tributions under the name of loans, not to their own interests, but entirely as if France had been at war with them. For the first of these injuries the King was contented with an imperfect satisfaction. Of the second he took no notice, the fears of the maritime towns preventing him from making complaints. The King made unexampled sacritices for peace, and the maintenance of this peace was ever the dearest wish of his heart. The patience of other courts was sooner exhausted than his. War broke out on the Continent. The situation of the King, with respect to his duty, was now more difficult than ever. To prevent France from augmenting the troops she had in Hanover, he promised to suffer no attack on that territory. From this moment, the whole burden of the relation between France and Prussia turned on this object, without the latter deriving the least advantage from it; and, by an extraordinary chain of circumstances, Prussia, which only wished to act impartially, and remain neutral, appeared to take part against the allied powers. All the advantage arising from this position of Prussia, was entirely for France; and the King was daily threatened with collisions, as formidable to him, as decisively favourable to the plans of Napoleon. revenge; she passed over the events of the late war, however violent they might have been, since they had been sanctioned by existing treaties. He required nothing but the punctual fulfilment of those treaties; but this he required without limitation. Count Haugwitz repaired to Vienna, where the French Emperor then was. Scarcely had this Minister been there some days, when the whole face of affairs was changed. The misfortunes experienced by the Court of Vienna had compelled it to sign an armistice, which was immediately followed by a peace. The Emperor of Russia sacrificed his magnanimous views to the wish of his Ally, and his troops returned home. Prussia stood now alone on the field of contest; he was obliged to limit his policy by his powers, and instead, as had been his wish, of embracing the interests of all Europe, to make his own security, and that of his neighbours, his first object. The French Emperor proposed to Count Haugwitz a treaty, in which was stipulated on the one side a mutual guarantee of possessions, the inviolability of the Turkish territory, and the results of the peace of Presburg; and on the other, the taking possession of Hanover by Prussia, in return for the cession of three provinces. a firm, political constitution. The results of the peace of Presburg were a general misfortune to Europe, but Prussia sacrificed herself alone when she accepted them; and to place a limit to the inconstant usurpations of France, should the treaty be considered by the Court of St. Cloud as any thing more than words, appeared an advantage: the King therefore ratified this Article conditionally. Who could have supposed, that precisely at the moment in which the King gave the The first part of the treaty promised, at French government the strongest proofs of his least for the future, an acknowledged, guafirmness, a rare example of the faithful ful-ranteed, and, if Napoleon had so pleased, filment of the engagements into which he had once entered, should be chosen by Napcleon, to inflict on Prussia the most sensible injury? Who does not recollect the violation of the Anspach territory on the 3d of October of the preceding year, notwithstanding the express remonstrance of the civil government, and his Majesty's ministers? This contest between (which pardons every thing) that integrity which remains true to its engagements to the last, on the one part; and the abuse of power, the insolence inspired by deceitful fortune, and the habit of only reckoning on this fortune, on the other; continued several years. The King declared to the French government, that he considered all his connections with it as dissolved. He placed his armies on a footing suitable to circumstances. He was now fully convinced that no pledge of security remained for the neighbours of France, but a peace established on firm principles, and guaranteed by all the powers in common. His Majesty offered the allies to be the mediator, in negociations, for such a peace, and to support them with all his force. It is sufficient to know the conditions then proposed, to be convinced of the moderation which, at all times, governed the politics of his Majesty in their whole extent. Prussia, at this moment, listened not to the voice of The second half of the Treaty of Vienna related to an object, the importance of which had been manifested by serious experience. Prussia could not rely on security for a moment, so long as Hanover remained involved in a war, in which that country had, in fact, no concern. At whatever price it might be purchased, Prussia was resolved that the French should not return thither. She had her choice to obtain this end, either by a treaty, or a war. The cession of three provinces, which had been faithful and happy for a long term of years, was a sacrifice not to be made for any plan of vain ambition; but these provinces would, in case of a war, have been the first sufferers; all the calamities of that war would have pressed upon the Monarchy; while the acquisition of Hanover, could it have been made under less unhappy circumstances, would have been productive of the most valuable advantages to Prussia. All the advantages of this treaty were for France. On the one side she received guarantees, which put the seal on her conquests; on the other, she gave what she did not possess, what might be again conquered by the chances of an uncertain war, while, in the cessions of Prussia, she found the means of enriching her allies. Bat, between a policy, which will do every thing in its power, and an integrity, which regards its duties, and especially its promises, the contest is ever unequal. The King approached the moment when he was convinced of this by experience: this moment was the most painful of his reign. It was the affair of France to reject the modifications under which the King had confirmed the Treaty, if she did not approve them. But she avoided doing this, for the whole Prussian army was still under arms. She continued to be lavish of assurances of friendship; she fulfilled the Treaty as far asit suited her; but, when His Majesty wished to reap the only advantages which he had promised to himself from the late negociations, and which were nearest his heart, she suddenly altered her language; the modifications added to the Treaty of Vienna, were now rejected at Paris. Endeavours were made to force Prussia into the most injurious measures; and when Count Haugwitz, who was at Paris, remonstrated against this, the unconditional fulfilment of the treaty was haughtily insisted on, as was the immediate cession of the three Provinces, and the recal of the patent by which the occupation of Hanover was declared provisional. Prussia was required to resign a part of the advantages stipulated, and to shut her ports against the British flag, in the same manner as if the French had returned into the Electorate. The King at length was perfectly convinced of the true character of the friendship of the Emperor of the French-a soporific draught for a Power which still feels its own strength; an instrument of degradation, and finally of subjection, to every Power which no longer possesses strength. In the mean time, Napoleon was in pos session of every advantage. The Prussian army had returned; his own, after some movements, of no consequence, at which deceived Germany rejoiced prematurely, on come frivolous pretences, established itself on this side the Rhine. The first conflict might produce misfortunes. War, which is not, under all circumstances, the greatest of evils, might become such under those then exist ing. The King determined to continue the part he had hitherto acted, for some time. longer. Wishing to preserve his force now, more than ever necessary to Europe; and, at least, to secure the tranquillity of the North, he confirmed the new Treaty. Confidence, however, was now utterly lost. Prussia was convinced, that on the first opportunity to weaken her without danger, she might expect an attack from her pretended Aliy; convinced that there is a degree of ambition which nothing can satisfy, which proceeds, without intermission, from usurpation to usurpation, sometimes without a plan, but ever intent on destruction, careless of the choice of means, and employing alike, arms and the pen, violence and oaths. But even with this conviction-so great is the unfortu nate superiority obtained by such policy over those who wish only to be just-the King fulfilled all the conditions of the Treaty, with the punctuality of a faithful Ally. It is known what the consequences were with respect to the connections of His Majesty with England. France gained nothing by this; but she triumphed in secret at the thought of having disunited two Courts, the union of which might have been dangerous to her; and what, in the view of France, gave the principal value to her alliance with the King, was, that this alliance isolated His Majesty, since it produced an opinion that Prussia was a participator in the cause of so many misfortunes. But, not content with this, we shall see in what manner the politics of France, assured that she had now no enemy to fear, believing that she had annihilated Austria, forming a judgment of Russia with equal ignorance and rashness, and blinded by the apparent tranquillity of Prussia, at length threw off the mask, and, despising forms which she had hitherto sometimes respected, openly trampled on all treaties and all rights. Three months after the signing of the Treaty with Prussia, all its articles were violated. The Treaty had for its basis the status quo of the moment in which it was concluded also the guarantee of the German empire and its states, according to the constitution then established. This truth arises not only from the nature of things; the Treaty had also ex pressly prescribed to the two powers their duties. The relations in which the peace of Presburg had left his Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, were guaranteed to him; consequently, also, the Imperial crown of Germany, and the rights connected with it. The existence of Bavaria, and consequently the relations which had connected it for so many centuries to the empire, were likewise confirmed by the same common guarantee. Three months after, the confederation of the Rhine overthrew the Germanic constitution, deprived the Emperor of the ancient ornament of his house, and placed Bavaria, and thirty other princes, under the tutelage of France. But is it necessary to appeal to treaties, to form a just judgment of this extraordinary event? Previous to all treaties, nations have their rights; and had not France sported with the sanctity of an oath, this act of unexampled despotism would exasperate every mind. To deprive princes who had never offended France, and to render them the vassals of others; themselves the vassals of the French government; to abolish, with a stroke of the pen, a constitution of a thousand years duration, which long habits, the rembrance of so many illustrious periods, and so many various and mutual relations, has rendered dear to such a number of princes, which had so often been guaranteed by all the European powers, and even by France herself; to lay contributions on the cities and towns in the midst of profound peace, and leave the new possessors only an exhausted skeleton, to abolish this constitution, without consulting the Emperor of Germany, from whom a crown was wrested; or Russia, so lately become the guarantee of the German League; or Prussia, intimately interested in that league, thus arbitrarily dissolved. No wars and continued victories have sometimes produced great and remarkable catastrophes ; but such an example, in time of peace, was never before given to the world. The King commiserated the unfortunate Princes who suffered by these transactions, but he pitied not less those who had suffered themselves to be lured by the hope of gain, and he would reproach himself, should he increase their unhappiness, by judging them with too great severity. Deluded by the reward of their compliance, probably forced to obey commands, which admitted of no oppesition; or, if surprised into consent, sutticiently punished by their acquisitions, and by being reduced to a state of vassalage, as harsh and degrading, as their former relations were honourable, they deserve not to be treated by Germany with the utmost rigour. Perhaps, when the magnanimous nation to which they formerly belonged, arises around them on every side, to contend for their independence, they may listen to the voice of gratitude and honour, and at least abhor their chains, when they find they must be stained with the blood of their brethren. It was not enough that these despotic acts were immediately injurious to Prussia. The Emperor of France was intent on rendering insensible to the person of the King in allied states. The existence of the * Orange was under the common gua rantee of the two powers; for Prussia had acknowledged the political changes in Hol land only under this condition.-For several years this Prince had expected that his claims, secured by the mutual stipulations of Prussia and France, should be satisfied. The Batavian Republic had been willing to enter into an accomodation, but the Emperor Napoleon forbade it. Neither the recollection of this circumstance, nor the consideration of the ties of blood which united his Majesty to the Prince, nor the declaration twenty times repeated, that the King would not desert the rights of his brother-in-law, could prevent his being added to the heap of victims. He was the first who was deprived of his paternal property.-Eight days before, he had received from the Emperor a letter, condoling with him, in the customary forms, on the death of his father, and wishing him joy on his undisturbed succession to the states of his house. None of these circumstances are unimportant; each throws a light on the whole. Cleves had been allotted to Prince Murat; scarcely become a sovereign, he wished to become a conqueror. His troops took possession of the Abbeys of Essen Werden and Etten, under the pretext, that they appertained to the Duchy of Cleves, though they were intirely territories newly acquired; and there was not the shadow of a connection between them and the ceded province. Great labour was employed, in vain, to give even a colour to this outrage. Wesel was to belong to the new Duke, not to the Emperor Napoleon. The king had never resolved to give up the last fortress on the Rhine, into the power of France. Without a word, by way of explanation, Wesel was annexed to a French department. The existing state of the Austrian monarchy, and of the Porte, had been mutually guaranteed. The Emperor Napoleon certainly wished that Prussia should be bound by this guarantee, for in his hands it was an instrument he might employ as suited his politics; a pretext for demanding sacrifices in any contest which his ambition might occa sion, when it contributed to his interests: Ragusa, though under the protection of the Porte, was taken possession of by his troops. Gradisca and Aquilea were wrested from Austria, under nearly the same pretexts which had been employed when the French seized the three Abbeys. In all political proceedings, it was natu rally taken for granted, that the new states, ferned by France, were states in the proper sense of the term, and not French provinces; but it cost the cabinet of St. Cloud only a word, to deprive them of their independence. The appellation of The Great Empire, was invented, and that empire was immediately only surrounded by vassals. Thus there was no trace of the treaty left; yet Prussia proceeded to shut her ports against England, and still considered herself as having obligations to fulfil. The Emperor at length informed his Majesty, that it was his pleasure to dissolve the German Empire, and form a confederation of the Rhine; and he recommended to the King to establish a similar confederation in the north of Germany. This was according to his customary policy; a policy which had long been crowned with success, at the moment of the birth of any new project, to throw out a lure to those courts which might occasion difficulties in the execution of such project The King adopted the idea of such a confederation, not that the advice he received made the least impression on him, but because, in fact, it was rendered necessary by circumstances; and because, after the suc cession of the states of the south, which had acceded to the Confederation of the Rhine, a close union between those of the north, became more than ever the condition of their safety. The King took measures to establish this league, but on other principles from those of the model presented to him. He made it his pride to collect the last of the Germans under his banners; but the rights of each he left unimpaired, and honour alone was the bond of the league. But could France advise the King to any measures which should be productive of advantage to Prussia? We shall soon see what is to be expected when France makes profe sions of favour. In the first place, care had been taken to introduce into the fundamental statute of the Confederation of the Rhine, an article which contained the germ of all future innovations. It provided, that other princes should be received into this Confederation, should they desire it. In this manner, all relations in Germany were left indeterminate; and, as means were still reserved, by promise or threats. it was but too probable, that in time this Confederation would be extended to the heads of the Prussian monarchy; and that this might no longer remain doubtful, but be manifest to every one, the first attempt was immediately made. Fortunately, it was made on a Prince who knows not fear, and considers independence as the higher object of his ambition. The French minister at Cassel invited the Elector to throw himself into the arms of his master. Prussia, it was alleged, did nothing for her allies! It is true, Napoleon knows how to manage his better; and every one sees, that Spain and Holland, the Kings of Wirtemburg and Bavaria, have to thank their alliance with him for peace, independence, and honour.-Prussia did nothing for her allies. Napoleon, on the contrary, would reward the accession of the Elector by an enlargement of his territory. And this treachery was exerted towards an ally, and at the very moment when the King was advised to form an alliance, of which Hesse was to be the first bulwark; endeavours were made to detach from him a power, whom family connections, alliances, and relations of every kind, united in the closest manner to His Majesty's per-. son. But even these hostile steps were not sufficient. Does any wish to know what was the lure by which it was hoped to gain the Elector of Hesse, and what was the augmentation of territory, with the expectation of which he was flattered! It was the Prince of Orange, the brother-in-law of the King, that Prince, who had been twice deceived in the most shameless manner, who was now to be robbed the third time. He still possessed the terri tory of Fulda. This was promised to the Elector; and it would have been given, had the Elector consented to accept it, and had Prussia not taken up arms. His Majesty saw the system of usurpation advance every day. He saw a circle, continually becoming narrower, drawing round him, and even the right of moving within it, beginning to be disputed with him; for a sweeping resolution forbade a passage to any foreign troops, armed or not armed, through the states of the Confederation. This was to' cut off, contrary to the rights of nations, the connection between the detached Hessian pro-, vinces; this was to prepare pretexts on which to act; this was the first threat of punishment aimed at a magnanimous Prince, who had preferred a defender to a master. But even after this, His Majesty cannot reflect on it without admiration, the King considered whether a combination might not be found, which should render this state of things compatible with the maintenance of peace. The Emperor Napoleon appeared to be solicitous to remove this doubt. Two negociations were then carrying on at Paris; one with Russia, the other with the English ministry. In both these negociations, the intentions of France against Prussia were evidently manifested. By the treaty which the Emperor of Russia had refused to ratify, France offered in conjunction with Russia, to prevent Prussia fronr depriving the King of Sweden of his German territories; yet, for many months, the cabinet of St. Cloud had continually pressed the King to seize those states, with a threefold view; first, to revenge himself on the King of Sweden; secondly to embroil Prussia with all other powers; and, thirdly, to purchase her silence with respect to the subversion of southern Germany. But the King had long been aware that such were the views of France, and his unfortunate dispute with Sweden, was painful to him. He had, therefore, been careful to provide against every suspicion of self-interested motives, and he confided his explanations to the Emperor Alexander. The scene now again changed, and Napoleon, who had so long been the enemy of the King of Sweden, was suddenly transformed into his protector. It is not superfluous to remark, that in this insidious treaty of the French Emperor, in order to satisfy the honorable interest which the court of St. Petersburgh took in the maintenance of the rights of the King of Naples, he promised the latter an indemnification, engaging to prevail on the King of Spain to cede to him the Balearic Islands. He will act in the same manner with respect to the augmentations of territory he pretends to bestow on his allies. These were all preludes to the steps he took against Prussia. We now approach the moment which determined His Majesty.-Prussia had hitherto derived nothing from her Treaties with France, but humiliation and loss; one single advantage remained; the fate of Hanover was in her power, and in her power it must remain, unless the last pledge of the security of the North were annihilated. Napoleon had solemnly guaranteed this state of things; yet he negociated with England on the basis of the restoration of the Electorate. The King is in possession of the proofs. War was now, in fact, declared; declared by every measure taken by France. Every month produced a new notification of the return of his army; but on one frivolous pretext or another, it was still continued in Germany; and for what purposes? Gracious Heaven! to eradicate the last trace of sovereignty among the Germans; to treat Kings as Governors appointed by himself; to drag before military tribunals, citizens only responsible to their own governments; to declare others outlaws, who lived peaceably in foreign states under foreign sovereigns, and even in a capital of a German Emperor, because they had published writings in which the French Government, or at least its despotism, was attacked, and this at the time when that same government daily permitted hired libellers to attack, under its protection, the honour of all crowned heads, and the most sacred feelings of nations, These armies were in no manner diminished, but continually reinforced and augmented, and continually advanced nearer to the frontiers of Prussia, or her allies; till they at length took a position which could only menace Prussia, and were even assembled in force in Westphalia, which certainly was not the road to the mouths of the Cattaro. It was no longer doubtful that Napoleon had determined to overwhelm Prussia with war, or to render her for ever incapable of war, since he was leading her from humiliation to humiliation, till she should be reduced to such a state of political degradation and feebleness, that, deprived of every defence, she could have no other will than that of her formidable neighbour. The King delayed no longer. He assembled his army. General Knobelsdorff was sent to Paris, with the final declaration of His Majesty. Only one measure remained which could give security to the King, which was the return of the French troops over the Rhine. The time for discussion was past, though the Cabinet of St. Cloud appeared still desirous to protract it; General Knobelsdorff had orders to insist on this demand: it was not the whole of the King's just demands, but it was necessary that it should be the first, since it was the condition of his future existence. The acceptance or refusal of it must shew the real sentiments of the French Emperor. Unmeaning professions, arguments, the real value of which were known by long experience, were the only answer the King received. Far from the French army being recalled, it was announced that it would be reinforced; but, with a haughtiness still more remarkable than this refusal, an offer was made that the troops which had advanced into Westphalia, should return home, if Prussia would desist from her preparations. This was not all it was insolently notified to the King's Ministers, that the Cities of Hamburgh, Bremen, and Lubeck, would not be suffered to join the Northern Confederation, but that France would take them under her protection; in the same manner as, in the other Confederation, she had given away cities, and promulgated laws, without permitting any other power to make the least pretension. The King was required to suffer a foreign interest to be introduced into the heart of his Monarchy. Another contrast of conduct incensed the King to the utmost. He received from the Emperor a letter full of those assurances of esteem, which, certainly, when they do not accord with facts, are to be considered as nothing; but which the dignity of Sovereigns renders a duty to themselves, even when on the eve of war; yet, a few days afterwards, at a moment when the sword was not yet drawn, when the Minis ter of the Linperor endeavoured to mislead those of the King by assurances on assurances of the friendly intentions of France, the Publiciste of the 16th of September appeared with a diatribe against the King and the Prussian State, in a style worthy of the most disgraceful periods of the revolution, insulting to the nation, and what, in other times than ours, would have been considered as amounting to a declaration of war. The King can treat slanders that are merely abus |