upon this, I would observe, that something

* See Prideaux's Connexion, &c. part I. book v. pp. 343, 344, and book viii. pp. 573, 574, 4th edition.