First, by blending together in our apprehensions things which are really distinct in their nature, so as to introduce perplexity and error into every process of reasoning in which they are involved.

Secondly, by misleading us in those anticipations of the future from the past, which our constitution disposes us to form, and which are the great foundation of our conduct in life.

Thirdly, by connecting in the mind erroneous opinions with truths which irresistibly command our assent, and which we feel to be of importance to human happiness.

237. First. The association of ideas has a tendency to warp our speculative opinions, by blending together in our apprehensions things which are really distinct in their nature, so as to introduce perplexity and error into every process of reasoning in which they are involved.

Illus. 1. This branch of the subject embraces our notions of color and extension. The former of these words expresses that which is the cause of a sensation in the mind; the latter denotes a quality of an external object; so that there is, in fact, no more connection between the two notions than between those of pain and solidity; and yet, in consequence of our always perceiving extension, at the same time at which the sensation of color is excited in the mind, as when we look upon an extended verdant plain, we find it impossible afterwards to think of that sensation, without conceiving extension along with it.

2. Another intimate association is formed in every mind between the ideas of space and time. When we think of an interval of duration, we always conceive it analogous to a line, and we apply the same language to both subjects. Hence the terms long and short time, as well as long and short distance. Now, this apprehended analogy is obviously founded on the association between the ideas of space and time, arising from our always measuring the one by the other.

Example. We measure time by motion, and motion by extension. In an hour, the hand of the clock moves over a certain space; in two hours, over double the space; and so on. Hence the ideas of space and time become intimately united, and we apply to the latter the words long and short, before and after, in the same manner as to the former.

Illus. 3. From an accidental association of ideas arises also the apprehended analogy between the relation which the different notes in the scale of music bear to each other; and from a similar apprehended analogy arises the relation of superiority and inferiority, in point of position, among material objects.

Corol. In the instances which have now been mentioned, our habits of combining the notions of two things become so strong, that we find it impossible to think of the one without thinking, at the same time, of the other. Hence we may easily conceive the manner in which the association of ideas has a tendency to mislead the judgment, except the mind be accustomed to those discriminations which science requires, and which will not suffer it to be imposed on by that confusion of ideas which warps the judgments of the multitude in moral, religious, and political inquiries.

238. Secondly. The association of ideas is a source of speculative error, by misleading us in those anticipations of the future from the past, which are the foundation of our conduct in life.

Illus. 1. The great object of philosophy is to ascertain the laws which regulate the succession of events both in the physical and in the moral worlds; in order that, when called upon to act in any particular combination of circumstances, we may be enabled to anticipate the probable course of nature from our past experience, and to regulate our conduct accordingly. Nature has not only given all men a strong disposition to remark, with attention and curiosity, those phenomena which have been observed to happen nearly at the same time, but has beautifully adapted, to the uniformity of her own operations, the laws of association in the human mind. By rendering contiguity in time one of our associating principles, she has conjoined together in our thoughts the same events which we have found conjoined in our experience, and has thus accommodated (without any effort on our part) the order of our ideas to that scene in which we are destined to act.

2. The laws of nature, which it is most material for us to know, are exposed to the immediate observation of our senses; and establish, by means of the principle of association, a corresponding order in our thoughts long before the dawn of reason or reflection.

3. This bias of the mind to associate events which have been presented to it nearly at the same time, is, nevertheless, with all its boasted advantages, attended with inconveniences; for among the various phenomena which are continually passing before us, there is a great proportion whose vicinity in time does not indicate a constancy of conjunction; and they who do not distinguish between these two classes of connections, will become a prey to that superstitious disposition which confounds together accidental and permanent connections. Hence the regard which is paid to unlucky days, to unlucky colors, and to the influence of the planets.

Example. An Indian once found himself relieved of a bodily indisposition by a draught of cold water. This man was a second time afflicted with the same disorder, and was desirous to repeat the same remedy. He applied to a philosopher to be informed whether the cure was owing to the water which he had drank, to the shell in which it was contained, to the fountain from which it was taken, to the particular time of the day, or to the particular age of the moon. The philosopher smiled at the Indian's simplicity. A juggler, who was by at the time, overhearing what passed, looked gravely at the sick man, and, with as much pomposity, bade him repeat the experiment. In order, therefore, to ensure the success of the remedy, the Indian very naturally and very wisely copied, as far as he could recollect, every circumstance which accompanied the first application of the water. He made use of the same kind of shell, he drew the water from the same fountain, he held his body in the same posture, and he turned his face to the same point of the horizon. He recovered a second time. At the time of the second experiment, and ever after, all the accidental circumstances in which the first experiment was made, were associated equally, with the effect produced, in the

Indian and in the juggler's mind. The fame of the cure was spread far and wide. The fountain from which the water was drawn was ever after considered as possessed of particular virtues, the shell from which it was drank was set apart from vulgar uses, the day on which the experiment was made received a new name, and was deemed lucky; the posture of the body, and the point of the horizon in which the face was held, were also accounted lucky, for the sake of those who might afterwards have occasion to apply the remedy.

Corol. 1. Here, then, is the source of one species of superstition due to the influence of association; and it sufficiently proves how mankind are misled in those anticipations of the future from the past, which are the foundation of their conduct in life.

2. The reasonings we have now used may be extended also to analogous prejudices which warp our opinions respecting the customs and manners of our country; the form and exercise of its government; the execution of its laws, and the administration of justice; our manner of life and course of education; but weakness and versatility of mind, and the same facility of association we have contemplated in the Indian, are sources of national prejudice and national bigotry, among enlightened Europeans.

239. Thirdly. We have now to consider the third class of our speculative errors, arising from the association of ideas connecting in the mind erroneous opinions, with truths which irresistibly command our assent, and which we feel to be of importance to our happiness.

Illus. We have seen how all the different circumstances which accompanied the first administration of a remedy, come to be considered as essential to its future success, and are blended together in the conceptions of the mind, without any discrimination of their relative importance; and we shall now show, that whatever tenets and religious ceremonies men have been taught to connect with the religious creed of their infancy, become almost a part of their constitution, by being indissolubly united with truths which are essential to their happiness, and which they are led to reverence and to love with all the best dispositions of the heart.

Example. A young English officer had saved the life of a Brahmin's daughter. The Brahmin grew old and fell sick. On his deathbed he exclaimed to the officer," Is it possible that he to whose compassion I owe the preservation of my child, and who now soothes my last moments with the consolations of piety, should not believe in the god Vistnou, and his nine metamorphoses!

Here we have all the evidence the thing admits of, that the astonishment of the learned and venerable Brahmin was of a piece with what the rudest of mankind feel when they see the rites of a religion different from their own. The Brahmin seemed to question whether there could be any thing worthy in the mind which treated with indifference what awakened in his own breast all its best and sublimest emotions. The peasant views the rites of a religion different from that in which he was educated, with an astonishment as great as if he

saw some flagrant breach of the moral duties, or some direct act of impiety to God.

Corol. What has now been said on the nature of religious superstition, may be applied to many other subjects; and in particular to those political prejudices which bias the judgment even of enlightened men in all countries of the world. And with this remark we may therefore conclude here, that as, in ancient Rome, it was regarded as the mark of a good citizen never to despair of the fortunes of the republic;-so the good citizen of the world, the philosopher, and the Christian, whatever may be the political, the scientific, and the religious aspect of their own times, will never despair of the fortunes of the human race; but will act upon the conviction that prejudice, slavery, and corruption-ignorance, error, and speculative mysticism-irreligion, vice, and impiety-must gradually give way to truth, liberty, and virtue; to knowledge, good sense, and happiness; to piety, charity, and benevolence.

Thirdly, of the Influence of arbitrary Associations, as it affects our moral Judgment.

240. Our moral judgments may be modified and even perverted to a certain degree, in consequence of the influence of arbitrary associations; for there is a fashion, not only in matters of taste and speculative inquiry, but even in morality and religion.

Illus. In the same manner in which a person who is regarded as a model of taste, may introduce, by his example, an absurd or fantastical dress, so a man of splendid virtues may attract some esteem also to his imperfections; and, if placed in a conspicuous situation, may render his vices and follies objects of general imitation among the multitude. What a libel on human reason! to be ever swayed by the mere influence of casual association, and the false shame of avowing ourselves habitually the friends of virtue, because knaves have nicknamed such tergiversations marks of superior endowments, and proofs of a mind emancipated from vulgar prejudices. (See Dr. Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, for the most luminous views of this part of our subject.)

241. Again, if we examine the moral and religious opinions which have prevailed in different ages of the world, and among people of different climates and nations, we shall find a striking diversity in many important particulars.

Illus. 1. The ancient heathen and the modern savage enjoin us, while we do all the good we can to our friends, to be equally studious to injure our enemies. The milder precepts of Christianity, on the other hand, exhort us to an unlimited forgiveness of injuries. Among the Romans, suicide was a virtue; among Christians, it is a crime of the deepest dye. The South Sea Islanders, and the ancient Lacedemonians, practised theft without scruple; while, by the laws of Europe, it is punished with imprisonment, banishment, and death.

2. The heathen and the savage combine the ideas of valor and heroism with the revenge of injuries and the destruction of their enemies; and hence deem such conduct as praiseworthy, as gratitude for benefits received. But the more enlightened Christian discerns true magnanimity in the forgiveness of injuries; and justly accounts it a greater act of heroism to return good for evil, than to satisfy the impulse of his vengeance. The heathen looks upon suicide as an heroic act; the better instruction of the Christian leads him to consider it as a proof of timidity, as well as a highly culpable renunciation of the control of the supreme power. This diversity of opinion proves the extensive influence of the principle of association, which, however it may bias, can never totally subvert the power of the moral sense. (See Chapter XII. of this Book.)

3. With respect to the practice of theft, so prevalent among certain tribes, it may be remarked, that in those countries where it has prevailed, property has been considered as of little or no value. In the South Sea Islands, the spontaneous bounty of nature renders hoarding almost superfluous; and, in ancient Sparta, the accumulation of property was positively prohibited. In this latter country, too, it was merely the display of skill that sanctioned the theft; for detection was sure to cover the perpetrator with indelible disgrace.

Corol. Thus, it appears, that the diversities which are discovered in the moral sentiments of mankind, arise from known laws of the human constitution. The basis on which these moral sentiments are founded is immutable; but they may be variously modified, according to circumstances peculiar to the individual. It is thus that the language of different tribes assumes a particular character and idiom, according to the peculiar circumstances of their situation; but the fundamental principles of grammar continue radically the same in all dialects. (Illus. 1, 2. and Corol. Art. 62.)

Note. The power of association or combination, in regulating the succession of our ideas, and in directing the transition from one object of thought to another, will be examined when we come to treat of "IMAGINATION," and "THE TRAIN OF THOUGHT in the Mind."

CHAPTER VIII.

OF MEMORY.

I. Things obvious with Regard to Memory.

242. MEMORY is the faculty by which the mind has a knowledge of what it had formerly perceived, felt or thought. (See Illus. Art. 22. and the Illus. to Art. 139.)

Illus. 1. It is by memory that we have an immediate knowledge of things past. The senses give us information of things only as they