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DE LOLME-continued.

Those persons who seem to have it in their power to acquire the execu-
tive authority, are prevented from entertaining thoughts of doing
So, 946

Disgrace of the duke of Marlborough, under Anne, 947
Instability of greatness which is not founded on virtue, 947

Except under the English constitution, a discarded minister is the cause
of more or less anxiety to the governing authority, 948
Political effects of the dissolution of parliament, 949

Kingly office, has need of no other weapon, than the civil insignia of
dignity, 950

Civil wars of England, have rarely been occasioned, but by persons who
expressly laid claim to the crown, 951

The crown cannot depend on security, if it does not fulfil its engage-
ments to the country, 952

Stability of the powers of the English crown, allows essential branches

of English liberty to take place, which, without it, could not exist, 953
Political regulations to obtain their effect, must imply no direct contra-
diction to the nature of things, or to the other circumstances of
government, 954

Personal freedom, in England, superior to that of Rome and France, 953
Nomination of a dictator, 955

Ostracism in the republic of Athens, 955

Lettres de cachet, 955

The executive in England, cannot alter the settled course of law in
civil and criminal matters, 956

Liberty of the press does not exist in any European monarchy, as it
does under the English Constitution, 957

In republican governments, the people are kept under the greatest
restraints, by those who are at the head of the state, 957

In the Venetian republic, the press strictly watched, 957

The press affords every man a mean of laying his complaints before the
public, from which redress is ultimately acquired against any act of
oppression, 958

It is the right of canvassing, without fear, the conduct of those who
have the administration of government, which constitutes a free
nation, 959

Single rulers have ever found it impracticable to place an unreserved
trust in public assemblies, 960

Administration of Cromwell, 960

Cromwell feared the power of parliament, 961

Roman emperors distrusted the senate, 962

Kings of France have felt anxieties from the proceedings of their par-
liament, 962

Crown of England can give leave to assemble, and show the most unre-
served trust in parliament, 963

Unlimited freedom of speech, 963, 964

Executive authority operates to the advantage of the people in a two-fold
manner, 964

Power of the crown, in other monarchies, has not been able, by itself,
to produce the same effects, as it has in England, 965

In all national conventions, the people of England perceived that the
executive must be undivided, 965

Public assemblies for the redress of grievances, 966

The press is available for the purposes of advertising the time and place,
as well as the intent of such meetings, 966

Freedom of public discussion, 967

Impartiality in the administration of justice, 967

Difficulties exist under some governments for subjects of the inferior
classes to obtain legal remedies against certain individuals, 968

In England, individuals of the most exalted rank, cannot prevent the
operation of the law, 969

The king can only seek redress by the laws, 969

INDEX.

INDEX.

DE LOLME-continued.

The English government does not derive its stability from the standing force it has at its disposal, 970

The army generally composed of those, who have the same passions with the rest of the people, 971

Where the sovereign looks to his army for the security of his person and authority, the same military laws by which this army is kept together, must be extended over the whole nation, 972

In all monarchies the executive power in the state is supposed to possess originally, and by itself, all manner of lawful authority, 974

In England, it is not the authority of the government, it is the liberty of the subject, which is supposed to be unbounded, 974

When the magistrate exerts himself, he is bound to produce the law under which he acts, 975

Foundation of the doctrine which makes the powers of government subordinate to the laws, was laid before the Great Charter passed, 976

Limitations on the executive in Magna Charta, 977

The executive never acts but under such laws as are ascertained, 978 The crown of England never resorted to military force for its support, 978

Authority of the House of Tudor not maintained by an army, 979 House of Stuart, although only supported by the civil authority of their office, offered great opposition to the restless spirit of the nation, 979, 980

Events in the reign of James II. afford a proof of the solidity annexed to the authority of the English crown, 980

The manner in which the country has been governed since the Revolution of 1689, p. 981

The military power subordinate to the civil, 981

Military courts under a constant subordination to the ordinary courts of law, 982

All offences committed by persons of the military profession in regard to other classes of the people, are alone determinable by the civil judge, 983

If any of the military are claimed by the civil power, they must be delivered up immediately, 984

The English army cannot procure the sovereign any permanent strength,
984

Notoriety of parliamentary debates, induces all individuals, soldiers as
well as others, to pay some attention to political subjects, 985
James II. was deserted by his army, 985

Authority of the crown in England, rests upon foundations peculiar to
itself, 986

Essential power of the king is derived from the civil branch of his office, 987

How far the examples of Nations who have lost their Liberty are applicable to England, CHAPTER XVIII., 988-1005

The English Constitution will be destroyed, when its legislative power shall have become more corrupt than the executive, 988

Power of Rome became so great, that, after having conferred it, it was at length no longer able to resume it, 989

Rome destined to lose her liberty when she lost her empire, 990 Situation of the people of England essentially differs from that of the people of Rome, 990

In some states the active share, or the business of propounding, in legislation, is allotted to those persons who are invested with the executive authority, 995

The people, even where they are allowed a share in legislation, being ever passive in the exercise of it, cannot declare what the law in reality is, 995

Redress of grievances is the constitutional office of the representatives of the people, 996

DE LOLME-continued.

Frequent confirmations of Magna Charta, 996, 997

Different parts of the English government mutually assist and support
each other, 997

It is because the people share in the government through their repre-
sentatives, that they are enabled to possess the advantages arising
from proposing new laws, 998

All the political passions of mankind are satisfied and provided for, in
the English government, 998

Nothing is more chimerical than a state either of total equality or total
liberty, 999

The sovereign should possess authority to protect the whole community,
999

A class of men arise in every state, who, without having any actual
share in the public power, yet partake of its lustre, 1000

A great body of men cannot act, without being, though they are not
aware of it, the instruments of the designs of a small number of
persons, 1001

Advantage of a concentration of power, 1002

The English constitution secures not only the liberty, but the general
satisfaction of those who are subject to it, 1002

The English constitution has maintained its principles against all civil
commotions, 1003

The English government will be no more, when the crown becomes
independent of supplies, or when the representative power assumes
the executive, 1004, 1005

Thoughts on the Attempts that at particular times may be made to abridge
the Power of the Crown, and some of the Dangers by which such
Attempts may be attended, CHAPTER XIX., 1005-1014

Undue advantage may be taken of the minority or inexperience of the
sovereign, 1005

Popular discontents of long continuance in regard to certain particular
abuses of influence or authority, 1006

Power under any form of government must exist and be intrusted some-
where, 1006

King of England has an exclusive power in relation to foreign affairs,
war, peace, treaties, &c., 1007

King of England can always deprive his ministers of their employ-
ments, 1008

Power is never so well repressed and regulated, as when it is confined
to a sole indivisible seat, 1009

From the indivisibility of the governing authority in England, a com-
munity of interest takes place among all orders of men, 1009, 1010
The care of English legislators always kept pace with the exigences of
their situation, 1011

Constitutional evils, if bodies or classes of individuals were to acquire a
personal independent share in the executive, 1011

The men who are now the ministers, would then set themselves above
the law, 1012

Pretensions of an equality of right in all subjects, to property and per-
sonal safety, would be despised, 1012

Wherever the people applied for servants, they would only meet with
betrayers, 1013

Caution requisite in laying new restraints on the governing authority,

1013

The constitution only exists by a discriminating line being drawn
between power and liberty, 1013

Whenever the prospect of personal power and independence from the
governing authority is offered to the view of the members of the legis
lature, civil liberty will be destroyed, 1014

Observations on the right of Taxation, which is lodged in the hands of the
Representatives of the People. What kind of Danger this right may
be exposed to, CHAPTER XX., 1014-1024

INDEX.

INDEX.

DE LOLME-continued.

Evils from the crown being independent of parliament in pecuniary resources, 1015

The liberty of the subject might be invaded with impunity, 1015

If the crown could govern without the assistance of the commons, it would dismiss them for ever, 1016, 1017

King of England would be absolute were it not for the right of taxation, 1017

Right of granting subsidies to the crown, can only be effectual when it is exercised by one assembly alone, 1017

When a sovereign is made to depend, in regard to his supplies, on more assemblies than one, he, in fact, depends upon none, 1018

Sovereigns of England have always been kept in a state of real dependance on the representatives of the people for necessary supplies, 1018, 1019

Evils from the crown of England rendering itself independent from the commons for its supplies, 1020

National calamities might suggest methods for raising supplies, 1020
Rights of the people might be invaded from acquisitions of foreign
dominions, 1021

Foreign supplies might counterbalance the importance of the commons, 1022
Right of granting or refusing supplies to the crown is the only ultimate
forcible privilege possessed by the British parliament, 1022
Those who were the advocates of American independence, were the
most sanguine of the future wealth and greatness of that country, 1023
Conclusion. A few words on the nature of the Divisions that take place
in England, CHAPTER XXI., 1024-1032

Courtesy which is observed by the several branches of parliament
towards each other, 1025

Mode in which bills are rejected, 1025

Generality of the people preserve themselves more free from party spirit than their representatives, 1026

Dissatisfaction, in a free society, will be openly manifested by complaints, 1027

Agitation of the popular mind, animates all parts of the state, and is to be considered as the beneficial vicissitudes of the seasons, 1027, 1028 Political changes never occasion the shortest interruption of the power of the laws, 1028

If the highest powers in the state are subservient to the laws, a spirit of justice and order is thereby inculcated in the lower classes, 1028 Attention of the legislature in providing for the interests and welfare of the people, 1029

Constant tendency of the government to correct abuses and improve the laws, 1030

English liberty has been acquired by a fortunate conjunction of circumstances, 1031

Liberty has secured to herself an asylum against despotism on the one hand, and popular licentiousness on the other, 1032

NOTES, 1033-1139

Offences punishable with death, 1033, 1034

Felonies not capital, 1032-1081

Misdemeanors, 1081-1130

Analysis of crimes committed in 1837, p. 1130

Sentences passed in 1837, p. 1132

Accused persons who were committed or not prosecuted, in 1837, p. 1134
Number of offenders tried before the different courts, in 1837, p. 1135
Ages of the criminals of 1837, p. 1136

Result of the proceedings against offenders aged twelve years and under,
with reference to their respective ages, in 1837, p. 1137

Result of the proceedings against the offenders aged twelve years and under, with reference to their offences, in 1837, p. 1138

Degrees of instruction which the prisoners of 1836 and 1837 had received,

DEMESNES OF THE KING-vide ANCIENT DEMESNE

DENIZENS incapacitated from being members of parliament, 621

DESCENT in cases of freeholds, not of inheritance, exception in respect of, 543
General exception in favour of, 544

DESERTION from the service of the British crown, 1110, 1111

DETAINER-vide HABEAS CORPUS

DEVISE, when it confers the elective franchise, in cases of freehold not of inheritance, 543

As to possession, exemption in favour of, 543, 544

DICTATORS, power of, and which was sometimes useful, 850, 905, 908, 954,

955

DISQUALIFICATIONS-vide LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES

From exercising the parliamentary elective franchise, 541, 565

From being elected, or from acting when elected, as a member of parlia-
ment, 541-565, 621–629

DISSENTERS-vide CHARLES I. and II., JAMES I. and II., and WILLIAM
III., reigns of

DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT-vide LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES

Its effects, 534

Easily effected by the crown, 949
DISTURBANCE-vide RIOTS-SACRILEGE

DIVIDEND WARRANT, forgery of, 1045, 1046, 1047, 1069
Clerks making or delivering false warrants, 1069, 1105

DIVISIONS of counties and boroughs into districts for polling at parliamentary
elections, 551

DOMESDAY, motives which actuated William I., in compilation of, 30, 31
Exact time when the survey was undertaken, differently stated (Note 2),

31

Manner in which the inquisition was taken, 31

Mode in which the returns were entered, 32

Returns framed of greater length than were requisite, 32

Instances of purchases and mortgages, 32

Owners not oppressed for the formation of the valuation, 32

Number of places described in, as boroughs, 33

Burgesship did not depend on tenure, 33

Those who paid scot and lot alone entitled to the borough privileges, 33

Non-residents had no local borough rights, 34

Castles and merchant guilds distinct from boroughs, 34

Reeves and pledges mentioned in, 34

Privileges exclusively granted to the burgesses, 34

DOWER, husbands of tenants in, have a right to exercise the parliamentary

elective franchise, 543

Freehold coming in right of, exemptions in favour of, 543

DWELLING-HOUSE-vide BURGLARY-CRIMINAL LAW

ECCLESIASTICAL COMMISSIONS-vide REFORMATION

Jurisdiction and abuses of, temp. Henry VIII. and Edward VI., 206,
248

Commissions issued by Elizabeth and James II., 294, 296, 465, 466
EDWARD I., reign of, 82-102

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INDEX.

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