the following resolutions, submitted by Mr. Dickinson on the 14th ultimo, came up:

"Resolved, That true policy requires the government of the United States to strengthen its political and commercial relations upon this continent, by the annexation of such contiguous territory as may conduce to that end, and can be justly obtained; and that neither in such acquisition nor in the territorial organization thereof can any conditions be constitutionally imposed, or institutions be provided for or established, inconsistent with the right of the people thereof to form a free sovereign State, with the powers and privileges of the original members of the confederacy.

"Resolved, That, in organizing a territorial government for territories belonging to the United States, the principles of self-government upon which our federative system rests. will be best promoted, the true spirit and meaning of the Constitution be observed, and the confederacy strengthened, by leaving all questions concerning the domestic policy therein to the legislatures chosen by the people thereof."

Mr. Dickinson said:-The second resolution declares that the principle of self-government upon which the federa tive system rests will be best promoted, the true spirit and meaning of the Constitution be observed, and the confederacy strengthened, by leaving all questions concerning the domestic regulation of territory to the legislatures chosen by the people thereof.

It must be conceded by all, that Congress has no inherent power over this subject, and no more right to legislate concerning it than the British Parliament, unless such authority is delegated by the Constitution. The only clause of the Constitution which is supposed to confer upon Congress the right to legislate for the people of a territory, is as follows:

"The Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make

all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States," &c.

In providing legislation for the District of Columbia, and for places occupied by the government of the United States for fortifications and other erections required by the public service, the Constitution thus confers the power upon Congress :

"To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatever, in such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by the cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased, by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings."

By the clause of the Constitution first above cited, it is evident that territory is mentioned in its material, and not in its political sense, for it is classed with "other property," and Congress is authorized to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting both. In the other section they are separated, and Congress is authorized to legislate over all places occupied for public structures, but no such authority is extended to territory. The language of the Constitution is that of great precision-free from repetition and every word was well weighed in its positive and relative sense. And if its framers had supposed the phrase "needful rules and regulations" authorized legislation over places belonging to the United States, and used for public service, they would scarcely have authorized legislation over such places in express language in another section. Again, in providing legislation for the District of Columbia, Congress is authorized to "exercise exclusive legislation" over it. Now, if the words "needful rules and regulations" were deemed proper and apt language to confer legislative authority over the internal affairs of a terri

tory, why were they not employed to authorize legislation over the District? And to reverse the order of the inquiry, if it was intended to confer upon Congress the power to legislate over territory, why was it not given in the same express terms as in authorizing legislation for the District? From this view, there is little doubt that a strict construction would deny to Congress the right to legislate for the domestic affairs of the people of territory without their consent.

Congress has, however, upon various occasions, exercised legislative power over the subject, especially in incorporating into the law organizing territories the provisions of the Ordinance of 1787; and this has been acquiesced in by the people of the territory. This Ordinance was framed under the old confederacy, for the government of the Northwestern Territory, and the sixth article forbade slavery or involuntary servitude therein. Its validity has often been questioned, and its adoption was pronounced by Mr. Madison to be "without the least color of constitutional law." But whether authorized or not, having been passed before the adoption of the Constitution, the act has no authority as a precedent for like practice under it.

Extract from the speech of Henry Clay, in the United States Senate, February 5th and 6th, 1850.

Mr. Clay said: When I came to consider the subject, and to compare the provisions of the line of 36° 30'-the Missouri compromise line-with the plan which I have proposed for the accommodation of this question, said I to myself, if I offer the line of 36° 30', to interdict the question of slavery north of it, and to leave it unsettled and open south of it, I offer that which is illusory to the South-I offer that which will deceive them, if they suppose that slavery will be received south of that line. It is better for them I said to myself-it is better for the South, that there

should be non-action as to slavery both north and south of the line-far better that there should be non-action both sides of the line, than that there should be action by the interdiction on the one side, without action for the admission upon the other side of the line. Is it not so? What is there gained by the South, if the Missouri line is extended to the Pacific, with the interdiction of slavery north of it? Why, the very argument which has been most often and most seriously urged by the South has been this: we do not want Congress to legislate upon the subject of slavery at all; you ought not to touch it. You have no power over it. I do not concur, as is well known from what I have said upon that question, in this view of the subject; but that is the Southern argument. We do not want you, say they, to legislate upon the subject of slavery. But if you adopt the Missouri line, and thus interdict slavery north of that line, you do legislate upon the subject of slavery, and you legislate for its restriction without a corresponding equivalent of legislation south of that line for its admission; for I insist that if there be legislation interdicting slavery north of the line, then the principles of equality would require that there should be legislation admitting slavery south of the line.

I have said that I never could vote for it myself, and I repeat that I never can, and never will vote, and no earthly power will ever make me vote, to spread slavery over territory where it does not exist. Still, if there be a majority who are for interdicting slavery north of the line, there ought to be a majority, if justice is done to the South, to admit slavery south of the line. And if there be a majority to accomplish both of these purposes, although I cannot concur in their action, yet I shall be one of the last to create any disturbance; I shall be one of the first to acquiesce in that legislation, although it is contrary to my own judgment and to my own conscience.

I hope, then, to keep the whole of these matters untouched by any legislation of Congress upon the subject of slavery, leaving it open and undecided. Non-action by Congress is best for the South, and best for all the views which the South have disclosed to us from time to time as corresponding to their wishes. I know it has been said with regard to the territories, and especially has it been said with regard to California, that non-legislation upon the part of Congress implies the same thing as the exclusion of slavery. That we cannot help. That Congress is not responsible for. If nature has pronounced the doom of slavery in these territories-if she has declared, by her immutable laws, that slavery cannot and shall not be introduced there-who can you reproach but nature and nature's God? Congress you cannot. Congress abstains. Congress is passive. Congress is nonacting, south and north of the line; or rather if Congress agrees to the plan which I propose, extending no line, it leaves the entire theatre of the whole cession of these territories untouched by legislative enactments, either to exclude or admit slavery. Well, I ask again, if you will listen to the voice of calm and dispassionate reason-I ask of any man of the South, to rise and tell me if it is not better for that section of the Union, that Congress should remain passive upon both sides of the ideal line, rather than that we should interdict slavery upon the one side of that line and be passive upon the other side of that line?

Extract from Daniel Webster's speech in the United States Senate, March 7th, 1850.

Now, as to California and New Mexico, I hold slavery to be excluded from those territories by a law even superior to that which admits and sanctions it in Texas-I mean the law of nature, of physical geography-the law of the formation of the earth. That law settles forever, with a strength beyond all terms of human enactment, that slavery cannot exist in