and liberties, from and after the death of his majesty and the princess Anne of Denmark, and in default of issue of the body of the said princess, and of his majesty respectively; be it enacted by the king's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same.

2. That whosoever shall hereafter come to the possession of the crown, shall join in communion with the church of England, as by law established.

3. That in case the crown and imperial dignity of this realm shall hereafter come to any person not being a native of this kingdom of England, this nation be not obliged to engage in any war for the defence of any dominions or territories which do not belong to the crown of England, without the consent of parliament.

4. That no person who shall hereafter come to the possession of this crown, shall go out of the dominions of England, Scotland, or Ireland, without consent of parlia

ment.

5. That from and after the time that the further limitatiou by this act shall take effect, all matters and things relating to the well governing of this kingdom which are properly cognizable in the privy council by the laws and customs of this realm, shall be transacted there, and all resolutions taken thereupon shall be signed by such of the privy-council as shall advise and consent to the same.

6. That after the said limitation shall take effect, as aforesaid, NO PERSON BORN OUT OF the kingdoms of England, Scotland, or Ireland, or the dominions thereunto belonging (although he be naturalized or made a denizen, except such as are born of English parents) SHALL BE CAPABLE to be of the PRIVY-COUNCIL, or a member of either HOUSE of PARLIAMENT, or to enjoy ANY OFFICE OF PLACE of TRUST, EITHER CIVIL or MILITARY, or have any GRANT of LANDS,

TENEMENTS or HEREDITAMENTS, from the crown to himself or to any other or others, in trust for him.

7. THAT NO PERSON WHO HAS AN OFFICE OR PLACE OF PROFIT UNDER THE KING, OR WHO RECEIVES A PENSION FROM THE CROWN, SHALL BE CAPABLE OF SERVING AS A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

8. That after the said limitations shall take effect as aforesaid, judges' commissions be made quandiu se bene gesserint, and their salaries ascertained and established; but upon the address of both houses of parliament, it may be lawful to remove them.

9. That no pardon under the great seal of England be pleadable to an impeachment by the commons in parliament.

10. And whereas the laws of England are the birth-right of the people thereof, and all the kings and queens who shall ascend the throne of this realm, ought to administer the government of the same according to the laws, and all their officers and ministers ought to serve them respectively according to the same; the said lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, do therefore humbly pray, that all the laws and statutes of this realm, for securing the established religion, and the rights and liberties of the people thereof, and all other laws and statutes of the same now in force, may be ratified and confirmed; and the same are by his majesty, by and with the advice and consents of the said lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, and by authority of the same, ratified and confirmed accordingly.

CHAPTER II.

COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

SECT. I.

Authentic Copy of a Petition praying for a Reform in Parliament, presented to the House of Commons by CHARLES GREY, Esq. on Monday, 6th May 1793; and signed only by the Members of the Society of the Friends of the People, associated for the purpose of obtaining a Parliamentary Reform.

To the Honourable the Commons of Great Britain in Parliament assembled.

Sheweth,

THAT by the form and spirit of the British constitution the king is vested with the sole executive power.

That the house of lords consists of lords spiritual and temporal, deriving their titles and consequence either from the crown, or from hereditary privileges.

That these two powers, if they acted without controul, would form either a despotic monarchy, or a dangerous oligarchy.

That the wisdom of our ancestors hath contrived, that these authorities may be rendered not only harmless, but beneficial, and be exercised for the security and happiness of the people.

That this security and happiness are to be looked for in the introduction of a third estate, distinct from, and a check upon the other two branches of the legislature; created by, representing, and responsible to the people themselves.

That so much depending upon the preservation of this third estate, in such its constitutional purity and strength, your petitioners are reasonably jealous of whatever may appear to vitiate the one, or to impair the other.

That at the present day the house of commons does not

fully and fairly represent the people of England, which, consistently with what your petitioners conceive to be the principles of the constitution, they consider a grievance, and therefore, with all becoming respect, lay their complaints before your honourable house.

That though the terms in which your petitioners state their grievance may be looked upon as strong, yet your honourable house is entreated to believe that no expression is made use of for the purpose of offence.

Your petitioners in affirming that your honourable house is not an adequate representation of the people of England, do but state a fact, which, if the word "Representation" be accepted in its fair and obvious sense, they are ready to prove, and which they think detrimental to their interests, and contrary to the spirit of the constitution.

How far this inadequate representation is prejudicial to their interests, your petitioners apprehend they may be allowed to decide for themselves; but how far it is contrary to the spirit of the constitution, they refer to the consideration of your honourable house.

If your honourable house shall be pleased to determine that the people of England OUGHT NOT to be fully REPRESENTED, your petitioners pray that such your determination may be made known, to the end that the people may be apprised of their real situation; but if your honourable house shall conceive that the people are already fully represented, then your petitioners beg leave to call your attention to the following facts:

Your petitioners complain, that the number of representatives assigned to the different counties is grossly disproportioned to their comparative extent, population, and trade.

Your petitioners complain, that the elective franchise is so partially and unequally distributed, and is in so many instances, committed to bodies of men of such very limited numbers, that the majority of yonr honourable house is elected by less than fifteen thousand electors, which even if the male

adults in the kingdom be estimated at as low a number as three millions, is not more than the two hundredth part of the people to be represented.

Your petitioners complain, that the right of voting is regulated by no uniform or rational principle.

Your petitioners complain, that the exercise of the elective franchise is only renewed once in SEVEN YEARS.

Your petitioners thus distinctly state the subject-matter of their complaints, that your honourable house may be convinced that they are acting from no spirit of general discontent, and that you may with more ease be enabled to inquire into the facts, and to supply the remedy.

For the evidence in support of the first complaint, your petitioners refer to the return book of your honourable house. Is it fitting that Rutland and Yorkshire should bear an equal rank in the scale of county representation? or can it be right, that Cornwall alone should, by its extravagant proportion of Borough members, outnumber not only the representatives of Yorkshire and Rutland together, but of Middlesex added to them? Or, if a distinction be taken between the landed and the trading interests, must it not appear monstrous that Cornwall and Wiltshire should send more Borough members to parliament, than Yorkshire, Lancashire, Warwickshire, Middlesex, Worcestershire, and Somersetshire united? and that the total representation of all Scotland should but exceed by one member, the number returned for a single county in England?

The second complaint of your petitioners is founded on the unequal proportions in which the elective franchise is distributed, and in support of it—

They affirm, that seventy of your honourable members are returned by thirty-five places, where the right of voting is vested in burgage and other tenures of a similar description, and in which it would be to trifle with the patience of your honourable house, to mention any number of voters whatever, the elections at the places alluded to being notoriously a