In p. 45, he pretends to state the question between him and me. He saith, the only question between us is concerning the principal characteristic, or medium of proof, by which we are to perceive or judge of divine truth, or of truth as coming from God.' And then he adds, here the author (speaking of me) seems to think, that human testimony and authority, weak and fallible as it is, yet is both sufficient, and the only means of conveying such truth to us, who cannot pretend to any immediate personal inspiration or revelation in the case. But it is certain (says he) that divine authority, as founded upon human authority, must be liable to all the weakness, uncertainty, failures, and imperfections of such human authority. Since the superstructure can never be stronger than the foundation, nor the conclusion clearer than the premises from which it is drawn.'

All the strength of this lies wholly in the obscurity of it, and in jumbling things together which are of distinct consideration. It is manifest that he here confounds the questions, concerning the original proofs of a divine revelation, supposed to be given in former ages, and concerning the means or manner of conveying that revelation with those proofs to us. But these are distinct questions, and to be considered distinctly.

It is one question, how we come to know that the Christian religion, as preached by Christ and his apostles, came originally from God in a way of extraordinary revelation; and the answer to this is, that it came attended with such a series of illustrious miraculous attestations as gave a full testimony to the divine mission of the persons by whom it was published, and to the truth and divine original of the doctrines and laws. But it is another question, what ground we have to think that that original revelation, or the doctrines and laws, together with an account of those extraordinary miraculous attestations are safely transmitted to us, in such a manner, that we may have a reasonable assurance that they are the doctrines and laws that were originally given, and that these facts were really done.

The questions were distinctly treated in the book he pretends to answer; the former, p. 16, &c. the latter, p. 36, &c. But this writer, whose advantage lies in perplexing matters, perpetually confounds the question concerning the means of conveying a revelation to us with that concerning the proper proofs of its original authority; as if, because the writings in which that original revelation is contained, are conveyed to us through the hands of fallible men, therefore the divine authority of that revelation is founded upon human authority, as a superstructure upon its foundation, and a conclusion upon the principles from which it is drawn.

But it is evident to every one, that the question whether a writing or law be faithfully conveyed to us, is one thing, and the question concerning the authority of that writing or law, and the grounds of its obligation, is another. That which gives a law its authority, is its having been enacted by the legislature. Let us suppose such a law committed to writing; and that an age or two after, some

person is accused for transgressing that law. He denies its authority. Why? Because it comes to us through the hands of printers, clerks, keepers of records, &c. and these are not legislators, nor can pretend to any authority to make laws; and the authority of those laws must depend wholly upon the authority of the persons by whom they are conveyed to us. For it is certain that the legislative authority, as founded upon the authority of printers, clerks, &c. must be liable to all the weakness, failures, &c. of their authority, and can be of no other or higher kind than their authority is; since the superstructure can never be stronger than the foundation, nor the conclusion clearer than the principles from which it is drawn.’ I doubt this way of arguing would hardly be admitted in our courts of judicature as sufficient to set aside the authority of our laws; and if any man seriously made such a plea as this, he would hardly be judged to be in his right senses. But any kind of reasoning will go down, when brought against the authority of divine revelation.

It is on the same confused jumble of things that that censure is founded which he passes upon me, p. 50. That my 'scheme necessarily leads me to place the most important, or divine truth upon the foot of human fallible authority.' And every where, through his whole book, he insists upon it, as if this alone was sufficient to destroy the authority of the Scripture revelation, that it is transmitted to us through the hands of fallible men; and that to lay any stress upon the authority of a revelation that is thus conveyed to us, is to lay the whole stress of religion on fallible human authority. But if the original revelation, when first given and published, was of divine authority, and if that revelation was committed to writing, and we have sufficient evidence that that original revelation is safely transmitted to us without any material corruption or alteration, then it is as much of divine authority now as it was at first, and we are as much obliged to receive and submit to it, as if we had received it immediately from the persons by whom it was first published in the name of God. A revelation or law, if it had any real original divine authority, does not lose that authority by being committed to writing. Nor does its authority depend on the intermediate conveyers, but on the proofs of its having been originally given by revelation from God, as the authority of a law formerly enacted, depends not upon the persons through whose hands it is transmitted to us, but upon its having been originally enacted by the legislature. It is therefore to no purpose to object, as this writer does, p. 13, that we cannot depend upon that revelation, because the intermediate conveyers, as not being inspired or infallible themselves, might mistake the sense of the first promulgers, or give us a wrong account of it,' p. 13. For if the writings of those first promulgers are conveyed safe to us, then it is nothing to us whether the intermediate conveyers be fallible or not: for in that case we judge of the sense of the first promulgers, not by the opinion of the intermediate conveyers, but by the very words of the original promulgers committed to writing; and in that case may as properly be said to have that revelation in our hands, and may as properly be governed by

the doctrines and laws of it, as if we had lived in the age when it was first promulgated, and had then heard it published by word of mouth.

That an original divine revelation may be transmitted to us through the hands of fallible men, in a manner that may be safely depended on, was shown in my former book, p. 22, &c. And his learned adversary, Mr. Chapman, has considered this more largely and fully. To all which this writer has nothing to oppose but general clamors, which he repeats on all occasions, about the ununcertainty and infinite confusion of history, and fallible human testimony. This may possibly take with some that will not give themselves the trouble of thinking, and are carried away by mere sounds; but cannot have any influence on men of sense. It will easily be allowed this writer what he wisely observes, that all 'men are liable to error, and that even with regard to the most common affairs and things nigh at hand,' p. 3. But does it follow, that therefore no man can ever be certain of any thing; no, not even of what he hears or sees? Men may be deceived by human testimony; but does this prove, that therefore no human testimony can, in any case, be certainly depended on; I know it only by the testimony of fallible men, that there is such a place as Paris or Rome, or such a part of the world as America, for I never was there; and yet I am as reasonably certain of this as I am of my own existence. It is only by what the author calls 'human fallible testimony, that I believe any past facts whatsoever; that I believe there was such a king as Charles the First, and that he was beheaded, or that there were civil wars between king and parliament, or between the houses of York and Lancaster, and yet I have as little reasonable ground to doubt of them as if I had lived in those times, and seen those events myself. It is undeniably evident, that the most of our knowledge does, and in the present state of mankind must, come in this way; and that without it no advantage could be made of the knowledge, experience, and observations of past ages. It is in this method that all our laws, records, &c. are conveyed. And why then should it be thought absurd, that writings, containing an account of doctrines or facts relating to religion, should be also transmitted in this way; that is, in the only way of conveyance that, in the present constitution of the world and of mankind, is left for transmitting any past writings, laws, or facts to succeeding ages; and which in many cases may be so circumstanced, that it would be a ridiculous scepticism to doubt of the certainty and safety of the conveyance.

I would, therefore advise this writer not to trouble the world more with his general confused clamours about fallible human testimony,' except he will lay it down as a principle that human testimony, that is, the testimony of men, who are in themselves fallible, can in no case be certainly depended upon. And whenever he shall undertake to prove this, I will undertake to show his absurdity. But if human testimony may give a reasonable certainty, and be depended upon in many cases; and, particularly, if books written, and accounts of facts done in past ages, may be transmitted

to us in such a manner, that no man can reasonably doubt that these writings are safely conveyed, and that these facts were really done, then his mere crying out, that they are transmitted by human testimony, and that the intermediate conveyers were fallible, is all weak, impertinent harangue, and proves nothing at all. It has been often shown, with great evidence, that the conveyance of the sacred writings is such as may justly be depended on; and that we have all the assurance that can be reasonably desired, that they are transmitted safe to us, without any material corruption, either in doctrines or facts. If he would argue to the purpose, let him answer what has been offered on this head, and produce his proofs, to show that the conveyance is uncertain, and not to be depended upon. But this, I doubt, we are never to expect from this writer. If he cannot carry his point by general clamours, he has done his best, and you are to expect no more from him.

I shall conclude this introduction with taking notice of a passage which our author hath, p. 44, where he pretends to sum up the whole argument of my book. He there observes, that my whole work, as to the argumentative part of it, may be reduced to this one syllogism.

'Whatever God has commanded must be reasonable and fit, and ought, consequently, to be done on the sole foot of his authority, abstracted from any prior reason or fitness of things, as appearing to the understanding.

But God has commanded some things purely indifferent in their own nature, so far as we can see, and other things which must appear unreasonable to our weak understandings, abstracted from such immediate divine authority. '

"Therefore things indifferent in themselves, or which otherwise might appear unreasonable and unfit to mere human reason, may be reasonable, fit, and necessary by divine authority.'

Any one that had not read my book, and was to form an idea of it, from the account this writer here pretends to give of it, would imagine, that the main design of my book, and what I bent myself laboriously to prove, was, that God may command, and hath actually commanded, things that appear to us unreasonable and unfit,' and that yet they ought to be done, and to be regarded as 'reasonable and fit' on the sole foot of his authority. The major proposition in this syllogism, viz. that whatever God has commanded must be reasonable and fit, and ought, consequently, to be done on the sole foot of his authority,' &c.; I had little occasion to meddle with except in the case of Abraham. And there also, I mentioned it as a concession of our author's own, and a principle which he himself allowed to be reasonable.* And as to the minor proposition in the above syllogism, viz. that God has commanded some things purely indifferent, and other things which must appear unreasonable, &c. This, he tells us, is what he has denied,' as if

* See Divine Authority, pp. 91, 92.

It is evident

this was the main controversy between him and me. that he here forms his argument, as if I had not only granted, but affirmed, that there are several things commanded both in the Mosaical and Christian dispensation, that 'must appear unreasonable and unfit to our understandings.' But he knows very well, that I was so far from granting this, that on the contrary, the main design of my book was to answer the objections he brought against them, and to show that there is nothing in them that can be proved to be unreasonable or unfit. Nor has he been able to make good his charge in any one instance. But this may give us a specimen of the candour and justice of this writer; and by this, and several other things in this book, one would be apt to think, that he wrote principally for those who should never see or read my book at all, but take his word for what is contained in it.

CHAPTER I.

An examination of what the author represents as the main principles of his book. Their absurdity and inconsistency shown. His account of the nature of truth, and the grounds of its communicability; and the attempt he makes to show that truth cannot be proved by authority, considered. That authority may in many cases be of advantage for ascertaining us of truth, and that a divine authority, or testimony, may be of signal use in matters of religion and morality. This particularly shown with regard to the Christian revelation.

OUR author looks upon the main principles he had advanced in his former book, to be so 'strong and clear,' that I could not meddle with the principles themselves, and dared not contradict or argue against them directly;' and that I have therefore 'left all the principles of the book, which I pretended to answer, in their full force, p. 6. And he repeats it again, p. 9, that I knew very well that I could not confute any one general principle or position in the moral philosopher,' p. 9.

I must confess I am something at a loss to know what principles he means. That book is written in so loose and rambling a manner, with so little method or consistency, that it is no easy matter to know what are the main principles of it, and the chief difficulty lies not in confuting, but in understanding them. If there be any thing that can be called the main principle of his book, it is that concerning the 'moral reason and fitness of things,' being the only 'criterion of divine truth,' or of truth as coming from God.' And