RAILROADS DUTY TO FENCE STATION St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri, May 16, 1905. Under the statute requiring railroads to fence their tracks, they are permitted to leave a sufficient space open about stations for the safe and commodious transaction of business. A place on a railroad where passengers and freight are regularly received and discharged, irrespective of whether a depot and station agent are maintained there, and though unincorporated, is a station, within the rule permitting railroads to leave a sufficient space open about stations for the safe and commodious transaction of business, notwithstanding the statute requiring railroads to fence their tracks. GOODE J.: Action for double damages for the killing of a steer by the defendant's train. The animal went on the track of the defendant at Eaglet, a stopping place or station in Stoddard county. The defense was that it was necessary to leave the railroad track unfenced at that place in order to carry on the business of the station with reasonable convenience to the public and safety to train operatives. The court gave an instruction for the plaintiff which ignored this defense, and in effect, directed a verdict for the plaintiff if the animal strayed on the track where the railroad was unfenced, unless the point was at a public highway crossing or in an incorporated town. This instruction can be justified only in case there was no depot or station at Eaglet. It is a hamlet where there are a mill, several homes, and a store, but not incorporated. A platform is maintained by the railroad company along its track, and passengers are taken on and off there. Freight is received and deposited there, too, it seems, for the convenience of any one who wishes to ship to and from the point. There is no depot building, and as to whether or not a railroad agent is kept there the evidence is silent. By judicial construction of the statute requiring railroad companies to fence their tracks, they are permitted to leave a sufficient space open about depots or stations for the safe and commodious transaction of the business of the station. One side of the main track at Eaglet is unfenced, as is also a spur which runs out from the main track about 200 yards. There was testimony that it was necessary to leave this space open for the safety of train operatives, and so the patrons of the company could load and unload freight. Cattle guards would have been required if the whole space had been inclosed, and this might have endangered trainmen. On the whole, we bink it was a question for the jury whether it was necessary to leave the track unfenced where the plaintiff's steer entered, provided Eaglet was a station, within the meaning of the rule allowing railroad companies to leave such space unfenced about a station as business needs require to be open. The word "depot" or "station" is used in different senses, according to the subject Some matter of the case under consideration. times a court has to determine whether or not a railroad company has complied with its contract to maintain a depot or station at a certain point (Gaveau v. R. R., 25 Grant, Ch. U. C. 64; Hood v. R. R., L. R. 5 Ch. 525); at other times, whether a certain point is a station, in the sense that notice of the times, of arrival and departure of trains must be posted (State v. R. R., 133 Ind 69,32 N. E. Rep. 817, 18 L. R. A.502) and, again if the point is a station, so that passengers must be accepted or set down there (Georgia etc., Ry. v. Robinson, 68 Miss. 643, 10 So. Rep 60), or freight received (Kansas City, etc., Ry. v. Lilly [Miss.] 8 So. Rep. 644). The purpose of the rule exempting companies from fencing about stations is to promote the safety of train operatives, who would be endangered in moving and coupling cars by fences and the cattle guards required to render fences effective, and to facilitate public convenience. Therefore it is proper to affix such a meaning to the word "station" as will serve the ends of this rule of law, if we can do so consistently with reason and other legal rules. It is not necessary to have a depot and a station agent at a railroad point, to constitute the point a station, in some senses of the term. The receipt and discharge of passengers and freight and the maintenance of a platform are sufficient. State v. Northampton Co., 37 Conn. 153; Anderson v. R. R., 16 Can. L. T. 185, 27 Ont. Rep. 44; State v. R. R., 12 S. D. 305, 81 N. W. Rep. 503, 47 L. R. A. 569. A distinction is taken in the books between a regular station, where trains stop at appointed times, and offices are kept, and buildings for storage of freight and the comfort of passengers, and a station where passengers are taken on or let off if they give notice in advance. Cook v. R. R., 67 Ala. 533; Chicago, etc,. R. R. v. Flag, 43 Ill. 364, 92 Am. Dec. 133. Eaglet is designated as a station by the defendant company. We understand that the company regularly received and discharged passengers and freight there. If this is true, it ought to be deemed a station, within the meaning of that word when used in stating the rule permitting railroad companies to allow necessary grounds to remain unfenced about a station. It was important for the patrons of the defendant railway company to have convenient access to its platform and tracks at Eaglet in taking passage on trains and loading and unloading freight. It was important, too, for train operatives to be exempt from the danger of cattle guards in moving and coupling cars-a task they would be compelled to perform at that point. The facts appear to bring the place within the reason of the rule of law invoked as a defense to this action. Of course whether it was necessary for the track to be open at the very point where the plaintiff's animal entered was a question for the jury, to be submitted by an appropriate instruction. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. All concur. We NOTE.-Character of Place as a Station and Extent of Business Transacted to Exempt a Railroad from Fencing Track.-It is a general rule that a railroad company is not required to fence its track upon its depot grounds, in the absence of negligence. shall not review the authorities sustaining this well recognized rule of law but will confine our investigations to the more practical question as to what may be the necessary character of the place or the extent of business transacted to exempt a railroad under this rule. We observe first that a railroad company is not required to fence its road where the engine house and machine shop, car house, and wood house and yard are situated, and are not liable for cattle killed there, for want of a fence. Indianapolis,ete., R. R. v. Oestel, 20 Ind. 231. So also a railroad company is not chargeable with negligence in failing to fence its track and grounds at a place at which its trains stop to receive and discharge passengers and freight which is laid off in lots and blocks, though not incorporated, whereby animals stray into a crop of oats and destroy it. Louisville, etc., R. R. v. Scott, 34 Ill. App. 635. Grounds at a flag station at which trains are regularly stopped whenever there are passengers, freight or express to be taken, though no depot building is erected thereon, are depot grounds, which the railroad company is not required to fence. Schneekloth v. Railroad, 108 Mich. 1, 65 N. W. Rep. 663; Gulf, etc., R. R. v. Wallace, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 270, 21 S. W. Rep. 973. A railroad company, moreover, is not bound to fence at any place used for switching or loading and unloading freight, where a fence would seriously interfere with its business or the safety of its employees. Evansville, etc., R. R. v. Willis, 93 Ind. 507; Chicago, etc., R. R. v. Hogan, 30 Neb. 686. Thus in an action against a railroad company to recover damages for the alleged killing of a cow by defendant's locomotive, the issue being whether the killing was at the place at which the company was legally required to erect a fence, it appeared that the killing occurred at a switch outside the platted limits of an incorporated village, but adjacent thereto, and that in this locality, there was a warehouse and a storer, the place being used by the public as much as any portion of the village, and that the switch was so located that it could not be reached by teams for loading or unloading there if fenced. The court held that the facts were sufficient to justify a finding that the place was open to the public and a fence not required. Toledo, etc., R. R. v. Chapin, 66 Ill. 504. So also for the same reason, a railroad is not bound to fence opposite a grain elevator, where there are side tracks and freight constantly being received and unloaded. Lake Erie, etc., R. R. v. Kneadle, 94 Ind. 454. There is a limit, however to the law's indulgence of a railroad's violation of a duty to fence its track, and that limitation begins where danger to the public or the railroad's employees ends. Thus a railroad company is required to fence where, on an open prairie, it maintains a switch and side track for its own conveni ence in storing cars. Russell v. Railroad, 26 Mo. App. 368. Nor can the exemption to fence be extended to a siding used merely for the loading of ties, wood and piling purchased by the company at a point where no depot is maintained, no employee stationed, and where persons desiring to take passage are obliged to flag the trains. Hurt v. Railroad, 39 Minn. 485, 40 N. W Rep. 613. So also a point a mile from the neares station grounds, not within the limits of a town, re mote from any railway or highway crossing, and not necessary for use in making up trains though occasionally used for such purpose is not within the exception requiring railroad companies to fence their track. See also to the same effect, Morris v. Railroad, 58 Mo. 78. The intent to make use of certain grounds as a depot or switchyard does not give the railroad the right to leave the place unfenced. Actual occupancy and use are necessary. Thus, in the case of Cox v. Railroad, 41 Minn. 101, 42 N. W. Rep. 924, it appeared that plaintiff's horse escaped from his custody without his fault and entered upon the track of the defendant company at a point where it was not fenced and was struck by a locomotive and killed. The ground at the place where the horse entered had been purchased by the company with the intent to use it for terminal grounds and side tracks when the business of the company so increased as to render such facilities necessary, but it was not being so used at the time of the accident. The court held that the company was liable, the indefinite intent to use the ground for a public purpose not being sufficient to relieve the company from the duty to fence its track. As to what do not constitute "depot grounds" within the meaning of exceptions to statutes requiring railroads to fence their tracks, see Jaeger v. Railroad, 75 Wis. 130, 43 N. W. Rep. 732; Anderson v. Stewart, 76 Wis. 43, 44 N, W. Rep. 1091; Plunkett v. Railroad, 79 Wis. 222, 48 N. W. Rep. 519. BOOK REVIEWS. TAYLOR ON JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, A book which fills a place in the bibliography of jurisprudence which no other book has ever claimed to fill, and one which is destined to become one of the master pieces of legal literature is that which has recently issued from the press entitled "Jurisdiction and Procedure of the United States Supreme Court,” by Hon. Hannis Taylor, LL. D. If we knew nothing of this book but the name of its author we would have unhesitatingly given it our approval, on the ground that no man, who has once gained the reputation that Dr. Taylor enjoys today would assail that reputation by fathering a work of mediocrity or one founded on a careless jumble of authorities. Dr. Taylor is the author of certain works which have gained for him most honorable degrees from the universities of Dublin and Edinburg and have won for him a place among the greatest writers on jurisprudence in the world. These works were "The Origin and Growth of the English Constitution" and "International Public Law." Dr. Taylor is a matured student, well informed and grounded deep in the principles of the subject which he essays to discuss. There are no "shallow places" in any of his works which would serve to endanger the voyager who commits his whole confidence to the statements of the learned author without any other chart or compass. His reasoning is as profound as that of Bishop's and his diction as smooth and graceful as that of Cooley. In the book which we have for review at the present time we are amazed at the thoroughness of the analysis. The introduction treats of the "Genesis of the Supreme Court," which points out firstly the great fact that the Supreme Court of the United States has no prototype in history, and secondly ascribes its origin to a "distinctively American inven tion known as constitutional limitations on legislative power." In describing that invention, Dr. Taylor says: "That invention embodies the fundamental difference which divides two kindred political systems, the one resting on the sovereignty of the people as expressed in written constitutions, the other on the soveriguty of Parliament." The fundamental division of the work is into six parts: Part I, Original Jurisdiction; Part II, Appellate Jurisdiction Over Ordinary Federal Courts; Part III, Appellate Jurisdiction over Special Federal Courts; Part IV, Appellate Jurisdiction over State Courts; Part V, The Great Writs: Part VI, Procedure in the Supreme Court. Part I, which discusses the question of the original jurisdiction of the supreme court, is divided by Dr. Taylor into five chapters, as follows: Chapter 1, Constitutional Grant of Jurisdiction; Chapter 2, When a State May Sue; Chapter 3, When a State May be Sued; Chapter 4, Suits Between States as to Boundaries; Chapter 5, Procedure in Original Cases. Under the first chapter Dr. Taylor defines what is meant by the term "case" as contained in the constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the supreme court which provides that the judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, etc. Dr. Taylor explains this term on the authority of Judge Marshall, as follows: "This clause enables the judicial department to receive jurisdiction to the full extent of the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, when any question respecting them shall assume such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting for it. That power is capable of acting only when the subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law. It then becomes a case, and the constitution declares that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the constitution, laws and treaties of the United States." It is impossible within the narrow limits of this review to point out all the excellences of this work or its great value to one who desires to inform himself of the jurisdiction of what Dr. Taylor describes as the "greatest tribunal in the world." In our opinion there is not only nothing which is in the same class with this work of Dr. Taylor but also nothing which at all attempts to cover the same field of investigation with the same exhaustiveness. Printed in one volume of 1073 pages and published by the Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Company, Rochester, New York, HUMOR OF THE LAW. "This attack on Gen. Bristow for the disclosures in the special postal report reminds me of a justice of the peace in Mississippi who was hearing a case tried by a lawyer named George Smith and another named Brown," said Congressman John Sharp Williams. "The justice had been looking on the corn liquor when it was white and he was in a sad state. Smith had the witness. "What is your name?' demanded Smith. "'I object,' said Brown 'It doesn't make any difference what his name is.' "Objection sustained,' solemnly muttered the court. "Where do you live?' asked Smith. "'I Object shouted Brown. 'It is immaterial where he lives.' ""Shustained,' said the justice. Smith blazed up, calling the justice a 'drunken old fool' and adding 1. ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL-Death Pending Suit to Redeem From Foreclosure. The death of a party pending suit to redeem land from foreclosure of a deed of trust on land held to pass his interest to his heirs, which interest could not be represented by his administrator.-State Fair Ass'n v. Terry, Ark., 35 S. W. Rep. 87. 2. ACTION-Invasion of Property Rights. Where property is invaded, and the citizen is deprived of the property and the liberty to enjoy it, his appeal for protection is founded upon fundamental principles, adherence to which is obligatory upon the courts.-Bright v. Bell, La., 37 So. Rep. 976. 4. ACCOUNT-Sufficiency of Statement.-Items for onehalf of taxes paid, one-half the account of W, and onehalf the account of S in an account covering four years, are not insufficiently stated, as matter of lawBick v. Halberstadt, Mo., 85 S. W. Rep. 127. 5. ACCOUNT, ACTION ON - Verdict Where Only One Item in Dispute.-Where only one item of account sued on is disputed, a verdict for plaintiff for that item only entitles plaintiff to a new trial.-Peale v. Shore Electric Co., N. J., 60 Atl. Rep. 46. 6. ADVERSE POSSESSION- Substantial Enclosure. Breaches in an inclosure held not to destroy continuity, so as to prevent the title by prescription. Jones v. Hodges, Cal., 79 Pac. Rep. 869. 7. APPEAL AND ERROR-Adverse Possession.-The defense that a person's title to land has been lost by adverse possession is established by proof that he has been disseized and continuously kept out of possession for the legal term by another.-Murphy v. Commonwealth, Mass., 73 N. E. Rep. 524. 8. APPEAL AND ERROR-Entry of Decree Pending Exceptions. A final decree, entered pending exceptions, operated only as an order for a decree. - Tyndale v. Stanwood, Mass., 73 N. E. Rep. 540. 9. APPEAL AND ERROR-Failure to Include Evidence.On appeal in equity, the court will strike the statement of facts on certificate of the trial judge showing that such statement did not contain all of the evidence.Caughey v. Rien, Wash., 79 Pac. Rep. 925. 10. APPEAL AND ERROR-Findings of Court in Equity Suit.-A court in an equity suit having made findings independent of the verdict of a jury, an assignment that the court erred in calling the jury, or submitting questions of fart to it, would not be reviewed. Lauman v. Hoofer, Wash., 79 Pac. Rep. 953. 11. APPEAL AND ERROR-Findings of Fact. Where the court fails to find on all the material issues, the judgment must be reversed.-Stanley v. Flint, Idaho, 79 Pac. Rep. 815. 12. APPEAL AND ERROR-Interlocutory Orders.-Order for a bond for the release of a sequestration cannot work an irreparable injury, and, being interlocutory, no appeal lies therefrom.-State v. St. Paul, La., 37 So. Rep. 964. 13. APPEAL AND ERROR-Leading Questions. -Leading questions are reversible error, when, aside from the answers thereto, it cannot be said that there is sufficient evidence to warrant the verdict.-Ft. Worth & R. G. Ry. Co. v. Jones, Tex., $5 S. W. Rep. 37. 14. APPEAL AND ERROR - Reargument. Where the opinion of the lower court is submitted, and a reargu ment is ordered, a supplemental opinion, formulated thereafter, is no part of the case, unless sent up in pursuance of the request of the appellate court.-Varrick v. Hitt, N. J., 60 Atl. Rep. 47. 15. ARMY AND NAVY-Pay of Aid to Rear Admiral.-An aid to a rear admiral held entitled, in addition to his regular pay, to the same compensation as is allowed an aid to a major general, under Navy Personnel Act, ch. 413, § 13, 30 Stat. 1004.-United States v. Crosley, U. s. S. C., 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261. 16. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT- Unauthorized Compromise. In action against attorney for unauthorized settlement of claim for less than its face value, measure of proof required of plaintiff determined. - Vooth v. McEachen, N. Y., 73 N. E. Rep. 488. 17. BANKRUPTCY - Liens. -The lien of an execution levied on a bankrupt's property before bankruptcy proceedings is not affected by the sale of the bankrupt's property in such proceedings. Bassett v. Thackara, N. J., 60 Atl. Rep. 39. 19. BENEFIT SOCIETIES - Reinstatement.- Where the by-laws of a mutual benefit society contemplated a vote for reinstatement of a suspended member during his life, failure of his lodge to act on his reinstatement after he had died held not available to the beneficiary.-Butler v. Grand Lodge A. O. U. W. of California, Cal., 79 Pac. Rep. $61. 20. BILLS AND NOTES-Authority to Transfer.-In an action against a pledgee for the value of the property pledged, which was transferred with the note secured, evidence as to the authority to transfer the note is immaterial, it being negotiable.-Carson v. Old Nat. Bank, Wash., 79 Pac. Rep. 927. 21. BROKERS - Commissions for Sale of Land.-An agreement by a real estate broker to share commissions with another who found a purchaser held not to preclude the broker from recovering the commissions.Bray v. Riggs, Mo., 85 S. W. Rep. 116. 22. CARRIERS-Injury to Alighting Passenger.-A passenger, in alighting from a train without knowledge as to the existence of a platform, held not guilty of contributory negligence because, the company having provided a suitable platform, it was his duty to use it to escape the imputation of negligence. - Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Harris, Va., 49 S. E. Rep. 997. 23. CARRIERS-Injury to Passenger.-Where a street car company stops its cars for passengers, it is charged with the highest degree of care to see that all passengers get to a place of safety before starting its cars.Normile v. Wheeling Traction Co., W. Va., 49 S. E. Rep. 1030. 24. CHATTEL MORTGAGES-Effect of Taking New Note. -The mere taking of a new note and mortgage by a mortgagee does not discharge the original security, unless it is intended so to operate.-Dawson v. Thigpen, N. Car., 49 S. E. Rep. 99. 25. CHATTEL MORTGAGES-Failure to Record Mortgage. Where the chattels covered by an unrecorded mortgage were delivered to the mortgagee, the mortgage held not void as against a subsequent purchaser from the mortgagor.-Brockway v. Abbott, Wash., 79 Pac. Rep. 924. A 27. COMMERCE Combination of Meat Dealers. combination of independent meat dealers in aid of an attempt to monopolize commerce in fresh meats and to restrict competition in purchasing stock held an interference with interstate commerce, forbidden by Act 1890, ch. 647.-Swift & Co. v. United States, U. S. S. C., 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 276. 28. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Changes in Execution of Death Sentence.-Substitution, on conviction of murder in first degree, under Act N. D. March 9, 1903, of close confinement, after judgment and before execution of death penalty, in the penitentiary, in lieu of confinement in the county jail, held not to render the statute ex post facto, as applied to a person convicted before its passage.-Rooney v. State of North Dakota, U. S. S. C., 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 264. 29. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Illegal Taxation.-Illegal taxation is a deprivation of the citizen's right of property without due process of law, within Const. 1898, art. 2.-Bunkie Brick Works v. Police Jury of Avoyelles, La., 37 So. Rep. 970. 30. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Statute Requiring Cattle Guards.-Rev. Code 1892, § 3561, requiring railroad cattle guards, does not violate Const. U. S. Amend. 14, as depriving railroad companies of their property without due process of law.-Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Harrington, Miss., 37 So. Rep. 1016. - a 31. CONTRACTS Architects' Certificate. - Where building contract stipulates for payment on certificate from the architect, if his refusal of a certificate is dictated by prejudice, payment must be made without production of the certificate. - Duguc v. Levy, La., 37 So. Rep. 995. 32. CORPORATIONS-Authority of Secretary to Sell its Real Estate.-If secretary of a corporation contracts to sell its real estate, the contract is not enforceable unless he had express or apparent authority, or the corpora tion had ratified the sale.-Cobb v. Glenn Boom & Lumber Co., W. Va., 49 S. E. Rep. 1005. 33. CORPORATIONS-Exchange of Property for Stock.Corporate stockholders may agree that shares of stock be issued to themselves in exchange for property con veyed by them to the corporation. - Garretson v. Pacific Crude Oil Co., Cal., 79 Pac. Rep. 838. 34. CORPORATIONS - - Foreclosure of Mortgage. — In a mortgage foreclosure suit against a corporation, evidence examined, and held sufficient to show ratification by the stockholders of the mortgage on which the foreclosure was based.-Middleton v. Arastraville Min. Co., Cal., 79 Pac. Rep. 889. 35. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Comparison of Handwriting. -The admission of irrelevant papers to create a standard of comparison of handwriting should not be allowed, unless they are conceded to be genuine, or are such that the opposing party is estopped to deny genuineness.-State v. Seymour, Idaho, 79 Pac. Rep. 825. 36. CRIMINAL TRIAL- Appeal on Judgment Roll,-A conviction will not be reversed on appeal on the judg ment roll alone, because of an alleged erroneous in struction, unless it would be erroneous in every conceivable state of the case.-People v. Wong Fook Sam, Cal., 79 Pac. Rep. $48. 37. CRIMINAL TRIAL-Bill of Exceptions.-Where case comes up on strict bill of exceptions, and none of the exceptions taken were signed or sealed by the judge, the judgment must be affirmed.-State v. Leschine, N. J., 60 Atl. Rep. 29. 38. CRIMINAL TRIAL - Commenting on Credibility of Ex-convict's Testimony. Where, in a prosecution for robbery, two ex-convicts testified as witnesses for defendant, it was not error for the district attorney to emphasize such convictions in his argument to the jury.People v. Kelly, Cal., 79 Pac. Rep. 846. 39. CRIMINAL TRIAL Necessity of Request for Instruction. In a prosecution for robbery, it was not error, in the absence of a request, for the court to omit to charge that accused might be convicted of petit larceny.-People v. Modina, Cal., 79 Pac. Rep. 842. 40. CRIMINAL TRIAL-Reading Portions of Testimony.In a prosecution for murder, the district attorney should not be permitted in argument to read to the jury portions of the testimony as written out by the official sten. ographer.-Davis v. State, Miss., 37 So. Rep. 1018. 41. CRIMINAL TRIAL-Swearing Jury.-There can be no legal conviction for a felony, unless the record shows that the jury was sworn according to law. State v. Moore, W. Va., 49 S. E. Rep. 1015. 42. DAMAGES - Cancellation of Building Contract.Where the owner exercised the right given him by Civ. Code, art. 2765, to cancel a building contract, he must pay the contractor for the expenses incurred and damages.-Dugue v. Levy, La., 37 So. Rep. 995. 43. DAMAGES Injury in Ejecting Trespasser from Freight Train.—In an action for mjuries to a trespasser by his ejection from a freight train, statements by a stranger to a witness at the time of the accident as to how it occurred held inadmissible as hearsay. -- Dixon v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co, Wash., 79 Pac. Rep. 943. 44. DAMAGES-Loss of Child-bearing Power.-It is not error to instruct that loss of child-bearing power is an element of damage to be considered in an action for personal injuries.-Normile v. Wheeling Traction Co., W. Va., 49 S. E. Rep. 1030. 45. DEEDS-Ability to Understand Words Used. - It is not necessary that a person about to execute a deed should have the ability to understand the legal effect of the words employed.-Moorhead v. Scovel, Pa., 60 Atl. Rep. 13. 46. DISMISSAL AND NONSUIT - Alimony Pending Appeal.-Order denying a motion for alimony pending an appeal by a wife from a judgment granting the husband a divorce held not res judicata, preventing the granting of a similar motion made on a different state of facts.-Gay v. Gay, Cal., 79 Pac. Rep. $85. 47. DISORDERLY HOUSE-Letting Building for Unlawful Purposes.-Under Sess. Laws 1903, p. 153, ch. 12, art. 3, §7, a house that is actually being used as a disorderly house for lewd purposes is kept for an unlawful pur pose, and the letting of such house is in violation of the law. Oligschlager v. Territory, Okla., 79 Pac. Rep. 913. 48. DIVORCE - Interlocutory and Final Decrees.Where an interlocutory decree of divorce is ordered entered nunc pro tunc, the year which must elapse before final judgment can be given begins to run from the time of the actual entry of the interlocutory judgment. -Claudius v. Melvin, Cal., 79 Pac. Rep. 897. 49. DOWER-Relinquishment.-A wife held not barred from claiming her dower right, either by the deed, in which her husband did not join, under Code 1887, § 2502, or by estoppel.-Lewis v. Apperson, Va., 49 S. E. Rep. 978. 50. EMINENT DOMAIN - Land Belonging to State.-A riparian owner cannot defend proceedings to condemn land on the ground that land of the state will have to be taken, and that it is not the subject of condemnation. -Shamberg v. New Jersey Shore Line R. Co., N. J., 60 Atl. Rep. 46. 51. EQUITY-Exceptions to Report of Commissioner.To take advantage of a report of a commissioner in chancery for insufficiency of evidence, the report must be excepted to: but, where it is erroneous on its face, no exception is necessary. Bank of Union v. Nickell, W. Va., 49 S. E. Rep. 1003. 52. ESTOPPEL-Action to Recover Title.-The fact that children, to whom land has been conveyed by their father, revive a suit brought by their father involving the land in their names as heirs, and not as purchasers, does not estop them to claim under the deed.-Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Roberts, Va., 49 S. E. Rep. 984. 53. ESTOPPEL-Oral Admissions as to Title.-One can not lose vested title to land by oral admissions that it is the property of another.-Yock v. Mann, W. Va., 49 S. E. Rep. 1019. 54. ESTOPPEL-Subsequent Title. Where one sells property of which he is not owner, any subsequently acquired title inures to his vendee.-City of New Orleans v. Riddell, La., 37 So. Rep. 966. 55. ESTOPPEL-Subsequently Acquired Title.-When mortgagors warranted that they were seized in fee, a subsequently acquired title to a portion of the property mortgaged inured to the benefit of the mortagees.-People's Sav. Bank v. Lewis, Wash., 79 Pac. Rep. 932. 56. EVIDENCE-Ascertaining Value of Land.-The assessed valuation of property for the purposes of taxation is not controlling as a standard by which to ascertain the actual value.-Thompson v. Williams, Md., 60 Atl. Rep 26. Where a 57. EVIDENCE- Fraudulent Conveyance. deed is assailed for fraud, the deed itself is prima facie evidence of what the consideration was on which it was executed.-Thompson v. Williams, Md., 60 Atl. Rep. 26. 58. EVIDENCE-Influence on Bidders at Judicial Sale.Testimony as to the influence keeping persons from bidding at a sale for payment of testator's debt held hearsay.-King v. Bynum, N. Car., 49 S. E. Rep. 955. 59. EVIDENCE-Telegrams. - A telegram as received can be admitted only as secondary evidence, and where the original is produced its authenticity must be established.-Cobb v. Gleun Boom & Lumber Co., W. Va., 49 S. E. Rep. 1005. 60. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-Classification of Mortgages.-Where an administratrix failed to list a mortgage held by her on real estate belonging to the estate for taxation, she was not entitled to credit for taxes paid by her on the real estate covered by the mort gage. In re McDougald's Estate, Cal., 79 Pac. Rep. 875. 61. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-Construction of Will.-Where the intention of a testator to have his real estate sold and proceeds divided is plainly discoverable in his will, it gives to the executors a power of sale, without an express statement to that effect.-May v. Brewster, Mass., 73 N. E. Rep. 546. 62. EXTRADITION-Right to a Hearing.-Person demand ed in interstate extradition proceedings held to have no |