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amount to a proof of such intention, and whether they are sufficient to entitle a Jury upon their oaths to say, that such must have been the purpose and state of mind from which the acts proceeded,―acts, you will observe, in their own nature, unavoidably equivocal, and as to the true character of which no two men of opposite parties would form the same opinion.

What, then, is sedition? I do not object to the prosecutor's statement on the subject. He described it generally as any act, writing, or speech, the intention and probable effect of which is to excite disaffection towards the Government, and tumult and commotion in You must be already aware, then, of the the country. Now, you will observe here, that extreme caution with which a Jury is bound in order to constitute sedition, it is not abso- to proceed in considering a case of this comlutely or indispensably necessary that the plex kind. It can never be pretended, in the prosecutor shall bring proof of discontent or broad words of the definition of my learned disturbance having been actually excited or friend, that, to express dissatisfaction with the having followed in consequence of the acts proceedings of government, or opinions against charged. Nor should I think it right or safe the existing laws, or laws intended to be to make the fact of having excited such dis- brought into existence, can be arraigned as content or disturbance the criterion for the improper and seditious acts. On the contrary, crime of sedition; for there may be many it is from such acts that all the great improvespeeches and writings by which tumults and ments in our institutions have originated, and disaffection may eventually be excited, without to such proceedings are we indebted for all any such intention on the part of the speaker our distinguished advantages as a free, a powor writer. God knows there have been many erful, and enlightened people. Not only then measures adopted by Government here and is it the privilege, but it is the duty of those elsewhere, and probably believed by them at who think that measures may be taken for the time to be most expedient and proper, bettering the situation of the country at large,' which have led to disaffection and disturbance, to state their sentiments, and, if necessary, to to dreadful wars and most sanguinary remedies. complain aloud of the existing evils and im~Here, then, we feel at once the practical diffi- perfections. It may often be highly proper, culty of applying the definition of the crime and absolutely necessary, to point out the which is here charged. Sedition is said to disadvantages attending present institutions, consist in any acts by writing, speaking, or and to employ every form and mode of elootherwise, that indicate, with sufficient clear-quence in order to recommend the adoption ness, a purpose to divert the affection of the people from Government, and to excite hatred and dislike against the said Government, leading to rebellion, tumult and public confusion. We have evidence of this when a speech or writing actually produces such an effect. That is the most certain, and perhaps the only sure proof that a speech was uttered for such a purpose that it has done so. But I do not say that this is absolutely necessary. It is enough if there are acts established which are clearly and unequivocally intended to produce such an effect: But all this just places us under the necessity of judging and conjecturing as to the intention,-not upon such evidence as the shooting a man through the head is of intention to kill; but by the exercise of a sound judgment, and a delicate discrimination upon nice and subtle questions of politics and morality; in the course of which we must endeavour to divest ourselves for the time of all our cherished prejudices and partialities, and to judge of a probable intention, from facts, as to the import and character of which perhaps no two men will agree. In order to determine whether disorder, and discontent were intended to be excited against the Government, we must consider whether the objects that were professed to be in view,--the means that were adopted for their accomplishment, the words that were used,-the situation of the audience, and the result of the measures adopted, do all or any of them

of those measures and principles, which may lead to regulations and laws that are better and more efficient. Petitions for the abolition of the Slave Trade,-for Peace,-for the abolition of the Income Tax, were opposed by those in the actual administration of the Government: But it was never, I believe, ima-< gined, that these petitions had the most distant approximation to the shameful crime of sedition. But see where we are at this first step. Can it be doubted that the agitation of all these questions was offensive to Government? Can it be doubted that petitions setting forth the evils of the Slave Trade were opposed by the Government,-that trade which spread and encouraged ignorance, vice, and misery in Africa,-and which debased, and would have perpetuated the degradation of the human character in the west?-Can it be doubted that the complaints made in petitions for Peace, charging Government with unprincipled conduct in carrying on the war,—a war of advantage to a few individuals, but unnecessary and ruinous to the country, and attended with an enormous and prodigal expenditure of human blood, and of the means of national prosperity, can it be doubted that such complaints were disagreeable to the Ministers ?-Can it be doubted that petitions. against the hateful and inquisitorial but productive tax on income were opposed by them?

Can it be doubted that the proceedings at public meetings respecting these objects tended

to excite violent indignation among the people againt existing laws and establishments; and, with regard to a great number of the measures alluded to, excited the indignation of the people against those who are entitled to be called and are known to be our rulers? Many of those measures of public policy which I have stated, were very warmly defended by the Government; and it may be very truly said, that, in loading such measures with the opprobrious epithets which all men now agree they deserve, we were throwing an odium on our rulers.

But, says the public prosecutor, our rulers are the King, Lords, and Commons; and all attempt to excite hatred against them, is clearly within the narrowest definition of the crime of sedition. To this, however, I reply, that our rulers are his majesty's ministers for the time being, and those, and those only, who concur in their measures. It is only through these mimisters, and by their advice and influence, that the sovereign is understood to act, according to the principles of our constitution. The ministers are the king; and it is not lawful to impute any bad act to him personally, his acts being the acts of the ministers. And who are the Lords and Commons? The majority alone of them having been in fact our rulers, the minority have nothing to do with it.-If, therefore, it has been the pride and boast of Great Britain, eminently distinguished for the sense, the virtue, the morality, the science which it contains, that by the right of discussing politics and petitioning the legislature, oppression has been shut out, corruption exposed and circumscribed, and, in despite of their rulers, the people enlightened and enabled to judge of public men and public measures;-if it is on account of this invaluable right that we enjoy and pride ourselves among the nations; -where is the propriety of rashly interfering with the exercise of this right, and why object to the speech of a petitioner, because some things in it may fall under the general terms of the definitions which lawyers have given of the crime of sedition? Perhaps no better definition of sedition could be given; but here the intention was, not to excite tumult or disorder, and therefore no sedition was committed. The petioners did not approve of the measures of our rulers, they believed a reform in the representation would be beneficial, and they stated their sentiments on these subjects, to the King, Lords, and Commons.

But my learned friend said, the conduct of the panels was calculated to excite dissention. In one sense I admit that it was: But I have no such horror at dissention as the learned lord. There is a dissention known to this country, and known to all free countries, and to them only, which, however terrible it may appear to the sons of habitual slavery, or the minions of arbitrary power, or the contented and envied possessors of present influence, is of that wholesome nature, that on it the life VOL. XXXII.

and health of the constitution ultimately depend. It is not a frightful commotion, but a healthful exercise :-not an exhausting fever, but a natural movement, proceeding from the vigour of the constitution, and at once indieating and maintaining that vigour unimpaired. Wherever men are entitled to rise to high stations, whatever their birth and condition may have been, there great dissention will inevitably be found. In that fierce, but generous struggle, there will necessarily be great heats, and appearances of violence and intemperance. There will be some real excesses also, and a great deal of dirt will be scattered about in the competition, which is all the injury that the main body of the people will experi ence. In a free country where the principles of government are well understood, and the laws well administered, parties will ever be found opposed to parties, all of them calumniating and abusing one another, taking advantage of the slips of their adversaries, and fastening on them the keen and eager eye of hostile animosity,-contending with the most strenuous emulation for those places and offices attended with power and patronage, which are then only respectable and honourable, when filled by persons distinguished for those talents, and that industry and merit, which can neither be generated, nor made manifest on any other scene. dissention, though the parties engaged in it are somewhat reviling and reviled, is the life, and heart, and spirit of our constitution; and true policy should promote discussion on those great points, on which discussion must always be keen, and in some degree, stormy and violent, because it is on them that the liberty, the prosperity and happiness of the nation depend, and to them that all men of spirit, ingenuity and talents have devoted their whole lives, from their birth to their last moments. The lives, accordingly, of almost all the great men who have adorned the history of this country, have been a continued scene of warfare; and, except in a few instances of individuals endowed with more than usual placidity of temper, our most eminent statesmen may be said to have passed their lives in traducing the conduct and measures of their opponents, glossing over the faults of their partisans, and employing the strongest language in denouncing what appeared to them contrary to the spirit of the laws and the constitution. If this dissention were prevented, liberty would be extinguished. That very hostility which appears to excite so much apprehension, is the parent of public prosperity, and of all the advantages in a free state for which it is worth while to contend.

This

The right of exposing misconduct in the administration of the government, and of applying in a constitutional form to the legisla ture for redress of grievances, whether real or imaginary, is the result of this wholesome privilege of discussion. It might perhaps be maintained, that under the right of petitioning

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the legislature for any object which the persons petitioning might sincerely think fair, reasonable, and proper, language, however strong, if expressive of the sincerity and strength of conviction of the petitioners, should be permitted. The very publicity of the act of petitioning, the ancient date of the right, the constant and almost inmemorial experience of its good effects,-and, above all, the appearance it has of reliance on the legislature, protect almost everything that may be done under this invaluable privilege. But I am far from exposing my case to the hazard of maintaining, that in the exercise of this great public right excesses may not be committed, of which men ought to be ashamed, and which the law is called on to avenge. Without meaning to detract from the powerful argument you heard from my learned friend Mr. Clerk, I say that, even when met for petitioning parliament, excesses may be committed by speaking and writing, for which the people are responsible to the law, and for which a jury may be reluctantly constrained to punish them. In such cases, their intention is to be gathered partly from the nature of the objects pursued, and partly from the language employed, and the means recommended for the accomplishment of their purposes. If a person should pretend, or even be mad enough seriously to propose, to petition parliament for the abolition of the Christian religion,-for deposition of the king, or dismissal of the House of Lords, -for division of property,-community of wives, or such objects,(there can be no seriousness about such things, but suppose such petitions were proposed), the public prosecutor would be justified in interfering, and even the desperately ignorant could not be screened in the prosecution of such views. But supposing the object not so plainly extravagant, and obviously criminal, as any of those I have alluded to; still if the means held out for obtaining it are clearly criminal; -if, at the same time that a petition to parliament is recommended for universal suffrage, or any thing else, the petitioners are exhorted to appear with pistols in their bands, and to use them to enforce their requests, or even to do any thing implying an offence against decency and good order, transportation or a more severe punishment might be justly inflicted on the transgressors.

that

The point then at issue is, What is the degree of criminality that demands, or whereabouts are we to look for the excess which authorises the intervention of the law?-When is it that the avenging voice of a jury is required?-and has such a case occurred in the present instance?-It is by no means enough that you individually regard the objects which it is proved those persons had in view with their petitions, as erroneous, improper, and absurd objects. That is not the question which is committed to you to try. You are to judge whether they were actuated by seditious intentions. The object of the petitioners, in this

case, was parliamentary reform; and, as far as I can see, a change to a great extent in the representation of the people was contemplated. They wished for annual elections, and that all should have votes. You may think such a plan mischievous, and an attempt to recommend it productive of bad consequences. I rather think so myself. I think the introduction of annual elections would be a hazardous experiment. Universal suffrage is practically impossible; and if possible to be introduced, it would probably aggravate some of the evils it was intended to remedy. But ought such an opinion of mine, of yours, and of a great many others, to prevent persons holding different opinions from taking constitutional means for enforcing their opinions? Annual parliaments are beyond all question agreeable to the ancient practice of this country. Whether there ever was a law with regard to them, I shall not here pretend to determine. In point of fact, for many centuries, there were scarcely any others; and, upon the whole, I have no doubt there have been more annual parliaments held in Great Britain, than parliaments of a longer duration. Those who admire our ancestors and remote times more than I do (for I think, as to-liberty, we are better off now than ever we were), may wish to have recourse to annual parliaments, and this desire may be innocent and laudable.Universal suffrage, again, is agreeable to the theory of the constitution. There can be no doubt about that; and a greater approxima tion in practice to the theory of the constitution than at present exists, might perhaps be desirable. In all the books on the English constitution, the principle is to be found, But here again, to be sure, the theory and practice are disjoined. There never was any thing like what is now meant by universal suffrage established in these lands; for if we look to history, we shall find that the great body of the people were formerly in a state of villeinage under the aristocracy. Universal suffrage, however, is agreeable to the theory of the constitution. According to constitutional doctrine, every man has a representative in parliament. I might read a great variety of passages from Montesquieu and others, from which it is. quite clear that they regarded this principle, that the people have a right to be represented in parliament, as the foundation of our liberties. Now, the fact is well known that some places are not directly represented at all—that some large towns choose no representatives,→ and that there are representatives, on the other hand, who have no constituents. Now, it appears that the petitioners thought this wrong, and desired to introduce a practice a little more analogous to the theory of the constitution, which certainly was no great crime in them, whatever may be thought of the expediency of their views.

This brings me to some leading statements in the address of the public prosecutor. He says you may attack the Ministers, but not

been erroneously supposed by the prosecutor to infer blame. The panels are alleged to have said, they were entitled to break out into open rebellion if they did not obtain universal suffrage and annual parliaments. I have not discovered that they said this. I hope they will not obtain either of these objects; but it is competent for persons who think differently from me with regard to them to ask for them, and to state their reasons for doing so. That they are entitled to be heard, I maintain loudly and unequivocally, in opposition to all assertions to the contrary, assertions which would go to subvert the foundation, and extinguish the vital principles of our constitution.

But it is said that the words used here ad

yours only, to judge of the import of these words, and of the intentions of the persons who used them. I will not go over them all. One observation, however, it is quite indispensable to make, and that is, that you are not to form an opinion upon the import of the passages quoted in the indictment, without listening to, and pondering by yourselves all the other passages in the same paper. It has never been a rule in trying a case of sedition, that a single sentence is to be judged of by itself, and you are not entitled to proceeed on that sentence as indicating the seditious character of the whole production, if, in point of fact, the great bulk and general character of the statement give the lie to the charge.

the constitution. You must not deny that the King, Lords and Commons, are each of them, as now existing, the legal depositaries of the degree of power given to them; but you may attack the Ministers as much as you please. We are beholden to him, at all events, for the concession; but let us see what this distinction points at,-what it means. Does my friend mean that the people shall not petition against, -shall not complain of, any grievance which consists in a bad arrangement of any great branch of the legislature, any class or order in the constitution,-in, perhaps, a new grouping, or a mischievous alteration of any thing in the constitution of the legislative body? What! Is it not competent to petition against the septennial law? Was it not lawful to pe-mit of no defence. It is your province, and tition for its adoption? I think the ministry of that day would scarcely have treated such an application as seditious; yet it made just as great a change in the constitution, as the adoption of annual parliaments would now do. Direct acts of parliament make changes in such matters every day; but from what do they originate? Not surely from the arbitrary will of Government, but from the sentiments of the nation. I never heard such acts de fended as being measures of government, but as being conformable to wisdom, good sense, and propriety. The law establishing the inability of excisemen to vote at elections, laws relative to residence of voters, all these and many other arrangements touching the constitution of the legislature, have been made You are told that the expressions charged from time to time, and a great many have re- against the panels are seditious and inflamcently been made. Is it to be said that the matory. I believe that some of the expressions people are to have no voice regarding such are extremely absurd, and exceedingly impromatters? that they may petition and interfere per, nay grossly indecent. But I maintain, that as to the imposition of taxes, but not as to the looking at them either by themselves, or in conreformation or improvement of the body by text with the other passages in the publication, which taxes are imposed? I entirely deny the ex- and considering the occasion of the meeting, istence of any such distinction. The right of and the intentions of the parties, as demonstratpetitioning unquestionably extends to every ed by their whole conduct, and by the evidence thing that is within the competence of the le- which has been adduced, you cannot by posgislature to grant. It is not within the pow-sibility find in the pamphlet any thing to force er of the legislature to abolish Christianity or the House of Lords, or any of the branches of the legislature. But, with regard to every measure which may constitutionally originate with government, the people may humbly petition, pointing out such reasons as appear to them to recommend or to oppose its adoption. This is the people's right. To meet for this purpose is lawful, and there is no reason for restraining them in their deliberations on such occasions. Over the great legislative body they have thus had a continual, uniform, and a progressive control, from the first dawn of freedom in the country down to the present

time.

In the exercise of this control, they are not circumscribed to any particular class of topics, but may expatiate freely through every branch of our laws and policy. There are a great many authorities, which I need not read, to shew that propositions may on such occasions be maintained, the very mention of which has

you to say, by your verdict, that the author, publisher or seller must have acted with the intention of subverting the constitution, or filling the kingdom with trouble and dissention. You will underst and, then, that I do not wish to defend these expressions as free from blame; but I have again to warn you that you are not entitled to find a verdict against these men as guilty of sedition, merely because you may think, as I do, that they employed improper expressions, in prosecution of a lawful object by lawful means. If you could permit your own sentiments respecting the objects which the petitioners had in view, or your feelings of disapprobation of the language which they employed, to influence for a moment your opinion as to their legal guilt or innocence, the consequences to the law and the liberties of these kingdoms would indeed be tremendous. If such a principle of judg ment were to be admitted, different men before different juries might, under similar cir

cumstances, meet with very different verdicts.* The next is the famous passage about hell and Every man who strongly believes in the pro- allegiance and I shall not diminish the force priety of particular sentiments, will, in ex- of Mr. Clerk's remarks on this subject, by pressing his honest opinions, regard opposite offering many of my own.-But what is the sentiments as excessively wrong, and as having gloss now put on all this? The public proa most pernicious tendency. A sincere tory secutor here sees tremendous sedition, and thinks the principles of the whigs tend to ren- reads the meaning thus :-" If you, the Prince der the crown not fit to be worn, and to put Regent, will not become a reformer, we shall the country in imminent hazard of anarchy and take up our weaver's-beams, and force you." confusion. On the other hand, there is no Now, do the words necessarily bear such an honest whig who does not believe that the interpretation? I say they do not. I say, not principles of the tories, if left entirely to them- only that they do not bear it necessarily, but selves, would annihilate the privileges of the that they do not bear it at all, and that the plain people, and put the government on a level meaning of them is quite different. I say with that of any common arbitrary monarchy. that the passage is to this effect: "We, the In the opposite speeches of these two great Weavers of Kilmarnock, want universal suffrage parties, they continually arraign one another as and annual parliaments. We shall lay our defending principles leading to such conclu- petition for these objects at the foot of the sions. I hope neither of them will ever have throne, where sits our august prince, whose an opportunity of seeing put to the test, un- gracious nature will incline his ear to listen checked, the principles of their opponents. to the cries of HIS PEOPLE, which he is bound Perhaps you are neutral between these parties; to do by the laws of the country. But should he and I am persuaded, that, at all events, you be so infatuated as to turn a deaf ear to THEIR are possessed of liberal and fair toleration to- just petition, he has forfeited THEIR allegiance." wards persons of a different way of thinking The important words are exactly as I have now from you on political subjects, and that if their cited them,-and their plain, and indeed their lives give the lie to any idea that they intend only meaning is, that if the sovereign disregards mischief, and if they are men generally looked the voice of his whole people, he has no right to upon as entertaining moderate views-though their allegiance. It is not agreeable to allude you think that the practical application of to the miserable extremity of an actual diftheir doctrines would lead to evil consequences, ference between the sovereign and his subjects; you will give them credit for upright intentions. and no wise or moderate man could contemFairness and liberality require that trust and plate the possibility of such difference, but in confidence should not be withdrawn from the most extreme circumstances. But is there others, merely because they entertain different any thing in what I have read, which a court opinions from our own upon these disputable of law could pronounce to be seditious at all? matters, particularly when it is universally Our duty obliges us, in defending the panels, known that different opinions are really en- to take refuge under the argument of an imtertained as to the actual safety of their doc-plied contract between the sovereign and the trines. Therefore admitting that a great part of the statement in the speeches would be dangerous, if the authors could convert the great majority of the people to their way of thinking (in which case I should think some of us were in a bad way), God forbid that any other weapons should be used against them, than those of argument and good sense ;-God forbid we should think of binding reformers hand and foot, as the means of checking their erroneous doctrines.

Having made these few observations, I shall now more particularly examine the speeches which were made at the Dean Park meeting. And, first of all, I may remark, that the meaning of the passage in which the petitioners speak about the selfishness and aggrandize ment of our rulers is sufficiently obvious. The Ministers for the time are quite plainly meant; for what kind of aggrandizement could the King or the Prince Regent look for? The term must mean persons who have something in view before them; and not those who have already attained the heights of sublunary grandeur. Upon this I am sure it is unnecessary to waste another word.

* Vide 2 How. Mod. St. Tr. 214.

subjects, which may be broken, and of course may be enforced upon either side. Now, keeping this principle in view, let us attend to what the petitioners really say. They say, We the Weavers of Kilmarnock, want universal suffrage and annual parliaments, and will petition the Prince Regent on the subject, who is bound to listen to the cries of his people. What is the meaning of this? Do the "cries of his people" merely mean the cries of the weavers of Kilmarnock? Were these people really so blinded to reason, by hunger and their desperate situation, as to imagine that their voice alone could regulate any measure of public policy? Is there any reasonable ground for alleging that they meant to say, We, the unemployed weavers of Kilmarnock, are disposed to have universal suffrage and annual parliaments; and if you, the Prince Regent, do not give us them, we will rebel against you though nobody else should join us?

Is that the feasible sense of the passage? Could these persons, who seem to have had some smattering of reason about them, think that the constitution must be altered, in order to please a few hungry men assembled in a cold day at Kilmarnock? No such thing. The person who uttered these

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