of our conception is one single detached sensation; whereas every visible object complex; and the conception that we form of it is aided by the association of ideas. We attend not, at one instant, to every point of the picture of an object on the retina (Corol. 1. Art. 138); nor at one instant, therefore, do we form a conception of the whole of any visible object; but our conception of the object as a whole, is the result of many conceptions. The association of ideas connects the different parts together, and presents them to the mind in their proper arrangement; and the various relations which these parts bear to one another in point of situation, contribute greatly to strengthen the associations. This illustration is confirmed by the fact, that it is more easy to remember a succession of sounds, than any particular sound which we have heard detached and unconnected. The war-hoop of the American Indians, the yell of Cossacks, the shout of victory, or any cry that alarmed or encouraged us, may be considered a particular sound, but the conception of such a sound depends on the association of ideas.

143. The power of conceiving visible objects, like other powers that depend on the association of ideas, may be greatly improved by habit.

Illus. A person accustomed to drawing, retains a much more perfect notion of a building, or of a landscape, which he has seen, than one who has never practised that art. A portrait painter traces the forms of the human body from memory, with as little exertion as he employs in writing the letters which compose his name.

144. Secondly. In the power of conceiving colors, too, there are striking differences among individuals; and probably, in the greater number of instances, the supposed defects of sight, in this respect, ought rather to be ascribed to a defect in the power of conception, than in the organ of the perception of color.

Illus. We often see two men who are perfectly sensible of the difference between two colors when they are presented to them, who cannot give names to these colors with confidence, when they see them apart; and are perhaps apt to confound the one with the other. They feel the sensation of color like other men, it should seem, when the object is present, but are incapable, probably in consequence of some early habit of inattention, to conceive the sensation distinctly when the object is removed. Without this power of conception, Mr. Stewart thinks, that it is evidently impossible for them, how lively soever their sensations may be, to give a name to any color; for the application of the name supposes not only a capacity of receiving the sensation, but a power of comparing it with one formerly felt. In some cases, perhaps, the sensation is not felt at all; and in others, the faintness of the sensation may be one cause of those habits of inattention, from which the incapacity of conception has arisen.

145. Thirdly. A talent for lively description, at least in the case of sensible objects, depends chiefly on the degree

in which the describer possesses the power of conception. Nor is it merely to the accuracy of our description, in common conversation, that this power is subservient; it contributes more than any thing else to render them striking and expressive to others, by guiding us to a selection of such circumstances as are most prominent and characteristical.

Obs. The best rule for descriptive composition, is, to attend to those rules which make the deepest impression on our own minds. Now, these particulars are in general the outline; and it is the province of conception to neglect a minute specification of particulars, and to select only such as struck us most at the moment the object we are describing from recollection was present to our view. A person may therefore write a happier description of an object from the conception than from the actual perception of that object.

146. The foregoing observations, with their respective illustrations, apply to conception, as distinguished from imagination. The two faculties, we observed, are very nearly allied; and are frequently so blended and compounded, that it is difficult to say, to which of the two some particular operations of the mind are to be referred. There are also general facts which hold equally with respect to both.

147. The exercise both of conception and imagination is always accompanied with a belief that their objects exist.

Illus. 1. Thus, when the imagination is very lively, as in dreaming and madness, a real existence is ascribed to its objects; and in the case, too, of those who, in spite of their own general belief of the absurdity of the vulgar stories of apparitions, dare not trust themselves alone with their own imaginations in the dark, we have all the evidence that the thing admits of, that imagination is attended with belief. Dr. Reid's friend, who could not sleep in a room alone, nor go alone into a room in the dark, felt and acted in the same manner as he would have done, if he had believed that the objects of his fear were real, which is the only proof that the philosophers produce, or can produce, of the belief which accompanies perception.

2. The painter, who conceives the face and figure of an absent friend, in order to draw his picture, believes, for the moment, that his friend is before him. The belief is only momentary, for it is extremely difficult, in our waking hours, to keep up a steady and undivided attention to any object we conceive or imagine; and as soon as the conception or imagination is over, the belief which attended it is at an end. We, in fact, consider them as creations of the mind, which have no separate and independent existence, from the facility with which we can recall or dismiss the objects of these powers at pleasure. But when the conceptions of the mind are rendered steady and permanent, by being strongly associated with any sensible impression, as when we gaze on a magnificent prospect, they command our belief no less that our actual perceptions; and, therefore, if it were possible for us, with our eyes shut, to keep up for a length

of time, the conception of the immense extent of the whole scene that had formerly engaged our eyes, we should, as long as this effort continued, believe that all the different parts of which it was composed, were present to our senses.

148. The knowledge we obtain by the eye, of the tangible qualities of bodies, is the result of a complex operation of the mind; comprehending, first, the perception of those qualities, which are the proper and original objects of sight; and, secondly, the conception of those tangible qualities, of which the original perceptions of sight are found from experience to be the signs.

Corol. The notions, therefore, we form by means of the eye, of the tangible qualities of bodies, and of the distances of these objects from the organ, are mere conceptions; strongly, and indeed indissolubly, associated, by early and constant habit, with the original perceptions of sight.

149. The effects which exhibitions of fictitious distress produce on the mind, may all be resolved into the conceptions we have, for the moment, that the whole is real.

Illus. 1. During the representation of a tragedy, we have a general conviction that the whole is a fiction; but, I believe, no person ever witnessed Mrs. Siddons, Miss O'Neill, Mr. John Kemble, and Mr. Kean, in tragedy, who did not partake in the emotions which those artists created; who did not entertain a momentary belief that the distresses, which were but fictitious, were actually real. But whence arose this belief? whence the conception ?-but from the contagion spread by the faithful expression of the passions.

2. The emotions produced by tragedy are, thence, analogous to the dread we feel when we look down from the battlements of a tower ;or the horror which seizes a person, who, fleeing from a conflagration, escapes from the top of a house by a path, which, at another time, he would have considered as impracticable;-or to the astonishment of soldiers, who, in mounting a breach, have found their way to the enemy, by a route which appeared inaccessible after their violent passions had subsided. We have a general conviction that there is no ground for the feelings which we experience during the representation of a tragedy, or when we look down from the battlements of a tower, any more than the person who has escaped from the fire has to feel horror at the recollection of the imminent danger he was in as he traversed the hazardous path, or than the soldier's wonder at himself in having scrambled by a route the bare contemplation of which suspends his curiosity to retrace his footsteps.

5

CHAPTER VI.

OF ABSTRACTION.

150. ABSTRACTION is the faculty by which we analyze the actual assemblages of nature into their constituent parts. It is this faculty which enables us to ascertain what qualities an object has peculiar to itself, and what are in common to it and other objects of a like nature, which will therefore be referred to the same class with it. In short, the whole process of the formation of general notions is due to the faculty of abstraction alone.

Obs. Had we possessed no such faculty as abstraction, all our knowledge would have been limited to an acquaintance with individual beings and individual facts. But the very essence of science consists in generalizing and reducing to a few classes, or general principles, the multitude of individual things which every branch of human knowledge embraces. Hence, without abstraction, science would have had no existence; and the knowledge of man would have been like that of the lower animals, in whom no traces of this faculty are discernible; circumscribed to an acquaintance with those objects and events in nature with which he was connected by a regard to his own knowledge and preservation.

151. It is in the discovery of general principles, that reason has its noblest exercise. It is generalization alone that makes it possible for us continually to go on in scientific improvement.

Obs. It is in consequence of this, that at the moment when a multitude of particular solutions and of insulated facts begin to distract the attention, and to overcharge the memory, the former gradually lose themselves in one general method, and the latter unite in one general law; and that these generalizations, continually succeeding one to another, like the successive multiplications of a number into itself, have no other limit than that infinity which the human faculties are unable to comprehend. Hence it appears, that abstraction is completely subservient to all the nobler exertions of reason; to those, in particular, by which man has attained the high distinction of being denominated a rational animal.

152. In proportion as a man familiarizes himself in the exercise of abstraction, and accustoms himself to consider what are the distinguishing characteristics of the various objects of his contemplation, and what they have in common with others, does he fit himself for scientific pursuits.

Obs. But it has been supposed that the formation of general prin

ciples is not entirely suited to the direction of our conduct in the more ordinary occurrences of life; and hence the origin of that maxim which has been so industriously propagated by the dunces of every age-that a man of genius is unfit for business! But when theoretical knowledge and practical skill are happily combined in the same person, the intellectual power of man appears in its full perfection, and fits him equally to conduct with a masterly hand the duties of ordinary business, and to contend successfully with the untried difficulties of new and hazardous situations.

I. Of Abstract or General Terms.

153. The words we use in language are either general words or proper names. Proper names belong to individuals, as George, London, Thames; common names, or general words, are not appropriated to signify any one individual thing, but are equally related to many; as man, horse, star.

Obs. Under general words are comprehended not only those which the logicians call general terms; that is to say, such words as may make the subject or the predicate of a proposition, but likewise their auxiliaries or accessories, such as prepositions, conjunctions, articles, which are all general words, though they cannot properly be called general terms.

154. In every language, rude or polished, general words make the greatest part, and proper names the least. Grammarians have reduced all words to eight or nine classes, which are called parts of speech.

All verbs, par

ilus. Proper names are found only among nouns. ticiples, pronouns, conjunctions, interjections and articles, are general terms. Of nouns, all adjectives are general, and the greater part of substantives. Every substantive that has a plural number, is a general word; for no proper name can have a plural number, because it signifies only one individual. Custom, however, hath made a few proper names plural, but the position we have laid down is not overthrown by an exception. In all the books of Euclid's Elements, there is not one word that is not general.

Obs. At the same time, we observe, that all the objects which we perceive are individuals. Every object of sense, of memory, or of consciousness, is an individual. All the good things we desire or enjoy, and all the evils we feel or fear, must come from individuals.

155. The reason why proper names make but a very small and inconsiderable part of a language, is, that these names are local, and having no names answering to them in other languages, are not accounted a part of the language, any more than the customs of a hamlet are accounted part of the law of the nation, much less of the whole human family.