the deed recorded.-Benedict v. Gammon Theological Seminary, Ga., 50 S. E. Rep. 162.

109. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Defective Streets.-A fall into an open inlet in a public street in the dark is not conclusive of contributory negligence.-Dougherty v. City of Philadelphia, Pa., 60 Atl. Rep. 261.

110. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Incorporation. Where a town was reincorporated as a city by an act repealing all conflicting laws, the territory thereafter became a city, though the act granting a charter to the town had not been expressly repealed.-Wright v. Overstreet, Ga., 50 S. E. Rep. 487.

111. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Taxation.

Property

annexed to a city after the time the assessor was required to return his list held not taxable for the local taxes of the city for that year. City of Latonia v. Meyer, Ky., 86 S. W. Rep. 686.

112. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Use of Money Paid for Taxes. Where money collected from taxes is paid into the city treasury without appropriation for any particular purpose, it may be used for any legitimate expenditure-Blood v. Beale, Me., 60 Atl. Rep. 427.

113. NAVIGABLE WATERS-Riparian Rights to Accretions Where a riparian owner had by accretion acquired a vested contingent interest in accretions by change of water line on a meandered 'akе, he could not be deprived thereof by a later patent of such vested interests.-Weber v. Axtell, Minn., 102 N. W. Rep. 915.

114. NEGLIGENCE-Attempt to Save Life.-One is justi. fied in attempting to save human life, and in so doing is bound only to use due care, in view of the circumstances and emergency of the occasion.-Ridley v. Mobile & O. R. Co., Tenn, 86 S. W. Rep. 606.

115 NEGLIGENCE-Injury While Attempting to Board. -One held not guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law in attempting to board a street car when its speed is no greater than that of a man going at a fast walk.-Spencer v. St. Louis Transit Co., Mo., 86 S. W. Rep. 593.

116. PARENT AND CHILD-Right to Custody of Infant Parents have no right to the custody of their infant children, except subject to the paramount right of the state, to be exercised whenever deemed for the best interest of the children.-Wadleigh v. Newhall, U. S. C. C., N. D. Cal., 135 Fed. Rep. 941.

117. PARTNERSHIP-Advances by One Partner for Another. A release executed by one partner, discharging the copartner from liability for a sum advanced, held to operate as a discharge, though the amount of the advance was entered on the firm books as standing against the partner for whom the advance was made.Sterling v. Chapin, 92 N. Y. Supp. 904.

118. PARTNERSHIP-Claim Against Deceased Partner.The accounts of a partnership must first be settled in court of common pleas, before the claim of one partner against the estate of the deceased partner can be passed upon in the orphan's court.-In re De Coursey's Estate, Pa., 60 Atl. Rep. 490.

119. PARTNERSHIP-Evidence as to Existence of Rela tion.-On an issue as to whether defendant was a mem ber of certain firm evidence as to what one of the mem bers of the firm said as to who constituted the firm was incompetent.-Rector v. Robins, Ark., 86 S. W. Rep. 667. 120. PARTNERSHIP-What Constitutes -Where a partner contracts with a third person for a division of the profits in the partnership enterprise, such person does not become a member of the partnership, nor liable for its debts.-Morrison v Dickey, Ga., 50 S. E. Rep. 175.

121. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Acts of Agent. Where the obligee in a note and mortgage obtained by an agent claims the benefits thereof, he is also bound by the acts of the agent in the transaction by which they were procured.-Corbett v. Clute, N. Car., 50 S. E. Rep. 216.

122. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Notice to Agent of Inferiority of Goods Delivered.-A notice of the inferiority of goods sued for, given to plaintiff's agent at a time

when defendants knew that the agent would not communicate it to plaintiff, held not notice to plaintiff.Brown v. Harris, Mich., 102 N. W. Rep. 960.

123. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Ratification of Lease by Acceptance of Rent.-Where a lease was signed by an agent in his principal's name, the latter, by subsequent · ly accepting rent with knowledge of the lease, ratified such signature. - Clement v. Young-McShea Amusement Co., N. J., 60 Atl. Rep. 419.

124. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY Death of Principal Debtor.-The surety on a note may be sued thereon after the maker's death, without necessity of first presenting the claim to the deceased's administrator.Planters' & Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Robertson, Tex., 86 S. W. Rep. 643.

125. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Liability Under Contractor's Bond.-The sureties on a contractor's bond to indemnify owner for a breach of contract held responsible for such damages as resulted in the performance of the contract to an adjoining building.-Leppert v. Flaggs, Md., 60 Atl. Rep. 450.

126. QUIETING TITLE - Community Property. The husband's title to community property will not be quieted against the unfounded verbal assertion of the wife to title.-Newman v. Newman, Tex., 86 S. W. Rep. 635.

127. QUIETING TITLE - Possession. Except in the case of wild lands, it must appear, in an action to remove a cloud on title, that petitioner was in possession. —Weyman v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 50 S. E. Rep. 492.

128. RAILROADS - Injury Due to Obstructed View at Crossing.-A person injured while crossing a railroad track held not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to inquire whether it was safe to cross.-Coffee v. Pere Marquette R. Co., Mich., 102 N. W. Rep. 953.

129. RECEIVERS-Personal Expenses and Attorney's Fees. Where a receiver's account claimed allowances for personal expenses and attorney's fees not supported by voucher or proof of payment, it could not be allowed. Strauss v. Casey Machine & Supply Co., N. J., 60 Atl. Rep. 402.

130. RECEIVERS Suit Without Leave. The com mencement of an action against a receiver without leave does not affect the jurisdiction of the court, but merely constitutes contempt, and the action is regular until the proceeding is stayed or set aside by the court. -Pruyn v. Black, 92 N. Y. Supp. 995.

131. REPLEVIN-Damages -In replevin, the fair, reasonable, ordinary use value of the property, estimated by the market value of such use, held the proper measure of damages.--Ocala Foundry & Machine Works v. Lester, Fla., 38 So. Rep. 51.

132. SALES-Acceptance.-Where defendants accepted goods sued for, they were liable for the contract price, and not the actual value of the goods delivered.-Brown v. Harris, Mich., 102 N. W. Rep. 960.

133. SALES-Acceptance.-A delay in returning goods sold by sample from November 20th until December 12th held to amount to an acceptance of the goods.-MacEvoy v. Aronson, 92 N. Y. Supp. 724.

134. SALES-Burden of Proving Goods Tendered Complied With Contract.-In an action to enforce a contract for the sale of goods, plaintiff has the burden of showing that the goods tendered complied with the contract.McCall Co. v. Jacobson, Mich., 102 N. W. Rep. 1011.

135. SALES-Condition of Goods at Place of Delivery.Contract for delivery of goods in a certain condition at the buyer's place of business is broken or not according to the condition of the goods at that place.-Union Carpet Lining Co. v. George F. Miller & Co., Tex., 86 S. W. Rep. 651.

136. SALES-Duty to Inspect.-If original contract for sale of goods does not require consignee to inspect, he is not required so to do because bill of lading so provides.-Marlboro Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Brooke, S. Car., 50 S. E. Rep. 186.

137. SHIPPING-Interrogatories in Pleading.-Interrog atories annexed to an answer in a proceeding for limitation of liability, which are directed solely to the discov ery of assets of the petitioner, are immaterial to the issues and subject to exception.-In re Knickerbocker Steamboat Co., U. S. D. C., S. D. N. Y., 135 Fed. Rep. 956. 138. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - Unconscionable Contracts. Any fact showing that a contract is unfair, un just, and against good conscience will justify a court of equity in refusing to decree its performance.-Berry v. Frisbie, Ky., 86 S. W. Rep. 558.

The legisla.

139. STATUTES - Intoxicating Liquors. ture has power to pass statutes of local application gov. erning the liquor traffic, and to declare a misdemeanor the keeping of spirituous liquors with intent to sell in a certain county of the state.-State v. Barrett, N. J., 60 Atl. Rep. 506.

140. STREET RAILROADS-Collision with Wagon.-On approaching a public street junction,the motorman must anticipate that any person approaching such crossing from either side may turn his team into the street.Marden v. Portsmouth, K. & Y. St. Ry., Me., 60 Atl. Rep. 530.

RAILROADS-Collision

141. STREET with Wagon.That a car runs quite a distance after an accident is not conclusive of negligence, where the evidence shows that it was disabled in the collision and became uncontrollable.-Riley v. Shreveport Traction Co., La., 38 So. Rep. 83.

142. STREET RAILROADS - Death to Passenger.-The fact that a passenger on a street car was injured does not of itself raise a presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier.--State v. United Rys. & Electric Co., Md., 60 Atl. Rep. 249.

143. STREET RAILROADS-Injury to Pedestrian Crossing Between Motionless Cars.-It is not contributory negligence as a matter of law for a person to cross a street railway track between two motionless cars.Fitzgerald v. New York City Ry. Co., 92 N. Y. Supp. 732. 144. STREET RAILROADS -Refusal to Accept Transfer. -Where a street railway company was legally bound to issue transfers, and one was actually issued to plaintiff, defendant could not justify ejecting plaintiff on the ground that it did not issue transfers at such point.Chiert v. Interurban St. Ry. Co., 92 N. Y. Supp. 781.

145. SUBROGATION-Estate of Deceased Partner.-The estate of a deceased partner held entitled, on payment of attorney's fees incurred by the surviving partner on the firm's account, to subrogation to the attorney's lien for the fees.-Jones v. Dulaney & Mitchell, Ky., 86 S. W. Rep. 547.

146. SUBROGATION-Volunteer. One tendering to a mortgagee, at the request and for the benefit of a tenant in common of the mortgaged premises, the full amount of the debt, held not a mere volunteer, to whom subrogation should be denied.-Simonson v. Lauck, 92 N. Y. Supp. 965.

147. TAXATION-Delegation of Power.-The legislature, in which the power of taxation resides, cannot delegate to another body having no governmental function the authority to determine in its discretion the amount to be raised by taxation -Van Cleve v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Com'rs, N. J., 60 Atl. Rep. 214.

148. TAXATION-Validity of Assessment Notice.Where a widow uses the initials of her deceased husband, an assessment in which she is so described is sufficient.-Tieman v. Johnston, La., 38 So, Rep. 75.

149. TAXATION-Void Tax Deed. Where, in a suit by the holder of a void tax deed to quiet title, judgment was rendered for a sale of a building which had been removed by the owner, an order confirming the sale of the building held erroneous, in so far as it characterized the building as an "article of personal property."Easton v. Cranmer, S. Dak., 102 N. W. Rep. 944.

150. TENDER-Uncertified Check.-A tender of an uncertified check is sufficient, if it is not objected to on the ground that it is uncertified.-Bunte v. Schumann, 92 N. Y. Supp. 806.

151. TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES-Use of Cor. porate Name.-That a person has acquired some skill in a business which he has conducted with the intent of profiting unlawfully by the trade reputation of another does not, as against an injured party, entitle a corpora. tion in which he is interested to adopt that name in the same business -International Silver Co. v. Wm. H. Rogers Corp., N. J., 60 Atl. Rep. 187.

152. TRUSTS Charges Against for Procuring Letters with Will Annexed.-A trust fund is not chargeable with expenses of counsel in procuring letters with the will annexed.-Jewett v. Schmidt, 92 N. Y. Supp. 737.

153. TRUSTS-Grounds for Removing Co-trustee.-The existence of inharmonious relations between testator's wife, acting as co-trustee, and the beneficiary of the trust, and the wife's conduct in renouncing the will,held to warrant her removal as trustee.-Polk v. Linthicum, Md., 60 Atl. Rep. 455.

154. TRUSTS-Validity of Provision in Will.-A clause of a will enlarging a trust created for testatrix's husband, so as so invalidate it, held not a separable provision, which could be rejected and the trust sustained. -Ullman v. Cameron, 92 N. Y. Supp. 976.

155. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Certificates of Goods Furnished.-Estimates and certificates of vendee's engi neer as to coal delivered hela conclusive on the parties under their contract, in the absence of fraud or mistake. -Price v. City of New York, 82 N. Y. Supp. 967.

156. WATERS AND WATER COURSES-Railway Embank ment Causing Inundation of Land.-Measure of damages for the construction of a permanent railway embankment, subjecting land to inundation, held the difference in the value of the land before and after the construction.-Texas Cent. R. Co. v. Brown, Tex., 86 S. W. Rep.

659.

157. WILLS-Conditional Devise.-Where a devise was to the survivor of testatrix's two daughters remaining unmarried, it did not pass by the will of the unmarried daughter, who died prior to the death of her married sister.-Hill v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., Md., 60 Atl. Rep.

446.

158. WILLS-Contest.-Where testator had mental capacity and was free from undue influence, it was immaterial that he made an unequal division of his property. -Gesell v. Baugher, Md., 60 Atl. Rep. 481.

159. WILLS-Mental Capacity.-Where it was contended that testator was a victim of the morphine habit, evidence of the symptoms disclosed by her was admissible to enable experts to testify to the main fact.-Buxton v. Emery, Mich., 102 N. W. Rep. 948.

160. WILLS-Resulting Trusts.-A sealed letter, referred to by testator in his will, but not executed as a will nor attached to the will, being testamentary in character, held ineffective as a part of the will.-Bryan v. Bigelow, Conn., 60 Atl. Rep. 266.

161. WITNESSES-Act of God.-A newspaper account of an interview had between the publisher of a paper and a witness, with reference to a cloud-burst which was the subject of the witness' evidence, held inadmissible to affect his credibility or otherwise.-Southern Pac. Co. v. Schuyler, U. S. C. C. of App., Ninth Circuit, 135 Fed. Rep. 1015.

162. WITNESSES-Cross-Examination.-In an action for the price of goods sold, the sustaining of an objection to further cross examination of plaintiff held not error.— Brown v. Harris, Mich., 102 N. W. Rep. 960.

163. WITNESSES-Examination by Judge.-Where, on an examination of a witness by the court, it does not express any opinion, the fact that such evidence may be detrimental to a party is not ground for new trial Johnson v. A. Leffler Co., Ga., 50 S. E. Rep. 488.

164. WITNESSES-Explanation of Previous Statements. -It is not error to permit a witness for the state to explain a statement made by him which has been brought into the case by the accused. -State v. Taylor, W. Va., 50 S. E. Rep. 247.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., NOVEMBER 3, 1905.

WHEN ATTORNEYS' FEES MAY BE ADDED TO THE ACTUAL DAMAGES.

The law is made for the purpose of commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong, and while in ordinary cases attorneys' fees are not added as a part of the damages, there are cases where upon principle they ought to be so assessed. The general rule might be stated as follows: Whenever the act complained of is one which is the result of or essential to a deliberate or willful intention to commit wrongful act, and damage follows, the injured party ought, in reason, to be fully compensated for the whole wrong, including all the expense and trouble to which the injured party has been compelled to submit. In short, in all cases where exemplary damages are allowable, the expenses of the suit, including attorneys' fees, should be added. This rule seems to be well settled in Connecticut. Wynne v. Parsons, 57 Conn. 73 (1884), 17 Atl. Rep. 362; Welsh v. Durand (1869), 36 Conn. 182,4 Am. Rep. 55. In Ohio it is held that in assessing exemplary damages the expenses of litigation may be taken into consideration. Roberts v. Mason (1859), 10 Ohio St. 277; Peckham Iron Co. v. Harper, 41 Ohio St. 100. In Kansas the rule is, that where vindictive damages are recoverable, the jury in estimating them may properly consider the probable and reasonable expenses of litigation, although there is no testimony as to the amount thereof. Titus v. Corkins, 21 Kan. 722. See also Winstead v. Hume, 32 Kan. 568, 4 Pac. Rep. 994; Don v. Julien, 4 Pac. Rep. 1000; Cent. Digest, Vol. 15, Damages, Sec. 219. In Georgia under the Code, Sec. 2942, the jury may allow expenses of litigation, as part of the damages, where the defendant has acted in bad faith, or has been stubbornly litigous, or has caused plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense. Guernsey v. Shellman, 59 Ga. 797. There are of course other circumstances where attorneys' fees may be allowed, as where there are breaches of covenants for title and in covenants relating to quiet enjoyment in leases, and where by stat

ute they are specifically specified, such as injunction cases where injunction is dissolved. And while the statutes do not expressly provide for attorneys' fees in case an injunction is made permanent, it is impossible to see any good reason why the party committing the wrong should not be held to respond in damages for attorneys' fees, particularly if the matter which caused the wrong, resulting in the necessity of an application for the injunction, is guilty of an aggressive tort or any wanton or willful act intended to injure the aggrieved party. In the case of First Nat. Bank of Hutchinson v. Williams, 62 Kan. 431, 63 Pac. Rep. 744, counsel fees and expenses of the particular suit to recover actual damages from a wrongdoer are allowed where the defendant has been guilty of fraud, malice, or oppression. They are purely exemplary and are to be considered only in cases where substantial, actual damages are recoverable. Attorneys' fees and expenses in the present action of the bank against Williams are not sued for or claimed. The expenses paid by the bank were incurred before the action commenced. They were necessary and arose solely as the result of the fraud of the defendant below. To hold that the petition sets out a claim for damages not compensatory, and of a nature which only can be allowed as a punishment to the defendant, would be to remove from the category of actual and exact damages a loss resulting directly from the fraudulent conduct of a party and place it in a class where it might or might not be recovered by one who sustained it, according to the uncertain notion of a jury, whether the wrongdoer ought or ought not to be punished for his acts. In an action for damages by malicious arrest and prosecution the counsel fees and expenses of the party arrested incident to his preliminary examination and necessary to secure his release, if charged with felony, may be recovered on the principle that they are compensatory; but expenses and counsel fees attendant upon the particular action brought to recover for particular injuries growing out of such arrest can be awarded only as punishment to the defendant and are not compensatory in character. Their allowance rests in the discretion of the jury. The damages sought to be recovered in the case at bar may be likened to the expenses of a supposed case incurred by the party ma

liciously prosecuted in obtaining his discharge from arrest at the preliminary examination. They are compensatory and a right to recover being established, the jury cannot in their discretion refuse to include the amount in their verdict in favor of the party wronged.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

REAL ESTATE AGENT PURCHASING OF PRIN CIPAL HAVING ALREADY ARRANGED TO SELL TO THIRD PARTY.-In the case of Kingsley v. Wheeler (Minn.), 104 N. W. Rep. 543, an interesting point is decided. An action was brought by the plaintiff and respondent 1o recover from the defendants and appellants profits alleged to have been made by the defendants in the sale of a certain tract of land, under the claim by the plaintiff that at the time of the sale the defendants were her agents. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $600. The court says: "An examination of the evidence shows, among other things, that plaintiff bought the land, as defendants knew, for speculative purposes, in the hope, based in some measure upon defendants' statements, that it would increase rapidly in value. She had no agents other than the defendants for the sale of that land. entered into an arrangement with them for a division of the crops. She became discouraged as to her venture, and defendants encouraged her despondency until she was willing to sell at a small increase over the price for which she had bought. A series of letters concerning the land itself, crops, and its sale by defendants were exchanged. There is room for much legitimate controversy as to whether or not these letters, including one proved by parol, amounted to a listing of the lands for sale by defendants. Construing the testimony as a whole, we are of opinion that the jury was justified in finding that the defendants were the agents of plaintiff for the sale of the land.

She

Defendants further contend that, if they were appointed the agents of the plaintiff, that relationship was revoked by her letter of August 27th, in which she says: 'In regard to advance on that land, think it safer to wait a little and see what the crop will amount to.' This letter did not operate as a revocation; on the contrary, it is consistent with the theory that the defendants had the land for sale for the plaintiff.

The principles of law applicable to this state of facts are as simple as they are well settled. This court has repeatedly emphasized the principle that real estate agents enjoy no exemption from the ordinary rules which govern the relttionship of principal and agent. An agent owes a high degree of faithfulness for the protection and advancement of the interest of his principal. He must act solely for that interest, and not for

his own or another's benefit; and must not, and is not allowed to, put himself in a position of conflicting interest with his principal. The principal has a right to repose confidence in the most perfect good faith of his agent, and to rely upon his consistent loyalty. The agent is not entitled to enjoy the fruits of any abuse of his position, or failure in consistent performance of legal duties. An agent to sell land does not fulfill the measure of legal requirements by merely carrying out his specific instructions. He owes the duty of making a full, fair, and prompt disclosure of all facts affecting the principal's righ's or interests. or pertaining to the sale of land by him. He is denied the right to profit at the expense of his principal by concealment of fact which he ought to have revealed. Whatever advantage accrues to him by violation of his duties he must make good to his principal whom he has wronged. Tiffany on Agency, 414; Holmes v. Cathcart. 38 Minn. 213, 92 N. W. Rep. 956, 60 L. R. A. 734, 97 Am. St. Rep. 513; Merriam v. Johnson, 86 Minn. 61, 90 N. W. Rep. 116; Hegenmyer v. Marks, 37 Minn. 6, 32 N. W. Rep. 785, 5 Am. St. Rep. 808; Smitz v. Leopold, 61 Minn. 456, 53 N. W. Rep. 719; Donnelly v. Cunningham, 58 Minn. 376. 59 N. W. Rep. 1052; Snell v. Goodlander, 90 Minn. 533, 97 N. W. Rep. 421.

The defendants in this case rendered themselves liable in damages by their failure to inform their principal of their opportunity of their contract to sell. If defendants sold the land at an advanced price to a man of straw, and then through him to the real vendee, they would have been held responsible for their profit. Their direct purchase put them in a position of immediate conflict of interest; their concealment from the principal of the sale at a substantial advance clearly made it equally repugnant to a sense of justice and to the rules of law. In Tilleny v. Wolverton, 54 Minn. 75, 55 N. W. Rep. 822, Mr. Justice Mitchell says: "The important and material fact for her to know was that her agent was interested as purchaser in the proposed sale of her property, and therefore that his interests did or might conflict with hers. If, with knowledge of this fact, she saw fit to approve of the sale, deliver her deed, and accept the purchase money, without inquiry as to the extent of his interest or as to he details of the arrangement between him and the other purchasers, she must be deemed to have deliberately ratified upon the knowledge she bad, without caring more.' In that case, however, the sale was made to the agent and others on June 9, 1886, and the sale at an advanced price to a purchaser from these vendors was made April 17, 1887. In the case at bar the jury was justified in finding that the purchaser was found and contract of sale executed before the land was bought back from the plaintiff."

DIVORCE-DUTY TO EFFECT RECONCILIATION, WHEN. In the case of Edwards v. Edwards, 61 Atl. Rep. 531, the Chancery Division of the Su

preme Court of New Jersey, rendered the following interesting opinion:

The master, to whom this undefended divorce case was referred, has reported that the proofs before him establish a wilful desertion of petitioner by defendant on July 29, 1901. I am unable to discover sufficient evidence to support that conclusion. On July 29, 1901, the defendant left the house in which she and her husband had been living, and thereafter did not return. When she left, her husband was absent. In his testimony, he admits that his wife and he had a quarrel on the night preceding that day; but he claims that they had been reconciled. If the wife's conduct in leaving indicates an intent to desert, the case of the petitioner will be made out. Her intent at the time is indicated in two modes: (1) By the testimony of a neighbor, who came to her house while she was preparing to leave, and to whom she stated that she was intending to leave; and (2) by a letter which defendant sat down and wrote to her husband in the presence of the neighbor. This letter is more persuasive evidence than that elicited from the person present. I find it impossible to read it and resist the conviction that its writer did not intend to break up her home and life by removing from her husband's house. In it she declares that her husband loves his mother better than he loves her. and plainly indicates that there had been a serious quarrel between them, evidently respecting some difficulty with his mother. She says, "I do not like black looks as I have been getting, and you would not do it if you did not want me to go;" and a fair inference is that in this, and perhaps in previous quarrels, his conduct was such that she assumed that he desired her to leave him. At all events, after signing herself thus, "I am as very (ever) your true and loving wife," she adds, "Now, Ed, go and have a good time, as I will stay at home; but if you want to see me, you can."

From the tone of this letter, I think it clear, under the doctrine of our cases, that it was the duty of the husband to seek and urge a reconciliation with his wife, who thus left him holding out a hope that, if he came to see her, matters might be mended. Petitioner did not perform this duty, but on the 2d of August published in the local newspaper a notice that his wife had left him, and forbidding any one to trust her on his account. On the 3d of August, defendant procured the insertion in the same newspaper. below the notice of her husband, of a paragraph stating that she had just cause for leaving him, and "if he wants the world to know the reason, I will publish it, if needed." The petitioner produces no evidence of any immediate or early attempt at reconciliation. He states in his deposition that he sent friends to her, but be does not disclose the names of the friends or produce them as witnesses. That evidence is wholly unavailing to establish his performance of his duty.

On the 21st of September, 1901, petitioner received a letter from a lawyer, threatening him

with proceedings if he continued to "slur" his wife. Thereafter the petitioner did nothing to procure a reconciliation with his wife until a period within a year prior to the filing of his petition. He then called upon the mother of the defendant, taking with him a friend, and demanding from the mother an interview with his wife, or a reply to his request that she would live with him. This call was repeated, but during that period the defendant was away from home, engaged in the occupation of a nurse. Thereafter a letter without date, the envelope of which is postmarked November 29, 1904, was received from defendant, in which she wrote him that she had heard that he was inquiring for her and wanted to have a talk with her in regard to living together again. She excused herself for not meeting him, on account of her being compelled by her work as a nurse to leave her mother's house, where she had been making a visit and had learned of his wish. She then added: "If you should care to write, direct to mamma. She will forward it to me, and I will answer when I write her my address." Petitioner did not avail himself of this opportunity held out by the wife. What further he did he does not disclose; but he produces a letter without date, the envelope of which is postmarked January 19, 1905, in which his wife stated that she had heard that he wished a decided answer whether she would live with him or not, and she adds, "I never intend to live with you again." This letter is proof of a desertion that is willful, but I fail to find that prior to that letter a reconciliation might not have been effected, if the husband had done his duty in seeking it. But this leaves the petitioner unsuccessful, because the desertion thus proved has not continued for the statutory period.

AN ATTORNEY DISBARRED REINSTATED UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES.-In Re Burris, 81 Pac. Rep. 1077, the following opinion was rendered by the Supreme Court of California: "This is a petition for the modification of an order of disbarment heretofore entered against the petitioner. The order was made more than 10 years ago upon a charge of professional misconduct involving no criminality and no serious wrong to any one, though inexcusable in itself. Since that time, as we learn from the testimonials accompanying the petition, the petitioner has been living a life of probity, industry, and sobriety. These testimonials are signed by a number of judges of the superior court. and by many prominent attorneys of the counties where the petitioner was engaged in practice prior to the order of disbarment His restoration to the bar is also recommended by the judge in whose court the matter was pending out of which the charge of misconduct arose. In view of this strong testimony in his favor, we are of the opinion that the petitioner is entitled to the modification which he asks.

It is therefore ordered that the said John F. Burris be, and he is hereby, restored as an attorney and counselor of this court, and that his naine be reinstated upon the roll of attorneys thereof."