of seven years, and shall be disposed of by the justices as aforesaid, and be applied to the uses aforesaid.”

The other colonial law to which we refer, was passed by Massachusetts, in 1705, (ch. 6.) It is entitled "An Act for the better preventing of a spurious and mixed issue," &c., and it provides "that if any negro or mulatto shall presume to strike or smite any person of the English or other Christian nation, such negro or mulatto shall be severely whipped, at the discretion of the justice before whom the offender shall be convicted."

And "that none of her Majesty's English or Scottish subjects, nor of any other Christian nation within this province, shall contract matrimony with any negro or mulatto; nor shall any person duly authorized to solemnize marriage, presume to join any such in marriage, on pain of forfeiting the sum of fifty pounds, one moiety thereof to her Majesty, for and toward the support of the government within this province, and the other moiety to him or them who shall inform and sue for the same, in any of her Majesty's courts of record within the province, by bill, plaint, or information."

The language of the Declaration of Independence is equally conclusive. It begins by declaring, that "When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature, and nature's God, entitled them, a decent respect for the opinions of mankind require that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation."

It then proceeds to say: "We hold these truths to be self-evident That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among them is life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure these rights, governments are insti

tuted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."

The general words, above quoted, would seem to embrace the whole human family; and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day, would be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this Declaration; for if the language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with principles they asserted; and instead of the sympathy of mankind to which they so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and received. universal rebuke and reprobation.

Yet, the men who framed this Declaration were great men-high in literary acquirements-high in their sense of honor, and incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they were acting. They perfectly understood the meaning of the language they used, and how it would be understood by others; and they knew that it would not, in any part of the civilized world, be supposed to embrace the negro race, which, by common consent, had been excluded from civilized government and the family of nations, and doomed to slavery. They spoke and acted according to the then established doctrine and principles, and in the ordinary language of the day, and no one misunderstood them. The unhappy black race were separated from the white by indelible marks, and laws long before established, and were never thought or spoken of except as property, and when the claims of the owners, or the profit of the trader, were supposed to need protection.

This state of public opinion had received or undergone no change when the Constitution was adopted, as is equally evident from its provisions and language.

And if we turn to the legislation of the States where slavery had worn out, or measures taken for its speedy abolition, we shall find the same opinions and principles, equally fixed and equally acted upon.

Thus, Massachusetts, in 1786, passed a law similar to the Colonial one, of which we have spoken. The law of 1786, like the law of 1705, forbids the marriage of any white person to any negro, Indian, or mulatto, and inflicts a penalty of fifty pounds upon any one who shall join them in marriage; and declares all such marriages absolutely null and void, and degrades thus the unhappy issue of the marriage, by fixing upon it the stain of bastardy. And this mark of degradation was renewed, and again impressed upon the race, in the careful and deliberate preparation of their revised code, published in 1836. This code forbids any person from joining in marriage any white person with any Indian, negro, or mulatto, and subjects the party who shall offend in this respect, to imprisonment, not exceeding six months, in the common jail, or to hard labor, and to a fine not less than fifty or more than two thousand dollars; and, like the law of 1786, it declares the marriages absolutely null and void. It will be seen that the punishment is increased by the code upon the person who shall marry them, by adding imprisonment to a pecuniary penalty.

So, too, in Connecticut. We refer more particularly to the legislation of this State, because it was not only among the first to put an end to slavery within its own territory, but was the first to fix a mark of reprobation upon the African slave trade. The law last mentioned was passed in October 1788, about nine months after the State had ratified and adopted the present Constitution of the United States; and by that law it prohibited its own citizens, under severe penalties, from engaging in the trade, and declared all policies of insurance on the vessel or cargo made in the State to be null and void. But, up to time of the adoption

of the Constitution, there is nothing in the legislation of the State indicating any change of opinion as to the relative rights and positions of the white and black races in this country, or indicating that it meant to place the latter, when free, upon a level with its citizens. And certainly nothing which would have led the slaveholding States to suppose that Connecticut designed to claim for them, under the new Constitution, the equal rights and privileges, and rank of citizens, in every other State.

The first step taken by Connecticut upon this subject was as early as 1774, when it passed an act forbidding the further importation of slaves into the State. But the section containing the prohibition is introduced by the following preamble:

"And whereas the increase of slaves into this State is injurious to the poor, and inconvenient."

This recital would appear to have been carefully introduced, in order to prevent any misunderstanding of the motive which induced the legislature to pass the law, and place it distinctly upon the interest and convenience of the white population-excluding the inference that it might have been intended, in any degree, for the benefit of the other.

And in the act of 1784, by which the issue of slaves, born after the time therein mentioned, were to be free at a certain age, the section is again introduced by a preamble assigning a similar motive for the act. It is in these words:

"Whereas, sound policy requires that the abolition of slavery should be effected as soon as may be consistent with the rights of individuals and the public safety and welfare," -showing that the right of property in the master was to be protected, and that the measure was one of policy, and to prevent the injury and inconvenience to the whites, of a a slave population in the State.

And still further pursuing its legislation, we find that in

the same statute passed in 1774, which prohibited the further importation of slaves into the State, there is also a provision by which any negro, Indian, or mulatto servant, who was found wandering out of the town or place to which he belonged, without a written pass such as therein described, was made liable to be seized by any one, and taken before the next authority, to be examined and delivered up to his master, who was required to pay the charge which had accrued thereby. And a subsequent section of the same law provided, that if any free negro shall travel without such pass, and shall be stopped, seized, or taken up, he shall pay all charges arising thereby. And this law was in full operation when the Constitution of the United States was adopted, and was not repealed till 1797. So that up to that time free negroes and mulattoes were associated with servants and slaves in the police regulations established by the laws of the State.

And again, in 1833, Connecticut passed another law which made it penal to set up or establish any 'school in that State for the instruction of persons of the African race, not inhabitants of the State, or to instruct or teach in such school or institution, or board or harbor for that purpose, any such person, without the previous consent in writing of the civil authority of the town in which such school or institution might be.

any

And it appears by the case of Crandell v. the State, reported in 10 Conn. Rep., 340, that upon an information filed against Prudence Crandell for a violation of this law, one of the points raised in the defense was, that the law was a violation of the Constitution of the United States; and that the persons instructed, although of the African race, were citizens of other States, and therefore entitled to the rights and privileges of citizens in the State of Connecticut. But Chief Justice Dagget, before whom the case was tried, held, that persons of that description were not citizens of a